
HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

(JOURNAL OF HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION)
NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, United Nations

Vol. 28 Nos. 1-2

January-June 2024

(U G C C A R E A P P R O V E D J O U R N A L)

ROLE OF SOGDIANS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CULTURAL
INTERRELATION ON THE GREAT SILK ROAD

Bobir Goyibov

MAP OF ZAHIRIDDIN BABUR STATE

Omonullo Buriev

INDIANS IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 19-20TH CENTURIES

Oybek Yarmatov

EMPIRE AND MEDICINE IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1865-1917:

A COMPARISON WITH BRITISH INDIA

Sanobar Shadmanova AND Akmal Bazarbaev

ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION

Vladimir Paramonov AND Lola Akramova

CENTRAL ASIA AND UNITED NATIONS:

DYNAMICS AND NEW TRENDS

Oybek Abdimuminov

THE EU'S SOFT AND SMART APPROACHES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Mirzokhid Rakhimov AND Firdavs Kobilov

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER
THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN, 2021

Akram Umarov

UZBEKISTAN: ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE
REGION AND BEYOND

Kamala Kumari

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Editor : **K. WARIKOO**
Guest Editor : **MIRZOKHID RAKHIMOV**

© Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, New Delhi.

- * All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without first seeking the written permission of the publisher or due acknowledgement.
- * The views expressed in this Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation.

SUBSCRIPTION

IN INDIA

Single Copy (Individual)	:	Rs.	500.00
Annual (Individual)	:	Rs.	1,400.00
Institutions	:	Rs.	2,000.00
& Libraries (Annual)			

OVERSEAS (AIRMAIL)

Single Copy	:	US \$	40.00
		UK	25.00
Annual (Individual)	:	US	100.00
		UK £	80.00
Institutions	:	US \$	150.00
& Libraries (Annual)		UK £	120.00

Himalayan and Central Asian Studies is UGC CARE Approved Journal
It is included within the ProQuest products

Himalayan and Central Asian Studies
is included and abstracted in Worldwide Political Science
Abstracts and PAIS International, CSA, USA

Subscriptions should be sent by crossed cheque or bank draft in favour of
HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION,
B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi - 110029 (India)

Printed and published by **Prof. K. Warikoo** on behalf of the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029. Distributed by **Value Publications**, B-7, IIIrd Floor, Saraswati Complex, Subhash Chowk, Laxmi Nagar, New Delhi-110092. Printed at Nice Printing Press, A-33/3A, Site IV, Sahibabad Industrial Area, Ghaziabad-201010 (U.P.)

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Lokesh Chandra

Former President
Indian Council of Cultural Relations
New Delhi, India

Prof. T.B. Subba

(former Vice Chancellor, Sikkim
University),
Department of Anthropology,
North-Eastern Hill University,
Shillong, India

Prof. Vitaly Naumkin

Director
Institute of Oriental Studies
Moscow (Russia)

Prof. Akbota Zholdasbekova

Department of Regional Studies and
International Relations,
Eurasian National University,
Astana, Kazakhstan

Prof. Mirzokhid Rakhimov

Head,
Department of Contemporary
History and International Relations,
Institute of History,
Academy of Sciences,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Dr. Nawal K. Paswan

Professor and Head,
Department of Peace and Conflict
Studies and Management,
School of Social Sciences,
Sikkim University,
Gangtok, Sikkim, India

Dr. Sanjyot Mehendale

Executive Director,
Caucasus and Central Asia
Program,
University of California,
Berkeley, USA

Dr. Mahesh Ranjan Debata

Associate Professor
Centre for Inner Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi, India

Dr. Ashok K. Behuria

Senior Fellow,
Institute for Defence Studies
& Analyses,
New Delhi, India

Dr. Irina A. Zhernosenko

Head,
Research Laboratory "Culture and
Development Strategies of Regional
Environment",
Altai State Institute of Culture,
Barnaul, Russia

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Mirzokhid Rakhimov is Head of Department at the Contemporary History Center of Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, Tashkent.

Dr. Bobir Goyibov is Professor at Samarkand State University, Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

Dr. Omonullo Buriev is a leading researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Uzbekistan, Academy of Sciences, Tashkent.

Dr. Oybek Yarmatov is senior lecturer at Samarkand State University, Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

Dr. Sanobar Shadmanova is Professor at Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Dr. Akmal Bazarbaev is a senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Uzbekistan, Academy of Sciences, Tashkent

Lola Akramova is a junior researcher at the Contemporary History Center of Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, Tashkent.

Dr. Oybek Abdimuminov is Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) on historical sciences, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Firdavs Kobilov is PhD Candidate at the University of Glasgow, UK.

