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# **HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES**

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**Towards a New Strategic Partnership:**

**India, China and Russia**

*T.N. Kaul*

**Bridging the Himalayan Gap:**

**Viewing Sino-Indian Ties in the Long-term Perspective**

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**India and China:**

**Unknown Aspects in Cultural Intercourse**

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**Gandhi Through the Chinese Eyes:**

**The Echoes of Gandhian Movement in China**

*B.R. Deepak*

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## HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

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## *Editor's Page*

India and China, being the largest populated countries comprising nearly 40 per cent of the total humanity, are poised to achieve greater heights in their economic, industrial, technological and military prowess in the 21st century. Rich in human and material resources and having a wide diversity of peoples and cultures, both countries share a long history of historico-cultural interface. In the post-cold war era, both India and China can play a constructive role in maintaining peace and security in South and Central Asia, besides enhancing the prospects of bilateral trade, commerce and human development in these two countries. According to Chinese customs statistics, Sino-Indian trade during the period January to December 1998 amounted to 1.92 billion US dollars, which is up by 5.3% over 1997. The bilateral trade had increased by 30.2% in 1997 to 1.83 billion US dollars over 1996. Thus, India has emerged as the biggest trading partner of China in South Asia.

Both India and China share similar views on major issues, particularly economic development, pursuit of economic, social and cultural rights, threats posed by drugs and arms trafficking, trans-border terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic-religious separatism to the territorial integrity of nation states. Yet, there remain substantial differences on the issues of Sino-Indian boundary and China's military and nuclear assistance to Pakistan, which continue to be a matter of concern in India. Though China claims that the boundary question is a legacy of the British rule in India, the fact remains that China has resolved its similar long standing boundary disputes with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In these cases too, China had based its claims on the

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same premise that these border disputes were a legacy of the imperialist Tsars. Therefore, there seems to be no plausible reason as to why the Sino-Indian border issue can not be resolved after mutual negotiations to the satisfaction of both the parties.

It is encouraging to note that both countries have again signalled their intent to resume bilateral dialogue. There is need for a political initiative for reinvigorating the process of bilateral cooperation to cover various issues including the boundary question, cooperation in trade, industry, science and technology, transportation and aviation, oil exploration etc. At the same time initiatives for non-official contacts should be strengthened from both sides involving academics, scientists, artists, cultural and film groups, businessmen and entrepreneurs.

It must be noted that China has brooked no outside interference on the question of its territorial integrity and under its 'One China Policy,' Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Taiwan are integral parts of People's Republic of China. China is acutely conscious of the subversive role of Islamist extremists trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan in fuelling the Uighur Muslim separatist movement in Xinjiang, which accounted for a series of riots, bomb blasts and killings during the year 1998. Riots recurred in February 1999 in Urumchi, the capital of Xinjiang. But it goes to the credit of the Chinese authorities that they took serious view of external support to the Uighur separatists and made Pakistan hand over to them the identified Islamist extremists who are later reported to have been punished by the death squads for their terrorist acts. At the diplomatic level China has seen to it that various countries including the newly independent Muslim Central Asian Republics have committed themselves to this 'One China Policy' and even undertaken not to support or encourage any ethnic-religious separatist

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movements by Uighurs, within their countries. Applying the same principle, China has since early 1990s shifted its earlier position on Kashmir and recognised bilateralism as the basis of resolving the issue between India and Pakistan. The Chinese Ambassador in India, Zhou Gang's statement in an interview to an Indian newspaper (*The Hindu*, July 10, 1998) that "India and Pakistan peacefully resolve their differences including the Kashmir issue through talks" only reiterates China's position on Kashmir.

Given these facts and the possibility of Sino-Indian dialogue being resumed at high official and political levels, following points merit consideration, among other things :

- 1) The border trade points in Sikkim and Ladakh be opened to facilitate re-opening of the traditional border trade.
- 2) The proposal of Jammu and Kashmir government to open the Leh-Demchok route to Western Tibet as a viable and easier alternative route for pilgrimage to the Kailash-Mansarovar across the LOC in Ladakh be pursued and got accepted by the Chinese side. This will help in reducing the journey time and provide a safer passage to pilgrims. (More than 300 pilgrims died due to landslides at Malpa in the U.P. hills in October 1998).
- 3) Possibilities of opening a pipeline linkage across the LOC in Ladakh with the proposed Xinjiang - Kazakhstan pipeline project be considered and explored.
- 4) Opening of direct aviation link between Delhi and Beijing via Kunming and / or Urumchi.
- 5) Reopening of the traditional India-Central Asia overland trade route via Leh, Yarkand, Kashgar and onwards to the Central Asian Republics.

**K. Warikoo**

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# **TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP : INDIA, CHINA AND RUSSIA**

***T.N. Kaul***

The world has moved on from a bipolar to a uni-polar one. It is bound to move on from a uni-polar to a multipolar world, where the hopes and aspirations of all nations and peoples, for a world without war and violence and without the fear of self-destruction can be fulfilled in the not too distant future. Relations between ancient and modern countries, between the old and the new, can be stable and mutually beneficial if they are inspired and guided by a common long term vision and not merely by short term gains. A common vision is not only desirable but also necessary to promote peace and ensure security and prosperity for all in the 21st century. Ancient countries and civilizations, like those of China, India and others, which are proud of their own culture can play an important constructive role if they work in cooperation and not in mutual suspicion.

## **CHINA REVISITED**

I visited China after 44 years at the invitation of the Nankai University, Tianjin, to participate in a symposium held in 1998 in connection with Zhou Enlai's birth centenary. I missed the revolutionary enthusiasm, the spirit of sacrifice and the unity of the Chinese people which I had witnessed in the early years of the Revolution from 1950 to 1954. In Hong Kong, Tianjin and Beijing, I met leaders of the younger generation, specially associate professors, instructors in the military establishments, as well as some former leaders in government and the present leadership in the Communist Party. I was struck by the freedom with which they exchanged ideas with me on various subjects ranging from Sino-Indian, Sino-American, Sino-Japanese to Sino-Russian relations.

They were even more frank in speaking about their internal affairs such as the Tiananmen massacre, the responsibility of the party as well

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as some elements of the People's Liberation Army for it. However, the younger generation expressed its reluctance to join politics or review the Tiananmen incident because it felt that the leadership of the party, the government and even some leaders in the PLA would have to go and this might upset the unity, stability and progress of the country. It was, therefore, keener on finding suitable jobs in teaching and other professions. The older generation was divided. Some felt that the Tiananmen incident must be reviewed and those responsible for it punished. However, the majority felt that if the leadership had not taken action to suppress the uprising, it would have spread to other areas of China and created chaos and instability. This frank exchange of views was an eye opener and in sharp contrast with the atmosphere which prevailed in the middle and late fifties, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1965-76).

On economic development, most people I met were in favour of foreign investment in fields which suited China, development of industry and acquisition of advanced science and technology, particularly from America. They also expressed a keenness to strengthen cooperation with India in these fields as well as agriculture. However, they were looking ahead and apprehending that once they reached the same level as America in these fields - possibly within the next 20 years or so - they would have a confrontation with the U.S. They were, therefore, keen on strengthening links with India, Russia and other like-minded countries to prevent the domination by the U.S. and its friends over the Asia-Pacific region. They expressed the candid opinion that unless the U.S. changed its policy towards Taiwan and accepted it as part of mainland China, tension with the U.S. would remain. They were in no hurry to "Liberate" Taiwan because they felt that time was on their side and eventually it would come back to the "motherland." However, they were perturbed by Western support to the independence of Tibet and the Islamic countries' sympathy for the separatist movement in Sinkiang. They were also perturbed at the secessionist trends in parts of Inner Mongolia and other border areas. But they were confident that with greater autonomy, devolution of authority to the provinces and economic development, things would improve.

Their main worry at the moment is about the widening gulf between the coastal urban areas, where most of the foreign investments and economic development are taking place, and the rural and hinterland areas, where there has been very little investment of progress. This creates resentment among the rural population where unemployment is rife. I was told that 2 million or more from the rural areas come to Beijing everyday to seek employment. More than 100 million Chinese are still unemployed and more than 50 million are living below the poverty line, according to the authorities. The one-child family programme has been enforced in urban areas but it is being resisted in rural areas.

Old and young professors, experts on India, former leaders in government and some of the present younger leaders of the party were very frank and they gave me the impression that they would welcome talks on the border and other problems with India if it so desired. They even told me that it was unfortunate that a brief war had taken place in 1962. They felt that Mao and his wife were partly responsible for it because they had lost face when the Dalai Lama with 20,000 of his followers crossed into India in March 1959 and were warmly received by the Government and the people of India. They told me that Zhou Enlai had made a last attempt in April 1960, visiting India in order to have a peaceful settlement of the border issues. They agreed, however, that both Nehru and Zhou had internal constraints which they could not overcome - Zhou had to obey Mao's orders and Nehru could not overcome the mood in the country, the temper in Parliament and the media write-ups about Chinese incursions in Ladakh and elsewhere against Indian police patrols.

I do believe that the 1962 conflict could have been avoided if there had been coolness and consideration on both sides. The massive invasion by China had been under preparation since 1959 after the flight of the Dalai Lama and even earlier. It was unjustified but we must not let this prevent the normalisation of relations. In my informal talks with the Chinese, I gathered the impression that they are willing to talk if India so desires. I told them clearly that I was not speaking for the Government or any political party but as one who admired Zhou Enlai and Nehru and

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believed that India and China could at least raise the level and frequency of talks on the border problems with a view to settling them peacefully. The possibility of an early settlement may not be bright but I believe the efforts should continue and they could eventually succeed through “a spirit of accommodation and realities on the ground,” as the Chinese put it. Putting the border problem on the back burner, while trying to improve relations in other fields, may sound all right but unless and until the border issue is resolved, we cannot improve relations in other fields appreciably. While we continue to make efforts to improve relations in the economic field as well as in science, technology, culture and communications, we must not forget that the border problem poses a possible threat to India and is one of the reasons why China is trying to supply military weapons to Pakistan as a counter to India. However, the Chinese are also thinking of the future when cooperation with India and Russia could help them face the American domination specially in the economic and political fields. This is a perspective that faces India as well and needs to be studied in depth so that we may evolve our policies accordingly for mutual benefit and in the interest of peace and security in our region.

As regards Chinese help to Pakistan, I doubt whether China will militarily intervene in any conflict that may arise between India and Pakistan. It did not do so in 1971, in spite of the fact the the U.S. Seventh Fleet sent its Task Force into the Bay of Bengal. However, at that time we had a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the then Soviet Union. Even so, it was mainly through our own efforts that we won a signal victory against Pakistan in 1971. Today also we will have to depend mainly on ourselves but we must devise ways and means of improving our relations with Russia as well as China, and, if possible, with the U.S. in order to meet any possible threat from Pakistan.

Pakistan at war with India will be more a liability than asset to any other country. While we should make every effort to improve relations with Pakistan, we must not do so at the cost of our own unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I am not unduly worried by Pakistan's development of nuclear and missile capability. India already has this capability and if Pakistan so desires, we could sign a mutual agreement of “no first strike.”

***T.N. Kaul***

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We could then persuade more successfully the other nuclear weapon powers to sign a total disarmament agreement. China and Russia may have to reconsider their stand in that situation, instead of indulging in such gimmicks as the nuclear weapon-free zones, the NPT and CTBT. At the same time, we must make it clear to Pakistan, as we did in 1965 and 1971, that any intervention in our internal affairs in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere will be resisted and rebuffed at the time and place of our own choosing as Shastri said in 1965 and Indira Gandhi proved in 1971. The flagrant violation of the Shimla Agreement by Pakistan which is training, aiding, abetting, financing and sending armed militants and religious fanatics across the line of control must be repelled and punished; otherwise, militancy inside J&K cannot be ended. While we should not encourage or precipitate a war with Pakistan, we must deter it from indulging in a cheap proxy war which has cost us so heavily both in human and material resources. Will the new Government implement the policies it has enunciated? Let us hope so.

#### **INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS : FOCUS ON FRIENDSHIP**

Many books have been written on this subject, by Indian, Chinese, Western and other experts. Most of these were written after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and have been influenced by that brief encounter in the long history of friendly Sino-Indian relations. In the period until Mao's death, there was hardly any attempt by either side to touch the border problem. China was quite happy with what it had acquired through use of force while India was still sulking. However, Mao's smile towards the Indian Charge d' Affaires on May 1, 1970 did start a move towards sending back the ambassador of each side to the other after a lapse of 14 years in 1976. India still continued to suffer from a sense of deep hurt while China, even after Mao's death, continued to gloat about its victory. This became obvious when Deng Xiaoping attacked Vietnam in 1979, while the Indian Foreign Minister was on a goodwill visit to China, and boasted to the Press "We shall teach Vietnam a lesson, as we taught one to India in 1962."

This was during the brief period of Janata Party Government in India when Atal Behari Vajpayee was the Foreign Minister. As he told

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me on his return "I had to cut short my visit because the Chinese poured cold water over our hopes." This showed that the Chinese leaders, even after Mao, were in no mood to make up with India. However, when Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister he visited China - 34 years after his grandfather Pandit Nehru had been there. Rajiv did not suffer from a sense of shock as his mother Indira Gandhi or her father Nehru had from the Chinese attack of 1962. He was too young at that time to have taken to heart the Chinese attack. He took a practical and pragmatic view of the 1962 episode.

It was as a result of Rajiv's visit that the two sides agreed to take some steps to lessen the tension along the border. It was also agreed to appoint working groups who would meet from time to time alternately in China and India to not only ensure peace along the Line of Control but to try to settle the border problem peacefully. As that was likely to take time, it was agreed to improve bilateral relations in the fields of trade, culture and agriculture and cooperation in science and technology. Some improvement was made in these fields but not enough to encourage the two sides to settle the border problem. This was partly because the Chinese side, instead of trying to settle the problem, made fresh claims on India's Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. No Government of India would dare to accept these claims as both these States had long been under India's effective control and China had never exercised any authority over them. This was perhaps a tactic by the Chinese leaders to tell India: "Either accept the Line of Control as the international border or we can lay claim to other areas also."

I am trying to take a somewhat charitable view of the Chinese leaders' mind because I have been told this by several Chinese non-officials and academics during my last visit to China in 1998. It is my assessment that if we are prepared to accept China's Line of Control as the border in Ladakh, they are likely to give up their reference to Sikkim and Arunachal, in a spirit of 'mutual accommodation' as they put it. Whether the present Government of India is willing to explore this suggestion is doubtful, but it is worth examining. I believe that our case on Aksai Chin is not foolproof. Even the British Government had offered

eastern Aksai Chin to Peking as the border in 1899. The British Minister in Peking had offered to the Waichaupu (Chinese Foreign Office) a line going from Karakoram Pass to Daulatbeg Oldi and then south to Lanakla Pass. However, the Waichaupu did not accept it then. Now that they are stronger and more sure of themselves, it may be possible to settle the border in Ladakh on this basis, with minor modifications, on the clear understanding that the Chinese accept our Line of Control in the eastern and middle sectors which they have already respected on a de facto basis.

It would not be in the long-term interest of either India or China to keep the border problem unsettled. China has already settled its border with the Central Asian republics, although it had questioned these previously on the plea that these borders were forced on China by “unequal treaties” by the Russian Czars. China has almost settled its border with Russia's Siberia and the Far East, as well as with the Mongolian People's Republic and accepted the eastern extension of the McMahon Line with Burma. With India, another difficulty has arisen—the provisional agreement between China and Pakistan under which Pakistan ceded about 4,000 square kilometres of POK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) to China in January 1963. While we cannot accept this, it is significant that China calls it a ‘provisional’ agreement. That leaves some room for accommodation, either as a long-term or even perpetual lease of some of this territory by India to China. It also depends on whether we are prepared to settle the Kashmir question with Pakistan along the Line of Control established under the Simla Agreement. It is possible that if we are prepared to settle our border with China, it would facilitate our settling the Kashmir problem with Pakistan on the basis of the realities that have existed on the ground for the last fifty years.

However, all these ideas are only possibilities and in the nature of tentative suggestions that could form the basis of probes and informal discussions only. While border problems have existed between neighbours throughout history, civilised countries like India and China should and could solve them through peaceful negotiations.

The world is bound to move from a unipolar to a multipolar one where China and India are likely to be two great powers because of

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their huge potential. Neither America nor the Western world can ignore either China or India. Also we cannot ignore each other for long because each of us will have to deal with possible threats of domination by outside powers. It would be in our mutual interest to combat and prevent such threats through bilateral understanding and cooperation.

India and China must both look to the near and distant future and not allow past differences of a temporary nature to become permanent obstacles for future cooperation. We must base our relations on the five principles of peaceful co-existence which India and China were the first two countries to subscribe to in 1954. As both India and China get stronger and more stable, economically, politically and socially, they will have no reason to fear each other but much to gain from cooperation. Our friendship and cooperation need not be aimed against any other power but it will serve as a warning that no power can interfere in the internal affairs of either.

