Indo-Pakistan trade: Problems and Prospects

I.N. Mukherji

Central Asia: National, Regional and Global Aspects of Security

O. Kasenov

Architecture of the Jhelum Waterfront - Srinagar: Images and impressions

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The Himalaya is the embodiment of divinity, of nature in its splendour and of culture in the deepest sense of the word. The Himalaya has been inextricably interwoven with the life and culture of India since time immemorial. It has been the symbol of India’s spiritual and national consciousness. The Himalayan region stretching from the Hindukush in the north-west to Arunachal Pradesh in the east involves wide diversity of cultural patterns, languages, races and religious practices. Yet it has numerous common features like geographical contiguity, ecological adaptation based on uniform environmental features and a distinct pattern of hill economy. The imposing geographical features of the Himalaya did not prevent this region from being a complex of cultural interaction, movement of races, overland trade and communication. The Himalayan region has been the cradle from where ancient Indian culture including Mahayana Buddhism spread to different countries in Central, Southeast and East Asia. Such cross-cultural contacts were not confined only to religious philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism, these also included art, architecture, literature etc. Such movement produced a harmonious blend of cultures, arts, science and literatures.

The importance of Himalaya as the natural frontier of India in the north is immersed in Indian ethos and psyche. Kalidasa in his *Kumara Sambhava* has described the Himalaya as the measuring rod spanning the eastern and western oceans, thereby pinpointing the northern frontiers of India. Notwithstanding this traditional and historico-cultural understanding Western Himalayas being the contact zone between Central and South Asia, have served as the Gateway to India for numerous invasions and influences from Central Asia and West Asia. Even in contemporary times, India has had to experience successive military aggressions from Pakistan in 1947, 1965, 1971 and now in the from of proxy war in Kashmir, besides the Chinese military offensive in 1962 from across the Himalayas.
The very fact that boundaries of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, India and Myanmar converge along the Himalayas, lends a unique geo-strategic importance to this region. Its potential for instability and conflict is furthered by the ethnic-religious jigsaw prevailing in the Himalayas and trans-Himalayas where people of Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic faiths are concentrated in various areas and are vulnerable to extraneous influences. Any cross-border fraternisation of people of Xinjiang and Tibet in China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indian Himalayas from Kashmir upto North East, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, on ethnic and religious lines is a potential source of conflict in the region and a threat to the security of concerned states. With the disintegration of erstwhile USSR and the emergence of newly independent Central Asian states - all having predominantly Muslim population, a new geopolitical situation has arisen across the north-western Himalayas. Due to its geo-strategic proximity to South Asia and West Asia, Central Asia has emerged as a distinct geopolitical entity stimulating global attention and interest. The Central Asian states are in transition passing through an important phase of emerging and transforming into a new, social, political and economic order. All these states are engaged in building new national identities forming new patterns of alliances and associations and finding their place in the changed situation. The rise of Taliban to power in Kabul in September 1996 and the continuing conflict in Afghanistan has brought the region into the focus of global attention. Establishment of an extremist Islamic order in Afghanistan and the active involvement of militant Islamist Afghan Mujahed in cross-border terrorism and *Jehad* (Holy war), whether in Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Tajikistan or some other CIS countries, are important factors affecting regional security and peace. Besides, the continued state of civil war, shifting equations between rival groups and external involvement in Afghanistan, have serious implications for the socio-economic and political stability of the Himalayan and adjoining Central Asian region.

Apart from this security dimension, there have been signs of fissures in the social equilibrium in the region, as is evidenced by numerous movements for assertion of ethnic and religious identities. Similarly the
internal pressures such as increase in population, modernisation and tourism, deforestation, landslides, construction of big dams, limited agricultural resource base, adverse impact of modern means of communication and pernicious external influences have been posing threats to the equilibrium of the societies, polity and eco-cultural system in the Himalayan and adjoining Central Asian region.

This journal seeks to act as a forum for promoting objective and micro-study of various issues pertaing to the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, connected with its environment, resources, history, art and culture, language and literature, social structures, communication, tourism, regional development, governance, human rights, geopolitics etc. The Journal also seeks to facilitate a better understanding of all these issues by providing a local as well as specialists’ views and research reports. The objective is to promote the human, educational and economic advancement of the peoples of the region besides recording, preserving and enriching their ethno-cultural, literary and historical heritage.

First issue of HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES picks up an important theme, i.e. the Indo-Pakistan trade (1947-96), analysed comprehensively by Prof. I. N. Mukherji, which is hoped to generate the requisite momentum for bringing the people of India and Pakistan closer through strong and enduring bonds of economic cooperation, trade and commerce. Kasenov provides the Central Asian perspective on issues of national, regional and global security confronting the Central Asian states now. Similarly, the strategic challenges to Indian foreign policy in the post-cold war era are analysed in detail by L.L. Mehrotra. An exclusive paper on the architectural heritage of Jhelum waterfront by a Kashmiri architect records the sanctity of this ancient river for Kashmiris who built beautiful temples, mosques and buildings on the banks of the river. It is hoped to provide the necessary inputs to the planners and authorities of Jammu and Kashmir to restore the river to its pristine glory, which will in a large measure undo the damage caused by terrorism and religious extremism to the composite societal character of the valley.

K. Warikoo
INDO - PAKISTAN TRADE:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

I. N. Mukherji*

INTRODUCTION

India and Pakistan are the two relatively developed countries in the Indian sub-continent from the point of view of both economic and military capabilities. Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the relationship between the two neighbouring countries has remained tense and three wars have been fought. The adverse bilateral relationship between the two countries has also impacted on their bilateral trade relations. In 1985 both the countries became members of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In 1993 a South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed by all member countries of SAARC. All countries, having ratified SAPTA, the agreement came into force on December 7, 1995. SAPTA has thus been launched after a decade of SAARC’s existence. The success of SAPTA would very much depend on how far India and Pakistan are able to expand their mutual trade as well as trade with other member countries of SAARC. Data available for 1993 reveals that India and Pakistan accounted for as much as 52% of the total intra-SAARC trade. Apart from bilateral initiatives, both India and Pakistan have the opportunity to reduce barriers to their mutual trade through the mechanism of SAPTA.

This paper consists of three sections. In the first section Indo-Pakistan trade relations are examined since 1947 till date. The entire period is subdivided in three phases: (i) from partition of the Indian sub-continent to Indo-Pakistan war (1947-1965); (ii) the period of trade deadlock (1965-1975); and (iii) the period following the resumption of trade since December 1974. The second section examines trade flows between India and Pakistan since 1948-49. Subsequently the composition of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is examined during 1994-96. Since the volume of unrecorded trade as also trade

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through third countries between India and Pakistan is considerably higher than recorded bilateral trade, the same is also highlighted. The last section makes a few concluding observations.

**INDO-PAKISTAN TRADE RELATIONS**

*Partition to Indo-Pakistan War (1947-1965)*

Prior to the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, the economies of erstwhile India and Pakistan were complimentary in nature, being constituents of the same economic and political unit. India depended on Pakistan for raw jute, raw cotton, food grains and a few other raw materials. Pakistan on the other hand, being less industrially advanced, imported from India coal, textiles, sugar, matches, jute manufactures, iron and steel, and a few other manufactured products.

On August 15, 1947, the Indian sub-continent was partitioned and two sovereign states, India and Pakistan were carved out. Envisaging that the Inter Dominion boundary line could adversely rupture the long established economic relations, it was considered a standing necessity to maintain status quo in the matter of trade relations. The Standstill Agreement of August 1947 was an interim measure for the continuation of the pre-partition economic and commercial relations till February 20, 1948. It aimed at the removal of all types of impediments upon the movement of goods, people and funds along the frontier of the two countries during the specified interim period.

A Committee on Economic Relations (1947) came into being to examine matters regarding all trade and movement between the territories of the successor governments. The Committee recommended that the two governments should maintain a status quo regarding all matters affecting trade and movement between their respective dominions up to the end of the interim period, i.e., up to February 20, 1948. Under the terms of the Agreement, the two governments were not permitted to (i) change existing import and export policy, (ii) impose any restriction on the free movement of goods and remittances including capital equipment and capital, (iii) levy transit duties, (iv) interfere with the existing trade channels by monopolistic government purchases, (v) modify existing controls or introduce new controls, or (vi) interfere with the contracts between the nationals of the two states.
I. N. Mukherji

The Standstill Agreement however did not function as envisaged. In October 1947 restrictions were imposed by the Sind provincial government on the movement of a number of commodities in October 1947 which disrupted the entrepot services of the Karachi port in regard to the movement of a number of commodities essential to the Indian Union.3

The agreement on status quo was violated when Pakistan in its Aide Memoire dated 15 December 1947 demanded a share of the export duty on raw jute levied and collected by the Indian government at the port of Calcutta and a share of all the central excise duties levied and collected by the Indian government on Indian manufactures. The Pakistan government made it explicit that it was entitled to an equitable share of such duties by virtue of being the producer of more than 73 per cent of the raw jute produced in the two dominions and also by the fact that she consumed a considerable portion of the commodities produced in India. In response to Pakistan government’s claim, on October 30, 1947 the Indian government handed over an Aide Memoire to the High Commission of Pakistan explaining the stand taken by the Indian government. Therein it was stated that so long as any long term settlement is reached, the Indian government will be unwilling to make an exception in respect of an individual commodity such as jute. India had argued that such an arrangement could be administratively feasible only under a long term arrangement of the nature of a customs union. If Pakistan agreed to a customs union, India was ready to give it effect from August 15, 1947. But Pakistan did not favour the idea and on November 14, 1947, the spirit of the Standstill Agreement was completely flouted by Pakistan with her decision to treat India as a foreign territory for the purpose of levying export duty on jute exported from Pakistan. Further, import duties were levied on a few specified commodities of Indian origin.4

Under a new set of negotiations between India and Pakistan held under Inter Dominion Conference at Calcutta from April 15 to 18, 1948, the free flow of some perishable articles of daily consumption (covering fresh fruits, vegetables, fish, fresh milk and milk products) was guaranteed as also the transit facilities between the two countries.5

Following an Inter Dominion Conference held in Karachi in May 1948, an agreement valid for a period of one year from July 1948 for the mutual supply of certain essential commodities was reached.6 This was
the genesis of the first Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement signed on May 26, 1948. Since then till March 1960 India signed several bilateral trade and payments agreements with Pakistan. These Agreements are listed below:

(i) Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement, May 26, 1948;
(ii) Indo-Pakistan Payment Agreement, July 1948 to June 1949;
(iii) Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement, October 1948;
(iv) Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement, June 1949;
(v) Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement, April 21, 1950 to July 31, 1950 (extended up to September 30, 1950);
(vi) Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement, February 26, 1951;
(vii) Trade Quota Agreement, March 1953;
(viii) Trade Quota Agreement, September 1955;
(ix) Trade and Payments Agreement, February 1, 1957 to January 31, 1960;
(x) Trade and Payment Agreement, December 3, 1959 to December 2, 1960;

The main features of the trade agreements are summarised below:

1) The Indo-Pakistan trade agreements were initially for very short duration of a few months. The duration of these agreements was kept limited mainly owing to Pakistan’s insistence. The longest duration of the trade agreement was three years signed on February 1, 1957.

2) The trade agreements sought to achieve balanced expansion of trade between the two countries in essential commodities. The quantum of exports and imports were generally specified. The major items which India was required to supply Pakistan included: coal, cloth and yarn, steel, pig iron and scrap, paper and paper board, asbestos cement sheets, paints enamels and varnishes, tyres and tubes, leather and footwear, timber, jute manufactures, myrobalans, woollen and worsted goods, mustard oil, ground nut oil, toilet soap, flue of tobacco, cement, engineering goods, machinery, hardware, pharmaceuticals and biri leaves. The items which Pakistan was required to supply India included: raw jute, raw cotton, food grains, gypsum, raw hides and skins, rock salt, potassium nitrate, cattle, etc. Thus while India’s exports to Pakistan included a number of
manufactures, Pakistan’s exports to India consisted mainly of primary commodities.

3) Bilateral Trade Agreements were supplemented by payments arrangements. Thus under the Payment Agreement of July 1948, the Central Bank of each Dominion agreed to hold the other’s currency up to a limit of Rs.15 crores in order to accommodate a deficit in payments in either direction when payments from one Dominion to the other exceeded Rs.15 crore, a payment up to further amount of Rs.10 crore was to be made out of sterling held in the Bank of England in No.1 Sterling Account of the other.

4) The Trade and Payments Agreement signed in February 1957 introduced the “most favoured nation” (MFN) clause. It also provided for the continuance of border trade between East Pakistan and adjoining Indian territories. The commodities which were allowed to be sold in border trade free of customs duties and exchange control regulations were perishable articles of daily consumption.

The operation of the trade agreements during this period was subject to several constraints. Some of these are highlighted below:

i) Pakistan wanted its share of Indian export duties on raw jute and excise duties on manufactures. India proposed either a customs union or long term agreement which was unacceptable to Pakistan. This led to the breakdown of Standstill Agreement between the two countries.

ii) Both the countries failed to adhere to their supply commitments. Pakistan was unable to meet her commitments to India in respect of food grains, cotton and jute, nor could India meet the full quantity of coal, steel, asbestos, cement, tyres and tubes etc, required by Pakistan.

iii) Transit arrangements between the two countries were not working satisfactorily. It was found that Indian goods in transit from Calcutta to Assam and Tripura across East Bengal were being detained under order of the Pakistan provincial government in East Pakistan.

iv) On September 18, 1949 Great Britain and other countries of the sterling block including India devalued the pound sterling, but Pakistan did not follow in order to realise better value for its products supplied to India. This led to the cessation of trade between the two countries.
countries during January to March 1950. During this period Pakistan entered into trade agreements with Japan, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Egypt and France, in order to find alternative supplies and markets. ⁷

**Trade Deadlock (1965-1974)**

After the expiry of the Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement on March 20, 1962, Pakistan’s role in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 led to strained political relations between the two countries. The Indo-Pak war of 1965 led to the further decline in the total volume of trade between India and Pakistan and ultimately all trade relations between the two countries were completely banned. However, in 1966-67 and 1967-68 some trade did take place because of unilateral opening of trade channels by India, but it was negligible. There was hardly any trade between 1968-69 and 1969-70. In the meanwhile the Bangladesh crisis came up which led to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.

During 1965-73, India was reported to have made some inquiries for the resumption of trade with Pakistan. Steps were taken in the ministerial meeting in Rawalpindi in February 1966. In May 1966 India unilaterally lifted ban on trade. However, due to the absence of a positive response from Pakistan, trade remained suspended except for occasional exchange of goods through third countries. Another attempt to resolve the deadlock was made at the second UN conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi, but Pakistan’s insistence on the Kashmir issue settlement acted as a spanner in these efforts. ⁸

**Resumption of Trade (Since December 1974)**

The Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972 paved the way for normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. Under Article 3 of the Simla Agreement, a protocol was signed in New Delhi on November 30, 1974, lifting the embargo on trade between the two countries with effect from December 7, 1974. Under this protocol, trade between the two countries till July 1976 was confined to official agencies and restricted to a list of agreed items which was finalised in 1975. In July 1976, private sector of Pakistan was allowed to trade with India which was however, stopped abruptly in 1978. It was during this brief period of relatively liberal trade that a large variety of Indian goods found market in Pakistan. One of the main attractions then, were Bajaj scooters. This affected the interest of a
Pakistani company which enjoyed dealership of importing Italian made
Vespas, since the Indian Bajaj was much cheaper. That company used its
clout to have private sector trading banned in 1978.9

Since the beginning of the eighties, Indian and Pakistani trade bodies
started showing interest in mutual trade and trade delegations were
exchanged. In November-December 1981 Pakistan paritcipated, for the
first time, in International Trade Fair in Delhi. In November 1981 a 22
member delegation of the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (FPCCI) visited India and had detailed discussions with the
representatives of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and
Industry (FICCI). The FICCI delegation, led by its president paid a visit to
Pakistan in February 1983. This delegation visited important trade and
industrial centres besides holding a meeting with FPCCI and its affiliate
bodies. Such exchanges paved the way for starting private sector imports
of 42 items from India through Trade Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) since
February 1986. Necessary rules and procedures were set for opening letters
of credit by private sector parties through TCP on submission of a fee.

The Indo-Pakistan joint commission set up on March 10, 1983 was
again a step forward in the promotion of mutual trade. In the decade of
the eighties, the two countries decided to allow their private sector to
enter into their mutual trade. The agreement to this effect was reached
between the Pakistan Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning,
Mahbub-ul-Haq and India’s Commerce Minister, Arjun Singh at a meeting
held in New Delhi on November 15, 1985. Later, as a follow up action of
the above decision, the Finance Minister of India, Vishwanath Pratap Singh
and his Pakistan counterpart, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq held discussions on
February 8-9, 1986 at Islamabad. A customs notification issued by the
Pakistan government on April 24, 1988 increased the number of items
importable from India by the private sector to 249 items. The number of
such items was further increased by 322 items as per customs notification
dated July 26, 1989. Since then seven more items have been added to the
list, making a total of 574 items.