Akram Umarov is Vice Director, Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Dr. Kamala Kumari is Assistant Professor, University of Delhi.

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Vol. 28, Nos. 1-2

January-June 2024¹

CONTENTS

Role of Sogdians in international trade and cultural interrelation on the Great Silk Road	<i>Bobir Goyibov</i>	1-26
Map of Zahiriddin Babur state	<i>Omonullo Buriev</i>	27-41
Indians in Central Asia in 19-20 th centuries	<i>Oybek Yarmatov</i>	42-56
Empire and medicine in Central Asia, 1865-1917: A comparison with British India	<i>Sanobar Shadmanova and Akmal Bazarbaev</i>	57-70
Economic Relations of Central Asia and the European Union	<i>Vladimir Paramonov and Lola Akramova</i>	71-94
Central Asia and United Nations: Dynamics and New Trends	<i>Oybek Abdimuminov</i>	95-113
The EU's soft and smart approaches in Central Asia	<i>Mirzokhid Rakhimov and Firdavs Kobilov</i>	114-136
Regional Security Complex in Central Asia After The Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan, 2021	<i>Akram Umarov</i>	137-148
Uzbekistan: Enhancing Cooperation in the Region and Beyond	<i>Kamala Kumari</i>	149-164

1. The issue was prepared in partnership with fundamental project FZ 202009302 "New Uzbekistan: systemic liberalization and foreign policy strategies in the Context of strengthening stability in Central Asia" of Contemporary History Center of Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences.

ROLE OF SOGDIA NS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CULTURAL INTERRELATION ON THE GREAT SILK ROAD

BOBIR GOYIBOV

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the historical foundations of trade and cultural relations of ancient Sogd. The activities of the Sogdians in East Turkestan and China and the culture created during these activities are studied based on written sources. The first period of the migration of the Sogdians to China and the analysis of the data from related sources are also examined. The level of literacy of the Sogdians and the spread of advanced cultural results created by them in China are brought to the reader's attention. An important aspect of the Sogdian culture is the Sogdian language and writing, and information about the services of calligraphers and spiritual propagandists, scientific and empirical knowledge that flourished in Sogd, is also recorded in the article. The spread of the Kan surname belonging to the Sogdians in the regions of Eastern Turkestan and China and the processes related to them are shown. Historical analysis of a Sogdian document found in the Chinese city of Chinonchkat was carried out, and information is given about the place of the Sogdians in this Chinese city. The interpretation of the concept of "world rulers" and its interpretation in connection with the early Middle Ages is carried out. The cultural relations between Sogd and India are also considered in the article.

Keywords. The Great Silk Road, Sogdian script, knowledge, education, settlements, trade relations, Turkish Khanate, Chinonchkat, Kan surname, the concept of "World rulers".

INTRODUCTION

The Great Silk Road is a phenomenal event in the history of mankind. It served to realize the unity of the world, the common desire of mankind to

understand each other and other sharp changes in life, and signs of cultural progress. Thousands of years have passed, and the need for not only the exchange of goods, but also the life experience, production, cultural and spiritual achievements of different peoples has been fulfilled. Although the aspirations of different societies towards rapprochement were observed even in primitive times, the ancient and early medieval period was an important period for socio-economic, religious and ethno-cultural relations between different peoples.

During this period, there were friendly and sometimes hostile meetings between different ethnic groups. This created the need to explore new areas. Gradually, territories occupied by separate ethnic groups, connected by a common language and the main features of economy, culture and outlook were formed. According to S.F. Starr, this situation caused the emergence of new civilizations or, on the contrary, the gradual disappearance of some.¹ In this way, historical connections were established between Egypt and Mesopotamia, West Asia and the Middle East, Central Asia and the Far East, Central Asia and India.

In these relations, the Sogdian ethnos, which played an important role in the history of Central Asia in early Middle Ages, played an incomparable role. During this period, the East became known to the West through the Sogdians.² In addition, relations between the Turkish Kaghanate and Byzantium were strengthened thanks to the services of the Sogdians. During the reign of Khaqan Istemi (552-575), the Sogdians led by the Sogdian Maniakh failed to reach an agreement with the Sassanid ruler Khisrav I Anushervan (531-579), and managed to sell their silk to Byzantine ruler Justin I (565-578) through the Caucasus.³ It is recognized that the diplomatic relations established between the Khaganate led by Sogdi Maniakh and Byzantium continued even during the period when the Ughur Khaganate replaced the Turkish Khaganate. The foundation stone was laid for the cultural relations of Sogdians with India in the same period. In academic literature, the relations of the Sogdians with China and India have been studied in one way or another, and most researches are focused on the economic activities of the Sogdians.⁴

However, studying the religious, ethnocultural and social relations of the Sogdians with the local population in China, as well as the traces of cultural heritage created by the representatives of this ethnic group in China, is still a research issue. There is very little information on the cultural relations of the early medieval historical Central Asia with the Indian subcontinent. It is known that there were similarities and influences in the culture of these two regions recorded. To what extent did the Sogdians establish contact with India or when did they first go to China and what factors are related to this?