Might did prevail in the previous centuries that would be a dangerous doctrine to adopt in the space and nuclear age of today. Both India and China are nuclear powers, whether America and its allies accept this or not. Both together could exercise a healthy influence on the other nuclear powers to make some progress towards total nuclear disarmament, and not merely hoodwink the world through such discriminatory proposals as the so-called nuclear weapon free zones from which the five great powers are excluded, or the NPT and the CTBT, which may give the illusion of greatness to them. These are dangerous doctrines that can threaten the peace of the world in future.

### **TOWARDS A STRATEGIC FRIENDSHIP : SINO-INDIAN-RUSSIAN TIES**

Prime Minister Primakov's recent visit to India has undone some of the damage that the former Russian Foreign Minister had done to Indo- Russian relations. It is all the more significant because it came at a time when the US and some of its allies had imposed economic sanctions against India's Pokhran II nuclear explosions. The seven agreements signed in New Delhi further strengthen the common interests

between India and Russia which had undergone some weakening in the last few years, under pressure from America on Russia and because of Russia's own uncertain economic situation as well as some vacillation on India's part.

I have known Primakov since the mid-sixties when I was ambassador of India in the then Soviet Union. I met him again in 1986 to 1989 when I was sent to Moscow as India's ambassador for a second time. Primakov is a balanced, pragmatic, practical, broad-minded and independent politician. He seems, as of now, to be the main consensus candidate for the post of President when Yeltsin retires. Even if Yeltsin stands again and wins or loses the election, Primakov is likely to emerge not only as Foreign Minister but also as Prime Minister. He is a stabilising factor in the present faction-ridden situation in Russia.

It is significant that he should have thrown up a ball in the air, as it were, in proposing closer Sino-Indian-Russian strategic relations. When I visited a symposium on Zhou Enlai's birth centenary at Nankai University in Tianjin in China in February-March 1998, I made a similar proposal at the conference. It was supported by Dr. Tikhvinsky (though I had not talked to him beforehand), President of the Sino-Russian Friendship Society. No Chinese participant opposed it and some told me that they would support it. I was not representing the Government of India in the symposium but had been invited in my personal capacity by Nankai University. And I made this quite clear for I was not sure of the new BJP government's attitude.

This was before Pokhran II. Even at the time of Pokhran II, China did not at first oppose us as the US and some of its allies did. But, when some of our ministers said that China was potential threat No. 1 and wrote to some 'friendly' governments about the threat to our security from China as the justification for Pokhran II, China reacted sharply but did not go any further. We should justify Pokhran II mainly as our sovereign right to develop our nuclear capability and to compel other nuclear weapon powers to agree to complete nuclear disarmament. They did mention Sikkim and Arunachal as a diplomatic counter but did not carry on the controversy further.

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However, some of our ministers again criticised China and even went so far as to say that 'Taiwan' was an 'independent' country. This was against our official stand and pronouncements of the present and previous governments that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. China reacted even more sharply saying we had occupied 90,000 square kilometres of their territory and provoked the 1962 conflict!

Some members of the present Government of India express publicly their individual views although they are not directly in charge of foreign affairs. It is also to be regretted that the Chinese spokesman's reaction was unnecessarily sharp in reply to these unauthorised statements. He repeated claims which the Chinese know are not tenable either regarding Sikkim or Arunachal. In fact, when I addressed some professors and post-graduate students in Beijing University in March 1998, I said so and they not only did not question me but later told me I was right.

Is it not time that China and India realised the mutual benefit that would accrue from furthering our friendship rather than aggravating our relations? India should try to create more 'friends' and less 'enemies'. As long as the US administration suffers from the sole-surviving superpower syndrome, there is little scope for India, and for that matter other countries, to expect much help from the US except on its own terms, some of which are humiliating and some smack of threats of domination and interference.

By all means, we should increase trade and collaboration in science and technology and try to improve relations with the US. But let us not have any expectation of help from the US or its allies against China. They are all wooing China because of its vast market and potential. India has also great human and natural resources and a vast market but we have failed to use this bargaining chip as China has done. Our strained relations with China are one of the reasons for this, but the main reason is our tendency to woo those who rebuff us and rebuff those who are closer to us geographically and strategically.

India, China and Russia are great powers-potentially, economically and strategically. If they get closer it would help all three and others in the Asia-Pacific region and reduce the domination or attempts to dominate

us by some other 'great' powers. The Government of India, no matter whether it is run by one or more parties, must speak with one voice and not air individual or personal opinions which affect our national security and interests adversely. While Primakov's proposal regarding strategic cooperation between India, Russia and China needs to be followed up, at the same time a frank and friendly exchange of views with China - and not further pronouncements against it should be held. It is also for China to think seriously about this matter and discuss it informally with Russia and India on a friendly basis.

Primakov need not feel let down by India's cool response to his proposal, but continue his efforts with both China and India. India and China should refrain from making sharp statements against each other but concentrate on improving bilateral relations in the economic, political and strategic fields. Informal diplomatic feelers are more effective and productive than hostile public postures. Both China and India need to learn this lesson from the 1962 conflict which flared up as a result of a paper war and exchange of unfriendly notes and then from attempts to use force to establish territorial claims. Both countries need to reaffirm and respect by words and deeds the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Let them not forget that they were the first two countries to subscribe to *Panchshila*. China and India are neighbours and, but for the brief encounter in 1962, have a long history of good-neighbourly and friendly relations. Both have to gain much more from friendship.

China is likely to sober down and become more stable and less suspicious of India, as it develops economically, socially and politically. Maoism took China back in history but the new post-Mao China is likely to go forward towards greater democracy and individual freedom as it advances politically and economically. It will need friendly relations as will India. If China, India and Russia can develop closer strategic relations it will help the three countries and their neighbours to enlarge the area of peace and cooperation in east, south, south-east and Central Asia as well as on the Asia-Pacific rim. What is needed now is a long-term perspective and not a short-term policy which cannot stand the test of time in the coming decades.

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## **BRIDGING THE HIMALAYAN GAP: VIEWING SINO-INDIAN TIES IN THE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE**

*Swaran Singh*

The post-Pokhran II statements from both Beijing and New Delhi have resulted in creating some confusion in the process of Sino-Indian ties. However, what gives hope is the fact that, as the initial heat and dust of these explosions settles down, one finds rising aspirations, on both sides of the Himalayas, to restore and normalise Sino-Indian ties by trying to overcome, what Chinese officials and scholars describe to be only, “temporary difficulties” between these two countries.<sup>1</sup> Besides, it requires no unusual wisdom to assert that no country ever determines its policy on the basis of one singular event, howsoever important it might be. This happens to be especially true of the state policy of the large-sized civilizational nation-states like India and China that have a recorded history of over 5,000 years and have enjoyed a healthy diplomatic interaction for over 2,000 years. With such a backdrop in mind, to say that the Chinese authorities did not have any premonition on these nuclear tests, or did not fathom the logic of explanations that were extended, would amount to undermining the diplomatic finesse and the political judgement of the Chinese nation which has already emerged as the next global power in-the-making. Accordingly, most of these post-Pokhran-II actions and statements can now be safely described as largely a knee-jerk reaction and a public relations exercise which does not really represent the depth and strength of Sino-Indian ties in the long-term perspective.

From the practical experience as well, who will know it better than the Chinese that the nuclear capabilities are not created at the spur of any momentary crisis. These are always a result of long-drawn concerted efforts and decision-making. These recent nuclear tests, therefore, mark only as one of the important milestones in a long-drawn process of India using its nuclear option and does not mark any sudden strategic U-turn in India’s nuclear profile. There is, of course, no dearth of published

evidence to prove that China's nuclear arsenals and more lately their suspected assistance in Pakistan's nuclear program had always been viewed as the main factor moulding India's nuclear perceptions and policy.<sup>2</sup> The difficulty seems to be only with the manner in which each side has presented its views following these recent nuclear tests in Pokhran and Chagai. This, no doubt, demanded a fresh debate on India's nuclear policy. Yet, to reiterate, no such formulations of state policies can be done in any hurry; instead they will only evolve in the due course of time. Besides, the ruling regimes on both sides do have their genuine difficulties in terms of their domestic politics, mutual perceptions and foreign policies. Accordingly, much of these post-Pokhran-II polemics from both sides can not provide a very safe basis for projecting any long-term trends for the Sino-Indian ties. But at the same time, one also can not completely ignore that, in the immediate, these misunderstandings will have a certain limited impact in slowing down, if not de-railing, the pace of Sino-Indian rapprochement that had witnessed tremendous progress during the 1990s. Looking in the long-run, on the other hand, though these nuclear tests do represent an important turning point yet they certainly do not pose any insurmountable new challenge that can not be overcome by the goodwill and mutual understanding that has been generated by the Sino-Indian rapprochement since the early 1970s.

### **INDIA'S BOLD POLITICAL INITIATIVES**

To start with, India has traditionally been at the forefront of taking bold political initiatives towards 'untying various knots' towards improving Sino-Indian ties and will be again more than willing to untie any such knots regardless the fact who had tied them and why. To recall, the national liberation movements from both sides had enjoyed tremendous sympathy and cooperation from each other and the medical team led by Dr. Kotnis still continues to evoke memories of brotherhood amongst both Indians and Chinese. Chinese scholars have themselves commented on the correspondence between Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru during the 1940s and of similar contacts between other prominent people like Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, from the Chinese side and Gandhiji,

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Ravindranath Tegore, Dr. Dwarkanath Kotnis from the Indian side.<sup>3</sup> Later, the independent India was not only one of the first to recognise Mao's new communist regime in Beijing in 1950 but Jawaharlal Nehru had given up all of India's 'presence' in Tibet, all at the altar of normalising the Sino-Indian ties. Many Indians even today continue to criticise Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for being so idealistic and so magnanimous while formulating India's China policy during 1950s. But the tradition of always being the first to take initiatives has not even weakened and this could be seen again during the visit by Nehru's grandson Rajiv Gandhi who not only ensured Deng Xiaoping of not allowing Dalai Lama to use his stay in India to carry out any political activities but went a step further and recognised Tibet as "integral" part of the PRC.

During the second phase of Sino-Indian friendship as well, it is the bold political initiatives from Mrs. Indira Gandhi's regime that had resulted in putting an end to the long-held diplomatic deep freeze that had characterised Sino-Indian ties between 1962-1975. As early as in September 1968 as later on 1st January 1969 Mrs. Gandhi had stated that India had kept open the option of a negotiated settlement of all outstanding issues with China. Significantly, both these statements did not refer to the earlier Indian stand of conditioned talks (as laid out in Parliament's November 1962 resolution) and indicated that New Delhi was prepared for unconditional talks with China.<sup>4</sup> Later, the 1971 Afro-Asian Tanis Tournament held in Beijing became the first such occasion when New Delhi accepted China's invitation and an Indian team was allowed to travel to Beijing. It was on 26 August 1970 that the state of Sino-Indian relations was formally summed up by India's Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh who speaking in Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament) said the following:

We do notice a slight change in the attitude of China towards, and propaganda against, here neighbours including India, of late; but we have not seen any change in the substantive matters... Neither China nor India can change the geographical fact that both our countries have a long common border. It is in the interest of both countries to settle the border question peacefully and

normalise our relations in other fields as well, and when China is willing to take a concrete step in this direction, she will not find us lacking.<sup>5</sup>

During this second phase of Sino-Indian friendship since early 1970, while the Indian side was again always first make friendly overtures yet, unlike their no-reciprocation policy during the early 1950s, in the second phase of Sino-Indian friendship, the Chinese authorities were generally far more forthcoming though still very reluctant and their positive response always belated. Especially, the strength of India's initiatives during this second phase had also to be viewed in the backdrop of its perceived loss of face during their border war of 1962. Nevertheless, New Delhi was first to announce normalisation of Sino-Indian diplomatic ties, first to dispatch its Ambassador (July 1976), first to send its Foreign Minister (February 1979), first to send its Prime Minister (December 1988) and first to send its President (May 1992) to pay a visit. (See Table 1) Also, against the spirit of November 1962 resolution of Indian Parliament, the Indian leadership virtually accepted a policy U-turn by agreeing to the standard Chinese proposal of putting aside the difficult boundary dispute and begin improving other more agreeable areas in Sino-Indian ties.<sup>6</sup> This was made possible through a resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee on November 5, 1988 that was projected as having surpassed the November 1962 resolution of Indian Parliament. This resolution, briefly, urged the Rajiv Gandhi government to seek a settlement through "peaceful negotiations" based on "mutual interests" and "acceptable to the people of both countries," even if it took time.<sup>7</sup>

Even the Chinese scholars recognise the fact that India had never been found wanting in its desire to improve relations with Beijing. To give one most apt example of India's commitment, while in response to the Tiananmen Square incidents of June 1989 most of the western world had imposed sanctions on China, the period between the second half of 1989 and 1990 saw 10 high-level visits between China and India that included visits by Vice Premier Wu Xueguian in October 1989 and visit by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in March 1990.<sup>8</sup> This, of course, is not to say that this policy change during late 1980s was not perceived as serving India's national interests but only to highlight how, historically

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speaking, it is often India's bold initiatives that were responsible for breaking ice. At the same time, however, none of these bold initiatives would bear fruit had the Chinese response not been as positive as it had been. Nevertheless, reckoning from this track record of bold initiative it will not be wrong to predict that even this time round New Delhi will not be found wanting and would take 'concrete steps' at an appropriate place and time.

### **CHINA'S STRATEGIC U-TURN ON SOUTH ASIA**

This, however, is not to say that China did not make any important contribution to the Sino-Indian rapprochement. In fact, following their border war of 1962, while India had severed all formal interactions with China's leaders, it is Beijing that continued to explore possibilities of starting the dialogue. This may be brushed aside as a normal behaviour for a state that perceived itself as having emerged victorious yet it provided critical background for India's bold political initiatives that followed. In fact, later studies have proved how the entire rise and fall of Sino-Indian ties during 1950s was closely knitted into China's internal turmoil of those formative years where Mao is even believed having ordered war with India simply to divert attention from his declining stature as China's uncontested leader. Also, compared to Zhou En-lai and Deng Xiaoping, Mao is believed to have been much too suspicious of Nehru's bourgeois liberalism. And this was clearly reflected in the changed tenor of Sino-Indian ties following Mao's death in 1975.

A clear shift in China's South Asia policy was visible from early 1980s when Beijing gradually gave up its early post-1962 tactics of providing moral and material support to India's smaller neighbours which was aimed at (a) tying New Delhi down to the South Asian region and, (b) trying to offset India's pre-eminence even in this smaller region. In 1989, for example, China not only refused to supply weapons to Nepal and gave only a muted response to India's peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka, it even told General Ershad of Bangladesh to no more depend on China's support in sorting out their river water dispute with India.<sup>9</sup> But more than this, putting an end to its long-drawn reluctance over

issues between India and Pakistan, the Narasimha Rao-Li Peng Joint Statement of December 1991 clearly told China's closest allies in Islamabad that Beijing regarded Kashmir as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Since then China's position on Kashmir also underwent a marked change and the essence of this transformation can be gauged from the following two basic points where China (a) describes Kashmir as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan to be dealt not under the UN resolutions of 1954 but the 1972 Simla Agreement, and (b) agrees to underline the fear from rising security threats "Islamic fundamentalism" without making a direct reference to its fears of Pakistan's role in China's troubles in Xinjiang.<sup>10</sup> But despite this change of heart on such critical issues like China's perceptions on the Kashmir question, there have been various other pro-Pakistan actions and statements of China that still continue to dominate as a major irritant in Sino-Indian rapprochement.

#### **SINO-PAKISTANI ALLIANCE**

It is a common knowledge today that from the very beginning Pakistan had emerged as the major bulwark of China policies towards India. Following its traditional method of indirect approach to national security, China had sought to prop-up India's smaller neighbours to keep New Delhi occupied with its South Asian entanglements. Especially, India's wars with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965 were particularly responsible for providing them with an anti-India platform. Thus beginning from their famous border settlement agreement of March 1963 - where Pakistan transferred part of its occupied Kashmir to China - their defence cooperation had always been a major concern for India's China watchers. Repeated arms embargoes by the United States during 1965, 1971 and 1990 only further cemented this 'special relationship' between Beijing and Islamabad. As a result of this over 80 per cent of Pakistan's main battle tanks and nearly 60 per cent of its combat aircraft and most of its small and light weapons and ammunitions today happen to be of Chinese origin.<sup>11</sup> The fact that most of these are either targeted or were being used against India (and Afghanistan) had been one of

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New Delhi major concern all these years. But nothing can compare with India's worries about the alleged Sino-Pak nuclear nexus. And it is this specific aspect of China's indulgence with Pakistan that has continued to be a major hurdle for Sino-Indian rapprochement.

The very genesis of Sino-Pakistani nuclear nexus lay in Pakistan's search for nuclear deterrence which had come to be Islamabad's utmost obsession following its military defeat in December 1971 by a conventionally superior armed forces of India. It was in this context that, following President Bhutto's three important visits to Beijing in February 1972, September 1974 and April 1976, China finally agreed to sign an agreement that Bhutto himself describes as "my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our nation."<sup>12</sup> Most probably, it was this very agreement that laid the foundations of Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation.<sup>13</sup> However, both Beijing and Islamabad have continued to deny the very existence of any nuclear cooperation. There is, of course, enough circumstantial evidence available to prove the sustained co-relationship between the China's nuclear projects and their revelation as end products in Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan has repeatedly declared India being the potential target for its nuclear and missile arsenals makes Sino-Pak nuclear nexus as the most difficult knot in Sino-Indian rapprochement.