In 1991 when Nawaz Sharif government initiated a programme of
economic liberalisation by allowing free movement of currencies, foreign
investors started showing great interest. One of their major demands had
been to urge the Pakistan government to open up trade avenues with
India and with the entire region of South Asia. According to available
INDO - PAKISTAN TRADE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

information, Toyota Corporation of India has set up joint venture projects in both India and Pakistan. Japanese sponsors now want their Pakistan based venture to be allowed to market small vehicles to India and their affiliates to be given permission to sell their products in Pakistan. Pakistan’s importance to these multinational corporations is its geographical location which provides access to the sub-continent on the one hand and to 300 million people in Central Asian States on the other, with the affluent Middle Eastern countries lying nearby and a consumer market of another billion people with the People’s Republic of China not very far off.

The issue of opening up trade with India became all the more pressing when Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union emerged as independent countries. These countries are keen to have close trade and economic relations with Pakistan and more keen to get overland access to India and other countries in South Asia through Pakistan.

These factors compelled the Nawaz Sharif government to have a fresh look at the Pakistan - India trade relationship. It was in late 1992 that the government constituted a committee comprising business leaders and bureaucrats to work out a policy framework for opening trade with India. The committee was headed by Chairman, Export Promotion Bureau and included Presidents of the FPCCI, Mian Habibullah, a former president of Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, (LCCI), Salahuddin Sahaf, Chief Executive of Pakistan Investment Board (PIB), Ishaq Dar and Secretaries of the Commerce, Finance and Foreign Ministries. While the business members of the Committee were all set for opening up trade with India (after taking necessary safe-guards), the bureaucrats insisted on maintaining present level of relations. The Committee held three meetings and was reported to be giving final shape to a policy framework for opening up trade with India when Nawaz Sharif’s government was ousted on April 18, 1993.10

The endorsement of the agreement on South Asian Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) at the Eighth SAARC Summit held in New Delhi from May 2-4, 1995 is yet another landmark providing opportunity for India and Pakistan to expand their mutual trade under a multilateral framework. The Agreement has been signed by the Council of Ministers as far back as in 1993. However, there has been inordinate delay in the exchange of National List of Concessions, particularly by Pakistan. The smaller countries such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh which were much...
more keen to see the Agreement through, put pressure on Pakistan to expedite the issue of its offer list. The delay by Pakistan in issuing its list of concessions reflects its dilemma as to how best it could reconcile its discriminatory trade policy with India to its obligations as a Contracting State under SAPTA as also its obligations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Article 3 of SAPTA text provides for most favoured treatment which envisages that any concessions offered by one contracting state to another would need to be multilateralised for the remaining states. In this context Pakistan had before it two options:

(i) either to lift its discriminatory trade policy vis-a-vis India so as to enable it to offer its National List of Concessions from among products requested concessions by other states (not being restricted to its positive list with India) or (ii) to retain its discriminatory trade policy with India, thereby restricting its National List to products contained in its positive list with India. Largely due to deteriorating political relations between the two countries, and largely under the negative influence of its bureaucracy, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), it chose the latter option. This has put an undesirable constraint on the possibility of enhanced trade between Pakistan and other member countries of SAARC under SAPTA.

**INDIA - PAKISTAN TRADE**

**Recorded Trade**

The official trade flow between India and Pakistan since partition is presented in Table 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports To Pakistan</th>
<th>Imports From Pakistan</th>
<th>Balance of Trade</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>76.68</td>
<td>107.38</td>
<td>-30.70</td>
<td>184.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>43.30</td>
<td>44.05</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>87.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>30.60</td>
<td>43.87</td>
<td>-13.27</td>
<td>74.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>45.25</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>-42.25</td>
<td>132.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>30.90</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>+9.02</td>
<td>52.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*I. N. Mukherji*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>8.01</td>
<td>19.28</td>
<td>-11.27</td>
<td>27.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>-18.81</td>
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<td>1956-57</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>-7.84</td>
<td>23.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957*</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>-6.74</td>
<td>20.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958*</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>+1.01</td>
<td>13.63</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.59</td>
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<td>15.80</td>
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<td>1960-61</td>
<td>9.51</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>-4.50</td>
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<td>13.86</td>
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<td>23.31</td>
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<td>1981-82</td>
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<td>-49.75</td>
<td>59.65</td>
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<td>1982-83</td>
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<td>32.28</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>27.79</td>
<td>-16.02</td>
<td>39.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>28.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>26.59</td>
<td>-11.95</td>
<td>41.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>14.95</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>-12.55</td>
<td>42.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>20.12</td>
<td>30.59</td>
<td>-10.77</td>
<td>50.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>35.02</td>
<td>72.17</td>
<td>-36.15</td>
<td>108.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>51.39</td>
<td>53.79</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
<td>105.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>73.60</td>
<td>84.49</td>
<td>-10.88</td>
<td>168.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>98.82</td>
<td>141.28</td>
<td>-42.46</td>
<td>240.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>147.08</td>
<td>375.51</td>
<td>-228.43</td>
<td>522.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It will be observed that the recorded trade flows between the two countries which was at its peak in 1948-49, started to decline thereafter as both countries tried to reduce their trade dependence on each other. There was negligible trade between 1966-1975 following the Indo-Pak war of 1965 until the resumption of trade in December 1974 following the Simla Agreement in 1972. Since then the level of bilateral trade between the two countries remained at a low level until 1988-89. Later the level of bilateral trade picked up following the permission of the Government of Pakistan to private sector imports from India on a list of approved items. Also to be noticed is that in most of these years India’s trade balance has been negative with Pakistan except in 1952-53, 1976-77 and 1978-79 when the Government of Pakistan has permitted unrestricted private sector imports from India. Since 1993-94 India has started having growing trade surplus with Pakistan.

**Composition of Trade**

In Table 2 India’s top fifty products exported to Pakistan during 1995-96 has been presented. It may be observed that the most important products exported by India to Pakistan in 1995-96 were: meal of soyabean solvent extracted, iron or lumps, ginger fresh, bidi wrapper leaves, cardamoms, vegetable seeds for plants, cutch extracts, chilly, iron ore fines, phthalic anhydride, etc.

Between 1994-95 and 1995-96 there took place some change in the relative rankings of some of the products exported. Products such as chilly, phthalic anhydride, tamarind fresh, cathode-ray TV picture tubes improved their relative ranking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>200.96</td>
<td>136.68</td>
<td>+64.28</td>
<td>337.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>179.7</td>
<td>167.6</td>
<td>+12.10</td>
<td>347.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>257.0</td>
<td>150.9</td>
<td>+106.10</td>
<td>407.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * Relates to Calendar Year.

*Source:* Government of India, Director General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Calcutta.
It may further be observed that a number of products among the top fifty in 1995-96 were not among the top fifty in 1994-95, reflecting also an improvement in ranking. Some of these products included: vegetable seeds, soya oil cake solvent extracted, other sewing machines, pagers, other plants, petroleum jelly, other potatoes, fenugreek seeds, instant coffee, black pepper, etc. Besides a number of chemical intermediates increased their ranking. These included: synthetic organic colouring materials, dichlorofluoro methane, o-acetylsalicylic acid, oxalic acid, vinyl sulphone, H-acid, ecetyl salicylic acid, etc.

Some traditional products that lost their ranking included grey portland cement, cement clinkers, manganese ore, and reactive violets.

Table 2
India’s Exports of top fifty Products to Pakistan: 1995-96
(Value in IR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS CODE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>RANK 95</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23040003</td>
<td>MEAL OF SOYABEAN SLVNT EXTRACTD</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>115463</td>
<td>776236105</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26011101</td>
<td>IRON ORE LUMPS (60) PRCNT FE &amp;</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>213500</td>
<td>128319357</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09101001</td>
<td>GINGER FRESH</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>807207</td>
<td>98530087</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14049001</td>
<td>BIDI WRAPPER LEAVES (TENDU)</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>2648060</td>
<td>88676189</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09083001</td>
<td>CARDAMOMS LARGE (AMOMUM)</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>1135426</td>
<td>77764196</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12099109</td>
<td>VEGETABLE SEEDS FOR PLANTING N (CATECHU)</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>2997960</td>
<td>73914615</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32030001</td>
<td>CUTCH (CATECHU) EXTRACTS</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>2380870</td>
<td>72980815</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09042001</td>
<td>CHILLY</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>3731624</td>
<td>72422250</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26011103</td>
<td>IRON ORE FINES (62% FE &amp; ABOVE)</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>144208</td>
<td>68921665</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29173500</td>
<td>PHTHALIC ANHYDRIDE</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>1847000</td>
<td>49385501</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * indicates ranking change; *#* indicates a significant change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit Value</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Port of Entry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soya Oil - Cake</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>7751</td>
<td>48538849</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solvent Extracted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reactive Yellows</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>272055</td>
<td>43866580</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cathode - Ray TV Picture Tubes, I</td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>89000</td>
<td>42165098</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Printed Books</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>520476</td>
<td>41741326</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reactive Blacks</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>308599</td>
<td>40106744</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tamarind Fresh</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>4686150</td>
<td>38466355</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Betel Leaves</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>2952160</td>
<td>37991926</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Other Synthetic</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>247573</td>
<td>36961937</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Reactive Reds</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>179543</td>
<td>32099707</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Reactive Oranges</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>138777</td>
<td>30207297</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reactive Blues</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>191574</td>
<td>28360466</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Other Sewing Machines</td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>13442</td>
<td>20654975</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organic Colouring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Reactive Reds</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>179543</td>
<td>32099707</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Reactive Oranges</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>138777</td>
<td>30207297</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Reactive Blues</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>191574</td>
<td>28360466</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Other Sewing Machines</td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>13442</td>
<td>20654975</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Manganese Ore (30% &amp; TON ABOVE, BELOW 40%)</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>20236</td>
<td>19135162</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pagers</td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>4182</td>
<td>15594442</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Gray Portland Cement</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>8624</td>
<td>14724203</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Other Plants &amp; Plant Parts</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>1492747</td>
<td>14048686</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Petroleum Jelly</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>696000</td>
<td>13259160</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Psyllium Husk (Isobgul Husk)</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>196294</td>
<td>11786603</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Cement Clinkers</td>
<td>TON</td>
<td>6875</td>
<td>11695447</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Reactive Violets</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>57426</td>
<td>11020965</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Food Flavouring Material</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>356900</td>
<td>10824311</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Synth. Org. Coloring Mats. Other. Violets</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>45206</td>
<td>10342406</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Other Potatoes, Fresh KG. or Chilled</td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>1498370</td>
<td>9414354</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>DichloroFluro</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>124776</td>
<td>9112008</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Others. Aluminium Foil</td>
<td>KG.</td>
<td>61065</td>
<td>8847000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. N. Mukherji
India’s top fifty imports from Pakistan in 1995-96 have been presented in Table 3. Some of the top products during this year included: other cotton woven fabric printed, rock salt, other human vaccines, almonds, liquorice roots, urea, ayurvedic and unani herbs, other plain weave, other fabric of cotton, other plants, degressed shorn wool, cumin, cane sugar refined, etc.

Products which improved their rank significantly included, other human vaccines, rock salt, and cane refined. A number of products that
I. N. Mukherji

were among the top fifty in 1995-96, but not so in 1994-95, also improved their ranking. Some of these products included: almonds, liquorice roots, urea, ayurvedic and unani herbs, other plain weave, other fabric of cotton, other plants, degressed shorn wool, cumin, etc.

A number of products that lost their rank in 1995-96 as compared to 1994-95 included: hazelnuts, plums and sloes, printed books, synthetic staple fibres, bovine leather, poppy seeds, etc.

Table 3
India’s Imports of top fifty Products from Pakistan: 1995-96
(Value in IR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HS CODE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>UNIT QTY.</th>
<th>VALUE '96</th>
<th>RANK '96</th>
<th>RANK '95</th>
<th>DIFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52121500</td>
<td>OTHER WOVEN COTTON FABRIC, PRINTED</td>
<td>KG. 50258</td>
<td>412905504</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25010002</td>
<td>ROCK SALT</td>
<td>KG. 24834482</td>
<td>378471610</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30022019</td>
<td>OTHER HUMAN VACCINES</td>
<td>KG. 1238812</td>
<td>68907456</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08021100</td>
<td>ALMONDS FRSH OR DRIED IN SHELL</td>
<td>KG. 1745065</td>
<td>66725708</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12111000</td>
<td>LIQUORICE ROOTS FRSH/DRID W/N</td>
<td>KG. 3000</td>
<td>58519119</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31021000</td>
<td>UREA</td>
<td>KG. 761434</td>
<td>49733691</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12119026</td>
<td>AYURVEDIC &amp; UNIANI HERBS N.E.S</td>
<td>KG. 1023783</td>
<td>47020166</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52083909</td>
<td>OTHR. PLAIN WEAVE &lt;100gm./SQ. M.</td>
<td>KG. 253388</td>
<td>33252383</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52093909</td>
<td>OTHERS FABRIC OF COTTON</td>
<td>KG. 2524</td>
<td>32471490</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12119049</td>
<td>OTHERS PLANT OR PLANT PARTS</td>
<td>KG. 252567</td>
<td>32425442</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51012100</td>
<td>DEGRESD SHORN WOOL NT CRBNSD N</td>
<td>KG. 2005240</td>
<td>28267110</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09093002</td>
<td>CUMIN, OTHR. THAN BLACK</td>
<td>KG. 420240</td>
<td>28124645</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Unit Value</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17019902</td>
<td>CANE SUGAR REFINED KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>190094</td>
<td>19229264</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>52093229</td>
<td>OTHR. 3 OR 4 THREAD TWILL KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>18718602</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>52094200</td>
<td>DENIM (YARNS OF DIFFERENT COLOUR) KG</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>20441</td>
<td>16564766</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55102009</td>
<td>OTHR. YARN MIXED WITH WOOL/ANIMAL HAIR KG</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>1651385</td>
<td>16358054</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26201900</td>
<td>OTHER ASH &amp; RESIDUE KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>353116</td>
<td>15590105</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17019909</td>
<td>OTHR. REFINED SUGAR INCLUDNG CENT KG</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>1116985</td>
<td>15498777</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>41043909</td>
<td>BOVINE LEATHER - OTHER KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>226405</td>
<td>11069844</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>08109002</td>
<td>TURMARIND, FRESH KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>106474</td>
<td>10180297</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>07139004</td>
<td>TUR KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>242244</td>
<td>9228562</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08042002</td>
<td>FIGS DRIED KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>229471</td>
<td>8983033</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>09093001</td>
<td>CUMIN BLACK (KALIJIRI) KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>8083333</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08021200</td>
<td>SHELLED ALMONDS KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>455686</td>
<td>7724306</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41061909</td>
<td>OTHER FINISHED TANNED LTHR FROM G KG</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>435123</td>
<td>7506886</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54033300</td>
<td>OTHR. YARN OF CELLULOSE ACETATE KG</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>731200</td>
<td>7301663</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08062001</td>
<td>RAISINS KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>60659</td>
<td>6458449</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52113909</td>
<td>OTHR. OVEN FABRICS KG.</td>
<td>KG</td>
<td>—</td>
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NOTE: DIFF = DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RANK '95 AND RANK '96. A POSITIVE VALUE CONNOTES IMPROVEMENT.
* DENOTES THE PRODUCT RANK NOT AMONG TOP FIFTY.
# DENOTES AN IMPROVEMENT IN RANK IN '96 AS COMPARED TO '95
Unrecorded Trade

As noted earlier, the Export Promotion Bureau of Pakistan had been asked to identify and quantify unofficial trade between Pakistan and India. Smuggling between Pakistan and India is assessed anywhere between Rs.8 billion and Rs.16 billion a year which is two to four times the regular and official trade between the two countries. The actual volume of unofficial or irregular trade between Pakistan and India may exceed Rs.20 billion in a year, if account is taken of the supplies of India made textile machinery, spares and equipment, tanneries equipment and machine parts being used in foundries imported through official channels, but not directly from India. Orders are placed in Dubai, Hong Kong or Singapore from where arrangements are made to get supply of these items from India, from where they are shipped to Pakistan. Although the operation is circuitous, yet economical when compared to regular import of similar items from Japan, Western Europe or USA. Similarly textiles tycoons in Pakistan have been placing orders of Indian made fine count yarn through their agents in Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong. Other items similarly being imported include a large number of chemical goods, viscose fiber, stainless steel utensils, cosmetics, alcoholic beverages, cotton fabric, ayurvedic medicines, cashew nut, confectionaries etc. It is no more a secret that a sizable number of cattle are imported from India.