THE SOGDIANS IN CHINA: EARLY PERIODS OF CULTURAL CONTACT

Sogd, located in Zarafshan and Kashkadarya oases, is mentioned in ancient written sources as *Sugda* or *Suguda* (old Persian), *Sugda* and *Sukhda* ("Avesta"), *öu-ug-da* (Elam), *su-ug-du* (Akkadian). The book *Avesta* states that "the Sogdians live in the land of Ghava". In ancient sources, details are given about Sogdian land (*Sugd*) and Sogdian people (*Sugdi*), and the history of the settlement of Sogdians in this area dates bto 1,000 BC. It is recorded as belonging to the second half of the II millennium and the beginning of the I millennium.⁵

The rapid penetration of the Sogdians into the territories of Eastern Turkestan and China started in the 4th century and was caused by the campaigns of Alexander the Macedonian (329-327 BC) to Sogd. Iranologist W.B.Henning notes that the Sogdians, who moved to East Turkestan and the Turfan oasis, built settlements and taught farming to the local population. Research conducted in recent years also confirms this opinion.⁶ This shows that the emergence of Sogdian colonies in China began about two hundred years before Zhang Jian's arrival in Central Asia (138-126 BC).

The Sogdians in China were in constant contact with their compatriots in Samarkand. Information about this is also given in the *Ansient Letters* published around 313 AD, and the letter was sent from Turfon to

Samarkand, but did not reach its destination. The date of *Ansient Letters* was determined by Iranologist V.B.Henning, and on its basis,⁷ the scientist cites the occupation of the city of Loyang in 307 and in 312.⁸ This opinion was also supported by F. Greene and N. Sims-Williams.⁹ J. Harmatta suggests that these documents are dated to 196 AD and tries to make this date more than a hundred years older.¹⁰ We believe that W. B. Hening's interpretation is the correct one, which refers to the historical process of the Hun attacks and the burning of Loyang. This corresponds to the original historical processes of the same period.

Ansient Letters were sent to four addressees, the first of which was a letter to *Minai's* mother *Chatis* about her condition, the second was *Nanay Kanak's* name to *Varzak*, the third was a letter to *Nanaydot* from a girl named *Shayon*, and the fourth was a letter from merchant *Aspandot* to *Frikhoatav*.¹¹ In these letters, written to be sent from Dunkhuan to Samarkand, information was given about the Sogdian merchant community (the name of which city is missing from the letter), the Sogdians in Loyang, the city of Samarkand, and the trade routes from Dunkhuan to Sogd.¹² Through this information, it is possible to know about the first period of relations between the historical territories of Uzbekistan and China.

The Chinese works that provide information about Sogd can be divided mainly into chronicles and travelogue-type works or reports on a special assignment. Among them, chronicles such as *Bei Shi*, *Sui Shu*, *Tan Shu* cover almost the entire period of the early medieval history of Sogd.¹³ For example, they highlight the activities of the Eftalites and the Turkish Khagans, and pay attention to the political life of the Sogd confederation during this period. The information about the arrival of ambassadors from Sogd in the spring of 437 to the Northern Wei state,¹⁴ which was founded in 386 AD, is especially important, which strengthens the opinion about Sogd's relations with China and the rapid penetration of the Sogds into Chinese territories already in the 4th-5th centuries.

In the late 1970s, archaeologists discovered a large number of stone inscriptions in the Shatial tract, not far from the bridge over the Indus

River. As a result of research conducted here by the German-Pakistani expedition (1979) led by Ahmed Hassan Daniy and Karl Yetmar, thousands of rock paintings and more than one and a half thousand written inscriptions in 17 languages were found, and 250 of these written samples were identified as belonging to the Sogdians.¹⁵ The Sogdians actively traded on the mountainous Shatial and Chilas roads of the Karakorum Valley and continued their activities in the southern and eastern directions. These inscriptions, studied by H. Humbakh, were interpreted as belonging to the period of the Khionites.¹⁶