Over the years, the Chinese side has been accused of supplying Pakistan with nuclear designs, test data, heavy water and in setting up Pakistan's known and secret enrichment facilities.<sup>14</sup> Paul Leventhal of the US Nuclear Arms Control Institute was amongst the first to point out how the Chinese had conducted a nuclear test at Lop Nor in Xinjiang in 1983 in the presence of the Pakistani Foreign Minister.<sup>15</sup> According to another estimate, China supplied Pakistan the original design of their nuclear bomb tested in 1966 and that Pakistan had later carried out "one cold test in September 1987 in the hills west of Chagai in order to verify the Chinese design."<sup>16</sup> In fact, beginning from 1987, Pakistani leaders had themselves begun to make public announcements about Islamabad possessing capability to build a nuclear weapons. Despite these public announcements, Washington remained helpless in dealing with Sino-Pak alliance simply because they needed Pakistan's assistance

as a frontline state for fighting their bigger enemy in Afghanistan. Same has also been the case with Pakistan's missile development programme where each project in China has resulted in its outcome being announced by Pakistan as its own indigenous weapon. Lately, this Sino-Pak nexus seems to have gradually emerged as the single most important determinant of Sino-Indian ties, surpassing even their long-pending unresolved border settlement problem.

### **JOINT WORKING GROUP ON BOUNDARY QUESTION**

However, positive things have also been happening in Sino-Indian ties. And here, apart from their possible other meetings at international forums and other interactions, one most important forum for this Sino-Indian official debates has come to be the annual meetings of the Sino-India Joint Working Group on Boundary Question (JWG) which has come to one of the most effective and generic forum for implementing Sino-Indian confidence building measures (CBMs) (**See Table 2** for details). Created in the backdrop of Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 the JWG has already held eleven rounds of talks and though it is headed by the Foreign Secretary from Indian side and Vice-Foreign Minister from the Chinese side, it does not involve only officials from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) but also has representatives from armed forces and the Survey of India sitting in these meetings. Amongst its major achievements, the two CBM agreements of September 1993 and November 1996 had clearly originated during the discussions in the JWG's Second Round at New Delhi in August-September 1991 where the phrase "maintain peace and tranquility" was first coined.<sup>17</sup> At the operational level as well, credit for much of the peace and tranquility on Sino-Indian borders (compared to the eternally live Indo-Pak border) goes to these regular discussions at these annual JWG meets which have provided tremendous boost as also created various new "mechanisms" for implementing those political policy decisions at the higher level.

The high point in JWG meetings had occurred during their discussions during the Eighth Round of talks in August 1995 at New Delhi where the two sides had agreed to actually disengage their troops from four border

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posts in the Wangdong region where they had come to be deployed at alarming proximity to each other. This was hailed as the first example in the post-Cold War era where actual disarmament by mutual agreement ever took place amongst Asian countries. But, apart from these broad-based policy postures and political commitments, the JWG has also institutionalised regular meetings at more operational levels. Of special importance have been the regular meetings between the Sino-Indian military commanders posted in the border regions — at Bumla and Dichu in the eastern sector, and at Spanggur near Chushul in the western sector. Apart from these regular Flag meetings, the commanders on both sides are also provided with ‘hotline’ telephone links to ensure consultations in case of any intrusions or other contingencies.

It clearly speaks for the success of these JWG meetings that even during the heated post-Pokhran II scenario for Sino-Indian ties, these regular meetings and exchanges had continued as per schedule. The annual Commanders meeting which was scheduled for June 29, 1998 was held as planned. The same is also true of the Sino-Indian trade though reliable statistics have not yet been released on this subject. All this clearly proves the depth and durability of Sino-Indian CBMs that work as the foundation for Sino-Indian friendship and understanding. And the fact that Sino-Indian ties survived these initial tremours of this recent difficult period clearly shows that the working relationship between these countries has taken roots and the core of this mutual commitment can be seen from the letter and spirit of two CBM agreements that lays the basic legal framework for the past as well as future of Sino-Indian ties during the coming years.

#### **FIRST CBM AGREEMENT, 1993**

A nine-point agreement, titled as Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Control was the first legal document to formalise the Sino-Indian entente since the Panchsheel Agreement of April 1954. This was signed during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing on September 7, 1993. Reviving the Sino-Indian friendship this document reiterated faith in the Panchsheel - the Five principles of Peaceful Co-existence - thereby bringing Sino-

Indian ties back to the pre-1959 days of mutual trust and understanding about each other. Moreover, what distinguished this agreement was the fact that unlike the earlier Panchsheel Agreement of April 1954 where only the Indian side had made major concessions, it clearly emphasised on the principle of mutual and equal security for both sides. This new spirit of sincerity was crystal clear throughout the clauses of this agreement and this has since been ratified by both sides. Also, for many it represented the new spirit of the post-Cold War environment of 'peace dividends' and India's top security experts described this agreement as the first major conventional arms control agreement between two Asian nations without any role being played by third countries.<sup>18</sup>

To briefly leaf through its main provisions this agreement begins by re-affirming that both sides wish to resolve their boundary question "though peaceful and friendly consultations" and will, in the meanwhile, "strictly respect and observe the line of actual control" and will not ever try to "use or threaten to use force" and whenever necessary only "jointly check and determine the segments" which may be in dispute at a given time.<sup>19</sup> In Article Two both sides undertake to keep their military presence on the border "to a minimum level" and to further reduce them "in conformity with the requirements of the principle of equal and mutual security" for both sides. Then Article Three talks of "effective CBMs" and recommends specific levels of military exercises in which case each side will have to "give the other notification" and Article four and five detail on specific measures that may be taken to deal with intrusions and other exigencies. The clarification that nothing in this treaty will "prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question" is provided in Article Six while Article Seven asks both sides to start by specifically defining the "form, method, scale and content of effective verification measures". It is towards fulfilling these measures that the two sides later signed their second CBM agreement in November 1996.

### **SECOND CBM AGREEMENT, 1996**

The second CBM Agreement has been aptly titled as the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of

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Actual Control. This 12-clause document was signed on November 29, 1996 during President Jiang Zemin's historic first visit to New Delhi and has since been ratified by both sides. This agreement seeks to extend confidence building to the sensitive field of defence policy and military establishments and thereby it not only lays but further strengthens the foundations of Sino-Indian confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).<sup>20</sup> Going by the fact that its first two articles confirm the existence of "different perceptions" on certain segments of border and still proclaims that "Neither sides shall use its military capability against the other" but instead start "to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions..." this agreement has been hailed as virtually a No War Pact and both sides have projected it in that spirit.

What makes this agreement a great symbol of Sino-Indian friendship is the fact that it not only deals in detail with the sensitive subject of extending CBMs in the military field but has also been unusually candid and comprehensive. China's deployments in Tibet, for example, had always been a major irritant to all talks of troop-reductions on the border. This is because for being on the plateau the Chinese forces are believed to have nearly ten-to-one advantage against the Indian forces. But the Chinese had always been very sensitive on this issue considering their deployments in Tibet as a basic requirement of their internal security edifice. Taking notice of these sensitivities Article Three of this agreement clearly lays down that keeping with "the principle of mutual and equal security" all future ceilings on border deployments shall be based on the "parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communications and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments". Besides, to ensure peace and tranquility along Sino-Indian border regions, it also details on how certain offensive weapons - like combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger caliber, mortars with 120 mm or bigger caliber, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles - shall not be deployed on border regions. It also exhorts both sides to "avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one Division (i.e. 15,000 troops or more) in close

proximity to the LoAC” and in case it involves more than 5,000 troops, the other side should be informed “within five days of completion”.

Taking a major step forward, the two sides agree that no combat aircraft that “include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft” shall be allowed to fly “within ten kilometers” of the LoAC “except by prior permission” from the other side. Article Six even prohibits any use of “hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometers” of the LoAC unless it is “part of development activities” in which case the other sides shall be informed “through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance.” Should any land or air incursions take place “because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters”, the other side is expected under Article Eight to “extend all possible assistance” and to work out “modalities of return of the concerned personnel.” The agreement even further lays down under Article Seven that to “strengthen exchanges and cooperation between their military personnel and establishments” the two sides shall expand (i) “meetings between their border representatives at designated places,” (b) create “telecommunication links” between these border points, and (c) establish “step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities” of the two sides.

The most serious lacuna to both these agreements that has often been pointed out is the fact that despite being completely framed around the Sino-Indian LoAC these agreements can not become very effective as long as the LoAC itself remains undefined. But then like all other interstate agreements on paper there are always (a) limitations to what the two countries can agree to put in writing, and (b) even the written word can have no meaning once the mutual confidence and understanding starts eroding. Accordingly, these agreements, first of all, only symbolise the normalisation of Sino-Indian ties and their operational viability is only a secondary objective for it is their mutual trust that will determine the validity as well as the success of their policy initiatives. And seen in that context these two agreements have been aptly described as the culmination of the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement during the last thirty-years.

**BILATERAL TRADE AND COMMERCE**

Looking in this aforesaid long-term perspective, nothing can perhaps compare the Sino-Indian bilateral trade that has gradually emerged as the single most durable CBM increasing the mutual stakes of these two countries. Their bilateral trade is not only the proverbial cause as well the consequence of Sino-Indian rapprochement during these last twenty years but also one most reliable barometer of the strength of their mutual trust and understanding. One example of this new reality lay in the fact that in 1994, India became China's largest trading partner amongst South Asian countries, surpassing China's long-standing ally Pakistan. This surely provides a psychological boost for those who prescribe building-confidence as the only panacea for resolving all perceived or real problems between New Delhi and Beijing. Sino-Indian trade has witnessed a fifteen-fold increase since the two sides signed protocols in 1984 granting each other the most favoured nation (MFN) trading status thus marking a U-turn on their policies on mutual trade and commerce that had been lying suspended since the early 1960s. During the last five years alone the Sino-Indian bilateral trade had nearly trebled, and this figure does not still include India's trade with Hong Kong which joined China since July last year (1997) (**See Table 3**). And now, following the return of Hong Kong to China, the Sino-Indian bilateral trade has obtained an altogether new positive profile.

Agreed that compared to their total foreign trade, the volume of their bilateral trade remains still very small yet, it is the nature of their trade as also the context of their historical ties that makes the success of their bilateral trade so much important. Most of all, it is their border trade that has substantially increased the free flow of both goods and people thus expanding mutual transparency and solidifying their mutual confidence in their disputed border regions. As a gesture of goodwill from both sides as many as 15 commodities have already been exempted from all restriction on their trade in their border regions.<sup>21</sup> Garbyang (in middle sector) was the first border trade post to be opened in February 1991 followed by Gunji (also in middle sector) in 1992. Later, Shipki La (again in middle sector) was also opened for trade in 1994. A fourth

route, agreed in principle, remains yet to be announced. India has suggested an eastern route originating in Sikkim. China, on the other hand, has been evasive on this as it implies formally recognising Sikkim's accession to India. As an alternative, China has suggested a route from Kalimpong in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal (passing through Sikkim) to Yatung in Chumbi Valley with suggestions that agreement on this trade post would include language implying recognition to Sikkim as part of India. India, however, would like China to announce their recognition of Sikkim as part of India as a pre-requisite to any such agreement and this perhaps is partly goaded by their historical experience during 1950s.

As regards evolving the overall framework of Sino-Indian trade and commerce, it was during the early 1984 that two sides had signed the protocol granting each other the most favoured nation (MFN) status and set up a Joint Working Group for promoting mutual trade and commerce which meets annually. This has since resulted in many more agreements on evolving the new legal framework for trade and for establishing joint ventures between these two countries. The first Sino-Indian joint venture - between India's Mideast Integrated Steel Limited and China Metallurgical Import Export Corporation - was commissioned in Orissa in January 1993.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, on July 18, 1994, during his third visit to New Delhi, the then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had signed another trade agreement on avoidance of double taxation between these two countries.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, interactions during President Jiang Zemin's visit to New Delhi had witnessed China and India signing three other major agreements in areas of (i) putting in place double taxation avoidance mechanisms, (ii) providing MFN status to each other's sea-borne trade commodities, and (c) combating smuggling of narcotics and arms and other economic offenses. From Indian side, Ranabaxy (a pharmaceutical company) has invested in China extensively. Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) has itself been very active and it has since opened an office in Shanghai.

Lately, both China and India have, in fact, been gradually moving forward towards expanding co-operation in more advanced areas of

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sharing technologies even in more sensitive areas like nuclear technologies and China had supplied enriched nuclear fuel for India's Tarapore nuclear power plant during January 1996. China has also shown increasing interest in collaborating in other high-technology areas like joint production of 100-seater civilian aircraft or participating in India's ambitious Light Combat Aircraft project.<sup>24</sup> As of today, major items of export from India to China include iron and steel, chrome ore, chemicals, dye intermediates, bulk drugs and pharmaceuticals, construction quality wire rods, tobacco and tea, while Indian imports from China include items like raw silk and silk yarn, coking coal, some types of chemicals, pulses, mercury and antimony, fresh water pearls, pig iron and newsprint.

### **INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS AND AFTER**

As of now, among other things, it is the new Indian reality of having declared itself as a de facto nuclear weapon state that seems to overshadow all other aspects of Sino-Indian ties. To start with, the Chinese side did initially display its calm by keeping silence for nearly 24 hours following India's first two explosions on May 11, 1998. But later, in view of India's second series of three more explosions on May 13, 1998, followed by the leakage of Prime Minister Atal Behari Bajpai's letter to President Bill Clinton which described China's nuclear arsenals as also their proliferation to India's western neighbour as the main reason for India going nuclear, Beijing unleashed its tirade and described India as trying to emerge as 'hegemone' in South Asia — something that reminded most China watchers in India of Mao's denunciations of Jawaharlal Nehru's bourgeoisie democracy.<sup>25</sup> This display of displeasure in issuing harsh official statements was then followed by China taking its campaign further by being an active participant in the passing of resolution 1172 by the UN Security Council and later in convening another meeting of the P-5 Foreign Ministers in London on June 4, 1998. This was followed by China issuing bilateral Joint Statements on South Asia with President Bill Clinton when the later visited Beijing on June 27, 1998 and later organising another anti-India multilateral Joint Statement when President

Jiang Zemin visited Kazakhstan to attend the Third Presidential Summit of five nations - that includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The same was also the tenor of China's White Paper on National Defence which was issued in Beijing in July 1998.<sup>26</sup> All these statements/resolutions singularly blamed India for what was described as regional South Asian 'nuclear competition'. Also, all these have clearly increased India's difficulties and delayed positive initiatives from New Delhi that still remains equally keen for improving Sino-Indian ties.

There is no denying the fact, therefore, that mutual goodwill has definitely been bruised by some of the recent accusations and counter accusations of early 1998. Though, the Sino-Indian ties will take a while to recover from their present state of discomfiture, yet it gives great hope that the two sides have continued to work together in the same cooperative spirit. For example, the military commanders meet was delayed by a few days and this year's annual JWG meeting scheduled for Beijing has not happened so far (November 1998). Also, the China Commodity Fair scheduled to be held in Bombay was put off by Beijing and recent months have seen Air India flights between New Delhi and Hong Kong coming down from four-days-a-week to two-days-a-week. India also decided to put off a visit by a flotilla of Indian Navy led by INS Delhi which was scheduled to anchor on China's shores on a goodwill visit during September 1998.<sup>27</sup> It is possible, therefore, to assume that many of these recent interactions could have been much more fruitful and friendly had this mutual acrimony not been generated by India's nuclear tests. Surprisingly, the Sino-Indian bilateral trade is one area that has taken only a little beating and half-yearly estimates by the CII shows the decline in Sino-Indian trade following India's nuclear tests has not been very drastic. However, for months of May-June-July 1998, this does show a marginal decline (**See Table 4**).

According to the Chinese customs statistics for January-July 1998, however, the Sino-Indian trade reached \$ 1.013 billion which means an increase of 14.2 per cent over the same period for the preceding year. This has to be viewed in the backdrop of China's overall economic performance which has faced major challenges during 1998 like

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devastating floods during August-September (1998) and more devastating continuing financial crisis amongst the Southeast Asian countries. Also, at the highest level, the Indian side has since resumed its attempts towards breaking the ice with the Chinese leaders and Indian Prime Minister's special emissary, Jaswant Singh, has already opened high-level negotiations with the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. The two had their first post-Pokhran-II meet at Manila during the ASEAN Regional Forum's annual meet in July 1998. Speculations have been ripe ever since on Jaswant Singh's impending visit to Beijing. In the end, therefore, the Pokhran-II may have temporarily disturbed the process of Sino-Indian CBMs, but definitely nation-states do not let single events dictate their policies towards each other. And this definitely augurs well for the future of Sino-Indian ties.