While there is no such restriction on import of goods from Pakistan to India, the high tariff rates in general and other fiscal measures are deterrent factors in facilitating regular trade. Plastic goods, synthetic fiber fabrics, second hand clothing, plastic ware, melamine dinner sets, woollens, and food items such as wheat, sugar, edible oil, and vegetable ghee keep flowing into India through unauthorised channels. 11

Unleashing the Trade Potential

Removal of restrictions on Indo-Pakistan trade would help to substitute unrecorded and circuitous trade for official and direct trade between the two countries. In this process the losers would be illicit traffickers and smugglers and the beneficiaries would be ultimate
consumers and end users of raw materials in both the countries. The government would benefit from realising more revenue with even reduced customs duties. Pakistan is expected to take initiative by doing away with discriminatory trade policy with India. India could then reciprocate by lowering its customs duties in respect of products Pakistan is interested in exporting to India.

The PHD Chambers of Commerce in India and the FPCCI of Pakistan had already undertaken an exercise listing products which: (i) India has shown interest in exporting to Pakistan (207); (ii) Pakistan has shown interest in importing from India (152); (iii) India has shown interest in importing from Pakistan (34); and (iv) Pakistan has shown interest in exporting items to India (153). Looking at the four lists, we may list products (A), intersecting lists contained in (i) and (ii) and a list (B) intersecting products contained in lists (iii) and (iv). The two intersecting lists A and B have been presented below:

List A

Items that India has shown interest in exporting to Pakistan and Pakistan has shown interest in importing from India.

1. Agricultural Machinery, Equipment, Sprayers.
2. Automotive Parts.
5. Betel Leaves.
6. Cement.
7. Diesel Engines.
8. Dyes.
11. Engineering Items.
INDO - PAKISTAN TRADE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

12. Ferro Alloys.
17. Industrial Chemicals.
18. Laboratory Glassware/Chemicals/Equipment.
23. Pharmaceutical and Pharmaceutical Preparations.
27. Spark Plugs.
28. Spices.
29. Tea.
30. Turner.
31. Tyres and Tubes.
32. Tractors/Tractor Parts.

List B

Items that India has shown interest in importing from Pakistan and Pakistan has shown interest in exporting to India.

2. Cotton Textile for Export.
3. Medicinal Herbs.
I. N. Mukherji

5. Naphtha.
6. Onyx and other Edible Nuts.
7. Rock Salt.
8. Stainless Steel Scrap.

Lists A and B reflect the maximum convergence of interest between the trading communities of India and Pakistan. Pending the removal of discriminatory trade policy with India, Pakistan should immediately ensure that all products enumerated in List A are included among the list of products importable from India (if not already included). India on its part, should reduce its customs tariff on all products included in List B. The ultimate goal should, however, be for Pakistan to adopt MFN trade status with India. Such a measure would also help to strengthen Pakistan’s trade relations with all member countries of SAARC under SAPTA. The data for 1994-95 reveals that the unit cost of imports of India from Pakistan was considerably lower relative to similar imports from the rest of the world in case of sugar, almonds, degressed wool, ayurvedic and unani herbs, other fabric of yarn of cotton, other ash and residue, other bovine and equine leather, waste of sheep’s and lamb’s wool, other natural gums, etc. Since Pakistan’s share in India’s world imports of such products is quite marginal, there is considerable scope for India to augment its imports from Pakistan in respect of such products.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s trade data for 1993-94 reveals that Pakistan could benefit considerably by importing a number of products from India whose unit costs were considerably lower as compared to similar imports from the rest of the world. Such products included: sewing machines, industrial reactive dyes and its preperations, iron ore agglomerates, carbon electrodes, seeds of other vegetables etc. In most of these products the share of India in Pakistan’s world imports is a small proportion of its imports from the world. Hence it is possible for Pakistan to augment its imports of such products from India.12
EXCHANGE OF CONCESSIONS UNDER SAPTA - II

Till to date, two rounds of negotiations have been held under South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA). Under SAPTA - I no more than 226 products were offered concessious by all contracting States (CS), of which 100 were in favour of least developed countries.

The Trade flows in negotiated products reveals that while Pakistan received concessions valued at US $ 2435 thousand from India, the latter country received concessions valued at US $ 1284 thousand from Pakistan. The second round of negotiations (SAPTA - II) was more comprehensive. Under SAPTA - II as many as 2013 products were negotiated for preferential concessions. Under it India offered Pakistan concessions in respect of 375 products and received concessions in respect of 230 products from Pakistan. Of the 375 products offered concessions by India, only 17 were imported during 1995-96. The value of concessional imports was Rs. 174 million out of total imports of Rs. 1509 million, implying liberalisation of bilateral imports of 11.5 %.

Of the 230 products offered concessions by Pakistan, as many as 137 were exported by India during 1995-96, valued at Rs. 425 million as against total bilateral exports of Rs. 2570 million, implying liberalisation of 16.5%.

The above figures suggest that as in case of the SAPTA-I, most of the negotiated products were not being traded at all during 1995-96, even though it may be admitted that product coverage and targeting was more satisfactory than could be achieved during SAPTA-I. It is also to be seen that product targeting and trade coverage was more satisfactory in respect of concessions received by India than the same received by Pakistan. The concessions received by India were more favourable for India because of the total number of products received concessions by India, as many as 14 were among the top fifty exported products.
by India to Pakistan during 1995-96 whereas Pakistan received concessions in respect of only 5 products that were among the top fifty being imported by India. This points to the need for further improving the trade coverage concept as against product coverage concept. Further, under SAPTA-III Pakistan should endeavour to get more concessions from India in respect of top products being imported by India for achieving a better balance in the bilateral trade between the two countries. The products listed in Tables 2 and 3 provide the direction for improving the trade value coverage concept in the subsequent rounds of negotiations.

EMERGING PERCEPTIONS

Despite the political hostilities on Kashmir, the nuclear issue, etc. it appears that a move towards freer trade between India and Pakistan is on the cards. At the first ever SAARC trade fair held in Delhi in January 1996, Pakistani businessmen are reported to have sold and contracted business worth about Rs.700 crores - almost double the two-way trade between the two countries in 1993-94.

Encouraged by the response, Pakistan booked 300 sq.m. of pavilion space for 16 participants at the Auto Expo held in Delhi in February 1996. Pakistan sent the first ever business delegation from the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry to Delhi in December 1995 and in January added another list of 19 items on its list of goods that are freely importable from India. A 15-member trade delegation from the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry visited Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad in March 1996.

Pakistan’s multilateral commitment under WTO could be another factor that would induce the country, sooner than later, to offer MFN status to India. One gets this impression from several statements made by the then Pakistan Commerce Minister, Ahmed Mukhtar when he led a high-powered Pakistan delegation at the first meeting of SAARC
trade ministers in Delhi on January 7, 1996. In an interview, Mukhtar is stated to have held that granting of MFN to India was a matter of time. He said that the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had also said so. Mukhtar, however, argued that it was important for India to provide a “level playing field”. In this context he said Pakistan had completely liberalised its import regime. Barring only 24 items, import of all other items had been freed of restrictions. On the other hand he maintained that India continued to apply a number of quantitative restrictions on imports.

The issue of further opening up Indo-Pak trade is being debated in Pakistan. At a seminar on “Trade with India” organised by Press Institute of Pakistan, the President of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Tariq Saed Saigol, summed up the deliberations by stating that Pakistan could consolidate its trade relations with India by exercising positive discrimination, albeit with safeguards, to make sure that their industrial and commercial sectors were benefitted, and not adversely affected by the new alliance. For instance, Pakistan could benefit substantially from certain raw materials like specialised alloys for the engineering industry. Similarly, former Finance Minister, Dr. Mubashir Hasan said that Pakistan would be the ultimate beneficiary if it traded with India. He maintained that Pakistan had no threat form India. In his opinion, traders had a greater role to plan trade between Pakistan and India than the politicians who may come and go.14

The question of further opening up of Pakistan’s trade with India is also finding increasing expression among Pakistan’s academics. For instance, S.M. Naseem has held that by adopting a negative attitude towards the expansion of trade with SAARC in general, and India in particular, Pakistan is letting slip a unique opportunity of providing the economic and trade leadership to a region which has a large potential of becoming a dynamic economic force in the next century. In his view, the two countries need to engage in an economic and trade competition, instead of the senseless arms race that provides no real security to the people of either country.15

*Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*  Vol. 1 No. 1,  April - June 1997  27
In keeping with increasing privatization as also globalisation of the economies of South Asian countries, the time has come to depoliticize and demilitarise intra-South Asian relations. The key lies in the India-Pakistan equation. However, political instability in both the countries severely constrains the leadership in these countries from taking any initiative. It is thus left for the non-governmental organisations in both the countries to exert pressure on their respective governments to ease bilateral trade and other economic exchanges. Now that both India and Pakistan are members of World Trade Organisation (WTO), both the countries must abide by multilateralism which in essence prohibits discriminatory trade practices. It is reported that India has already approached Pakistan seeking MFN status with her. In an Indian telecast (*Newstrack*, 26 September 1995), Pakistan’s former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto stated that “if Pakistan’s obligation under WTO warrants MFN status with India, the same need to be granted”. It appears that given the current state of adverse Indo-Pak relations, Pakistan’s leadership finds it politically inexpedient to do so. However, the business community as well as other non-governmental organisations have started exerting considerable pressure on the government to further liberalise its trade relations with India. There has also been an official acceptance of Pakistan’s obligations under WTO. Meanwhile, faced with dwindling foreign exchange reserves, Pakistan badly needs to economise their use by sourcing its imports from the cheapest locations. Perhaps Pakistan was hoping that India would put in its formal protest to WTO making it politically expedient for it to grant MFN status to India. However, in opting to deal with this issue bilaterally, India has chosen the correct strategy.

REFERENCES


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CENTRAL ASIA: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY

Oumirserik Kasenov*

The contemporary international significance of the new Central Asian states reflects their economic and demographic potential, geographic location, the character of their relations with other states, primarily with neighbouring ones, as well as their role in regional and global international organizations. Over fifty-five million people live in the region of former Soviet Central Asia, which is quite rich in natural resources as well as in terms of its economic, scientific, and technological potential.

The strategic significance of the region derives from the fact that it borders two of the five nuclear states of the world—Russia and China—and through Iran and Afghanistan it has access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. With the completion of trans-Asian railway projects and the development of road and air communications, the geostrategic trade and economic significance of Central Asia will rise further, for it will start to serve as a route for considerable cargo flows from Asia and the Pacific region to Europe and West Asia as well as from west to east.

POTENTIAL MILITARY THREATS

The official documents on military policy of the CIS Central Asian states do not specify probable enemies, although CIS documents signed by these states suggest in broad terms the sources of potential military danger.

In October 1993 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan signed in Bishkek an Agreement on the Concept of Military Security of the CIS member-states. This document considers “as a major source of potential military threat for member-states of the CIS, the instability of the social, economic, military and political situation in a number of re-

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regions, the existence of potent military potentials in certain states which exceed their defence needs, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.”

On February 1995, at a CIS summit, a declaration of member states on the Collective Security Agreement and a Concept of Collective Security were adopted. This concept, which of course was not meant to apply only to the Central Asian region (Turkmenistan has not signed the original collective security agreement), defines major sources of military danger and factors which might contribute to military dangers evolving into a direct military threat as follows:

— the build-up of military capabilities in regions neighbouring member states to limits which disturb the existing balance of forces;
— the formation and training on the territory of other states of armed forces intended for use against member-states;
— inflaming border conflicts and armed provocations from the territory of bordering states;
— the transfer of foreign troops onto territories neighbouring the member-states (if this is not connected with peace-keeping measures in accordance with the resolutions on the UN Security Council or CSCE).

However, a significant handicap for the CIS Central Asian states is the fact that their armed forces are still at an initial stage of formation. They are fragments of the collapsed armed forces of the former Soviet Union and therefore do not yet have a single internal system which includes command and control, communications, a comprehensive supply system, mobilization readiness, the training of personnel and defence production. Despite this, after independence the Central Asian states have determined the general structure of their armed forces. Command and control bodies, military doctrines and military policies as a whole are being worked out.

Does a military threat to Central Asian states arise from regional states beyond the CIS region such as China, Afghanistan, and Iran? Among the latter only China has a powerful military potential which includes nuclear weapons. The Lanchzhou military district bordering Central Asia is the fourth largest Chinese military district where twelve Chinese land
divisions are deployed. The Lop-Nor nuclear test-site is also situated in
the same district.

Referring to a seminar organised by the Rand Corporation in Almaty
in October 1992, S.Kurginian maintained in Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the
“Lanchzhou military district if aimed directly at Kazakhstan can deploy
about 400,000 soldiers, 500 tanks, 5,000 artillery pieces and mortars, and
480 aircraft in the event of a conflict”. He argues that “the 40th Afghan
army, which was left as a legacy to Kazakhstan from the Soviet forces
deployed in the republic, would not be sufficient even to guard the border
more or less effectively”3. This analyst noted not only the increasing military
force of China, but also unsettled border issues and a form of ethnic
expansion—the infiltration of Chinese into other countries for permanent
residence4.

Another part of the myth about “the Chinese threat” is that Beijing
can accuse the Central Asian states of allowing their territories to be used
by some Uighur organization for subversive activities against China5. Both
in the Russian and Western press, a number of publications have reported
that the appearance of newly independent states in Central Asia stimulates
the struggle of Turkic-Muslim peoples in China, mainly Uighurs, for their
national independence.

However, in Central Asia there are no signs of any Pan-Turkic or
Pan-Islamic solidarity. The Central Asian states maintain the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and do not permit
any organizations to undertake activities which would damage their
relations with other states, including China. The registration of such
organizations is not permitted and their activities are prohibited.

An agreement on strengthening confidence-building measures in the
military area signed at the end of April 1996 in Shanghai by the leaders of
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was of particular
significance in enhancing stability and developing neighbourliness between
the states. The agreement stipulates the withdrawal of armed forces and
armaments, except border forces, from a zone 100 kms. from the border,
the cessation of military exercises directed against the other side, limitations
on the size and number of forces participating in military exercises, as
well as the need for the states to inform each other about such exercises. It
also establishes friendly relations between the border troops and provides
for the mutual invitation of observers to military exercises.
Iran, which ranks as the second world oil state after Saudi Arabia and raises about $20 billion a year from oil sales, has considerable armed forces and is conducting a large-scale programme of rearmament. Western states accuse Iran of creating an infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons, mainly with the assistance of China. However, it can be affirmed with full confidence that Iran is not and will not become a source of military threat to the Central Asian states. Iran is increasing its military potential in order to become a major regional power centre in the Persian Gulf. This is a long-term goal of its external policy. Even though Iran has interests in the northern and north-eastern perimeter of its borders - Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Afghanistan, the lessons of the Iran-Iraq war suggest that Iran will not use force, let alone armed aggression against any of its neighbours, at least in the foreseeable future.

The real threat to the security of newly independent states of Central Asia is the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border which poses the danger of ‘Afghanistanization’ to Central Asia - the possibility of the new Central Asian states is cracking at their “ethnic seams”, as it is occurring in Afghanistan. This could follow if the Tajik-Afghan border were to disappear. Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, the states bordering and involved in Afghan affairs, declare their interests in the integrity of Afghanistan, since its fragmentation could become a serious source of destabilization in and around the region.

The fracturing of the CIS Central Asian states along ethnic lines is a potential danger for Russia itself since, as noted by Russian analysts, this region forms the ‘soft underbelly’ of Russia. In response Russia would have to build new state borders in an attempt to contain what is viewed as “Islamic fundamentalism”.

Yet neither Russia, nor the Central Asian states are able to equip new intra-CIS state borders between themselves. According to Russian estimates, the equipment for one kilometre of border would cost not less than 1 billion rubles. The decision whether to continue to guard the 1400 kms long Tajik-Afghan border, or to leave Tajikistan and to start the construction of a new 6200 kms long Russian-Kazak border is an acute issue for Russia. But it is influenced by the fears noted above and by the fact that the Central Asian states themselves can not afford the construction and equipping of new state borders. Therefore, it is in the interests of Russia and the Central Asian states to leave ‘transparent’ borders between themselves, but to
strengthen the protection of outer borders of the CIS, especially the Tajik-Afghan section.

It is in Russia’s strategic interests to strengthen the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian states, promote the development of the economic and defence potentials of the Central Asian states, and engage in military and political cooperation in order to protect the common borders of the CIS by means of joint forces. A coincidence of strategic interests underlies the treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance signed by Russia and Central Asian states. These treaties presuppose mutual defence obligations in the event of aggression against any one of the parties. Similar interests underpin more specific treaties on military cooperation.