In these inscriptions, the names of merchants from Maymurg, Kesh and other regions of Sogd are mentioned, next to them are the stamps of coins minted in Samarkand.¹⁷ It can be seen that the migration of the Sogdians to the East existed for several hundred years, and several generations of traders passed through here. Most of the Sogdian writings are very short, consisting of only one name or one sentence. Some of the inscriptions include the time they were written, and merchants communicated to each other by writing their name and time on a rock on the mountain. One of the Sogdian sentences was written by Nanay-Vandak, a merchant from Samarkand, who wrote a letter to leave a message to the merchants after him.¹⁸ Nanay-Wandak was the head of the Sogdian merchants and supervised their activities. This tract is in the southern part of the Great Silk Road, passing towards the southern borders of the Taklamakan desert, connecting with its northern route in the Dunhuang region. The road passed along the Great Wall of China and reached Chang'an, the ancient capital of China.

It is understood from the information given above that from the 4th century BC to the beginning of the 4th century AD, the Sogdians tried to penetrate the Chinese territories. The Sogdians were skilled traders and were able to use life resources wisely and were literate.

TRANSFORMATION OF SOGDIAN CULTURE

By the early Middle Ages, Sogd culture was deeply transformed by Turkic, Persian, and Arabic cultures. Especially in religious life, this issue was clearly visible.¹⁹ During this period, the Sogdians were propagators of various religious views outside their homeland. Sogdian calligraphers participated in the spread of Buddhism in the Orhun oasis, the seat of the First Turkic Khaganate (551-630 AD), and later among Turks in Turfan and other regions.²⁰ They translated the Buddhist texts into the Sogdian language and distributed them inside China.²¹ One of the Turkish rulers, Mughan (554-574) allowed the spread of Buddhism, while Taspar Khagan (574-581) created conditions for its widespread.²² This Buddhist literature spread in China due to the service of Sogdian calligraphers. Most of the information written on materials such as coins, ceramic fragments, tree bark, leather, and paper found in various regions of China (between the 1st and 8th centuries AD) are astronomy, medicine, literature, ethics. It is composed of philosophical epics, economic, legal and diplomatic documents, which reflect the Sogdian culture.

After the second half of the 8th century, the military campaigns of the Arab Caliphate intensified, and the penetration of the Sogdians into the Chinese territories became more rapid. During this period, most residents of Sogd left their homeland and settled in Yettisuv regions. Some information about this has been preserved in the sources.

In the 60s of the 11th century, Mahmud Koshgari (1029-1101) witnessed an important ethnic and linguistic change in the region – the completion of the assimilation of the Sogdians with the Turks during the collection of information in Yettisuv for the work *Devoni lug'at tit-turk* (interpretation by V.V. Bartold so to speak “the period of the last settlement of the Sogdians in Yettisuv”).²³ This dictionary of Mahmud Koshgari provides specific information that supports this process. For example, in some cities of Yettisuv (Bolasogun, Taroz, Isfijab) Sogdian-Turkish bilingualism existed, in other cities the Sogdian language was being forgotten, and Sogdian language was phonetically assimilated into Turkish dialects. The characteristics of the Sogdian ethnoculture were

disappearing. For example, the Bolasogun Sogdians adopted Turkish customs and clothing.²⁴

By this time, the Sogdian script was also reformed in Eastern Turkestan. The Sogdian alphabet contains 22 letters, and their alphabetical order is taken from the Aramaic alphabet. The standard Sogdian script mainly used 17-18 letters. After the Sogdians moved to Eastern Turkestan, the earlier letters in the Sogdian script were adapted to the language and reformed. For example, this situation is manifested in the Uyghur script, which was formed on the basis of the Sogdian script. An inscription carved on the rim of a *khum* (a ceramic container for storing grain and other products) found in 1941 in the city ruins of Kyzyl River (Ettisuv/Eastern Turkestan) was found (a photo copy of the inscription was published by Ch. Djumagulov).²⁵ The inscription consists of one line and is written on the *khum* flange in a counter-clockwise direction. Based on the paleographic feature of the inscription and the pronunciation of the letter <ɮ>, this writing sample can be interpreted as belonging to the second half of the 8th century - the beginning of the 9th century. The letter <ɮ> was formed in the Uyghur alphabet and was used to pronounce foreign words in recent Sogdian texts (the phoneme /ɮ/ is not found in the Sogdian dialect in other written records).²⁶

Thus, changes in the Sogdian culture began to manifest themselves more clearly in comparison with other regions of Central Asia and spread to neighboring regions, including Eastern Turkestan and China. During the rule of the Turkish Khaganate, the Sogdian language was a leader in trade on the Great Silk Road, which stretched from China to the West, and served as an international language – *lingua franca*. By this time, in the Sogd region, agriculture and farming, irrigation (artificial watering), urban planning, architecture, oriental education, state administration, knowledge based on experience, writing culture, calligraphy, books, epics, literature, medicine, dozens of branches of social knowledge, such as astronomy and archival science developed. This cultural advanced experience and knowledge was refined in the early Middle Ages (5th-8th centuries) and reached the peak of its development in the 9th-12th centuries.