### **CONCLUSION**

To conclude, an objective understanding on the implications of these events of early 1998 for the future of Sino-India ties must be viewed in the larger perspective of the Sino-Indian historical ties, their perceived long-term national interests and future vision. As for the recent reactions from both sides, it is understandable that even in the best of circumstances Beijing could not have diplomatically let such an event go uncensored. China's reactions may have also been partly spiked by India's decision to play extremely low in dealing with Beijing which was obviously the most affected party of all countries.<sup>28</sup> However, these may also be partly the result of India's display of its nuclear potential that may have outsmarted most of the Chinese estimates on India's nuclear capability. Whatever be the truth of these perceived estimations about the legality or potential of India's nuclear wherewithal it sure remains impossible to undo what has already happened. Accordingly, to continue prescribing the old and ineffective policies like 'cap, roll-back and eliminate' can only amount to closing eyes on the new reality of India's nuclear profile. Also, this will only further increase India's difficulties in establishing its continued commitment towards improving Sino-Indian ties and towards its policy of nuclear disarmament. Such negative attitude will also increase

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India's difficulties in expressing its sincerity to building peace and security for the future.

China is one country which can understand India's predicament the most. This is simply because China itself has had a long history of fighting for same rights and principles as also against the very same hegemonic and imperial powers. To many Indians, some of China's recent responses do send very confusing signals as to whether Beijing has also joined the club of those status quo powers who wish to block India from getting recognition on what is its due. And here, New Delhi's expectations for understanding are obviously far more from the leadership in Beijing than they are from other major powers. How China and India evolve their mutual equations will not only further enhance their mutual benefit, it is this very mutual confidence and understanding that will largely determine the options of all other great powers in their dealing with both Beijing and New Delhi. The fact that India today is a nuclear weapon state is a undeniable reality. It is also the tenor of Sino-Indian ties that will largely determine the future implications of India's new nuclear weapon state profile.

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**Table 1: High-level visits between China and India**

| <i>Visits from India to China</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <i>Visits from China to India</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p align="center"><b>First Phase</b><br/><b>October 1954</b></p> <p>Jawaharlal Nehru,<br/>Prime Minister of India</p> <p align="center"><b>Second Phase</b><br/><b>February 1979</b></p> <p>Atal Behari Bajpai,<br/>Foreign Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>December 1988</b></p> <p>Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>May 1992</b></p> <p>R. Venkataraman ,<br/>President of India</p> <p align="center"><b>January 1993</b></p> <p>Shivraj Patil, Speaker Lok Sabha</p> <p align="center"><b>September 1993</b></p> <p>P.V. Narasimha Rao,<br/>Prime Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>July 1994</b></p> <p>Gen. B.C. Joshi,<br/>Chief of Indian Army</p> <p align="center"><b>October 1994</b></p> <p>K.R. Narayanan,<br/>Vice President</p> <p align="center"><b>March 1996</b></p> <p>Adml. V.S. Shekhawat,<br/>Chief of Indian Navy</p> <p align="center"><b>May 1996</b></p> <p>Justice A.M. Ahmadi,<br/>Chief Justice of India</p> <p align="center">?</p> <p align="center">?</p> | <p align="center"><b>First Phase</b><br/><b>April 1954</b></p> <p>Zhou En-lai,<br/>Prime Minister of China</p> <p align="center"><b>April 1960</b></p> <p>Zhou En-lai,<br/>Prime Minister of China</p> <p align="center"><b>Second Phase</b><br/><b>June 1981</b></p> <p>Huang Hua, Foreign Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>March 1990</b></p> <p>Qian Qichen,<br/>Foreign Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>December 1991</b></p> <p>Li Peng, Prime Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>December 1993</b></p> <p>Li Ruihuan, Member Politburo<br/>Standing Committee</p> <p align="center"><b>June 1994</b></p> <p>Wu Yi, Minister, Foreign Trade &amp;<br/>Economic Relations</p> <p align="center"><b>July 1994</b></p> <p>Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister</p> <p align="center"><b>September 1994</b></p> <p>Chi Haotian, Minister of Defence</p> <p align="center"><b>November 1996</b></p> <p>Jiang Zemin, President of China</p> <p align="center"><b>November 1997</b></p> <p>Wei Jinsheng, Member Politburo<br/>Standing Committee</p> <p align="center"><b>April 1998</b></p> <p>Gen Fu Quanyou, Chief of China's<br/>armed forces</p> |

**Table 2: Joint Working Group on Boundary Question, 1989-1998**

|                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| First Round: Beijing<br>July 1989                | Held in the backdrop of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's historic visit and India's continued support to China despite Western sanction following its Tiananmen Square crisis.                                                                                                                               |
| Second Round: New Delhi<br>August-September 1990 | The two sides started by ascertaining "the principles & perimeters" that should "govern the settlement of the border issue." Set up the first critical "mechanism" that initiated periodic meetings between Indian and Chinese military commanders to "maintain peace and tranquility" along the borders. |
| Third Round: Beijing<br>May 1991                 | With minority government of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar having just faced disqualification of its Foreign Minister, V.C. Shukla and the general election approaching (in June 1991) neither side was expecting any major decision.                                                                     |
| Fourth Round: New Delhi<br>February 1992         | For the first time senior military officials were part of the JWG that decided on twice-a-year military commanders meet at Bumla and Spanggur in June and October. They also agreed for setting up "hotline" links between these commanders.                                                              |
| Fifth Round: Beijing<br>October 1992             | Trying to increase frequency of their meetings, the JWG met twice in 1992 which hastened major decisions in the next round of talks.                                                                                                                                                                      |

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|                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sixth Round: New Delhi June 1993    | The JWG agreed (a) to open two new border trade points at (i) Namgya in India's Himachal Pradesh and (ii) Zhuba in China's Tibet; (b) suggested measures for increased transparency about mutual military positions and activities along the LoAC. |
| Seventh Round: Beijing July 1994    | Among other things the JWG recommended measures to avoid troop concentration on border and setting up more meeting points between their military personnel on the border.                                                                          |
| Eighth Round: New Delhi August 1995 | For the first time, two sides agreed to dismantle four military posts in the Wangdong area which was the first concrete action in terms of their proposed military disengagement on the border.                                                    |
| Ninth Round: Beijing October 1996   | The JWG agreed to expand their CBMs and recommended for two more points for annual meetings between their military commanders on the border: (i) Lipulekh in the middle sector and (ii) Dichu in the eastern sector.                               |
| Tenth Round: New Delhi August 1997  | The two sides ratified their Agreement Extending CBMs to military field (November 1996) and exchanged instruments of ratification.                                                                                                                 |
| Eleventh Round: Beijing             | [Dates for meeting could not be finalised until March 1999]                                                                                                                                                                                        |

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Table 4: Sino-Indian Trade for post-Pokhran-II trends  
(in thousand US dollars)

| Month of the Year | Indian Exports | Indian Imports | India's balance | Total Trade | Increase/decrease |
|-------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------------|
| January 1998      | 56,799         | 61,426         | - 4,627         | 118,225     | —                 |
| February 1998     | 109,237        | 63,941         | + 45,296        | 173,178     | + 47 %            |
| March 1998        | 138,009        | 69,186         | + 68,823        | 380,373     | + 120 %           |
| April 1998        | 91,838         | 101,584        | - 9,746         | 193,422     | - 49 %            |
| May 1998          | 77,522         | 102,364        | - 24,842        | 179,886     | - 7 %             |
| June 1998         | 70,543         | 71,469         | - 74            | 142,012     | - 21 %            |
| July 1998         | 63,862         | 84,186         | - 20,324        | 148,048     | + 4 %             |
| Total of 7 months | 607,524        | 554,560        | 52,964          | 1,162,084   | + 16 %            |

*Note:* Table based on half-yearly estimates on Sino-Indian trade by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), New Delhi.

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# SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF UIGHURS IN XINJIANG (CHINA)

*Sheripjan M. Nadirov*

## INTRODUCTION

Uighurs are one of the ancient Turkic speaking people with very long history, difficult life but very rich culture and tradition. They live in the Central Asian region. Many experts in oriental studies have been studying the history of Uighurs. The study of the cultural monuments of Uighurs led to the establishment of entirely new branch of the oriental studies-Uighur studies. In the scientific research of history of Uighurs two scientists occupy the prime position - Yumus Claprat of France and Nikita Bachurin of Russia. Nineteenth century was the period of intense research of the history and ethnography of the Uighurs. Several scholars who published the scientific works include A. Kazembek, Ch. Valikhanov, V. Grigoriev, V. Radlov, D. Pozdneev. The scientific expeditions of Grum-Grzhimailo, M. Pevtsov, V. Roborovsky, etc. to Eastern Turkestan in XIX century were very fruitful and provided significant materials on history, life and culture of Uighurs. The archaeological researches conducted in Eastern Turkestan were organised by Regel, Klements, Yadrimtsev, etc.

Apart from the Russian scientists who were researching Eastern Turkestan many foreign scientists A. Stein from England, S. Hedin from Sweden, A. Gruenvedel and A. Le Coq from Germany, Grenar and P. Pellio from France, K. Otany and Toru Khaneda from Japan, Philippo de Philippini from Italy, etc. visited Turkestan to discover the history of the region and study the life of people there. In the twentieth century, a number of scientific works were published on the history, ethnography and culture of Uighurs by S. Oldenburg, V. Bartold, S. Malov, A. Bernstam, L. Goumilyov, D. Tikhonov, S. Klyashtorny, V. Shakhmatov, etc. Nowadays many foreign scientists such as J. Roudelson, M. Dillion, Sh. Roberts, K. Warikoo etc. do research on the history and culture of Uighurs.

“Uighur” ethnonym and its synonyms are known since the times of Oguz khan (III century B.C.), Ptolemy (II century B.C.), V. Rubruk and Marco Polo. The establishment of the state in the Central Asian region is related to the establishment of Turkic Khanates. In the middle of VII century A.D., the first Uighur Khanate was established in Northern Mongolia (647-687). In VIII century the new powerful empire - the Uighur Khanate was established in Eastern Mongolia (744-840) that played a significant role in the political life and events in Central Asia during the century. After this Khanate collapsed, Uighurs left the area attached to Orkhon river. Most of them moved to south west to Gansu and Turfan. After settling down at the new place in X-XII centuries Uighurs established several independent states : in Gansu, Ganzhou, in Turfan - Uighur Idikut and state of Karakhanids (932 - 1165) with its capital in Balasaghun. A small number of Uighurs moved to area attached to Aral Sea, to Amu Darya river. Nomad Uighurs living in Mongolia used the written language since VII century and settled Uighurs living in Eastern Turkestan used the written language since V century.

Uighurs who moved to oases with developed urban culture and agricultural traditions were assimilated with local Indo-European population. Iranian population had always exerted strong influence on the ancient civilisation on the Asian mainland. The nomad Uighurs who assimilated with local population handed to them its name and language. The process of the formation of the Uighur ethnos was completed in XIV century. The basis for Uighur nationality was eastern Iranian, ancient Uighurian and other Turkic speaking tribes. After the invasion of Mongols in XII century, the Uighur state was forced to join the empire of Chingiz khan. In XVII century Eastern Turkestan fell under the power of Jungar Khan and in XVIII century under the rule of Ching empire. In XIX and first half of XX century, there occurred several rebellions. In the second half of the XIX century, the Kashgar Khanate and Ili Sultanate were established. Towards the end of XIX century, Russia had occupied the area attached to Ili river and later handed it back to China in accordance with the agreement signed in St. Petersburg in 1881. During the years 1881 to 1884 the mass migration of the Uighurs, Dunghans and Kazakhs

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to Russia took place. In 1933 an independent state of Eastern Turkestan in the southern part was established which existed for three months. In 1945 after “the Revolution of Three Districts,” the Eastern Turkestan Republic was declared as an independent state (1945-1949). In 1949 after the Chinese revolution, the People’s Republic of China was established and Xinjiang became a part of China. In 1955, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was declared as a province of the PRC.

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is situated in the north west part of China. Its surface is over 1.6 million square kilometers and occupies one-sixth of the whole of China. XUAR is rich with natural resources including wide number of minerals : iron, copper, aluminium, zinc, manganese, chrome, lead, mica, asbestos, etc. The XUAR has the largest coal reserves in the country. There are significant reserves of oil, salt etc. The region produces a range of agricultural commodities. The following crops are cultivated : winter and summer wheat, rice, maize, gaoling, barley, millet besides cotton, oil, maize, beet, sugar, hemp, tobacco. This region is well known with its melons, water melons and grapes. In XUAR there are factories and plants of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, coal, oil, chemical, sugar, paper, textile, leather, tobacco industries. Besides there are food processing and livestock production, consumer goods and defence industries.

### **DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION**

At present the population of XUAR consists of 16,327,048 inhabitants. The Uighurs constitute 47.14% of all population, Hans- 37.76 %, Kazakhs - 7.45%, Dunghans - 4.5%, Kyrgyzs - 0.96%, Mongolians - 0.93%.<sup>1</sup> The demographic factor in China plays important role and makes very strong influence on the social and economic development of the country. The unprecedented growth of the population in 1950s and 60s made the Chinese government to undertake strict measures for population control. Population control programme was formulated which is being implemented countrywide. At present this programme is closely connected to the economic development of China. The campaign on the birth rate control is conducted under the

“Later, Seldom, Less” slogan in three directions : a) increasing the marriage age; b) 4-5 years intervals between birth of children; c) limiting the number of children in one family.

Since 1976, the measures for birth control among the Han nationality have been implemented. In the cities and towns it is allowed to have one child and in the rural areas only two children. The demographic policy of China is carried out through ideological education and is connected to economic and administrative benefits for one-child family as well as with penalties for the families having more children. In 1988 the local government of the XUAR issued “The Temporal Decree on Planned Procreation among National Minorities.” Taking into account the small number of the national minorities, these nationalities have been given privileges in this population planning : in the cities and towns they are allowed to have two children and in the rural areas three children. Exclusive rights are given to those ethnic groups whose number does not exceed fifty thousand people.

Let’s see demographic ratio in details. The life span of Uighurs is much lower than that of Han population and is corresponding equal to 60 - 72.5 years. The mortality ratio among Uighurs is considerably higher than among Hans due to the social, economic, environmental, natural and other factors.

1. **Social and Economic Factor** : Most of the Uighurs live in rural areas. Comparing to the industrial areas in the rural ones the social and economic development as well as health care system are lower.
2. **Environmental Factor** : The environmental situation is getting worse. The environmental balance is upset due to the nuclear weapons tests at the Lop Nor testing site. Though the moratoria was announced in order to stop the testing, yet the environmental situation is not expected to improve immediately. The population who have lived in the area close to the testing site will feel the consequences of the nuclear testing for long time due to high mortality among children and severe illness of the population. Xinjiang is still relatively safe from environmental point of view but

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plans for its economic development are likely to threaten the environment of the region.

3. **Natural and Climatic Factors** (Taklamakan desert, Tarim and Turfan Depressions) : These factors make unfavourable influence on the health of the entire population that affect the cardio-vascular system, leading to increase in mortality. The major reasons of mortality are problems in cardio-vascular, breathing, blood circulation systems.

- In 1987 almost 800 people died in Lop, Cherchen, Keriya, Khotan and Charkilyk and the reason is unknown;
- In 1988 the International Health Care Organisation announced that about 4,000 people had died in Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar and the reason was unknown as well;
- In 1988 the *Mingbao Daily* (Hongkong) reported that 20,000 mutated children were found in the area attached to the nuclear weapon as testing site;
- In 1991, 160 children were born with eye cataract in Khotan
- The growth of the child mortality in XUAR amounts to 200%

Thus despite the fact that the national minorities have privileges within the framework of general policy on birth control, the high mortality rate, particularly child mortality, low life span result in the lower growth of population.

**Table 1 : Population of 6 Nationalities in Xinjiang<sup>2</sup>  
(in Thousands)**

| Year | Hans    | Uighurs | Dunghans | Kazakhs | Mongolians | Kyrgyzs |
|------|---------|---------|----------|---------|------------|---------|
| 1949 | 292     | 3,291   | 126      | 444     | 53         | 66      |
| 1994 | 6,164.8 | 7,697.3 | 740      | 1,217   | 151.9      | 156.2   |

A comparison of the population growth in the XUAR between 1949 and 1994 (45 years) indicates that there has been relatively small increase of Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian and Kyrgyz population. Secondly, Hans have increased by 21.1 times and Dunghans by 5.8 times. In fact it is not the natural growth of Han and Dunghan population, but a result of the migration process.

Since 1940 the migration of Hans to the region increased by 8% annually which resulted in the increase of Chinese population from 200,000 up to 6 million. At present the Chinese population almost equals to the number of the Uighur population.<sup>3</sup> The results of the demographic policy could be foreseen not in the beginning of its implementation but later that can be clear from Table 2.

**Table 2 : Population growth of 6 nationalities in Xinjiang  
(in % during 1993-1994)<sup>4</sup>**

| Years              | Hans | Uighurs | Dunghans | Kazakhs | Mongolians | Kyrgyzs |
|--------------------|------|---------|----------|---------|------------|---------|
| 1992<br>to<br>1993 | 2.28 | 3.93    | 3.48     | 3.59    | 3.36       | 4.68    |
| 1993<br>to<br>1994 | 2.12 | 1.42    | 1.11     | 1.72    | 1.81       | 1.28    |

As one can see from the Table 2, the growth of the Uighur population was higher till 1993 than that of the Han population, whereas between 1993-1994 the growth of Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongolian and Dunghan population declined due to the impact of demographic policy and birth control. At the same time the growth of the Han population in 1994 was higher than that of other nationalities despite the privileges given to national minorities in the implementation of demographic policy. Thus the higher growth of Han population is due to increase in the migration of Han population. The population growth in XUAR, Tibet and Inner Mongolia is determined not by natural movement but by permanent migration of Han population that changes the ethnic structure of these national regions. Since 1949 till 1990s the migration process was mainly oriented towards northern and eastern parts of the region. The migration changed the ethnic and social structure of the population as well as the demographic situation in the region since the overwhelming majority of migrants are young people. The majority of the urban population of the XUAR belongs to Han nationality. Only in southern parts of XUAR as well as in Kuldja and Turfan, Uighurs are in majority.