KAZAKHSTAN

The backbone of the defence policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan may be summarised as follows:

Firstly, the formation of Kazakh armed forces capable of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country is underway. Secondly, in May 1992, Kazakhstan and Russia concluded an Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, by which they are obliged to render each other military assistance in case of aggression against one of them. A supplementary agreement on military cooperation was signed together with a package of documents on military issues. Russia is leasing the Baikonur space facility. There remain forces and military sites on the territory of Kazakhstan under Russian jurisdiction. Thirdly, Kazakhstan signed in May 1993, a CIS collective security treaty and is making every effort to create a joint defence space aimed at the coordination of defence activities with CIS partners.

One of the important factors reinforcing the security of Kazakhstan after it joined the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state was the acceptance of formal affirmation of security from Russia, the United States and Great Britain. In December 1994, in Budapest, during the CSCE summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton and Prime Minister John Major signed the Memorandum of Security Guarantees. They confirmed their commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing
borders of Kazakhstan and to avoid the threat of or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Kazakhstan, as well as to avoid exerting economic pressure against it.

If Kazakhstan becomes a victim of aggression or an object of threat of using nuclear weapons, then Russia, the United States and Great Britain will demand immediate action from the UN Security Council to render assistance to Kazakhstan as a non-nuclear member-state of the NPT. The Chinese Government has also offered Kazakhstan guarantees of security. As expressed by the Xinhua agency on 8 February 1995: “China fully understands the desire of Kazakhstan to obtain security guarantees. To abstain unreservedly from the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use against non-nuclear states and non-nuclear zones, this is the consistent position of the Chinese Government. This position of principle applies to Kazakhstan.”

The Armed Forces

When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, the armed forces on the territory of Kazakhstan consisted of 4,40,000 military personnel. About 95% of the officers were from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. When Russian President Yeltsin created the armed forces of the Russian Federation, President Nazarbayev expressed a clear preference for the preservation of unified CIS forces. Consequently the process of separating Russian, CIS and Kazakhstani armed forces was undertaken. World War II veteran Sagadat K. Nurmagambetov was appointed Defence Minister, to be replaced by Alibek Kasimov in 1995. A Republican guard of 2500 men to protect the President and the Parliament was created. Initially, the force planning by the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defence was based on the criterion that troop numbers should be at least 0.5% of the state’s population (i.e. about 83,000). This proved to be unrealistic due to shortage of funds and the inability to enforce conscription consistently. The other serious problem for the Kazak armed forces is the lack of experienced Kazak military leadership personnel. About 6000 Russian troops from the former Soviet 40th Army remained in Kazakhstan to provide military training. According to bilateral agreements with Russia, 500 officers from Kazakhstan are sent to Russian military schools each year. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan still has to rely on ethnic Slavs for most of
its officer corps. The departure of many non-indigenous officers has resulted in a shortage of cadres of more than 50%. In 1993, the IISS Military Balance estimated the strength of the army at 44,000 troops. In 1995 this estimate had declined to 25,000 (with an estimated figure of 40,000 for the armed forces in total). The air force (personnel estimated at 15,000) has 37 fighter and 71 fighter ground attack aircraft at its disposal. The social conditions of the army are very poor; soldiers are said to be suffering from lack of food and infectious diseases. Despite official rhetoric, the army exhibits all the signs of severe neglect. Much of the equipment inherited from the Soviet armed forces is deteriorating due to lack of maintenance. Landlocked Kazakhstan has no Navy but intends to form a maritime force. There is a Caspian Sea Flotilla which operates as a joint Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen flotilla under Russian command.

The most important Soviet strategic assets on Kazakh territory were the ICBM bases with 104 SS-18, the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, the Baikonur space launch centre, and the ABM radar site. The disposition of these assets raised major difficulties since on the one hand Kazakhstan could not integrate them into its own military forces, and on the other hand it had an interest in getting the most out of their presence on its soil. Furthermore President Nazarbayev insisted that all military installations in Kazakhstan were the property of Kazakhstan. The strategic nuclear missiles were stood down as part of the START process and all the nuclear warheads were transferred to Russia as Kazakhstan joined the NPT as a non-nuclear power. The Semipalatinsk site was closed. After much political wrangling, the Baikonur space complex was made available to Russia on the basis of 20-year, renewable lease.

KYRGYZSTAN

The Russian-Kyrgyz military relationship centres around border protection. An inter-governmental agreement concluded in October 1992 stipulated that Kyrgyzstan, to ensure its own security, the security of the Russian Federation, and the collective security of the CIS member-states, delegated the issue of protecting its state border with China to Russian border troops. A subsequent agreement signed in April 1994 established the terms of recruitment and military service of citizens of Kyrgyzstan in the Russian border troops deployed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.
covers 80% and Kyrgyzstan 20% of the expenses of these troops. Russia has also undertaken to help Kyrgyzstan to form its own border troops during the transition period. However, the duration of this transition period has not been specified.

UZBEKISTAN

The Uzbek president Karimov, has explained the framework of Uzbek security policy in the following terms: “In the unstable world surrounding us we have friends, but there are those as well, who would like to drag Uzbekistan into their sphere of influence. And those forces may use any available methods, including military ones. Therefore, we must have a mobile, well-trained and equipped army capable of defending our borders, our independence and sovereignty”10.

The key elements of the concept of national security declared by Karimov are as follows:

Uzbekistan occupies an extremely favourable geographic location, in the centre of transport and autonomous energy and water systems of the region;

Uzbekistan outnumbers its neighbours, and surpasses them in its scientific and technical potential, and other capacities; the Republic has oil, oil products, gas, namely those resources which are the backbone of any economy. It has every chance to increase its economic potential;

Uzbekistan occupies a deserved place in human civilization. It exerts a strong influence on various spiritual and political processes not only in the region, but all over the world.

Taking these assets into account, Karimov believes, Uzbekistan could emerge as a centre of integration of Central Asia.

At the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, Karimov proposed to set up in Tashkent a permanent United Nations seminar on issues of security, well-being and cooperation in Central Asia. In this connection he claims that “the republic could serve as an outpost in Asia, a bridgehead of cooperation between the OSCE and the United Nations in the provision of regional security and cooperation, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention”.

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Uzbekistan is a full-fledged member of the Non-Aligned Movement. It could be claimed that this membership, which stipulates non-participation in military blocs, contradicts Uzbekistan’s commitments in the collective security agreement which it signed in Tashkent in May 1992. However, the Non-Aligned Movement does not intend to undertake any action against any member of the CIS, and also the 1992 Tashkent agreement can not serve as a basis for the formation of military blocs, so participation in it does not contradict the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, the criteria for membership in the latter are not clear-cut.

Uzbekistan’s Armed Forces

Uzbekistan faced the problem of building up its armed forces out of the Soviet heritage. In 1992, 70% of the officer corps was still Russian speaking. At the same time about 7000 Uzbek soldiers and non-commissioned officers were serving in the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The declared target for the Uzbek armed forces is 30,000 men plus a National Guard of about 1000. The most important difficulties are the shortage of funds and trained personnel. In March 1994 Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Islam Karimov signed a treaty on military cooperation according to which Uzbekistan would receive help with training, logistics and equipment. Uzbekistan continues to be part of the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan and 500 Uzbeks participate in guard duty at the Tajik-Afghan border. The armed forces of Uzbekistan have 280 main battle tanks, 780 armoured vehicles, 265 fixed wing aircraft and 24 helicopters.

MILITARY INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

During the summit of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Bishkek, April 29-30, 1994, Kyrgyzstan joined the Agreement on the Creation of a Single Economic Space previously signed by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It is noteworthy that the integration of three Central Asian states is deepening not only in the economic field, but also with regard to defence issues. A Council of Defence Ministers has been created, which guides the development of concrete proposals on military cooperation.
During a session of the Interstate Council of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, held in December 1995 in Jambyl, the three states approved a regulation on a joint Council of Defence Ministers. It specified that the Council, as a working body of the Interstate Council, would consider all relevant issues of regional security, defence coordination and cooperation. For such cooperation it is tasked to coordinate military exercises, air defence, mutual supplies, as well as the maintenance of arms and equipment, military research and other activities.

To ensure national and regional security, the three states should direct and coordinate their efforts in the following directions:

Individual defence - forming and strengthening national armed forces;

Collective defence - forming a system of collective security in the framework of the CIS. Since the Agreement on Collective Security, signed in May 1992 still does not have mechanisms for its realization and still does not work, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have to proceed with efforts aimed at the coordination of their defence activities in Central Asia; the creation of a system of Euro-Central Asian security; the coordination of defence policies and cooperation as well as peace-keeping activities - jointly with member-states of the OSCE and NATO;

The creation of an Asian system of security; the strengthening of cooperation and confidence-building measures - jointly with the Asian states;

The creation of a global system of security - jointly with all the UN member-states, primarily with the members of the Security Council.

**TURKMENISTAN**

Turkmenistan did not sign the October 1993 Agreement on the Concept of Military Security, the February 1995 Agreement on the Collective Security or a number of other CIS documents related to issues of military policy. Consequently it has distanced itself from multilateral CIS defence or security policy coordination. The state maintains a posture of ‘positive neutrality’ and according to its military doctrine, does not view any state as an enemy.

In his speech at the September 1995 Ashkhabad International Conference on ‘Neutrality of Turkmenistan and International Relations
in Asia’, the President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Niyazov, formulated the neutrality policy of the country as follows: ‘Having today over 30% of the world reserves of natural gas, up to 12 billion tonnes of oil in the Caspian shelf alone, owning a huge territory and a population of almost 5 million, it is impossible to do without neutrality, it is impossible to join any group of countries for that would lead to the creation of blocs and weaken neutrality’.

In conformity with these principles, Turkmenistan refrained from signing the Tashkent Agreement on Collective Security or joining the Council of Collective Security of the CIS states. At the same time, Turkmenistan has entered into a bilateral relationship of strategic partnership with Russia and tackles many defence issues jointly with it, including the protection of its 2,300 kms long southern border with Afghanistan and Iran. In 1995 there were more border incidents on the Afghan section of this border than in any year since the end of the USSR - some fifty armed clashes. The growing tension on this border has compelled Turkmenistan to strengthen its border defences jointly with formations of Russian border troops.

Niyazov, declares that Turkmenistan is committed to the principles of positive neutrality, but emphasises that this goal will be achieved with the support of Russia. Overall, Turkmenistan’s armed forces are about 35,000 strong, and include an army, air forces, air defence forces and rear services. But it is noteworthy that these armed forces employ many Russian military officers. Indeed, the Defence and National Security Council of Turkmenistan includes a Russian officer who represents the Russian Defence Ministry at the Defence Ministry of Turkmenistan, Major General V.M. Zavarzin, as well as the Commander of Border Troops K. Kabulov and his first deputy V.S. Grishchak. However, Turkmenistan’s officers are being trained in military schools not only in Russia, but in Turkey. Ashkhabad has concluded agreements on the training of its officers with the defence departments of Iran and Pakistan as well.

RUSSIA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS: A THREAT TO CENTRAL ASIA?

Russia considers Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia to be in its own sphere of national interest.
What kind of interests does Russia have in Central Asia? On the basis of statements by Russian politicians, Kazakh experts have come to the conclusion that while the Russian approach towards Central Asia has not yet taken shape, there is a framework for the definition of policy. The most important points are:

1. The Russian military considers the loss of Kazakhstan and the whole of Central Asia as a threat to Russian state security.

2. Central Asia is at the periphery of the global economy and will always remain so. However, Russian economic interests have to be protected, especially in Kazakhstan, by the following measures: the end of direct control from Moscow, but the preservation of some Russian assets and rights, support for the economic interests of ethnic Russians, and the support and preservation of the economic system in the Ural-Western Siberia-Northern Kazakhstan regions.

3. Russian influence in Central Asia should not be allowed to diminish to the point that more dynamic economies would gain a stronger foothold. The usual contenders are Turkey and Iran.

4. Russia is the last bastion capable of stopping the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

5. Russia cannot permit the reinforcement of China’s position in Central Asia. China could extend its influence through economic pressure, the presence of nuclear weapons, and ethnic infiltration. The latter is the most dangerous from the Russian point of view.

This conception has external and internal dimensions. Externally, Russia wants to demonstrate to the world that Central Asia belongs exclusively in the sphere of Russian interests, and it will not allow any rival powers to emerge. Internally, this conception aims at convincing the newly independent states of Central Asia (as well as public opinion in Russia) that there is an external threat from other regional powers and that only Russia is capable of protecting them against absorption by these powers.

In Kazakhstan, it is believed that this conception will govern Russian foreign policy in the future. There are important reasons for this conclusion. The best-known factor is the Zhirinovsky phenomenon. His declarations regarding foreign policy, Russia’s national interests and the fate of Kazakhstan clearly cannot be part of a responsible approach to foreign
policy. But Kazakh analysts believe that the demagogy of Zhirinovsky reflects not merely the opinion of political extremes, but also the ambitions of Russia’s ruling elite. The next factor is Solzhenitsyn. This modern Russian prophet declared some years ago that the northern part of Kazakhstan belongs to Russia because these territories were colonized and settled by Russians for a long period in history. Such views were also evident in statements by the former Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev in the Spring of 1994, and the then Foreign Minister, A. Kozyrev in 1995: the Commonwealth of Independent States is in the Russian sphere of influence, and Russia will protect the Russian population anywhere with the use of force if considered necessary. Although the concept of Russia’s national interests has not yet been officially declared, it can be discerned in various documents. The most important is Russia’s military doctrine.

Kazakh experts have concluded that the new military doctrine of Russia is radically different from the former Soviet one. Whereas the USSR had proclaimed it would never use nuclear weapons first, the new Russian doctrine allows the use of nuclear weapons in specific situations: aggression against a state which is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or against an ally of the Russian Federation. This is a policy of nuclear deterrence. It extends nuclear deterrence to the parties of the Collective Security signed in Tashkent in May 1992. Therefore one could say that Kazakhstan is under some sort of ‘nuclear umbrella’.

However, Russia’s new military doctrine also implies, at least in principle, that Kazakhstan could be the object of political, military and nuclear blackmail. The doctrine considers the subversion of strategic stability as a result of the violation of international agreements in area of arms reduction and limitation as a source of military danger to the security of the Russian federation.

This point is exemplified by the START I agreement. Russia, the United States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are party to this treaty. If Kazakhstan had not joined the NPT by December 1993, it could have been considered a military threat. Likewise, when the Ukrainian parliament (the Supreme Rada) declared Ukraine a de facto nuclear state, Ukraine became a potential military threat to Russia, giving rise to a whole range of actions to coerce Ukraine into denuclearisation.

Russia also considers the violation of the rights of Russian minorities
as a potential military threat, justifying military intervention. Moscow looks at the so-called Russian (Russian speaking) population in Kazakhstan (about 50% of the total) as Russian citizens. From 1993 to 1994, Moscow demanded that Kazakhstan recognize the principle of dual citizenship for Russians in Kazakhstan. Hypothetically, Kazakhstan could be considered a threat to Russian national security interests.

It is also clear from Russian military doctrine that the preservation of administrative and military control over strategic nuclear forces, space assets (such as Kazakhstan’s space port at Baikonur) and any installations/part of the system of control over strategic nuclear forces is central to Russian national security interests. The document reasserts that nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union belong to Russia. This puts it automatically in conflict with Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Russian military doctrine defines the security space of the Russian Federation which is supported by the Collective Security Treaty within the framework of the CIS. Russia only used it once—in the case of Tajikistan. To fully support the treaty commitments, it requires, in the view of the government of Kazakhstan, expenditures which Russia cannot presently afford.

The adoption of Russian military doctrine and its place in Russian foreign and security policy permits the following conclusions to be drawn:

1. Russia insisted on the right to follow its own policy in the field of security; that is why it rejected the formation of unified armed forces of the CIS.

2. Russia estimates that various sources of threats to its national security will emerge. To deal with some of these problems, Russia will sacrifice the sovereignty of its allies.

3. The solution of the problem of nuclear weapons is closely linked to the solution of Russia’s economic problems.

4. The fundamental paradox of Russian-Kazakh relations, as becomes clear in the Russian military doctrine, is that Russia is both the guarantor of Kazakhstan’s security and its principal threat. Russia views Kazakhstan as an ally, as part of the sphere of Russian national interest and as a potential military threat.
CENTRAL ASIAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCES

During the meeting of the Interstate Council of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, held in Jambyl on 15 December 1995, a resolution was signed on the formation and organisation of the joint peacekeeping battalion of the three countries under the aegis of the United Nations. The presidents of the three countries appealed to UN Secretary General to send a UN mission for consultations with representative of their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and requested the preparation of the necessary documents in order to join the Agreement on Reserve Forces of the UN. The decision to form a joint peace-keeping battalion apart from the CIS peacekeeping efforts reflected concern over the situation in Tajikistan and Afghanistan and probably an understanding on the inefficiency of collective peacekeeping forces in the framework of the CIS.