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**Table 3 : Nationality Structure of the Districts in the  
XUAR in 1994 (in %)<sup>5</sup>**

| District                    | Uighur | Han   | Kazakh | Dunghan | Kyrgyz | Mongolian |
|-----------------------------|--------|-------|--------|---------|--------|-----------|
| Ili Kazakh                  | 16.01  | 44.33 | 26.32  | 8.09    | 0.47   | 1.92      |
| Ili County                  | 26.90  | 32.70 | 23.13  | 10.81   | 0.76   | 1.42      |
| Tarbagatay                  | 4.63   | 57.83 | 25.13  | 6.54    | 0.23   | 3.73      |
| Altay County                | 1.82   | 42.38 | 50.53  | 3.43    | 0.01   | 0.97      |
| Boratola<br>Mongolian Dist. | 13.34  | 65.30 | 10.32  | 3.25    | 0.02   | 7.03      |
| Sandji-Huai<br>District     | 4.13   | 74.76 | 8.35   | 11.51   | 0      | 0.36      |
| Khamit County               | 20.27  | 66.26 | 9.45   | 3.04    | 0      | 0.44      |
| Bayangol<br>Mongolian Dist. | 34.90  | 54.63 | 0.12   | 8.54    | 0.02   | 4.65      |
| Turfan County               | 73.0   | 20.20 | 0.04   | 6.61    | 0      | 0         |
| Aksu County                 | 77.04  | 21.66 | 0      | 0.84    | 0.48   | 0.02      |
| Kyzylsu<br>Kyrgyz Dist.     | 64.63  | 4.56  | 0.01   | 0.08    | 29.56  | 0         |
| Kashgar County              | 89.76  | 8.75  | 0      | 0.15    | 0.17   | 0         |
| Khotan County               | 97.13  | 2.67  | 0      | 0.06    | 0      | 0         |

As one can see in the Table 3 the migration process has resulted in the domination of the Han population over the local nationalities in northern and eastern parts of the XUAR. It is only in the southern and western parts that Uighurs are still in majority. The practice of replenishment of the labour resources by bringing in surplus labour power from the inner regions of China is continuing. Since 1990s, the direction of migration has been changing. Now Hans have started to move to the southern and western parts of the XUAR, a) to prevent the separatist tendency in the highly volatile area of southern XUAR, b) to increase the role of these parts in the economy of entire XUAR as well as of 'China'.

**Table 4 : The Uighur Population's Proportion by Districts  
in 1991-1994 (in %)<sup>6</sup>**

| <b>District</b>             | <b>1991</b> | <b>1994</b> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| XUAR                        | 47.23       | 47.14       |
| Hi Kazakh District          | 16.25       | 16.01       |
| Hi County                   | 27.29       | 26.90       |
| Tarbagatay County           | 4.73        | 4.63        |
| Altay County                | 2.07        | 1.82        |
| Boratola Mongolian District | 14.17       | 13.34       |
| Sandji-Hui District         | 4.06        | 4.13        |
| Bayangol Mongolian District | 35.80       | 34.90       |
| Khami County                | 20.80       | 20.27       |
| Turphan County              | 74.25       | 73.0        |
| Aksu County                 | 78.45       | 77.04       |
| Kyzylsu Kyrgyz District     | 64.77       | 64.63       |
| Kashgar County              | 91.17       | 89.76       |
| Khotan County               | 96.62       | 97.13       |

As one can see in Table 4, the migration has resulted in the reduction of the proportion of the Uighur population in XUAR on a permanent basis.

Taking into account the increase of the Han population (despite the implementation of the policy of strict birth rate control), density of population in central and eastern provinces of China will only expedite the migration process into national regions. Thus differentiated demographic policy conducted towards the national minorities by the government of China has the following outcome :

- a) The government carries out very strict demographic policy towards Han population. However, their growth in the XUAR is not determined by natural growth but increasing migration.
- b) The demographic policy towards the national minorities is more positive. They have got a number of privileges (depending on the number of children in one family). However, despite these privileges, the growth of national minority population will remain lower than

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that of Hans since : i) the mortality rate, children mortality particularly, is very high among national minorities as well as their life span is lower than that of Han nationality; ii) the growth of the Han population is due to their increased migration.

### **ECONOMIC SITUATION**

Social and economic problems of XUAR of China are the part of general problems in China that have followed the economic reforms. Due to the large area of China, these problems have different territorial features which require different regional policy. Concerning the XUAR the social and economic problems depend on its distinct regional features, i.e. the specific economic and geographical location, its unique natural resources and complicated ethnic composition with the native population still comprising majority.

At present the share of XUAR in the total population of country is 1.3%, in annual national income 1.3%, in GDP 1.8% and in oil industry 4.5%. In the industrial sector the lead role is played by the so called "Three Large Branches" - oil, light and textile industries. These branches are the major resource for earning foreign currency and thus play significant role in solving financial problems besides producing half of the GDP of the region. These branches are linked to the overall approach of the economic development of the XUAR not only in the framework of northwest China but the entire Central Asian region in keeping with the approved concept of establishing new northern zone of opening economic relations with the adjoining CIS countries. Oil industry takes the first place in the GDP. However, its share in total production has declined for the last 10 years from 22.9 to 21.5%, whereas the share of the textile industry increased from 12.4 to 18.4%.<sup>7</sup> Together with it the metallurgy, chemical and tanning industries play important roles nowadays. The power industry, engineering and food processing industries have a tendency to decline. Thus the textile, oil, chemical and non-ferrous metallurgy form strategic export not only for the XUAR but for the whole of China. The investment policy for the XUAR adopted by the government of China is based upon these facts.

The implementation of the regional co-operation is mainly determined by the level of banking system that regulates and monitors internal and inter-regional processes. The banking system of China started to move in that direction in early 1980s when besides the only National Bank of China, four systems of management had been established and their further evolution was conducted on the basis of macro, meso and micro regulations. The National Bank of China started playing a role similar to that of the National Bank of the USA, i.e. carrying out fiscal and currency operations, whereas the crediting functions were handed over to specific banking institutions. In the initial stage of the economic reforms in China, the transition of banking system, introduction of new forms of organisation and labour payment in agricultural sector, succeeded. After 10 years the major task was to pay attention to strengthening the viability of large and medium scale public sector undertakings, laying stress on restructuring their economic activity and structure of management, acceleration of reform in financial and banking systems, further development of the market on production means, gradually changing and improving the system of payment as well as method of management of investments. Later there was emphasis on the development of socialistic commodity oriented economy and implementation of the reforms in the fields of planning, capital investment, materials, external trade etc.

Despite the problems and contradictions that aggravated during the last few years, China has become one of the leaders in world economy since the western business is deeply integrated into Chinese economy and role of China in the Asia - Pacific region has essentially grown. In our opinion it is one of the largest achievement of conducted reforms and guarantee of its forward development. Certainly all this positive change in China increases its chances in the inter and sub-regional co-operation with Kazakhstan and other CIS countries. The main features of the industrial companies in the XUAR are the following :

- Irregular industry location, determined either by their concentration near the raw material resources or by the transport network available;

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- Monopoly role in some branch of industry (mining, processing and light industries);
- Concentration of industries in new lands on the basis of labour resources attracted from other provinces of China;
- In the economy of the XUAR the centralised companies play significant role. Such companies produce approximately half of GDP of the XUAR.

In 1988, 81.7% of the GDP was produced by public sector industries, 14.5% by collectives, 2% by private and 1.8% by other companies and in 1994 the share of public companies was equal to 74.6%<sup>8</sup>. Despite the development of production, the economic effectiveness of industries in the XUAR, particularly the large and medium scale industries, depend on the machinery and technological equipment available, which is responsible for the slow economic development of XUAR. For instance only 13 leading industries in XUAR reached the highest standards set in the country. Technically speaking, only 8.23% of equipment meets the world standards set in early 1980s, 27.8% of equipment meets highest domestic standards, 30.29% of equipment is very old. Over 70% of all equipment was domestically produced in 1960s and 70s. 45.3% of product was produced by hands, 15.8% of labour was mechanised and only 1.55% was done with automatic equipment. Over 70% of technological operations were carried out by ancient methods, complete processing was not carried out and the main product was raw materials and semi-finished products, etc. The effectiveness of the equipment in the engineering plants was equal to 40%, on the metallurgic plants 30 to 35%, in the power industry 62%. All production is with power capacity and consumption is exceeding the national standards by 65.6%. Labour productivity was lower by 75 to 80% than in the entire country.<sup>9</sup> Urumchi, Shihedzy, Kashgar, Kulja, Sanzhi, Korla, Aksu have emerged as the modern industrial bases of Xinjiang. The products manufactured there satisfy the demands of local population and are also exported to other regions of country and abroad.

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# INDIA AND CHINA : UNKNOWN ASPECTS IN CULTURAL INTERCOURSE

*Priyadarshi Mukherji*

India and China, the two most ancient civilizations that have survived till today, have been dwelling peacefully across the Himalayan heights like two sisters for ages. They have interacted harmoniously that eventually resulted in the crystallisation of two cultures. The socio-linguistic intercourse virtually transcended the physical barriers. Time and space could not impede their contacts that spoke more of amity than of acrimony. The rich legacy of Sino-Indian contacts, unknown hitherto, would certainly lead us to conclude that there is a pressing need to rewrite our history often plagued by prejudice till today.

Here is a brief introductory account of Sino-Indian contacts through ages with an attempt to inspire the readers in doing further research in the field.

## CONTACTS IN THE 15TH CENTURY

On 15 November 1993 a Chinese naval training ship named *Zheng He* anchored at Mumbai on a five-day goodwill visit to India. We are also aware that Kochi is home to the exquisite Chinese fishing nets. But how many of us actually know how these nets reached Kerala? There is an interesting link between the name Zheng He (Cheng He) and the Chinese fishing nets in Kerala.

In the early years of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China was an economically developed country. Envoys and officials, traders and merchants from different parts of the world used to visit China in the hope of developing trade relations. In order to strengthen contacts with the outside world, the Ming emperor Zhudi (1360-1424) decided to send his envoy on a sea voyage abroad.

A power eunuch and an expert in sea navigation—Zheng He (1371-1435), whose original name was Ma Sanbao, was given the title of

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‘Zheng’ by the emperor. A believer of Islam, Zheng He hailed from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. He undertook seven voyages within a span of three decades, touching more than thirty kingdoms on his way to the Western Ocean (*Xiyang*).<sup>1</sup>

Leading a mammoth crowd of twenty seven thousand eight hundred personnel comprising sailors, army commanders, soldiers, physicians, interpreters and artisans in a grand fleet of sixty two ships<sup>2</sup>, Zheng He set off on his voyage from Liujiagang—a maritime port in Jiangsu province, in 1405 A.D. He passed along southern Vietnam, Java, Sumatra and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and finally reached Kerala. Zheng He bartered porcelain, silk, iron and copper wares, gold and silver for the specialities of those regions.

However, Haraprasad Ray points out that Zheng He’s voyage with a grand army was certainly not a peaceful mission. After the setting up of an empire by the Mongols<sup>3</sup>, this was once again an attempt towards hegemonistic expansion, now by sea. This theory can be exemplified by the fact that a Sinhalese king, who had refused to comply with the terms and conditions set by Zheng He, was abducted to China and later beheaded. A new king of Zheng’s choice was enthroned.

The co-voyagers Ma Huan, Fei Xin and Gong Zhen<sup>4</sup> recorded the natural conditions and socio-cultural characteristics of various kingdoms on their way to Xiyang. They made minute observation of the contemporary social order and folk customs of different peoples of that era. Zheng He undertook six more voyages, 1407-1409, 1409-1411, 1413-1415, 1417-1419, 1421-1422 and 1431-1433. He went up further across the Arabian Sea to the east of Africa, the Red Sea and Mecca. He also anchored at Tamralipta (now known as Tamluk) of Bengal. This ‘Sea Silk Route’ of Zheng He set a milestone in the history of Sino-Indian contacts with special reference to Kerala.

### THE LINGUISTIC KINSHIP

Kochi (Cochin) and Kozhikode (Calicut) were the sea-ports where the Chinese junks anchored. Kerala’s trade relations with China

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developed during the first half of the 15th century, much before the arrival of Vasco de Gama (1498). In the process of interaction with China, Kerala received various Chinese trade items, one of which was the fishing net. Bengal too received quite a few items from China. The names of these items in Bengali and Malayalam amply reveal their Chinese origin.

In Bengal, 'chinabadam' (groundnut), 'chinamati' (China clay, porcelain), 'chinapatka' (small stringed-firecrackers), 'chinangshuk' (Chinese silk) etc indicate their association with China. So in Kerala, as 'chinala' (Chinese fishing nets), 'chinachatti' (frying pan), 'chinachempu' (arum), 'chinikzhangu' (sweet potato), 'chinabharani' (big jars used to preserve pickles) etc.

It is fascinating to note that besides all these, there is certain linguistic affinity between some particular words in Chinese and Malayalam which constitute basic concepts. For example, the word *ni* means "you" in both the languages; *chechi* in Malayalam corresponds to *chieh-chieh* which means 'elder sister'. The word *ittiri* prevalent among Keralite Muslims, corresponds to *yitianr* in Chinese which means 'few' or 'a bit'; *ikka* corresponds to *keke* in Chinese meaning 'elder brother' might very well be an Arabic loan word. A unique phenomenon can be observed in the words-*chaya* and *teila* in Malayalam. *Chaya* which means tea meant for drinking, has its origin in north China where it is called *ch'a*. Whereas *teila* which means 'tea leaves', has originated in south China. In fact, in this context we can very well see that English *tea* or French *the* have been derived from the south Chinese word *t'e*.

China, which the Chinese considered to be the centre of the earth, became the abode of Buddhism and the storehouse of Buddhist scriptures. To the Chinese, India became the sacred land of wisdom; the fruit of heaven, etc. Buddhism became the carrier of wisdom. And thus came different new concepts and words into Chinese vocabulary directly from Sanskrit. The Chinese are good at translating new concepts from the essence point of view. The Chinese language has also assimilated new words in its vocabulary which have been transliterated instead of being translated. Following is a list of such loan words and concepts :

|     | <b>Sanskrit</b> | <b>Chinese</b>       | <b>English equivalent</b>                                                    |
|-----|-----------------|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.  | samsara         | <i>lunhui</i>        | transmigration                                                               |
| 2.  | samgha          | <i>seng</i>          | assembly of priests (Buddhist)                                               |
| 3.  | patra           | <i>po</i>            | alms-bowl of the Buddhist                                                    |
| 4.  | dhyana          | <i>ch'an</i>         | contemplation, meditation                                                    |
| 5.  | bodhi           | <i>p'u-t'i</i>       | supreme wisdom or enlightenment                                              |
| 6.  | Buddha          | <i>fo</i>            | Buddha                                                                       |
| 7.  | arhat, arhan    | <i>luohan</i>        |                                                                              |
| 8.  | Bodhisattva     | <i>p'u-sa</i>        |                                                                              |
| 9.  | bhikshu         | <i>pi-ch'iu</i>      | Buddhist mendicant, monk                                                     |
| 10. | bhikshuni       | <i>pi-ch'iu-ni</i>   | Buddhist nun                                                                 |
| 11. | Sakya           | <i>shih chia</i>     | Buddhism                                                                     |
| 12. | Mahayana        | <i>Ta-sheng</i>      | Great Vehicle                                                                |
| 13. | Hinayana        | <i>Hsiao-sheng</i>   | Little Vehicle                                                               |
| 14. | karma           | <i>yin-kuo</i>       | (lit.) cause and effect;<br>preordained fate                                 |
| 15. | hetu            | <i>yin-yuan</i>      | cause                                                                        |
| 16. | karuna          | <i>ts'i-pei</i>      | compassion, mercy                                                            |
| 17. | bhiksha         | <i>she, shih-she</i> | alms, bestow in charity                                                      |
| 18. | kama            | <i>yu, yuwang</i>    | lust, desire                                                                 |
| 19. | kalpa           | <i>chie</i>          | 4,320,000,000 years between<br>the creation and destruction of<br>the world. |
| 20. | Brahma          | <i>fan</i>           | the first person of Brahminical<br>Trinity, pure and clean.                  |
| 21. | kshana          | <i>ch'ana</i>        | minutest fraction of time                                                    |
| 22. | Yama            | <i>yen-luo</i>       | the King of Hell                                                             |
| 23. | jambu           | <i>yen-fu</i>        | a fabulous tree with triangular<br>leaves.                                   |
| 24. | Jambudvipa      | <i>yen-fu-t'i</i>    | (Primarily refers to) India; nations<br>of the East.                         |

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|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 25. bhagya, adrishta | <i>ming, mingyun</i> | destiny, fate                                                 |
| 26. Om               | <i>wan</i>           | sound embodying good fortune and virtue.                      |
| 27. Amitabha         | <i>Omit'ofa</i>      | may Buddha bless us; merciful Buddha.                         |
| 28. namah            | <i>nan-wu</i>        | to trust in....                                               |
| 29. Apsara           | <i>fei-t'ien</i>     | flying fairies of the Paradise                                |
| 30. Shiva            | <i>Shih-p'o</i>      | the Hindu god of destruction                                  |
| 31. Durga            | <i>nan-chin-mu</i>   | to Mother who brings an end to calamity; Hindu goddess.       |
| 32. Avalokitesvara   | <i>kuan-yin</i>      | the one who hears the prayers of the world; Goddess of Mercy. |

The list is seemingly endless. The words listed above are mainly related to Buddhism or Buddhist philosophy or something related to India.