OSCE AND CENTRAL ASIA: FROM A EUROPEAN TO A EURO-CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY SPACE

The role and responsibility of the OSCE on the territory covering all of Europe, Euro-Asian Russia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia (by geographic coverage one could describe this as the Euro-Central Asian region) is very high. OSCE is the only organization which unites all states of the region and is charged with the provision of security and cooperation. However, the avalanche of conflicts within the post-communist space has revealed that the OSCE does not have a mandate, funds, or its own peace-keeping forces for the control of the situation, especially in cases of armed conflicts. The UN has such a mandate, funds and peace-keeping forces, but is experiencing serious difficulties in maintaining and supplying its present operations. It is unrealistic to anticipate the involvement of the UN in the settlement of conflicts in the vast Euro-Central Asian space.

NATO has offered its military potential for settling critical situations under the aegis of the UN or OSCE, beyond its zone of responsibility. The option of referring to NATO in critical situations and strictly in accordance
with the mandate of the UN Security Council or OSCE should not be ruled out. But NATO is a military and political alliance of sixteen states which has its own interests and it is difficult to expect that any involvement of its military potential beyond its zone of responsibility will be accepted positively by all its members and that such an agreement can be sustained.

At the same time, Russia’s attempt to get a mandate and funding from the UN and OSCE for the use of its armed forces for peace-keeping purposes on the territory of the former USSR is unacceptable. Russia, which insists on the recognition of its priority role in settling conflicts in the CIS region and on granting its armed forces a peace-keeping status, seeks to promote its interests since it envisions that it will become the most influential power in the region if its armed forces serve as the basis of regional peace-keeping forces.

Instead of looking to NATO or Russia it would be optimal to create multinational peace-keeping forces of the OSCE itself. Unlike organizations like NATO and the WEU, the OSCE is the only institution where all the states of Europe, Euro-Asian Russia, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states and the Central Asian states are represented on an equal basis. Of course, this should not exclude the possibility of the creation of CIS collective peace-keeping forces which are in the process of formation. But the most important thing in the creation of peace-keeping forces of regional organizations is to avoid the watering down of the universal role of the UN in regard to peace-keeping operations. Such operations should be conducted only under the UN mandate, in strict compliance with the established principles and rules and on the basis of two major principles: neutrality and multinationality.

The Central Asian states gained (CSCE then) OSCE membership not by virtue of their geographical location but as a legacy of their position in the former Soviet Union. However, as a result they were positioned in a space of security and cooperation much broader than of the post-Soviet space, which reinforces their sovereignty. Since the strengthening of security and cooperation is the major mission of the OSCE, the Central Asian states are very much interested in contributing to the success of this mission. The active participation of Central Asian states in the activities of the OSCE helps to bolster their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic and social progress, development of legislative and democratic political institutions, the respect of human rights and rights of national
The creation of a united Euro-Central Asian space of security and cooperation (if one takes into account the participation of the USA and Canada in the OSCE, then it would be more accurate to talk about a North Atlantic and Euro-Central Asian space) does not contradict the efforts of Kazakhstan to convene a conference on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia (CCCMA). The latter initiative is derived from the experience of the European CSCE/OSCE security process and has many similarities with the CSCE/OCSE experience of collaboration with certain Mediterranean countries which are not members of this organisation.

The situation in Central Asia and also in neighbouring regions which do not participate in the OSCE - China, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and India - is important to strengthen the stability of the OSCE space. In this context the OSCE should welcome the efforts of Kazakhstan aimed at the convention of CCCMA. The OSCE should also accept positively the processes of regional integration in Central Asia, in the CIS as a whole, as well as within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization.

The following arguments in favour of the realization of the idea of a Euro-Central Asian system of security may be advanced:

1. It would place the Central Asian region in the field of European processes of security and extend onto its territory the common principles of inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity etc.;

2. The Central Asian states would enter into a broader security space than the post-Soviet space, which would reduce the domination of Russia in the Central Asian region and increase opportunities of the OSCE to implement or control peace-keeping operations on its territory;

3. It would stop disputes about the possible expansion of NATO, diminish frictions between Russia and NATO, Russia and the USA, and Russia and the West as a whole, in connection with Russia’s policy in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. The border between the ‘far’ and ‘near’ abroad would be eliminated in favour of the single Euro-Central Asian space of security;
4. There would emerge a reasonable balance of mutual relations between the OSCE, NATO, EU, WEU and CIS, which as a whole and under the aegis of the UN might characterise the Euro-Central Asian system of security;

5. The creation of the Euro-Central Asian system of security would not contradict Kazakhstan’s efforts to create a system of security on the Euro-Asian continent. Instead, it will contribute to this process.

The strategy for the security of the Central Asian states would be effectively realized within a number of concentric circles. The system of national security is placed within regional Central Asian and CIS security frameworks which in turn are built into the Euro-Central Asian and global systems of security. At the same time, it is very important for the Central Asian states, whose armed forces will never be comparable with the armed forces of such neighbours as Russia and China, to rely mostly upon effective foreign policy and economic cooperation with other states, above all with neighbouring countries.

**CENTRAL ASIA : ASPECTS OF SECURITY**

**NATO AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES**

At the beginning of the independent existence of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev declared that:

“...the North-Atlantic Treaty has a suitable goal for our rapprochement - to assist the democratic development of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, and to prevent regional conflicts as far as possible. ... NATO member-states for the purposes of cooperation with these states have committed themselves to providing their accumulated experience and considerable expert potential in defence policy. ... Considering all this, we will broaden contacts with NATO, provided their sphere and limits are strictly determined and they are not damaging for military cooperation within the CIS framework or bilateral military ties.”

NATO responded to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, on the basis of which a completely new form of cooperation-programme
partnership for peace’ (PFP) - was developed. These activities were conditioned by the following well-defined NATO objectives:

— to prevent the emergence under conditions of political uncertainty and economic chaos of new totalitarian regimes and militarized states;

— to prevent the creation within the CIS framework of a new anti-NATO military bloc;

— to prevent the merger of Central Asian states with the Islamic world, especially with the countries where the ideology of orthodox Islam prevails;

— to assist the cooperation of the new states in order to provide regional and global security;

— to assist in the creation of the necessary conditions for the democratization of societies in these states.

NATO has made considerable efforts to implement these objectives and as a result the contacts of NATO with Central Asian states are developing and joint programmes in the sphere of security are being carried out. Within a year of NATO inviting the new Central Asian states to cooperate under the PFP programme, the framework document was signed with all these states except Tajikistan. The interest of these states to develop partnership with NATO is conditioned also by their belief that it will create options for military, political, economic and technical cooperation with the Alliance in establishing and developing their national armies. It is believed that such partnership will promote the creation of armed forces in these countries that will comply with democratic principles and world standards, and be able to participate in UN peace-keeping operations.

Modern conflicts, irrespective of their geography, with increasing frequency have an ethnic origin and the priority is to extinguish the flames of conflict in a timely fashion. To assist this goal NATO has at its disposal certain military, material, technical, human and financial resources as well as the means to create data banks and monitoring services to help resolve conflicts.
Since the PFP programme was initiated, military and civil representatives of the new Central Asian states have taken part in the majority of events conducted within its framework; in seminars and conferences concerning security problems and the principles of constructing armed forces in democratic societies; in various NATO training activities during which the objectives of peace-keeping activities have been elaborated. Military officers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have also been welcomed to different military schools of NATO member-states.

In August 1995, military exercises were conducted in Louisiana (USA) which included the participation of some military units of Central Asian states alongside military units of the USA and Canada. To deepen this cooperation NATO Headquarters prepared similar exercises for August 1996 in North Carolina. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan opted to send a unit of the Central Asian peace-keeping battalion, which was still being formed, to take part in these exercises. The deepening of cooperation with NATO could permit the conduct of similar exercises on the territory of one of the Central Asian states. Plans for such an exercise on the territory of Kazakhstan in 1997 were developed by the Kazakh Armed Forces together with the US Defence Ministry.

Among the NATO states the greatest assistance in establishing the national armed forces of Central Asian states has been rendered so far by the USA, Germany and Turkey. From the first day of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new states of Central Asia they suggested different forms of bilateral military relations and began assistance with foreign language teaching, military education, and teaching the principles of construction of contemporary armed forces.

In conclusion, it can be affirmed that the cooperation of the Central Asian states with NATO is not aimed at damaging collective security within the CIS framework. On the contrary, it acts to promote Central Asian security as a whole.
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ARCHITECTURE OF THE JHELUM WATERFRONT-SRINAGAR: IMAGES AND IMPRESSIONS

NEERJA TIKU*

‘who has not heard of the vale of Cashmere,
With its roses the brightest that earth ever gave,
Its temples, and grottos, and fountains as clear,
As the love-lighted eyes that hang over their wave.’

— Lalla Rookh by Thomas Moore

INTRODUCTION

Visitors to the valley have vividly described the splendour of the habitat along the Jhelum waterfront. The development along the river presents the most characteristic and memorable urban form of the city of Srinagar. One of the earliest descriptions of the valley was given by the Buddhist pilgrim from China, Huen Tsiang who visited the valley in 631 A.D. Francois Bernier, the French traveller who visited the valley much later in 1665 A.D. described the valley as ‘the paradise of the Indies’—which fired the imaginations of the western world, and gave Kashmir the aura that it has retained to this day. Bernier described the city as “not less than 3/4 of a league in length and 1/2 league in breadth...during this time there were only two bridges over the Jhelum”. Describing the houses in the city he adds, that, although for the most part the houses were built of wood, the houses were well built and consisted of two or three stories. Wood was preferred by most people of the city because of its cheapness and the facility with which it was brought down from the mountains by man through so many small rivers.

In November 1714, Father Desideri arrived in Srinagar, and found the city and its surroundings peaceful and pretty. He described it saying,
“a big river flows through the middle of the city, and nearby are large and beautiful lakes, whereon with much pleasure and amusement one can sail in small boats or in well formed larger vessels. A great many delightful gardens near or on the border of these lakes form as it were a garland around the city, which contains splendid buildings and well laid out streets, squares and bridges. The houses of the merchants and of common people, and also of some of the noble are built of stone and brick, but outside they are of diligently carved timber....The whole district round the city is not only beautiful but extremely fertile....”

Kalhana, the Kashmiri poet, traced the history of Kashmir back to four thousand years from 1148 A.D., the date at which he was writing, into the mists of time, through the pages of his great chronicle-the Rajatarangini, (River of Kings). Kalhana, according to Kennan, “emerges as an exceptionally likeable and wise man, indeed a sort of Kashmiri version of Chaucer and Shakespeare, who clearly loved his country and described it charmingly. Leaning, lofty houses, saffron, icy water and grapes; things that even in heaven are difficult to find are common here”. Kashmir has been the cradle of ancient culture and a nursery of two great religions-Hinduism and Buddhism. This can be seen in the remnants of its temples and viharas along the riverfront. Islam came to the valley in the middle of the fourteenth century with the coming of the Sultans.

The city of Srinagar has evolved over a period of more than two thousand years, with a number of settlements being founded, during various periods on or near the site of the present city. Due to their locations at a point which commands the trade routes to the rest of India and to Central Asia, these settlements served as the capital of Kashmir, as distribution centres for the valley and were also renowned centres of learning. According to Kalhana, ancient Kashmir has had a number of capitals. The most of these ancient cities was Srinagari, which was founded by Ashoka in 250 B.C. Srinagari occupied the site of present village of Pandrethan, about mile and half east of the Hari Parbat hill. Pandrethan derived its name from the Sanskrit word Puranadhisthana, literally the old capital. No traces are left of the many Buddhist shrines that by Kalhana’s account once graced the city. Srinagari remained the capital of Kashmir till about the middle of the sixth century A.D. when a new city was founded by Pravarasena near Hari Parbat hill. This was called Pravarpura after its founder’s name and extended only along the right bank of the river Jhelum (Vitsata). The two cities were in close proximity to each other, and strangely

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enough the old name of Srinagari triumphed over the new. Hieun Tsang mentions the two capitals of Kashmir, the old and the new. He also mentions that the old city lay to the south east, at a distance of two miles and to the south of the great mountain. The latter Hindu rulers are reported to have transferred the capital from one place to another.

The river Jhelum played a very important role in the formation and development of the city. It has been seen that the city developed at a number of sites but the importance of the river - the sustainer of life - has never been lost. All ancient civilizations evolved along the waterfronts and as such Srinagar is no exception. The city has evolved in total consonance with the river. A network of canals extended through the city structure inwards from the river’s edge and further habitation spread up to the base of Hari Parbat. Later extensions spread to the edge of the Dal Lake and the base of Shankaracharya hill and beyond. Thus the growth of the river Jhelum waterfront was the development of the city of Srinagar, which extended about three miles on each side of the river.

**JHELUM-SPRITUAL AND CULTURAL IMPORTANCE**

The *Hydaspes* of the ancient, the *Vitasta* of the Hindus and *Vyeth* of the Kashmiris, has been of great religious and cultural significance to the people of this great Himalayan region. *Vyeth - Vatru* - a spring below Verinag is believed to be the source of this great Kashmir river. The Rigveda mentions the seven great rivers of which *Vitasta* is one. All spiritual and cultural activities of the Kashmiri people revolved around it. The day began with a dip in its holy water, followed by prayers and daily offerings which were a common ritual. The river was a source of peace and solace and brought harmony among all religions. The mosques built on sites which had been earlier occupied by the temples and viharas were also located along it. The spiritual significance of the river is manifested in the verses [314] of the *Nilamata Purana*, an ancient Sanskrit text which deals with the sacred places, rituals and ceremonies of Kashmir - in which the great sage Kashyapa says:

\[
\text{‘Assuming the form of a river called Vitasta, O goddess, the daughter of the mountains, you are not a river (but) an ascetic}.
\]
We even find the significance of the river as an important Teerth Sthana in the Bhringeesh Samhita (Topography of Ancient Kashmir) in which Odes to the various Teerth Sthanas are written. The Vitasta Mahatmaya or Odes to the Vitasta in the 42nd shloka mentions:

वितस्ताया महानं गंगा तस्मां सममवतात्
तद्वर्ष्ण गणते देवी तस्म तीर्थरेखाया ॥ ४२ ॥

It clearly glorifies the Vitasta as being as sacred as the Ganges and endorses its significance as an important Teerth Sthana. The river is the lifeline of the people and the pivot around which all life evolved. Today the river is in danger and the settlement along the waterfront is in a dilapidated state. It is high time that efforts are made to restore the waterfront to its pristine glory.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EXISTING SPATIAL STRUCTURE

The city of Srinagar has an architectural character and a settlement pattern that is quite distinct from other settlements in the Himalayan region. The architecture and the pattern that emerged was primarily due to the following factors:

(a) The climate
(b) The waterbody - the river Jhelum that formed the main spine of the settlement.
(c) The two hillocks-Gopadri and Shankracharya.

It was also the locally available building materials and the skill and craftsmanship of its indigenous people, that brought about a unique stylistic coherence in the architecture along the waterfront. It may be said that the growth of the Jhelum waterfront is the development of the city of Srinagar.

The first urban settlement in this area is believed to have been founded in 250 B.C. by the Mauryan King Ashoka and was known as Srinagari. The evolution of the city of Srinagar can be divided into nine phases. In the past the valley of Kashmir is believed to have been under water with settlements concentrated on higher ground of fertile areas. The two hillocks Gopadri and Shankracharya projecting out. The first settlement is believed to have been at the foothills of the Hari Parbat. This settlement gradually
ARCHITECTURE OF THE JHELUM WATERFRONT

grew southwards along the right bank of the river Jhelum, with the formation of the Dal lake on the east side. The river Jhelum flowed in a serpentlike manner and was to become the main spine along which the city grew southwards on the right bank. The city developed on the left bank in the mid-fourteenth century, and the first bridge Zaina Kadal was also built about the same time. The physical remains of the earlier settlements are few. Only some important physical features, large places of worship and monuments, certain mohalla names, the street patterns and some items and sites can be identified as dating from the earlier period. However, elements from the Mughal period onwards are identifiable and they have played an important role in the later development of the city.

SPATIAL STRUCTURE AND THE URBAN FORM

The spatial structure of the city has evolved in consonance with the waterbodies and the topography. The main movement spine is formed by the river and parallel streets on both banks, connected across by a series of ten bridges, seven of these are of traditional wooden structures while other three are made of reinforced concrete built in the later half of this century. There is a significant difference in the spatial plan of the old settlement extending from the first bridge down river and the newer development extending up river towards Zero Bridge. In the traditional pattern, the river’s edge is defined by the buildings standing on retaining walls rising out of the water, and the street which is parallel to the river runs behind the buildings, with narrow crosslanes perpendicular to the river, and descending in a series of steps to the level of the water.

The new development upriver on the other hand reverses the traditional pattern and has a running parallel to the river which is on a raised embankment along the river’s edge. The traditional pattern evolved with the river being the main transport corridor with the streets being subservient to it. The streets widened as they extended into the interior with the major street running parallel to the river behind the buildings. The change in the newer development came about due to the importance attributed to the automobile traffic over the water transport together with the influence of European planning principles. The pattern of the earlier period, in contrast to the latter, presents a richly woven urban fabric at the human scale.
The pattern has a slight bend at the base of the hillock as it stretches southwards in a linear fashion guided by the river. Along its route the river spills into canals which flow into the inland creating settlements alongside it. A very interesting clustering takes place along the waterfront. In the earlier settlements upstream riverborne traffic alights at a wide flight of steps, commonly known as the ghats, which are regularly spaced along the banks. The steps rise up to the narrow lanes which are perpendicular to the river, giving access to the houses through private open courtyards, and gardens. These crosslanes meet up with parallel streets which have shops lining both sides and which distribute the traffic by vehicular modes to the rest of the city. The ghats on the river’s edge are major common open spaces where the daily activities take place such as bathing, washing and activities associated with the temples, mosques and houses located along the waterfront. Each community or individual identifies with a particular ghat which they patronized and there is hardly any ghat that is left unused. The mohalla along the waterfront was accessible from the ghat by a wide flight of steps leading on to the residential area. There appears to be a large open space between the river’s edge and the houses which was rather rare, as we move along the waterfront. The shikaras (small boats) are parked along the ghat being used for ferrying people across or to other points along the river’s edge. The trees formed an important element in the cityscape.

_Saraf Kadal-an ancient bridge on the Mar canal_
ARCHITECTURE OF THE JHELUM WATERFRONT

The Mar canal formed an interesting waterway meandering through the city. Wherever the back waters of the Dal lake flowed through the city, it was known as the Mar canal deriving its name from the beautiful Marsar. The major portion of the water of the Dal lake came from the Marsar lake situated beyond the Harwan water reservoir. There was a network of Mar canals flowing through the city. An interesting clustering existed along the canals, some of the houses belonged to the rich merchants, as can be deciphered from the scale and magnificence of the buildings along the waterway. The canal has since been filled up to form a road. An interesting feature here is the row of shops along the bridge which formed an interesting walking experience across the canal. The shops appear to project out along the length of the bridge, as can be seen, with the help of timber columns resting on the banks on both sides. At Sekhi dafar there was an interesting streetscape. It was probably an important street within the cluster along the waterway. There was a row of shops on the ground floor of the houses along the street. The houses overlooked the waterway on one side and the street on the other.

Nakshband Sahib shrine on way to Hari Parbat

It is a simple and beautiful structure built primarily of timber. It was probably the prototype adopted for the other shrines/mosques seen along the waterfront. The roof structure and the towerlike pinnacle can be seen in a more elaborate form in the Shah Hamdan mosque along the waterfront. The roofs were constructed of wooden planks laid over with birch bark and made watertight by a layer of specially prepared earth.
On these grew white lilies and red tulips presenting a colourful roofscape which was a viewer’s delight in spring time.

THE TYPICAL CLUSTER

A study of a typical cluster along the waterfront clearly indicates that the waterfront was dotted with temples and shrines at close proximity to one another and the residential mohallas extended beyond into the mainland. There was a linear extension of the city along the waterfront and the temples too were within walking distance along the ghat, from the farthest point in the mohalla. The aristocracy and the wealthy traders built their mansions overlooking the river for a number of reasons - the primary being the proximity to the main artery of communication, and the temples located along the river’s edge. The larger houses were built next to the places of worship, and the rest of the associated community came up in smaller and denser clusters, in the remaining space between the river’s edge and the parallel movement spine. The traders and merchants combined both commercial and residential activities by building along the river’s edge. These larger houses were emphasized by the smaller scale development which surrounded them. A harmonious relationship existed between the height and scale of the public and religious structures, the larger houses and the smaller residential structures.
The Raghunath mandir was a prominent landmark and had a well-defined structure as compared to the other temples along the waterfront. Its towering *shikhara* stood well above the other structures in the mohalla. One notices the taller and larger houses located in close proximity to the temple while the smaller ones are in the interior or further down. These houses belonged to the richer merchants and were located on the edge of the river. The entrance to the temple from the riverside was through the ghat, which had structure above it, forming a gateway to the temple, this was a rare phenomena, not noticed in the other temples. The house on the right hand side, had a private access to the waterfront by a flight of steps linked to the house through the projected covered balcony. The projected baywindows formed the predominant architectural feature of the facades along the waterfront. The long timber brackets that supported these projections lent a continuity to the composition. One also notices the courtyard on the extreme right which punctuated the continuous facade, as well as, the grass grown roof tops. The dharamashala on the left side had a temple alongside and the chanting of religious hymns by people seated along the projected balcony, could be heard by devotees, to the temple across the river.

*Old Haba Kadal bridge*

(The framing pattern of the wooden bridges can be clearly comprehended. The large houses along the waterfront can be seen, the houses appear to have elaborate projected facades, the towering *shikhara* of the temple of Somyar is seen at a distance.)
THE TYPICAL DWELLINGS ALONG THE WATERFRONT

The dwellings along the waterfront were approached through the narrow crosslanes which were in turn approached from a wide flight of steps rising from the river’s edge. The buildings were generally three to four storeys high, with basements contained within the retaining walls along the river side. The houses both large and small followed a similar pattern of organisation. The plans were generally squarish so that a minimum of external walls were exposed and heat was conserved in the cold winter. The rooms were multifunctional, the rooms on the ground floor serving more public uses while the rooms on the upper floors being more private. The ground floor was approached through a courtyard, by a short flight of steps and was entered through a lobby called wuz, on either side of the lobby were then located public rooms generally used for multipurpose functions such as meeting with visitors. In some houses the kitchen was located in the rear of the house to the left hand corner and the room adjacent was used for serving meals, which was generally served on chokies or low wooden tables, the size being such that one large thali or plate could be served on it. The height of the choki was such that a person could have his meals sitting crosslegged on the floor.

The Kashmiri people are generally a very social group and have had a slow pace of life which could be attributed to the harsh climatic conditions and indulgence in intellectual pursuits. They interacted frequently bringing about a closeknit community with a sense of neighbourliness, and as such there were frequent visitors to the house. The visitors would use the room on the ground floor which was generally large and used by both men and women. In the smaller houses the staircase was located to one side. The ground floor was used for dining and sitting, besides the kitchen being located in the rear corner, while the large sitting room for visitors was on the upper floor. The room on the ground floor adjacent to the kitchen was known as the wuth, meaning wrap. It probably meant that due to smaller openings and the warmth around due to kitchen fire, it kept the warmth wrapped around the persons using the room. The first floor had more private rooms used by the family. The second floor was known as the kani, and was a large room spread to cover the entire floor with windows running all along its perimeter. The windows had typical panels, and were only partially glazed. The low extent of glazing was to keep out the
cold in winter and reduce the heat loss in winter. The kani was used extensively in summer, the windows were generally kept open and the cool summer breeze allowed to blow through. Besides the timber mullions, windows, and timber infills which presented a stylistic coherence, the most striking feature of the kani were the projected bay windows known as the dub. It was used by the family to overlook on to the riverfront or the street or to be a part of the activities along the major activity zones. The dub was generally located on the southern side so that the sun was available in winter. These bay windows were cantilevered from the main face and suspended over the river or street. They were constructed by a direct and simple technique of extending over the floor joists and enclosing the three or five sided alcove with windows all around. These alcoves formed the window seats in the kani and other rooms in the house besides enriching the facades with the bold projections. These window seats were approximately 4 to 6 inches above the floor level and the “sills” were a foot and a half above the seat level thereby allowing a clear view once seated alongside it. The layout of the houses along the waterfront were simple and generally depicted a uniform pattern. Inspite of the varying sizes of the houses there existed an intricately woven urban fabric which reflected the cohesive and well knit community, each playing their part. There were the traders, the merchants, the intellectuals, the shop owners, the teachers, the artisans and others. The plan could be classified into two types. The smaller square having the stair to one side and rooms on the other, while the larger one with a central stairway with rooms on either side. The basement was used for storage of wood and fuel etc., for use during the cold winter months, and was generally approached from the stairs adjoining the kitchen and not visible from the main entry. The basement was large and generally occupied the whole floor.

The staircase, in the smaller houses occupied very little space and therefore was close to a spiral. The larger houses usually had a straight flight of steps and in some there were wooden staircases winding round the central space with rooms around them. There was a tendency to minimize on the space of the staircase, and as such in the smaller houses the staircases were often narrow with risers as high as 10 inches or more. In the larger houses the risers varied between 6 to 8 inches. The staircases were generally made of timber. The landing in the smaller houses opened up to the main living space separated by a low wooden partition, of the width of a door and of about 2 feet height which could be crossed over
easily and which defined the space of the room. In larger houses too the entry to the room was defined by this low partition, and the rooms usually had doors too. The need of the partition was probably due to the fact that owing to the cold weather conditions the rooms were generally carpeted wall to wall or had a mat covering. There was seldom any furniture in the rooms, and generally comprised of low seating along the walls.

The rooms could be classified into the following:

the *brand*-steps at the entry to the house.

the *wuz*-the entrance lobby.

the *bud kuth*-the large room on the ground floor used for meeting with visitors.

the *lokut kuth*-or small room, it could be on any floor usually a private space.

the *kani*-the large room on the second floor or attic occupying the whole floor and used for large family gatherings and festivities. Most commonly used in summer as with its band of windows, it provided a cool breeze.

the *shran kuth*-the bath usually located on the ground floor adjoining the kitchen, the kitchen fire of the *chula* used to heat the water in the hamam.

the *choka*-the cooking area or kitchen.

the *kuth*-the individual rooms were known by the person occupying the room.

the *thokur kuth*-the prayer room, it was located above the entrance and projected out of the main facade.

The houses along the river’s edge had private ghats which were accessible from a projected terrace with steps on one side. These ghats were used by the merchants for purpose of trade and commerce. The toilets were located outside in a corner of the large courtyard and along the wall adjoining the lane in order to facilitate the collection of the night soil without entering the courtyard. In the absence of a proper drainage and severage system in the old city the people shifted out to newer areas and thus it lost the patronage of the people.
THE CIRCULATION NETWORK

The circulation network comprised of the waterway formed by the river Jhelum and the system of navigable canals together with the parallel spine and the crosslanes or galis and kochas. In the past water transport was of great significance and the movement of a large proportion of goods and peoples took place along the waterways of Srinagar. The river and the canals were thus an integral part of the circulation pattern and played an important part in the development of the city. There was a definite hierarchy in the circulation pattern. The river formed the primary artery of movement and thereby the highest order in the hierarchy. The main movement corridor running parallel to the river but behind the houses followed next in the hierarchy. The river, canals, and the parallel spines were thus of greater width. The bridges were also fairly wide and provided a connection with the development on the other side forming the next order in the hierarchy. The perpendicular lanes joining the parallel spines to the river were next in order. These then grew progressively more winding in the dense residential clusters. A number of very narrow access galis to small group of houses branched off from these roads. The movement was primarily pedestrian, and as such the narrow galis or kochas as they were known never gave a congested look. The residents of the mohallas could use either the water transport or the road depending upon which was available in close proximity. As the distances travelled were within 3 kms, and within walking distance, the movement was generally pedestrian.

THE ACTIVITY SPACES ALONG THE WATERFRONT

The river Jhelum almost serpentlike stretches in a linear fashion from the base of the two hillocks. Along its path on either side stretching inland for a distance of 3 kms lies the present city of Srinagar. The development on either side depicted a similar pattern and evolved over a period when the river was the prime channel of movement. The earlier development had seven bridges across the river linking the two sides and linking the development as one harmonious whole. One never observes the development as subdivided along the two banks, as the integration of the two sides has evolved in such a way that the bridges form the major activity zones, with the important bazaars located alongside it.

The land use along the waterfront was a mixed one. The predominant land use being residential, interspersed with religious places dotting the
waterfront at a distance of 1-1/2 kms. The large residential building were generally used as showrooms and for commercial activity. The other important land use was public facilities such as schools, government buildings, hospitals etc. The market was located in the interior along the street parallel to the river but running behind the houses. The activities thereby generated along the waterfront were primarily related to residential cum religious activity. The schools and other important buildings were located along the river’s edge due to easy accessibility. The waterfront was dotted with ghats and punctuated by gardens hanging over the edge of the retaining wall. The ghat within the mohalla was approached by a wide flight of steps, and was used as an entry to the mohalla. It was used by the residents for washing, bathing and formed the community meeting place. The activities on the ghat would begin early in the morning, it would start by bathing and washing. The women would, at places, have an enclosed bathing area built along the waterfront. This would be followed by a visit to the temple, in close proximity. Each mohalla had its own temple. At times the boats would bring in fruits and vegetables at the respective ghats for the residents of the mohalla. The ghats would also serve as delivery points for rations. The ghats formed a significant element in the life of the community. They also acted as the transition space between the public area of the river and the private residences. There were a number of ration shops and dhobi ghats along the river. Ration shops catered mostly to the residents of the houseboats as well as the houses in nearby areas. The cluster was generally deficient in educational and health facilities, though at places the facilities were available along the waterfront.

THE BAZAAR STREET

The main street was generally 6 to 7 metres wide and ran parallel to the river behind the buildings. It was known as the puth bazaar or rear market street. The houses along the street had shops on the ground floor while the floors above were used for residential purposes. There was a dense pattern of built fabric enriched by the mixing of activities and functions. Houses, showrooms, temples, shops and even schools were accommodated within the street. The commercial activity sometimes extended to the upper floor and to the smaller streets leading to the interior. The type of shops depended upon the hierarchy of the street. The main street had shops selling textiles, woollens, sophisticated household items, handicrafts, spices, fruits, vegetables and day to day requirments of the residents of the mohalla.
The secondary street was formed by the crosslanes which zig zagged into the interior leading to the ghats. A group of shops could be seen in the interior along the street. The shops catered to the day to day needs of the residents of the cluster. There were the tailor’s shop, the baker, the milk man, the meatshop, the barber and the general merchant. These shops catered to the needs of the residents within a 5 minutes walk from their houses. The facade along the main street depicted an endless variation reflecting the heterogeneity of its inhabitants, varying from the rich traders to small shop owners. The shops were on either side of the street, and the height of the buildings fronting the street varied between three to four floors. The street scape offered an endless variety of visual experiences in the play of facade treatments and the display of skills of the craftsmen best revealed in the delicately carved wooden *pinjara* shutters. The light that filtered through these and fell on the intricately designed carpet in the room together with the delicate and colourful patterns of the *kangri* made a blissful sight. There existed a stylistic coherence in the entire streetscape that brought about an effect of total proportional harmony. The ground floor had an endless row of shops along the main street while the upper floors depicted a rhythmic play of intricately carved lattice shutters, a series of bay windows, carved screens, and steeply sloping roofs with beautifully carved caves. The streets were linear in arrangement and at times were punctuated by secondary streets leading to the interior, which often lead on to a temple along the waterfront. The temple of Ganpatyar is one such example.

**THE TEMPLE TERRACE OR GHAT.**

The temples were located along the waterfront each with its own private ghat or terrace. Each cluster had its own temple within a 5 minutes walking distance from the farthest point in the mohalla or cluster. The clusters were sometimes known by the temple they contained such as Ganpatyar mohalla or Raghunath mandir mohalla etc. The mohallas were also identified by the name of the bridge or kadal in close proximity such as Fateh Kadal mohalla or Ali Kadal mohalla. The temples formed an important landmark in the mohalla with its towering *shikhar* visible from a distance, as well as the sounds of the temple bells that ushered in a new day for the residents of the mohalla. The day began by a bath in the river and a visit to the temple. Water was an important requirement during religious rituals or prayer and as such the temples were conveniently located. The temples were approached through the narrow crosslanes...
generally 1.5 to 2 meters wide. The entry was through a court or sometimes through a series of courts. There was a main shrine with its *pradakshina* path around, located on a terrace at the edge of the river. The shrine was easily identifiable from a distance across the river with its *shikhar* rising about the sloping roof of the *pradakshina* path.