### **CONTACTS AND PARALLELS IN THE FOLK REALM**

The Dragon Boat Festival in China has parallels in Manipur and Kerala. Understandably, Manipur has geographical and cultural proximity with China. But Kerala most probably got deeply influenced by Zheng He's voyages and some Chinese customs as this.

The well-known Beijing Opera depicts tales from Chinese classics. The actors and actresses paint their faces with various colours. Red stands for bravery and honesty; white represents the villain, harsh and severe; and so on. Similarly, Kathakali dancers in Kerala too paint their faces. They enact episodes from Ramayana or other legends. But how Kerala and China established kinship in regard to colours representing human characters, is indeed unknown. However, Zheng He's visit to Kerala might be a decisive factor in this respect.

The Water Sprinkling Festival, prevalent among the Dai and Achang tribes in Yunnan province, originated in India among the Brahmins in the form of religious rites. The old people, unable to bathe in the rivers, were given sprinkles of water by their progeny. This was an act of atonement for sins. Subsequently this became a folk custom. Later this custom migrated to Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and the Dai region of China.

The custom of singing in antiphonal style, known as *duige* (tui-ke) among the Chinese minority tribes of Zhuang and Miao, has its parallel in eastern India. The battle of wits or a struggle by the virtue of argument and reasoning is well known even among the young girls of the Zhuang tribe in Guangxi province. Such battle of wits is equally popular in Bengal till today. *Kavigan*, or the songs of poets is actually a form of debate in the form of songs. These song-debates often dwell upon philosophy, religion, social ethics, dualism of past and present, etc.

Phallism was and still is a popular form of worship today in various societies. As the phallus of the Hindu god Shiva is worshipped in India, the female phallus or *yon*i of Nuwa is worshipped by different tribes in Yunnan province of China, and also by the Vietnamese. Goddess Nuwa is believed to have created man with clay. She is seen also as a Mother protecting man from deluge. Nuwa's lower part of the body is conceived as of a snake as noticed in Han brick-paintings. So do we find the intertwined body of Nag and Nagini in the sculptures of the Belur temple in Karnataka. Both Nuwa (in companion with god Fuxi) and the Nag-Nagini duo are symbols of child-givers. The *yon*i of Parvati, that is believed to have fallen on earth as a result of the *tandava* of Shiva, is propitiated at Kamakhya temple on the Neelanchal hills in Assam. Sterile women are believed to be blessed with a child by the goddess. This is also a vestige of phallic worship.

The custom of bullfight is prevalent among the Miao tribe of Guizhou and Yunnan provinces of China. The villages pool fund to buy big sturdy bulls and feed them. On the day of bullfight, villagers gather and burst crackers. They also feed the bulls with sweet wine and blindfold them with tree-leaves. The bulls are brought together and the leaves are removed. The victorious bull is draped with a band of red silk. Whereas, in India, bullfights are still seen in the district of Purulia in West Bengal. However, this custom is gradually getting out of practice. Such bullfights have nothing in common with fights between bulls and the matadors as seen in Spain.

The floating of oil lamps in the river is a traditional recreation among the people of northern Jiangsu province in China. These lamps, known as river lamps, are made out of colourful exquisitely-designed papers.

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They are lit with wax, or with bean-oil at times. The lampwick is made of rush. The colt that killed the rain-denying evil dragon, is remembered by lighting lamps on the night of the 30th day of the seventh month of the Chinese lunar calendar. The practice of floating oil lamps in India is very popular. It is done to bring fortune and well-being for the dear ones.

Snake worship is perhaps the most ancient form of propitiation in the world. The deadly reptile with poisonous fangs evoked so much fear in the minds of the common people that side by side with the worship as a damage-control device, they conceived that utterance of the word 'snake' is an ominous act. In the eastern part of India, uttering the word 'snake' is a taboo especially in the evening. In Bengal and in parts of Orissa, snake is colloquially termed as *lata* (lit. creeper). In ancient China, snake was referred to as *t'a* (it), ideographically depicted as a snake under the roof. Traditionally, the snake, perceived as an insect in China, shows a semantic combination of 'insect' and 'it' in Chinese character though ideographically it stands as a hooded snake.

#### ***The Ethical Contacts***

Buddhism acted as a vehicle not only to carry the scriptures from India to China, but also transmitted the seeds of popular ethics through tales and fables. The famous *Panchatantra* tales influenced the Chinese so much that they transcreated ethical tales and fables of their own with indigenous flavour. So did the minority tribes in China who dwell near the border.

The Indian version of *Panchatantra* of a tortoise being carried by two storks is comparable with the Chinese version where a frog is depicted in the place of tortoise, geese instead of storks. In some parts of rural India, tortoise is eaten by the poor populace for protein. Whereas in China, frog is a delicacy. The creature falling from the sky due to its own folly is naturally seen as a gourmet's luck. Therefore the different choice in different cultures is only very natural.

Similarly, other stories of admonition against avarice and temptation are often steeped with typical Chinese flavour from the point of view of the role models-the personified characters through which moral lessons are imparted.

*The 'Sugary' Connection*

India has been a country that produced sugarcane since long. The juice extracted from sugarcane was eventually made into molasses, popularly known in India as *gurh*. To the Westerners it was 'the delicious Indian chocolate'. China, which was not a producer of sugarcane, used to import molasses from India. The famous Chinese Indologist Prof. Ji Xianlin of Beijing University has unravelled the history of sugar in many of his scholarly articles. It has now been understood that the red molasses after migrating to China underwent a thorough refinement and decolourization process that ultimately made it white. This technique of turning red molasses into white sugar migrated from China to India. Hence the conclusion why sugar in many parts of India is called *chini*, a term that indicates its Chinese origin.

*The 'Epic' Links*

The epic Ramayana did not confine itself within the Indian frontiers. It crossed over the snowy mountains, sailed across the sea and reached the south-east Asian people. The impact had been so great that the tribes inhabiting the tropical Yunnan came up with tales exactly or almost similar to those of Ramayana. The tribes such as Yi, Bai and Dai are among those who tell and retell stories with characters that entirely correspond to Rama and Sita.

The influence of Indian literature on that of China had been immense so far as the Buddhist philosophy is concerned. The Chinese vocabulary became enriched with many Sanskrit terms, either translated or transliterated according to the need and convenience of the hour.

The Chinese people, essentially very chauvinistic in terms of their cultural superiority, were aware of the basically sinister intentions of the morally inferior sea-farers from the West. Therefore, the terms like *yangguizi* / *yang-kui-tzu* (foreign devils, a term used in pre-liberation China for foreign invaders); *yangnu* (worshipper of everything foreign) etc. were coined spontaneously for the white-skinned marauders who crossed the ocean to inflict harm upon the Chinese people; and the servile

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followers who acted as traitors to their own people. The term *yang* originally means ocean, and has a connotation which means foreign or Western.

However, India did not fall into the purview of this definition of foreigners. India was regarded as a sacred land, the birthplace of Buddhism. Hence India was referred to as *Hsi-t'ien* (the Western Paradise), or *Hsi-yu* (the Western Domain). Out of veneration, India was also given different names like *Tien-chu* (the Heavenly Bamboo), or *Tien-chu-kuo* (the Country of the Heavenly Bamboo), or *Hsi-chu-kuo* (the Country of the Western Bamboo) etc.

Prior to the 7th century A.D., India, a civilization built along the River Indus or Sindhu, was called in Chinese as *Shen-tu*. However this word was represented by two characters that were *Shen* (body)+*tu* (poison) which took care of the name Sindhu in respect of phonetics but not in terms of semantics. The great Chinese monk Xuan Zang (Hsuan Tsang) during his studies in India in the first half of the 7th century A.D., found the name *Shen-tu* to be damaging for the image that India and already got from her preaching of Buddhism. So he gave a new name to India, that is, *Yin-tu* which semantically was insignificant. It simply was an attempt to transliterate the word *Sindhu*. Later this name also came to represent another word, that is, 'Hindu' which was nothing but a modified derivative of *Sindhu*. Thus we see how the Chinese had held India in high esteem.

### **THE COLONIAL IMPACT**

The colonial domination by the British over Asia, especially over India and China brought about horror, misery and prolonged struggle for freedom. The British merchants forced the peasants in India to cultivate poppy. Then the opium was shipped to China for 'domestic consumption'. Not only opium was transported from India to China, but many helpless people from India were conscripted to unknown lands. The tall sturdy men from the Sikh community were sent to China. Some were posted in Hong Kong, others in Shanghai.

### THE FUTURE OUT LOOK

Can the people on both sides of the Himalayan divide afford to forget the amity they had cherished for more than a thousand years? The socio-cultural bond that had united the people of India and China must be properly cultivated without resorting to political gimmicks. It is for the future of our progeny that we should find the ancient roots of ties between us. The principles of peaceful coexistence can be found by refreshing our memories by reviving the bonds that kept us as good neighbours for ages.

As the saying goes, "Old is gold", it is upto us to look into the wisdom of men in olden days, how they cherished friendship; to properly assess how to rectify our errors on both sides, to restrain ourselves from showing arrogance, doing chauvinistic gestures or unnecessarily projecting cultural superiority over the other. The pragmatic and reserved nature of the Chinese people, and the idealistic and frank character of the Indian people should be synthesized well so as to play a constructive role with a view to the next millenium. Each can appreciate and assimilate the merits of the other and thus reconstruct the bridge of all times. The cultural intercourse that went on uninterrupted between the Himalayan twins, should once again be revived for our mutual benefit.

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1. In those days the marine expanse between Borneo and Africa was known as Xiyang.
2. The biggest ship measured 146 m. in length, 60m. in width, had 12 sails and could accomodate a thousand men, and needed 200-300 sailors to row it.
3. The ruling Mongols were known as Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) in China.
4. MaHuan accompanied Zheng He in his 4th, 6th and 7th voyage, and was his interpreter. He wrote a book named *Yingya Shenglan* (Visits to the Ocean Shores). Fei Xin went with Zheng He on four voyages. He wrote a two-volumed book named *Xingcha Shenglan* (Records of the imperial Voyages). Gong Zhen went as an official aide to Zheng He. He wrote a book named *Xiyang Fanguozhi* (Annals of the Alien Lands in the Western Ocean).

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# GANDHI THROUGH THE CHINESE EYES : THE ECHOES OF GANDHIAN MOVEMENT IN CHINA

*B.R. Deepak*

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), who led India in a long march to freedom was the product of history - the history of the Indian movement. He was a revolutionary but did not bring this revolution through the barrel of gun but with his weapon of *ahimsa* or non-violence, non-cooperation and *satyagraha*, for he saw violence as an expression of mindlessness and hatred. Gandhi adapted himself to the Indian realities after returning from South Africa, tried to rediscover India's past and shed social evils in the society which made an immediate appeal to the ordinary masses. This is the reason why Gandhi was successful in uniting the masses in our freedom struggle. In words of Spear "He could persuade the masses to follow the classes because they believed him to be a good Hindu, a great soul; he could persuade the classes to accept his Hindu and, as many of them thought, his primitivist habits because it won them the masses."<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, he was not a Hindu bigot. He criticized it when he found it discriminatory not only in his speeches or articles but in practice also. For example he threw off the holy thread when he saw that the fourth *varna* was deprived of this practice. The people of other religions held Gandhi equally in great esteem.

In the pursuit of truth, Gandhi spearheaded his attack on British through his powerful weapon of *ahimsa* and *satyagraha* that came to be seen in many shapes and forms such as Non-Cooperation and civil disobedience etc. This was a new kind of revolution the entire world was watching with great curiosity and interest. There was no dearth of bard, who sang the eulogies of Gandhi abroad as well as in India, especially the idealists and the humanists. But the criticism against him was equally sharp and sometimes even hostile. His success was deemed to be "success of the reactionary forces and triumph of reactionary policies in India"<sup>2</sup> and his movement as "the mascot of bourgeoisie"<sup>3</sup>

which others said was sacrificed to two forces of landlordism and industrialism. No doubt Gandhi was a complex personality but he stood among the masses, spoke their language and understood their weaknesses. He said in August 1942, "I have travelled all over India as perhaps nobody in the present age has. The voiceless millions in the land saw in me their friend and representative and I identified myself with them to the extent that it was possible for a human being." It was this identification of Gandhi with the masses that those who did not understand Gandhi or Indian realities at that particular time failed to understand that what makes a London educated barrister adapt himself to these realities, thus attributed his adaption to 'primitive habits'. The major thrust of the freedom struggle since 1919 was based on Gandhian concept of *Satya* (truth) and *Ahimsa* (non-violence). There were two great tides in our freedom struggle during the 20's and 30's of this century. These being Non-Cooperation of 1920-22 and the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-34. As in India the strategic debate continued on Gandhian movement, in China where it also found its echoes amidst encomium and criticism. The Chinese people who had joined hands with Indian patriots and revolutionaries against imperialism attached utmost attention to the developments in Indian freedom movement under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

#### **EARLY CONTACTS OF GANDHI WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE**

The Chinese people came into contact with Gandhi during his days in South Africa. But most of them were workers and the relation they had with Gandhi was that of a client and a lawyer. In China his name went unnoticed. Nevertheless, a few learned people and nationalists knew that there was a certain man from India in South Africa who had shown concern for the Chinese workers. Zhang Taiyan, a close associate of Sun Yat-sen who joined hands with Indian revolutionaries in Tokyo received a letter from an overseas Chinese which he mentioned in an article entitled *The Hope of India's Upsurge*. Being the editor-in-chief of *Minbao* (People's Tribune) he published this article in this paper. Zhang

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wrote : “our compatriots in Johannesburg have remarked: when the British ordered Chinese labourers for registration, a certain Indian barrister was furious and told them, in any event if I see a Chinese being imprisoned that will be a big insult to me, if needed I will argue for you people as lawyer, with all my wisdom and energy and will secure justice for you without charging a single penny.”<sup>4</sup> Chinese people saw the spirit of this man as resurgence of India and greeted India for this. Though he knew that this man was an ‘ Indian barrister ’ but didn’t know the name Gandhi. In his works Gandhi had mentioned about his contacts with Chinese people in South Africa at many places. Here are a few to support the statement. On December 19, 1907, the Chinese Association in Transval convened a meeting to thank Gandhi for the services rendered by him in the crises faced by the Asian community there. It was attended among others by about 400 permanent Chinese residents. The acting chairman of the Chinese association J.L. Wengsee presided over the meeting.<sup>5</sup> On November 27, 1907 he was invited to a memorial service held for Chow Kwai a Chinese who, feeling the degradation of having been submitted to registration had committed suicide. Gandhi was invited by the Chairman of Chinese Association Quinn to address the gathering. Gandhi had taken upon himself the responsibility of advising on the fight against the Asiatic Act. Gandhi had also acknowledged helping the Chinese labourers in South Africa. In a letter to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in June 1942 he wrote: “Long ago between 1905 and 1913 when I was in South Africa, I was in constant touch with the small Chinese colony in Johannesburg. I knew them first as clients and then as comrades. In the Indian passive resistance struggle in South Africa I came in touch with them in Mauritius also. I learnt then to admire their thrift, industry, resourcefulness and internal unity.”<sup>6</sup>

As soon as Gandhi entered the Indian politics he instantly became a name in every household. His techniques in the freedom movement found an immediate appeal abroad alike as they were different and unprecedented in any freedom movement as large as the Indian. In China also Gandhian movement became a subject of debate and was given a large coverage by various journals and newspapers.

**ECHOES OF NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT IN CHINA**

After having successfully launched the *satyagraha* against the racial policies of the government of South Africa, Gandhi came back to India in January 1915. The Indian National movement since then under the leadership of Gandhi took a new shape and turn. It was only after Gandhi took over the leadership of national movement that the Chinese people became familiar with the name-Gandhi, specially during the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920-22 and the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930-34. It was natural for both India and China to watch the development of either side as both had suffered the same fate specially after World War I, when both of them being the part of allies were kept away from their legitimate rights. In India they were ditched by the British when Churchill declared that Atlantic Charter didn't apply to India; while in China the allied powers successfully tried to carve out spheres of influence with the territory of China. Having suffered the same fate it was natural for both to study national developments on either. A revolutionary journal published from Guangzhou (Canton) remarked in 1923 : "India and China are two Asian giants who have suffered oppression. The only difference being that while India is ruled by only British, there are many countries who have cast their eyes to carve up China. Therefore the study of Indian situation and its ongoing movement will certainly be of great contribution to China."<sup>7</sup>

The Chinese media paid utmost attention and widely covered the Indian freedom struggle in various newspapers and journals. *Dongfang Zazhi* (Eastern Miscellany) took the lead and introduced Gandhi and Gandhian movement to the Chinese people. It covered extensively the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920-22 and Civil Disobedience Movement of 1931-34. From 1920-1926 this journal introduced some 20 articles. Roughly from 1905-1948, the *Eastern Miscellany* carried over 65 articles covering different aspects of Indian National Movement. In the beginning it carried articles such as *Gandhi-The leader of Indian National movement* (Yindu Minzuyundong Lingxiu Gandhi), *What is Gandhism* (Gandizhuyi shi shenme), *Biography of Gandhi*, *What is Gandhism* (Gandizhuyi shi shenme), *Biography of Gandhi* (Gandi

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Luezhuan), *Indian Movement for Self Rule* (Yindu zizhiyundong) etc. These articles introduced Gandhi and Indian National Movement. Some called him a 'Saint'<sup>8</sup> and others 'the Tolstoy of India'<sup>9</sup> and yet some others 'The emperor of India,'<sup>10</sup> etc. While writing on non-cooperation and non-violence some writers maintained that in order to accomplish the revolutionary task of 'resisting the evil forces and destroy the plunderers' beside resorting to violent revolution there is yet another moderate yet broadminded non-violent way advocated by Gandhi.<sup>11</sup> This writer is inclined to be satisfied with the views of Sun Yat-sen when he expressed his views on non-cooperation and non-violence. When Sun Yat-sen heard the news of Non-Cooperation Movement launched by Gandhi he felt delighted and inspired. In 1921, in a speech he remarked: "India has suffered the oppression of the British. But, now the people of India are putting a tough resistance to British with a new revolutionary thought. This progressive revolutionary spirit of the Indian people will never yield to the British till the finish".<sup>12</sup> He wanted the Chinese people to go the Indian way as far as the spirit of this movement was concerned. While speaking on non-cooperation he, however, considered it as a method of *passive resistance* which he said was one of the methods to resist the foreign rule. He remarked, "when we talk of resistance in any country, the methods involved are two. The first one is radical resistance which arouses the national spirit and struggle with alien rule for restoring the problems of people's democratic rights and livelihood; the second one is passive resistance which he said included non-cooperation by resorting to which national integrity of the country is maintained and the nation is saved from destruction."<sup>13</sup>

Sun Yat-sen highly approved of non-cooperation movement and agreed that the movement will severely attack the imperialist economically. However, since he himself was an advocater of an armed revolution, he was of firm belief that it was only the armed revolution which can overthrow the foreign rule. This of course he said in the context of the Chinese situation as during the Non-Cooperation Movement warlords in China were busy fighting for their spheres of influence. Yet there were people in China who advocated that China which was under the fury of warlords at that time

should draw insight from Gandhian thought. Writing on Gandhi, Fan Zhongyun, a contemporary scholar wrote, “His (Gandhi) emergence has become a matter of great interest, significance as well as a matter of great political, social, ideological and economic insight... He is against violence and advocates the liberation of India by spiritual force. This is really a thing of unprecedent in history. Recently the entire world has been greatly excited by Lenin’s achievements. People’s spiritual instinct is killed by the wild animal desire. There is the advocacy of bringing this revolution by recklessly destroying the life without making any distinction between the national character and nationalities of the countries. It is in this context that the rise of Gandhi is of greater importance for the Chinese people who at present are under the suppression of domestic as well as foreign warlords.”<sup>14</sup> Therefore, many in China aspired for the success of Indian freedom movement led by Gandhi. They looked for a free India which “after its independence would be of great help to the Chinese revolution. At minimum it will give China a moral and invigorate that revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people.”<sup>15</sup>

Some of the articles attributed non-cooperation movement to the British policies after the First World War and remarked, it was the ‘outcome of the erroneous British policy measures after the war.’<sup>16</sup> Some attributed the idea of non-cooperation and Gandhian principles to the amalgamation of Gandhi’s family background, religion and western humanism, yet others remarked, non-cooperation was “a practical policy measure established on the lines of self-respect, conscience and founded on the social and economic benefits of the people in society”. The writer also compared it with the October Revolution (1917) of Russia and remarked that this method was different from the use of “centralized violence” in Russia to solve the social problems; this is exactly where “the thought of social transformation of eastern and western societies is different.”<sup>17</sup>

The erroneous policy measures after the War in Pan Gangzhan’s article explicitly point to the Montague - Chelmsford Reforms and the draconian Rowlatt Act which authorized the government to imprison any person without trial and conviction in a court of law. The Jalianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919 was the outcome of this Act. In an article “what

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is Gandhism” Hua Lu called Gandhi a ‘saint’ and ‘The leader of Indian intelligentsia.’ He wrote : “It is at Gandhi’s advice that thousands of Muslims and Hindus have reconciled their animosities, and it is upon his inspiration that Indian people have put the foreign cloth on fire and have changed it with *Khadi* woven with hands.” He said that “Gandhi is capable of storming an invisible revolution.”<sup>18</sup> The article emphasized “What is Gandhism? In simple words Gandhism represents the life of integrity of oriental civilization. The Gandhian thought like Tagore’s advocacy of love for the life which finds its roots in religion, has more radically advocated the purity of soul and an idealist revolution.”<sup>19</sup> It further noted that this ideal revolution is put into practice by means of ‘Satyagraha’ and ‘non-violence’ which the writer deemed as ‘non-resistance’ but of ‘radical significance’. The commentator maintains that it is through these pacifist techniques and ‘weapons of peace’ that Gandhi has been successful in disseminating the thought of ideal revolution among the Indian people.

The British government took to repression. The movement was suppressed and by the end of 1921 all the important leaders except Gandhi were in jail. Gandhi had emphasized that the movement should be peaceful. However, in February 1922 in Chauri Chaura, Gorakhpur district of Uttar Pradesh, angry peasants burnt alive 22 policemen. As soon as news reached Gandhi the movement was withdrawn by him on February 11. The reason behind it what he said was “I wanted to avoid violence. I want to avoid violence. Non-violence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed. But I had to make my choice. I had neither to submit to a system which I consider had done an irreparable harm to my country or incur the risk of the mad fury of my people bursting forth when they understood the truth from my lips’.”<sup>20</sup> On March 10, 1922 he was arrested and sentenced to a six year jail term. Thus the Non-Cooperation Movement came to an abrupt end. When the Indian compatriots in Shanghai heard of Gandhi’s arrest they gathered for a prayer on April 6, and prayed for his early release. Indian shopkeepers observed a “bandh” that day. They brought out pamphlets requesting their fellow Indians to dissociate themselves from rendering any service to the British and defy their

registration in British Consulate. "This day the police arrested two Gandhi disciples and issued warrants against another... at midnight three Indians brought out yet another pamphlet written in English which asked their compatriots not to become slaves of the British."<sup>21</sup> Surprisingly in India there was not a ripple of protest anywhere in the country when Gandhi went to Jail.<sup>22</sup> Next year after a lull in the political arena, the Swaraj Party was formed by C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru. Some analysts in China termed this event as "turning non-cooperation movement to a constitutional movement". Das had agreed that the Congress should enter the Councils to wreck them from within by total obstruction of their proceedings, creating a deadlock which would force the British to concede further reforms.

### **ECHOES OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT (1930-34) IN CHINA**

After the withdrawal of non-cooperation movement by Gandhi in 1922 there was a lull in activities which finally was broken in 1927. The British government appointed Simon Commission to suggest if any further reforms were to be initiated in the system of government established after the Act of 1919. The members of the commission were all British and it was decided to boycott the commission at the annual session of the Congress held at Madras in 1927. The national freedom movement entered a new phase after the Lahore session in 1929 when the Congress adopted a resolution for complete independence. A pledge of independence was to be taken publicly all over India on January 26, 1930 and civil disobedience under the leadership of Gandhi was supposed to commence; at the sametime January 26 was declared as independence day. On March 12, 1930 Gandhi broke the salt law with the epic Dandi march and thus started the Civil Disobedience Movement. It may be noted that other national leaders including Nehru had doubted Gandhi's call to break the salt laws and make their own salt. As Nehru puts it, "we were bewildered and could not quite fit in a national struggle with common salt."<sup>23</sup> But after Dandi March the response of the public was tremendous and the movement spread like a prairie fire. It was at this time that Nehru and others were impressed by the call of Gandhi. Nehru

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records it in his own words : “As we saw the abounding enthusiasm of the people and the way salt making was spreading like a prairie fire we felt a little abashed and ashamed for having questioned the efficacy of this method when it was first proposed by Gandhiji.”<sup>24</sup>

In 1928 when Simon Commission reached India, the Chinese people showed their sympathy with India and rendered full support to the Indian cause. *Guowen Zhoubao* (National News Weekly) wrote, “The goal of the Indian people is to attain complete independence. This is also the reason why they have boycotted the Simon Commission. If the British still did not mend their ways and persisted in their traditional policy of highhandedness and treachery it will only amount to digging their own grave.”<sup>25</sup>

When the news of historic Dandi March and the commencement of Civil Disobedience Movement launched under the leadership of Gandhi spread in China it immediately found its echoes in Chinese media. *Eastern Miscellany* took the lead and carried almost 30 articles on Civil Disobedience Movement. Yu Zhi wrote in an article entitled *Indian Revolutionary Theory*, “The Non-Cooperation Movement of this time (Civil Disobedience Movement) also adheres to the principle of non-violence but from its defiance to law and taxes etc. its effects naturally are going to be tremendous. Not only this, the reason for the restoration of Non-Cooperation Movement is to deepen it among the masses. It will also redress the shortcomings of the constitutional movement (initiated by Moderates) coming down for many years.”<sup>26</sup> The British government as in previous years resorted to repression. All the important leaders including Gandhi and Nehru were imprisoned. About ninety thousand people were imprisoned within a year of the movement. When the news of Gandhi’s arrest reached China, the Chinese people expressed their shock and reprimanded the British government for this act. You Ren said in an article, “Gandhi is great as he is deeply loved and held in great esteem by the entire Indian nation, the British have still dared to arrest him. It is amply clear that the British government is adopting all oppressive means to check the Gandhian revolutionary movement.”<sup>27</sup> The author

further writes, Gandhi has not only received the sympathy of intelligentsia and proletariat but has also been able to get the support of the business class. The measures adopted by various political parties to deal with the British although are different, but their aim is one.<sup>28</sup> He remarked that “entire India has awakened, almost entire nation has jumped into this revolution, this time a fresh combat force of women has also joined this revolution. They are playing an important role and have contributed a lot to the movement. We can see that the awakening of the Indian nation is a heart moving and at the same time a soul stirring tale ! This is even clear that the wave of anger amidst revolution is spreading far and wide, the more the people join the more aggressive it is becoming, there is not breaking up of this wave the force of which is unswerving. I dare to say that this type of great revolutionary spirit will never succumb to any armed might.”<sup>29</sup> Great Chinese scholar Tan Yunshan who with Ravindranath Tagore founded Sino-Indian Cultural Society gave a much more vivid account of the Indian freedom movement in Chinese media as he himself was a witness to the developments related to freedom movement in India. While writing on the women’s participation in the movement he wrote, “Old and young, women and men, almost every one is a participant. At many places women have joined enmasse, are inspecting salt shops, foreign cloth and have participated in burning the foreign cloth.”<sup>30</sup> The writer observes that specially in a traditional society like India where women are oppressed and discriminated, it is really an extraordinary change that women are breaking all bonds and jumping into freedom movement.

Early in 1931, efforts were made by Viceroy Irwin (1881-1959) to persuade the Congress to join the Second Round Table Conference. An agreement was reached between Gandhi and Irwin according to which the government agreed to release all the political prisoners while the Civil Disobedience was to be suspended. The agreement was approved in Karachi session of the Congress in September 1931 and Gandhi went to London to participate in the conference but agreement couldn’t be reached. Gandhi returned back empty handed. The movement was revived but was finally called off officially in May 1933.

**CHINESE CRITIQUE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE**

The echoes of Civil Disobedience Movement in Chinese newspapers and journals could be said to have following three main characteristics. Firstly, the Chinese people supported and sympathized with the movement and Gandhi was held in high esteem and as a saviour of the Indian nation. Yu zhi remarked, "If we talk of social revolution in India, after Sakyamuni we do not find a man greater than Gandhi." The only difference this writer gave for these personages was that "the starting point for the Buddhist movement was religious motive while today the crux of new social movement in India is political and economic."<sup>31</sup> The writer termed this as a 'new religion' with everlasting vitality and thought, the ultimate aim of which is to overthrow the foreign rule.

This time the contributors studied and analyzed minutely the developments and future prospects of the Indian freedom movement. Some critics wrote why Gandhi had to make an issue out of salt law only? The author analyzed it and remarked, "non-cooperation touches upon various aspects, it is indeed very difficult to materialize everything in one stroke. The harsh and heavy salt tax and laws regulated by colonial authorities have brought untold sufferings to the Indian people. Gandhi leading the people to make salt and sell it freely and his appeal to the people not to buy government salt is aimed at breaking the salt law of the authorities, thus mobilizing the people and reaping the benefits. Once the salt law is broken, other laws and acts will follow. Non-payment of the salt tax and defiance of the government orders in reality is 'Non-Cooperation Movement.'<sup>32</sup> The articles of Tan Yunshan and Zhang Mingyang further correlated the Civil Disobedience Movement with other national movements ongoing in Asian countries like Korea, Vietnam, Philippines etc. They also criticized the hypocrisy of the Liberal Party headed by Macdonald in Britain and remarked that before coming to power they criticized the Indian policy of the Conservatives and aired the views agreeing to the Indian independence. But after coming to power they have not kept their words and continue to suppress the Indian people with the policy of high handedness.<sup>33</sup> When Gandhi returned empty handed from London some writers said that it was "victory of the British"

and criticized Gandhi for having “brushed aside the demands of revolutionary Indian masses.”<sup>34</sup> Secondly, the Civil Disobedience Movement in Chinese media couldn’t escape the influence of domestic politics in China particular, and Communist International in general. During the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-22) in China, communists and KMT headed by Sun Yat-sen had formed United National Front but during Civil Disobedience (1931-34) Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and KMT were engaged in a civil war. As a result, the radicals in China termed Gandhi as a ‘rightist’ and criticized his policy on non-violence. For them Congress in India was a political organisation of Indian bourgeoisie class which represented the interests of landlords and capitalists. The KMT in China was said to have represented the same class and same interests. Though both the parties talked of the liberation of the masses but in reality both represented the bourgeoisie interests. They went to the extent of saying that both the parties were the tools in the hands of the imperialists. The Communist International was of the same view. It called on the masses to oppose and expose these parties. Radicals wrote that Gandhi represented the interests of “landlords and industrialists.” What he is demanding is “autonomy for India not the independence!” and thus he wants to “reach the goal by political reforms”. On the contrary he is “least concerned about the economic reforms in the society,” this is precisely because this way he is “afraid of deepening the revolutionary movement of the masses.” The writer further said that the British were just looking for such “compromising elements” for their use; and attributed it as one of the reasons why Indian revolutionary movement had suffered setbacks in all those years.<sup>35</sup> Gandhian techniques might not appeal to this writer but Gandhi did think of upliftment of Indian society. His action program *Sarvodaya* speaks volumes about his efforts for the betterment of everybody. Moreover *Sarvodaya* itself envisages all round development of the society.