*Typical houses along waterfront, with temples in close proximity - View from Fateh Kadal*

The terrace had a few steps to one side which lead to the land from where there was a wide flight of steps that lead to the ghat along the river. The ghats served as entry points to the mohalla as well as the important landmarks, when movement of people was primarily by river borne traffic. A study of the clusters clearly indicates that the river Jhelum was dotted with temples at close proximity to one another and the

*The Zaina kadal ghat*

(A wide flight of steps can be seen leading on to the mosque on one side and the main street on the other)
residential areas extended beyond into the mainland. The temples were located along the river’s edge and were within 5 minutes walking distance from the farthest house in the mohalla. Each mohalla had its own temple and the day began by a bath in the river and a visit to the temple. One notices the waterfront being dotted by temples in close proximity.

Wide streets led to the mohalla from the ghat, the upper floors projected out towards the streetside presenting an interesting streetscape. The timber trusses that support the roof are visible in the foreground, the framing of the towerlike structure rising above the roof is also visible.

The residential area or mohalla comprised of large and small houses along the waterfront. The traders and merchants located their houses overlooking the river probably for a number of reasons, the primary being the proximity to the river, the main channel of movement. Thereby combining commercial and residential activities besides maintaining a nearness to the temples or other place of worship. The houses along the edge of the waterfront generally had a simple square plan with a staircase kept to one side, these houses were used as showrooms, and the family lived in an adjoining house overlooking the common court. The house had a private ghat accessible from the projected terrace overlooking the river. The terrace had steps leading to the river from one side. These ghats were used by the traders for transacting business. The houses along the river’s edge were punctuated by colourful gardens hanging over the edge of the retaining wall. These gardens formed an important element in the open space pattern between the buildings. The temples at places were sometimes located on the river’s edge on a level lower than the surrounding residential development. The temple in such a case was built on a raised
stone embankment with steps leading on to it from rear. The structure was simple in its form, having a square plan projecting out uniformly on all sides with the help of closely spaced wooden brackets. The projected portion formed the pradakshina path around the main shrine and was enclosed with the help of beautifully carved screens. The towering shikhar above the sanctum pierced as it were through the otherwise sloping roof of the temple. The temple was simplistic in form and was usually identified by the shikhar rising above the surrounding residential development. The temple forms did not reflect the same maturity and elaborate ornamentations and probably the similar development of architectural styles as was witnessed in other parts of the country during the similar period or for that matter in the valley six hundred years ago. Of the temples along the waterfront the Raghunath mandir stands out as a prominent structure, but due to its location within the cluster it was visited primarily by the residents of the cluster. On the other hand the Ganapatyar temple was very popular probably due to its location along the main bazaar street and being accessible by both the channels of movement.

THE BAZAAR AT THE JUNCTION OF THE STREET AND THE BRIDGE

The bazaars at the junction of the street and the bridge formed the hub of commercial activity in the development. There were a series of bazaars along the riverfront at the junction of the bridges which formed the hub of commercial activity within the mohallas. The development being linear the bazaars served the mohallas in proximity to it within a radius of approximately 2 to 3 kms. The bridge formed the centre of the cluster as it were on either side. Thus the city could be linearly sub-divided into series of clusters with the bridges forming the centre of each, or the pivot around which the community evolved. The clusters were known by the name of the bridge in close proximity to it. The market served the clusters for their day to day needs. The shops were specialised in nature and included large showrooms, eating places, large textile shops, groceries etc. The bridges were wide and the movement was generally pedestrian. The river physically divided the settlement into two but the bridges integrated the development so perfectly that this division was never felt and it appeared as one homogenous settlement. This was due to the fact that the bridges converged so to speak all activity within the neighbourhood.

The tonga was the most widely used mode of travel. People could traverse long distances on foot. The terrain, the climate, and the slow pace of life encouraged people to walk. The farthest distance that one had
to travel to work, or to the temple, to the bazaar, to the school, or to shop was barely 3 kms away. The interesting streetscapes, the changing visual experiences, the play of light and shade and the landmarks punctuating the zig zag of the streets created an exciting experience for the pedestrian. Thus walking was not a tiring experience but a rich and exhilarating one. This was in total contrast to the streets stretched for long distances making walking a monotonous experience. The new development was sparsely spaced out while the old was compact.

(There was access to the waterbody by a long flight of steps, and the raised embankment with the street running alongside it. There were probably shops along the street as is seen by the projected overhangs along the ground floor of the houses on the street. The pinjakari windows, the projected balconies or dubs create the typical visual experience of the architecture of the Jhelum waterfront.)
The shops within the cluster, along a mohalla lane, or at the end of a lane were typical in their facades. The shop opened on to the street and projected out by a couple of feet. It had a raised plinth and was linked to the rest of the house from the rear. The shopkeeper usually sat crosslegged on the mat covered, mud plastered floor smoking his hookah, while he sold his wares. The mohalla street usually had a row of shops selling the day to day requirements of the residents of the mohalla. The typical tea shop seen here, was at the end of a street and was the shop at which the tonga wallahs stopped for a hot cup of *sheerchai* or salted tea along with the freshly baked bread *katlam* seen stacked on the right hand sid

**IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND PERSPECTIVES IN RESTORATION**

It is important to re-examine our traditional habitat and understand the rationale behind the mud-plastered walls, the projected baywindows, the earth roofs with its colourful array of spring flowers, the houses along the narrow lanes etc. so that, what we build today has the ‘spirit and the aesthetics’ of our traditional forms, even though, we may rely on the developed technology base. The waterfront has lost its grandeur and magnificence. The great resource of traditional craftsmanship is now sadly disappearing quite rapidly. The architecture that had emerged was a response to the climate, the topography and the traditional lifestyles of the Kashmiri people. Our traditions become far more relevant today than they were in the past. The past is unique and overpowering and it cannot be ignored. The climate for a return to the traditional appears to have set in, as the society is at the crossroads and there is an urge to look back into one’s roots, serching for an identity.

The waterfront is in a state of dilapidation, the buildings have been destroyed and the people had to flee their homes and hearths. The old settlements which preserved the unique tradition and character, lie plundered and deserted. The rebuilding that takes place is arbitrary and oblivious of the existing urban form and character of which it is a part. Building materials that are alien to the climate and original urban fabric are being used thus eroding the urban scape. Eventually if this is allowed to continue, the character of the place would be transformed. The traditions and the cultural identity would be lost forever. A once unique urban pattern and traditional architecture would be replaced by brick, concrete and
steel which not only would be climatically unsuitable but aesthetically appalling. This is our architectural heritage and it must be conserved and restored to its original glory. This is an immense task which requires a great deal of sensitivity so that the new that is built harmonises with the old and the distinct identity is retained.

The following steps would go a long way in realising this:

i) Setting up of an urban commission with statutory powers, which could monitor and overlook all works that are carried out in the heritage zone.

ii) A massive clean up drive to rid the land and water of filth and garbage, that has created unhealthy living conditions.

iii) Preparation of a spatial plan in the present context when thousands of houses, many of them being along the Jhelum waterfront have been burnt and destroyed.

iv) Restoring the houses to their original owners and involving the people in the rebuilding process, besides providing them all financial assistance required.

v) Curbing the use of concrete and all materials that are not energy efficient and climatically unsuitable besides marring the urbanscape.

vi) Specifying the facade treatment so that the original character is retained.

vii) Evolving an efficient garbage disposal system whereby the garbage is not dumped into the river.

viii) Reviving the Jhelum as a prime channel of movement with the buildings along the waterfront restored of their original glory with their ornately carved eaves, projected bay windows or dubs and screens etc.

ix) Restore the temples and important shrines along the waterfront so that they act as important landmarks along the landscape.

x) The waterfront has all the potential to be one of the unique architectural development in the region, where the people are strongly rooted to their tradition and still maintain a strong cultural identity.

xi) Design the waterfront as an interesting settlement whereby the tourists too could get an insight into the traditional lifestyles of the
Neerja Tiku

people.

xii) Redevelop the habitat in all respects including paving of lanes, bylanes, drains etc.

xiii) Establish Training Institutes which could go a long way in reviving the traditional craftsmanship, which was of a very high order such as the art of Khatamband ceiling, the wooden flooring, carving of eaves, paper machie etc.

xiv) Last but not the least, lay down specific guidelines for all building works within the heritage zone.

These are some of the many sugestions that would help to make the Jhelum waterfront an important waterway complete with landmarks such as temples, mosques, showrooms, merchant houses, tourist facilities, interspersed with gardens, terraces, houseboats, traditional habitats etc., so that the people of the valley could once again live in peace and harmony, follow their traditional lifestyles, retain their distinct cultural identity and nurture their arts and crafts and thereby restore their uniqueness in the Himalayan region.
OBITUARY

G.R. SANTOSH (1929-1997)
TRIBUTE

The news of passing away of
Ghulam Rasool Santosh, an artist,
writer and poet of repute and Padma
Shree awardee, on March 10, 1997
was received with shocking disbelief
by the literary and cultural circles.
The sudden and untimely demise of
G.R. Santosh has caused a void
which will be difficult to be filled.

Born in 1929 in Srinagar
(Kashmir), Santosh took to painting
and poetry in Kashmiri at an early
age. By 1953 he was an
acknowledged poet of Kashmiri language. From 1954 to 1956 he studied
painting and art at Baroda University under Prof. N.S. Bendre.

Santosh distinguished himself as an epitome of search and fine
fusion and became quite involved in the tantric search and expression.
In fact he spear-headed the tantric movement in contemporary art in
India. Throughout his life he carried forward his search based on
tantric symbolism and painted it on his canvas reflecting the artistic
endeavours of a human mind.

His works presented a coherent world in vital images of his
heightened awareness. His morphology of geometrical figures
assumed symbolic significance, sometimes pure and sometimes
qualifying. But none of his paintings serve any specific magical
functions that were normally assigned to yantras in the tantric systems.
The forms of his art represented the forms of his consciousness and
his aspirations that revealed an urge to link his individual
consciousness to the deepest layers of his being.
Through his profound understanding of his geometric form, Santosh created a symbology that leads to a harmonic unison with the cosmic process. He developed vertical, horizontal, oblique and circular movement for creating a network of lines and forms that determined all the static and kinetic sequences in the geometric configuration and designated them a formative quality of a unified organic whole - a significant creation of his inward eye. In this way, his paintings evoke a sense of meditative contemplation to enable one to identify with the relative sources - the Ultimate Reality and the Self.

Since 1953, Santosh held numerous solo and group shows of his paintings both in India and abroad including Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Honolulu, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Zurich, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, Cambridge, Trenton, Dubai, Washington and many other places. Everywhere his approach and visual metaphysics was held in esteem mainly due to the fact that he painted what he believed and there was no contradiction in his thought and deed.

Besides being an artist rather a painter of distinction, Santosh was also a noted writer and poet in Urdu and Kashmiri and won many prestigious awards like Sahitya Akademi, Lalit Kala Academy and Kalhana award for his distinguished works. In 1979 he was awarded the Sahitya Academy award for a compilation of his poems titled 

BESUKH RUH (the tormented soul) which was published in 1978. The following year in 1980 he published Shakti Vichhara and Vaakh in Kashmiri. He was awarded the Padma Shree in 1977, in recognition of his artistic and literary attainments.

Santosh’s contribution to the art, culture and literature based on the indigenous cultural and spiritual heritage of Kashmir, particularly his belief in Yoga and Shaivite philosophy is of great importance and value for future generations. The Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, of which Ghulam Rasool Santosh was the Founder Member, has pledged to carry forward his mission of preserving and disseminating the traditions, philosophy and heritage of Kashmir.
Santosh’s exposition of The Five Elements — Panchmahabhuta

Shabda - Sound

Sparsha - Air

Roopa - Light
OBITUARY

*Rasa - Water*

*Gandha - Earth*
Kashmir Shaivism in its practice may be prescriptive initially. Indeed, there is a clear distinction, though not distancing, between the two symbol systems - *yantra* and *mantra* - which are to be contemplated upon. There is a ‘semiology’ of *yantra* - the visual, geometric, representational or vehicular state - and a ‘semiotics’ of *mantra* where constituents are signs or autonomous symbols in an aural, though not necessarily lexical, mode. In actual practice the *sadhaka* is to jettison both at a particular stage which is indeterminate and be in a formless and aphonous state. This is akin to what Roland Barthes calls semioclasty. However, the recombinant energies of which the physical body of the *sadhaka* is both progenitor and storehouse may appear in altered or unaltered form as creative force. This state of manifest energy is another brief stage in the process after which linearity of experience loses meaning retrospectively and the area of ‘beyond’ envelopes all. Beyond this ‘beyond’ is the inscrutable, unfathomable and unknowable - the *Paravaak*. 

*Paravaak*, literally, is beyond-sound-ness. Yet this is such a wholly unsatisfactory sense that it is as far from the import of the term as anything else would be. That there is no cardinal scripture in Kashmir Shaiva Darshan is precisely because it does not lend itself to lexical logic or semantic study. All texts relating to Kashmir Shaiva Darshan - *tantras*, *yamalas* and other *agamas* - communicate only through non-semantic implication. They map the frontiers of linguistic logic and let go at that. After that there is hyper-silence which is in turn subverted by *Paravaak*. This is an experiential state which cannot be described. This state voids the space of *tantra as yantra* and *mantra*. This is the triadic heart of Shiva.

The seminal influence on the work of Santosh is that of Kashmir Shaivism in its entirety. Its formatting into several sub-schools did not blinker his vision. He was formally initiated into the rigorous *krama* school by his Guru who hailed from the South. He was, nevertheless, highly
receptive towards the fine nuances of the other schools as well. In this, as in his other beliefs, he was signally devoid of dogma. He had a fine understanding of the highly abstract canons of this philosophy to which he was initially drawn because of its specificity to Kashmir. From there on, his experiential journey took him to latitudes where he could plumb the depths of his own being. His incessant quest of self discovery abutted on his aesthetics as well. Realization is often ascetic in nature. With Santosh it underwent an alchemy brought about by his artistic vision resulting in limpid prose, lyrical verse and majestic pictures. The most abstruse of philosophical concepts would be transformed into a luminous work of art. The mere fact of trying to do this is sufficient in itself. When the undertaking succeeds the result can be grand. It is a tribute to the artistic genius of Santosh that he succeeded eminently in manifesting the unmanifest.

Santosh was many things to many people. Well! So are a great many of us. But unlike others similarly positioned, he was his true being in all interpersonal and societal transactions. There was not a trace of artifice in this artist of many parts. His utterances, creative expression in several genres, human relationships, social concerns, behaviour and morality were all informed by an integrated world view that was his personal credo, his philosophical stance. There was no place for hypocrisy in this scheme of things. This meant that he was not loved, or even liked, by all; but widely respected he was.

Ghulam Rasool Dar was born in 1929 in a lower middle class Shia family of Chinkral Mohalla, Habbakadal. He spent a rather unspectacular childhood and did not get the benefit of a college education. But his immediate environment was steeped in a refined understanding of the arts and non-orthodox though deeply religious outlook. This, in a word, is the quintessential Kashmir as well. His liberal disposition was characterised early on by the fact that he took on his wife’s name, Santosh, as his own. She, in turn, became Toshi - the universal Bhabi. Santosh chose Delhi as his workplace in the early sixties after completing art studies at the M.S.University, Baroda - but he remained the authentic dyed-in-wool Kashmiri all his life. In the entire corpus of his artistic work whether in visual and plastic art or literature, Kashmir remains the constant reference. He wrote a major novel in Urdu, several stage and radio plays and a
substantial amount of poetry in Kashmiri. Kashmir remains the express or oblique leit-motif in his entire oeuvre, even while the contents are universal. A true Kashmiri soul, he could not but be representative of the gentle ways of the Sufis, the compassionate and balmy air, delicate hues of nature’s palette executed to perfection in the sky and the brook, tarns and the roses, cowslip and the intoxicating larkspur. Santosh reflected all of this and more in his artistic outpourings.

Santosh gained international recognition as an artist. This came about through sheer hard work. As a writer, however, his contribution to modern Kashmiri literature is yet to be assessed properly. This has happened in part due to his long absences from Kashmir as an artist living in expatriate settings, and also due to a lack of comprehension on the part of the contemporary critic in respect of the import of his work in the area of form as well as content. His major achievements as a writer are the reclamation of *vaakh* as a sustainable poetic form after a gap of nearly six hundred years, incorporating the complex classical form of *Behr-e-taveel* in the poetic corpus of Kashmiri and rediscovering the chastity of Kashmiri idiom eschewing the Persian and Arabic word-hoard. Santosh comes through as a worthy successor of Sufi poets of the eighteenth and nineteenth century even though he does not use the specific terminology employed by these poets.

His writing, as also his art, is robust and vigorous. The very sweep of his vision makes it compelling. And he displays the delicate touch of a master in practically the entire body of his work across media. The basic underpinning, however, remains the same. His art is never stuffy, pedantic or anaemic. It is aesthetically sound even while partaking deeply of the ambrosia of philosophy. An excerpt from his short story *Path* (Converse) amply illustrates the point:

“When I received sight, she was regally seated on a high throne. A million suns were radiating light. This light was not a searing firebolt. it was cool moonlight. Like nectar cleansing every limit, every pore all over. The face was a blameless full moon. The forehead, an assembly of all the stars - glittering and radiant. The eyes were closed under heavy lids. When she opened them, they contained the deep and resplendent vastness of the cosmos - coloured a pastel sky blue - bidding me to rise and enter them and
soar in flight. When the rainy nights are still and a slight aircurrent ripples the stillness - a like smile hovered around the corners of her mouth. The fact is that I recognised her and knew her, but I only yearned to see her converse. Then she bared her bosom. The moonlight lay congealed and the lotuses curled inwards. I had sucked at these breasts and had the mother’s milk of this liquefied moonlight. The blood sang in my veins. Unconsciously, I put my thumb in my mouth and started sucking. This did not alter the thought of seeing her converse. Then I saw her trunk. It was a field of lotuses shaped like a mandala, a central knot at the navel. It made me remember what I knew, without knowing when I was in that womb for nine months. Growing from a point to a child, I remembered all the forms. Then she extended her hands towards me in the manner of cradling me. After all I was born to her with the opening of the lotus. Being suckled in this cradle, I have grown and crawled down here; stood up when I could and started running, getting distanced.”

Santosh was influenced early on in his life by leftist ideology. He was also linked with the Kashmir Cultural Conference. While retaining the core of progressive thinking as a part of his personal credo, he consciously shunned unnecessary and at times anti-aesthetic ideological baggage. The other strands of his artistic persona are not difficult to trace either. His childhood memories of the marsiya form and its structured lament are discernible in his early poems. Interestingly, it is his love lyrics of this period that show the strongest influence of this genre. He wrote marsiyas later in his life which are an important addition to the scant literature of this genre available in Kashmiri language. It is worth mentioning here that the Kashmiri marsiya is quite distinct from its Urdu and Persian versions. Kashmir as a geographical entity is integral to the work of Santosh. The cutting edge of this awareness is the Hari Parbat hill in Srinagar. Santosh worked out a detailed theory with the Hari Parbat and the prehistoric shrine of Sharika as Chakreshwari situated atop this hill. He based his work on the iconic forms carved out on the face of the hill and related them to ritualistic sounds, mnemonic phonemes and children’s riddles.

This is a monumental work which has been documented in detail. Unfortunately, he could not give the finishing touches to this work which
KASHMIR AND HAARAPPA: THE SOUND IMAGE

“The written word and the representational picture issue from the same matrix in as much as they are encapsulated transmedia images. There exists the possibility of a written picture as well as the representational word. We are widely familiar with the latter but do not readily perceive the former. The basic flaw in the research approach to understanding the Harappan seals is the wholly untenable premise of considering it to be the script of some, as yet unknown, language. We are marooned in the discipline of hierography whereas we should employ cryptographic notions. Kashmir has been the theatre of the discovery of many terracota seals not very unlike the ones found in Harappa. These, and several others from other civilizational sites, have been regarded as sundry pictograms if they are not reducible to the notion of a script. This is a blinkered approach. It is the purpose of this book to create a new frontier of enquiry - whether these seals are concepts and notions organised in a simple, and yet sophisticated, visual code? If so, what about the language, language components or phonemes that provide the word - thoughts for the pictures? This is an effort to understand the ‘sound image’.”

As mentioned earlier the basic underpinning on which Santosh built his world of art as well as his personal world is the Kashmir Shaiva philosophy. Phoneme mysticism is an important component of the same. His research approach makes use of deep insights in respect of the same. Santosh is one of the rare people who outgrew the circumstance of his birth and became a highly evolved person in his lifetime. It is appropriate to close this account with a sampling of his poetic persona:
If even I get lost in this fair
What happens to unweaned innocence
The whirligig winging the flight of thoughts
The pigeon roost reduced to a void
If I fly the wilful pigeons
Visions of Shiva-Harhar, Shiva-Shambhu

★

I internalised the blood river by and by
Do not go by the footmarks on my chest
Radha, come let us anoint ourselves
With the moon tonight
Come for raas, let us dance
For, when has the lotus ever
Wet itself?

★

Call out
And the sky will be your limit
Or else its pillars crumble
How do I help it
My poppet is so used to it:
A cupful of lifeblood
Evening and morn.

★

He said:
It happens now, or never!
Which route is the shortest-
Will someone enlighten me?
Distances, perhaps, are catapulted vision
Did the road ever curl itself
Around a milestone?
He said: sky.
Limit of vision, said I
The stars - blinkers of the Age.
He said: ascencion
A pure moment, I affirmed
The implosion of an aeon’s span.
Harhar: said he
Quintessence, I replied
There is achieving in losing
Finding.
UNEP Sasakawa Environment Award (1996) for Dr. T.N. Khoshoo

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Sasakawa Environment Prize for 1996 worth 200,000 US dollars was conferred upon distinguished Indian scientist-cum-environmentalist and Vice-President of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation Dr. Triloki Nath Khoshoo at an impressive function organised at New Delhi on November 30, 1996. The prestigious award was presented by Ms. Elizabeth Dowdeswell, UN Under Secretary General and the Executive Director, UNEP, to Dr. Khoshoo in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the protection and management of the environment, in the royal presence of Princess Chulabhorn of Thailand. Instituted in 1982, the prize is awarded annually to leading environmentalists. Previous awardees include Chico Mendes of Brazil, Prof. Lester Brown of USA and Dr. M.S. Swaminathan of India.

The award ceremony function began with a Bharatanatyam recital titled *Bhumi sukta* - a prayer for the environment, by Geeta Chandran. Earlier Ms. Elizabeth Dowdeswell introduced the award winner as an advocate of strong...
regional environmental planning for long-term ecological and economic security, particularly in the developing world. She emphasised that Dr. Khoshoo’s conservation work in cytogenetics, biological diversity, biomass production and environmental research and development have been significant and his efforts have earned him a place as a leader in the environmental field. He has generated considerable knowledge regarding the genetic - evolutionary race history of a number of plants. Based on this knowledge, he has delineated for the first time, centres of their diversity and origin, circumscribed gene pools and standardized procedures for studying the taxonomy of cultivated plants. Dr. Khoshoo has also initiated work on the standardization of herbal drugs and their compound formulation, particularly for rural use and development. She also complimented Dr. Khoshoo’s remarkable role in elucidating the linkages between environment and development, sensitizing public opinion on these global issues and his original work in environmental sciences.

Lord Stanley Clinton - Davis, Acting Chairman of the Prize Selection Committee noted that “Dr. Khoshoo’s environmental work has been wide ranging and he has pursued his goals, always in the interest of the environment, with determination and consummate skill and success, and he has had a marked influence in the societies where he has worked.”

In his speech Takashi Ito of the Nippon Foundation drew attention to Dr. Khoshoo’s “considerable knowledge, experience and skill gained from a long and distinguished career as an eminent scientist, researcher and administrator”. He stressed that “despite the tremendous theoretic brainpower at his disposal, Dr. Khoshoo went out and demonstrated a marked ability to get things done, to be an agent of change, which greatly extended his impact.”

In his speech Dr. Khoshoo said “I accept this award in all humility. Ahead of me there is a lot of work. As yet we have not touched even the fringes of sustainable development.” He underlined the need for the developing countries of the equatorial, tropical, subtropical and hot temperate belt to move towards the concept of economic and ecological budgets. He added, “the earlier we do this, the better it is for us. We will then know in exact economic terms the loss of our ecological assets due to apathy. It stems from the mistaken notion that resources are in abundance, or we can get them from moon or even other planets. While technology is acceptable, technological over-optimism is unacceptable; perhaps it is
dangerous. Having spoilt the earth, particularly, the tropical - subtropical
belt which, in a sense, constitutes the heart of this earth, it is high time that
we set right these areas. No one is safe in temperate region as long as tropics/
subtropics are bleeding. We have to recognize the element of globality and
even universality in environment. Ecological and economic security are
mutually reinforcing.”

Born at Srinagar, Kashmir on April 7, 1927, Dr. T.N. Khoshoo obtained
M.Sc. in Botany from Punjab University, Lahore (1946) and his Ph.D. from
Punjab University, Chandigarh. His chequered career included a long stint
at Punjab University, Chandigarh (1948-62), and then as Head, Post-
Graduate Deptt. of Botany, J & K University, Srinagar (1962-64). Afterwards,
Dr. Khoshoo shifted to Lucknow and looked after the National Botanic
Garden (1964-82). However, it was during his stint as Secretary to the
Government of India, Department of Environment, New Delhi (1982-85)
that Dr. Khoshoo made distinguished mark formulating policies and plans
for sustainable management of the environment in the country. He was the
Distinguished Scientist, CSIR, New Delhi (1985-90), International Fellow,
World Resources Institute, Washington (1991) and Jawaharlal Nehru Fellow
(1991-93). Since 1993 he has been working with Tata Energy Research
Institute, New Delhi as Distinguished Fellow.

Dr. Khoshoo has been involved in paraphrasing sustainable
development in the Indian context and has spear-headed science and
technology based environmentalism. Added to this has been his significant
contribution to the genetic-evolutionary understanding of several non-
aricultural economic plants including those of ornamentals. He applied
this knowledge for their improvement and has evolved over 30 cultivars of
ornamentals, a sizeable number of which are in nursery trade. Besides, Dr.
Khoshoo has made original contributions towards elucidating the genetic
system of gymnosperms particularly in softwoods. It has helped map out
forest tree breeding programmes for economically and environmentally
important group of plants.

Author of six and editor of eleven books, Dr. Khoshoo has written
profusely on botanical research, sustainable management of geosphere,
biosphere, natural resources and environment. He received the Gandhi
Medal of UNESCO for his book, Mahatma Gandhi: An Apostle of applied human
ecology, which was published in 1995.
BOOK REVIEWS

JAMMU, KASHMIR AND LADAKH: LINGUISTIC PREDICAMENT
Edited by P.N. Pushp and K. Warikoo;
Issued under the Auspices of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation,

This book has been very ably edited and well printed. The ethno-linguistic map of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh in the beginning as well as at the end is a very useful one, and unique as it shows the various areas speaking the three main languages, Kashmiri, Dogri and Pahari as well as the various dialects in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. It would have been much better if the map was given in different colours rather than shaded in dots and lines which do not leap to the eye.

The book is edited by Prof P.N. Pushp and Prof. K. Warikoo, both of whom have contributed articles. The other articles are by experts in the various languages spoken in the State. Prof. Warikoo’s article at the end deals with language and politics in Jammu & Kashmir: issues and perspectives. Prof. Pushp’s article in the beginning is a scholarly treatment of the subject “Kashmiri and the Linguistic Predicament of the State”. Prof. Warikoo’s article is of importance in the present situation as well as for the future of the State from the linguistic-ethnic point of view. The other articles in the book are also written by learned scholars and experts in their subjects and are worth reading. There is a wealth of information in the book which has, I believe, been put together for the first time. The Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation under whose auspices the book has been published, deserves congratulations for encouraging such works. There are a few printer’s errors particularly in the concluding portion of Prof. Warikoo’s article and it is hoped that
Two things stand out from the scholarly work. One, Grierson’s myth that Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus speak two different languages has been exploded. It has been proved beyond doubt that Kashmiri language, like other languages in the State and in the rest of the country, is not based on religion but on history, geography, ethnicity and culture. Language is a bond that ties together people of various religions because they speak the same language and belong to the same ethnic and cultural group even though they affirm different faiths.

The book has also dealt with the mistakes, deliberate or otherwise, made in the various censuses held in the State. The recommendation that there should be a fresh census on a rational and reasonable basis is worth pursuing. Government would do well to pay heed to this and other suggestions made in the book and ensure that future censuses take due note of the origins of the various linguistic groups and give encouragement to all of them.

Urdu as the official language of the State need not be scrapped just as English, as the official language of the country is still useful as a link language and as a window on the outside world. However, it is necessary that all main languages in the State such as Kashmiri, Dogri, Gujarati or Pahari should be given necessary facilities and encouragement and be available for teaching pupils in their mother tongue at least at the primary school stage if not later. This book is a must for all those who are interested in the linguistic and ethnic problems facing the country in general and the Jammu and Kashmir State in particular.

T.N. KAUL

 Courtesy: World Affairs, June 1996, p. 77
FOREIGN AID AND NGOs

Edited by Dr. Manoranjan Mohanty and assisted by Anil K. Singh.

In recent times, external aid from the North to meet the growing needs of the poor and underdeveloped in the countries of the South has started flowing. The nature of foreign aid has changed significantly in terms of volume, priorities, geographical areas and channels of flow. In addition to the bilateral, i.e., government to government and the multilateral aid channels, such as the World Bank, the UN system etc., the transfer of resources (financial or technical) through NGOs of the North to South is considerable.

Today, the role of NGOs as a catalytic agent in supplementing government’s development and welfare efforts is well recognised by all bilateral as well as multilateral aid agencies. NGOs are now considered as ‘partners’ in the process of development and their involvement is not only seen in the implementation of governmental programmes but also in the process of policy formulation, project designing, monitoring, evaluation etc. The NGOs of North contributed to the flow of more than 7 billion US dollars in 1990. NGOs have gradually moved from being agents of development aid to promoters of development cooperation. The rapidly growing NGO movements have made their presence felt in all walks of life. The process of networking of NGOs too has become a growing phenomenon in the developing world in Latin America, Africa and Asia particularly in leading developing countries like India.

However, very few attempts have so far been made to study the foreign aid phenomenon from an NGO perspective. There also existed
an information gap on external aid to India which is one of the recipients of foreign aid through bilateral and multilateral channels. It has been a long felt need to have documentation on the evolution processes and implications of the increasing role of NGOs in the development assistance and cooperation.

The book under review entitled *Foreign Aid and NGOs* edited by Dr. Manoranjan Mohanty and assisted by Anil K. Singh is a bold initiative in providing as much information as possible in the field of foreign aid. The editors have painstakingly gathered the requisite information and compressed it in the book form which has been published by the Voluntary Action Network (VANI). The book provides up-to-date information on various aspects of developmental aid flow and cooperation between North and South, particularly to India by the major world donors including the leading NGOs of North America, Europe, Oceania and Japan. The book has two major perspectives on foreign aid: an NGO perspective and an Indian perspective. It also makes a critical evaluation of the NGOs and also gives details about the history, forms of aid transfer, current trends, patterns and mechanism of aid transfer from North to South. In addition, it provides vital information on major world donors, aid administration, objectives, activities and programmes, geographical direction, mode, pattern and volume of assistance etc.

For a proper understanding of the subject matter, the book has been divided into three parts. Part I exclusively deals with foreign aid and NGO movements in the North and South. Whereas part II gives a detailed account of bilateral and multilateral aid donors, part III provides an insight into the private aid generated through international NGOs. Details of some funding NGOs of North America and Europe are also
given in part III. Besides, the contact addresses, both head office and India office of each donor, are listed in the book which may prove to be of help for smoothening the process of aid cooperation programmes.

The book is valuable as a reference source on foreign aid for both the government and non-government institutions as well as those dealing directly or indirectly with the subject of foreign aid and development cooperation.

SHARAD K. SONI
HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES is a quarterly Journal published by the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, which is a non-governmental, non-profit research, cultural and development facilitative organisation. The Journal is devoted to the study of various issues pertaining to the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, connected with its environment, resources, history, art and culture, language and literature, demography, social structures, communication, tourism, regional development, governance, human rights, geopolitics etc.

While the principal concern of the Journal will be on its focal area, i.e. from Afghanistan to Mayanmar including the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan; China, Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan and the Indian Himalayan states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttrakhand and North East states; papers with a broad sweep addressing environmental, social, cultural, economic, geopolitical and human rights issues are also welcomed.

The objective is to make a scientific appraisal of the issues confronting the Himalayan and adjoining region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, and to make specific policy oriented studies and need based recommendations as the means to promote the human, educational and economic advancement of the peoples of the region besides preserving and enriching their ethno-cultural, literary and historical heritage. Promotion of human rights, social justice, peace, harmony and national integration are the other key areas in which the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation has been active.

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Himalayan and Central Asian Studies
Vol. 1  No. 1,  April - June 1997

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Edited by K. Warikoo
New Delhi, Trans-Asia Informations, 1994. 73 pp.
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Edited by P. N. Pushp and K. Warikoo
Price Rs. 295/-. ISBN (81-241-0345-3)

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Tele : 0091-11-616 2763, 0091-11-617 9408
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Designed by : IMAGE PRINT, Ph.: 6107469, Fax : 91-11-6172181
Printed at : PRINT INDIA, A-38/2, Mayapuri-I, New Delhi-110064