### **THE STRATEGIC DEBATE**

Both the Non-Cooperation (1920-22) and the Civil Disobedience Movement (1929-34) suffered the same fate. The former was withdrawn

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by Gandhi after violence broke out at Chauri Chaura and the latter in the wake of Gandhi-Irwin pact. Repression of the movement by British as well as orders of withdrawal issued by Gandhi led to considerable demoralization especially of the enthusiastic political workers. Subhash Chandra Bose wrote : “To sound the order to retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling point was nothing short of a national calamity. The principal lieutenants of the Mahatma, Deshbandhu Das, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai who were all in prison shared the popular resentment.”<sup>36</sup> Many thought that Gandhi had failed to give a proper leadership to the movement while some believed that Gandhi visualized that the growing militancy among the masses will weaken his leadership of the movement and the movement might slip into the hands of radicals and, therefore, in order to protect the interests of the landlords and bourgeoisie of which he was also a product, he withdrew the movement. Recent studies have claimed that Gandhi was right. One such study reveals that had not Gandhi withdrawn the movement, the repression of the people and crushing of the movement (as it happened in 1932) would have led to even greater demoralization.<sup>37</sup> The study emphasized the fact that since Non-Cooperation Movement was the first attempt of a nation wide mass struggle against the British, a serious reverse at this elementary stage could have led to a prolonged period of demoralization and passivity. However, the suspension of the movement should not be attributed to Chauri Chauara incident. According to Nehru, “All organisation and discipline was disappearing, almost all our goodmen were in prison and the masses had so far received little training to carry on by themselves... the Civil Disobedience Movement then (1920-22) and in 1932 was a very powerful and organized affair, this was lacking in 1921 and 1922 and there was little behind the excitement and enthusiasm of the people.”<sup>38</sup>

In China there was also a hot debate in the wake of withdrawal, as in India it led to the emergence of ‘Changers’ and ‘No Changers’. The former which included C.R. Das (1870-1925) and Motilal Nehru (1861-1931) asserted that nationalists should end the boycott of Legislative Councils, enter them, obstruct their working, expose their weaknesses

and thus use them to arouse public opinion. The latter which included Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel (1875-1950), Dr. Ansari (1880-1936), Rajendra Prasad (1894-1963) and others opposed Council entry and proposed to adhere to the constructive programmes proposed by Gandhi. The debate in China centred around such questions as : Was the movement launched in accordance with the Indian situation? What would be the repercussions of withdrawal? Would Gandhi and Gandhism save India from the British onslaught? In China, the United National Front had been formed against the feudal militarists and imperialists. The CCP had joined hands with KMT but was allowed to retain its separate entity, therefore, if India witnessed the emergence of 'Changers' and 'No Changers', in China it was the nationalists and the revolutionaries. Though there were differences of opinion on Gandhi and Gandhism, one thing that was common was that the Chinese had all their sympathies for the Indian masses and they wished for the success of Indian national freedom movement. This was precisely because they maintained that Indian Freedom Movement was spearheaded against the oppression and exploitation of the British colonialists and imperialists. Such view points are reflected in Tai Lei's article when he says: "The Indian bourgeoisie have already awakened and have taken the leadership of the national movement thus accomplishing their historic mission. The Indian peasants and newly resurgent proletariat class have also arisen against the British imperialism under whom they have suffered and have tried to hamper the development of the Indian economy. This is the reason that in recent years a fierce Indian National Movement has shaken the power of the British in India from its very roots." With regard to Gandhi's withdrawal of the movement the article remarked, "The more the British government make concessions to Indian bourgeoisie the more it will press for these. But at present they are still weak in strength, therefore, can't but seek peace with the imperialists."<sup>39</sup>

The second point of unanimity was Gandhi's ability to take all the sections of Indian society into confidence and make them join the freedom movement. In fact this was the greatest achievement of Gandhi throughout the freedom movement. Pan Gongzhan said in an article, "though the

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movement is a bloodless revolution but its force is gigantic which has left the British authorities helpless.” The reason he said lies in, “the people who have jumped in this movement are the people of entire India irrespective of young and old, men and women. They have forged unity against the British and have mitigated their religious differences. Though the British are cunning and crafty, let’s see how would they deal with Indian situation in days to come.”<sup>40</sup> The writer has given the credit of unity to the Indian people and its gigantic force against the British to Gandhi which he said has set out a momentum for the movement thus taking the Indian national movement to new heights. Some writers expressed their sympathy for Gandhi even after he withdrew the movement and gave all the credit for having started off the “revolutionary flames.” One commentator said, “The flames of revolution have already been torched, they will never extinguish, having made use of ‘bullets of thought’ against bombs, weaving in place of force and love against hate has enabled India to come close to the freedom.”<sup>41</sup> The writer was talking in the context of withdrawal of Non-Cooperation Movement and what ever he explained was on Gandhi and Gandhian techniques during the movement. Yu Zhi in yet another article hailed Gandhi’s achievements. He remarked, though the movement had failed but “having made the entire nation to adhere to the principle of non-cooperation and non-violence, is the achievement we cannot but attribute to Gandhi only.” He further commented, “The principle of non-cooperation has now found its roots in the minds of entire Indian people. The question whether the British would be able to govern and harness India in future is really a doubtful one.”<sup>42</sup>

Finally, some people remarked that the nature of the ongoing freedom movements against colonialism and imperialism in countries like India, China, Turkey etc. were of the same nature and called upon the progressive forces of all these countries to render mutual support and sympathy amidst the struggle. They also visualized that the colonialists and imperialists would use all repressive means to quell the movement and commented that this will not weaken the nationalist and revolutionary forces who were in command of the leadership. Hua Lu wrote, “If this

movement (non-cooperation) is successful, and enables India to attain independence from the British oppression, won't it then prove a new fact? This new fact in other words is : revolution, resistance to evil forces, and the destruction of plunderers, and this necessarily does not mean that you have to make use of violence for this."<sup>43</sup> However, there were people who severely criticized Gandhi for his non-cooperation and non-violence. Whereas the nationalists announced *Satyagraha* as the "strongest and sharpest weapon against aggression, the radicals denounced it as "a negative way of resisting the imperialist". Some said "it will strangle the revolutionary movement of the masses", yet others remarked that bourgeoisie can never lead the Indian national movement to victory". Sun Yat-sen had called the Gandhian spirit to mobilize and unite the entire Indian nation against British oppression as "the progressive revolutionary spirit of the Indian people." He had confirmed the role played by non-cooperation during the freedom movement but had deemed it as "passive resistance" which he said can't solve the problems of people's democratic rights and livelihood. In other words, it can't fetch freedom. Therefore he said, only armed revolution can overthrow a foreign rule. Yu Zhi, the author who described Gandhi as greatest after Sakyamuni wrote that the Gandhian movement has lost its original essence. He gave two arguments in his defence. Firstly, he said that 'non-cooperation has to be non-violent, but once it grows into a mass movement it will be difficult to restraint it from turning violent.' The writer cites the example of Chauri Chaura incident and expresses doubts over "implementing a complete peaceful non-cooperation movement." Secondly, "since the class interests are different therefore a clash of interests is unavoidable," specially between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The writer further says that in India different classes have joined this movement with their own interests.<sup>44</sup>

Sun Yat-sen's views on non-violence and armed struggle are understandable. Considering his background and the Chinese society, his armed struggle against the Manchus would not have been successful had he gone the Gandhian way; instead, he would have lost his head to the Tartars, who were hunting him for his life. And later during the time

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of the non-cooperation movement in India, he had to use force against the warlords in order to unify the Chinese nation. Though he called non-cooperation a pacifist technique but reiterated that it will “attack the imperialist economically,” at the same time “nation’s status is maintained and the nation is saved from destruction.”<sup>45</sup> But, for those who remarked that Gandhian ways “will strangle the revolutionary movement of the masses” it is clear that they didn’t understand the Indian realities and the national movement as such. It was only after Gandhi took the leadership of freedom movement that he took it to new heights and made it a movement of the masses. Gandhi had the will to fight and resist the British precisely as HuaLu had remarked in his article that Gandhi “had the courage to struggle. He made every effort for Non-Cooperation Movement, ran place to place and made speeches, had he lacked this fighting spirit of a revolutionary he would not have been able to do it at all.”<sup>46</sup> For the failure of the movement, some severely criticized Gandhi and commented that he lacked “political calibre” and deemed him as a ‘religionist’. However, the writer held him in reverence as a person and said that his thought was also legitimate. He wrote : “There is no doubt that Gandhi is a man of high moral integrity, his thoughts are also legitimate. But he is entirely a religionist, he lacks the calibre of a statesman.”<sup>47</sup> In the wake of the movement when two factions the ‘Swarajists’ and ‘No Changers’ emerged in the Congress, the same author expressed his concern for the unity of the Indian people. The writer noted, “The attitude of the two factions is becoming clearer and clearer. There are happenings of conflict and mutual attack, as a result of this, the strength of Indian national movement is not as it was before. If this continues the future of the Indian National Movement will really make others sad.”<sup>48</sup>

Despite of all these differences on Gandhi and Gandhian movement, the most striking feature of this debate was that everybody agreed that though the movement has ended in a failure, it has further strengthened and aroused the spirit of entire Indian nation. The freedom movement then was no longer confined to the intelligentsia or to the bourgeoisie. It spread to villages and the people gained self-confidence. Another fact which was confirmed was the unity among peoples of all walks of life

including the Hindus and the Muslims. As remarked by Nehru, “non-cooperation essentially was a passionate protest against British dominion of India and its action was to withdraw peacefully all support from the British government. It was based on the admitted assumption that British rule can’t exist in India without the support and the exploitation of large numbers of the Indian people.” On the failure of the movement, he said “non-cooperation didn’t die, nor can it die, it has come to India to stay.”<sup>49</sup> Nehru said logically that non-cooperation was a perfect scheme and no government can withstand it. However, he admitted that it required a tremendous deal of self sacrifice and forbearance.

The failure of the Civil Disobedience Movement even made the commentators sharpen their criticism towards Gandhi and his thought. The majority of them hailed his moral integrity and ideals but expressed doubts over his leadership qualities and the method adopted by him for mass movement. Tan Yunshan remarked, “no doubt that Indian people support and follow him, but his revolutionary methods have not shown much appeal to the people to follow it, many people worship him as a religious saint but refuse to accept him as a revolutionary statesman.”<sup>50</sup> Tan Yunshan substantiated his argument by citing the example of individual revolutionaries resorting to violent means. However, at that time this method didn’t prove effective. In the words of Nehru “the only effective means of action in order to impress the will of the people on any group or any power that oppresses them is action and there is no other method.” Nehru refuted the means of these individual revolutionaries as ‘acts of terrorism’ and said that these acts “show an extraordinary misconception of the situation.”<sup>51</sup> Nehru may be right in his perception, but the role played by these individual revolutionaries can’t be underestimated. They certainly aroused the feelings of nationalism and hatred against the British colonialists among the people. These were the people who got disillusioned and disappointed by the failure of the movement launched by the Congress. It’s unfortunate that our history books still refer to them as ‘terrorists’. But the same author, when he personally visited Gandhi in 1928 changed his entire approach towards Gandhi. He stayed with Gandhi in Sevagaon for a few days and even stopped eating meat

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at Gandhi's instance. At the end of an article attributed to the reminiscences of his first visit to Gandhi, Prof. Tan summarized the entire Gandhian thought in three words namely; 'Sincerity', 'Love' and 'Peace', and attributed non-cooperation, non-violence and civil disobedience to these three words. According to him, the genesis of non-cooperation lies in sincerity, non-violence in love and the civil disobedience in that of peace and thus refers all these movements by the name of 'Satya Movement'. Not only he says that 'Satya Movement' is a remedy to attain Indian independence but further calls it as great revolutionary movement which will rescue the entire world. In his opinion many a people had misunderstood Gandhi's Satya Movement'. They have gone on describing non-violence and non-cooperation as non-resistance movement and civil disobedience as passive movement, he says this was a gross error. He further says, "no matter whether there exists non-resistance or passive movement in the world but Gandhi's 'Satya Movement' can't be called 'non-resistance or passive'. On the contrary it is the movement of most powerful resistance and most radical in approach. The only difference being the power and method of his resistance and radicalism are different".<sup>52</sup>

The radicals in China also confirmed the progressive character of the non-cooperation movement but expressed doubt whether it will lead India to final victory. They gave their own explanation for it. Yu Zhi commented, "Gandhi's advocacy of non-cooperation movement and non-violence are complementary to each other and must go together, but once non-cooperation movement turns into a mass movement it is bound to face restraint." This way he said it is impossible to implement the peaceful non-cooperation thoroughly till the end. Another thing Yu Zhi emphasized was the unity during the movement, "but with various classes joining the movement with their own different demands the clashes of the class interests are unavoidable. Bourgeoisie have joined the movement as they independently want to develop capitalism, workers and peasants have joined it for the betterment of their status. When the workers will go on strike and peasants demand cut in taxes this would infringe upon the interests of the bourgeoisie and landlords, as a result a wedge will be

created among the contingents of non-cooperation. Therefore, it is impossible to have unanimity of the action.”<sup>53</sup> Yet some other commentators proposed that Indian leaders must arouse the national conscience and even join hands with the ongoing movements of other oppressed countries across the world who are also striving for their freedom. This spirit is reflected in Zhang Mingyang’s article when he criticized the voluntary imprisonment of the Indian leaders. He commented, “a revolutionary should have the spirit not to be afraid of entering the prison, however, at times, when there is no urgency to do so, a revolutionary leader must not put himself behind the bars. Therefore, at this time the imprisonment of Gandhi and others, some people suspect that they are moving away from revolutionary front and are seeking a temporary rest in the prison. Although this kind of criticism is not entirely responsible but at the same time reflect some truth in it. If India really wants its revolution to be successful it must even more courageously resist the armed oppression of the British Labour government, mobilize the consciousness of the entire Indian nation and join hands with various weaker nations of the world and put a united struggle and meanwhile improve its own revolutionary methods.”<sup>54</sup> The same author who was of the view that Gandhian techniques won’t fetch India freedom remarked in the wake of Gandhi-Irwin Pact that, “the trend has been set for further peaceful negotiations in cordial way. These negotiations would certainly have some results but these results as we see them now would not be of anything more than the dominion status. However, the writer stucked to his view point that “if one has to think in terms of complete independence of India, I am afraid that this won’t be the method to attain it.”<sup>55</sup> Later in an another article, analyzing the two round table conferences the author reiterated, “the past experience tells us that Indian freedom movement won’t be successful as long as cooperation between India and Britain is hailed and the peaceful measures are resorted to. Therefore, if the Indian people really want to be free they must once and for all finish the rule of British imperialism.”<sup>56</sup> Criticism was equally severe when Gandhi returned empty handed from the Round Table Conference. His failure was deemed as “an act of compromise” and “having brushed aside the demands of the revolutionary masses.” However, there were some hard core

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supporters of Gandhi. They viewed that Gandhi's act can't be said as 'compromise' or 'surrender'. Song Hua wrote, "Gandhi's attitude to the British has been the same throughout. It is not appropriate and truthful to say that he has submitted to the British". In Gandhi's support he further remarked, "why Gandhi is held in great esteem by the people across the world, this is precisely because he has a priestly spirit to fight and resist the imperialist, with his great moral principles and indomitable courage."<sup>57</sup>

The echoes of Non-Cooperation Movement and Civil Disobedience Movement found in Chinese press indicate that the Chinese people attached utmost importance to the Indian National Movement and its developments. They sincerely hoped for the success of Indian freedom movement and were of the conviction that sooner or later Indian people will throw the British off their soil. Gandhi attracted people of entire world to his principle of non-cooperation and non-violence or his 'revolutionary thought' as Sun Yat-sen puts it. In China he became a topic of serious debate and discussions among the intelligentsia, who while upholding his principle criticized his strange techniques adopted during the struggle. They expressed anguish specially when he called off the non-cooperation and civil disobedience at the cost of people and for no gains. However, as mentioned before the response to these two movements were influenced by domestic situation in China at that time to some extent. During non-cooperation of 1920-1922 in China, the United National Front had been formed in the wake of Lenin's speech of 1920 when he spoke in the Second Congress of Comintern that the newly founded Communist parties in the colonial world needed to cooperate initially with the more powerful bourgeoisie nationalist parties or groups who shared common aims of national unification and freedom from foreign control and exploitation.<sup>58</sup> Since both the Congress in India and KMT in China were bourgeoisie nationalist parties, the criticism to the failure of non-cooperation movement and Gandhi was not very sharp. During the civil disobedience movement, China was plunged into the civil war. The KMT headed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) launched five campaigns of 'encirclement and extermination' against the CCP between 1930-34. During this time the views of the radicals and

revolutionaries in China were severest against Gandhi and the National Congress. However, the common thing between the nationalists and the revolutionaries was that both had aspired for the success of Indian freedom movement. It was not strange as India itself had experienced the emergence of the radicals and pacifists.

Nevertheless, whether it was a support from the moderates in China or an attack from the radicals, all of them were anti-imperialist in nature. The moderates supported Gandhi and seemed to have developed a deep understanding of Gandhi and Gandhian movement. They compared his virtues and moral integrity with that of Confucius and Mencius and quoted from Confucian classics that Gandhi possessed “such a personality that would not be exploited by wealth, would not be wavered by poverty and would not be subdued by force and threat, such is the great personality of Gandhi with great heart.”<sup>59</sup> They were clear about his conviction to fight the British till end. The radicals also saw both the movements as anti-imperialist but attacked Gandhi when he withdrew the movements. They viewed it as an act of submission and humility. Gandhi was apprehensive of the radical approach. Later just after three years when the Japanese launched their offensive against China, Gandhi suggested for his weapon of resistance, but knew as he remarked in a discussion with the Chinese delegation which included Timothy Tingfang Lew, Y.T. Wu and P.C. Hsu on December 31, 1935 and January 1, 1939 that “they (Chinese) would not be ready to take up the new method (non-violence) and so they would be unsettled in the old. My interference would only shake them and confuse their minds.”<sup>60</sup> This was true to the spirit of Gandhi as he said “non-violence is impossible without humility” and he was very clear that China in arms can’t all at once give up arms and accept non-violence as its weapon”.<sup>61</sup> It may be noted that Gandhi never criticized the armed struggle of the Chinese people against Japan. He only said that it failed in the test of active non-violence but added, “this is no criticism of China, I wish the Chinese success. According to the accepted standard her behaviour is strictly correct”.<sup>62</sup> However, his heart was with the Chinese people since he knew what it is to lose is one’s liberty. In 1932, when Japan attacked north-east China, Gandhi

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said, “As regards Japan and China our sympathy is bound to be on the sides of the latter.”<sup>63</sup> He supported and appreciated the Chinese fight against the Japanese imperialist in order to restore their freedom and wished them success in their ongoing armed struggle. Therefore, the mutual support and sympathy at that time irrespective of divergent opinions from both sides was essentially sincere and was spearheaded against the imperialists.

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