In this way, in the development of the historical thinking of the peoples of Central Asia, the Sogdians continued the early medieval culture until the 9th-12th centuries, and they made a significant contribution to laying the foundation stone for the Renaissance period, which held an important place in the history of the peoples of the region.

EDUCATION AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE IN SOGD

There is not much information about the science and education system in early medieval Sogd. But the analysis of Sogdian documents and archeological materials allows us to draw some conclusions. Some Sogdian terms can be useful in studying the problem. One such term is the Sogdian phrase *naf* (literally meaning “navel”), which corresponds to the neighborhood institution according to its composition and functions. In Sogd, the community (*naf*) was part of the civic community in early medieval cities, and included artisans, merchants, and partly nobles. The village community included the population engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry.²⁷

Socially, it (“naf”) was divided into several classes. The nobles and the city craftsmen were free, the merchants were called *guvokor*, the farmers were called *kashovarz*, the servants were called *chorikor*, the mute koshchilars were called *kadivar*, and the slaves and maids were treated as bantaks and midwives. The nobility-free class included the *tsar*, local rulers and landowners. At the top of this social hierarchy stood the king. But the family was the main link of the society in Sogd.

In the Sogd family, special attention was paid to the upbringing of child and his literacy. According to *Bei Shi* (“History of the Northern Dynasties”), the Sogdians were skilled in trade, and many foreigners came to this country to trade. As per *Tan Shu* chronicle, “... (in Sogd) when a boy is born, they rub stoned honey (*novvot*) on his tongue, put glue on his palm, so that he will be sweet-loving and hold on to wealth in the future. They wanted him to be skillful and self-interested in trade. “When their men turn twenty, they go to neighboring countries and stay wherever there is profit.”²⁸ There

were many such customs in Sogd. For example, in order to become a skilled merchant in the future, the Sogdians tied coins to the hands of boys as babies. This custom is still preserved today, and the custom of giving money to a baby when visiting him is related to the tradition of tying a coin to the hand of a young child in Sogd.

In Sogd, special attention was paid to trading and being literate. At the age of 5-6, children were first taught calligraphy. Some information about this can be found in Sogdian written monuments. The first Sogdian alphabet in history, A was found by Isakov in the ruins of Panjikent in 1965. Experts suggest that this practice of writing on pottery indicates the existence of a school of calligraphers (*dabiristan*) in Sogd in early Middle Ages.

The names of some calligraphers who flourished in Sogd are also mentioned in Sogd documents. For example, *Vanenok* in the document number B-4 of the Mug' archive, the son of *Siyamich Tishich*, mentioned in the text of the document about the lease of the mill, Nov. Son of husnikhat owner *Romtish Vgashfarn* is mentioned in marriage certificate Nov. 3, *Aspanak Devgun* in document A-9, son of *Doipustak Ohvan Patur* in Sogdian letter found in Chinonchkat (China), *Qul Tek* mentioned in Sogdian inscription on stone slab found in Talos (Kyrgyzstan), the names of such calligraphers as *Nanedod* recorded on the wood found in Qalai Hisorak (Tajikistan) have reached us. It shows that calligraphy was a special branch of education in Sogdian society.

Along with calligraphy, several fields of science developed in early medieval Sogd. The analysis of the sources shows that the following sciences (empirical knowledge) developed in Sogd:

The murals of Panjikent have survived to this day almost exactly as they were when the colors were painted. One may wonder what paints they used. Painters got color from natural minerals. For example, red color was taken from red soil and a special mixture was mixed with tree glue, animal and fish bone glue to ensure its adhesion. They used gypsum and coal for white paint. And for the black color, powder (bone powder) was used. Paints were used separately and mixed.²⁹ According to the sources,

in 717 AD, among the gifts sent by the ruler of Samarkand to the Tang Empire, there was a blue dye called "indigo".³⁰ There was also a large paint workshop in the region, which points to the existence of knowledge about chemicals in Sogd;

Written sources provide information about the importance of music and dance-related holidays in the household life of Sogdians. Chinese annals are rich in such information. According to the *Tan Shu* chronicle, the residents of Samarkand, the center of Sogd, welcomed entertainment. The same source mentions that in rich houses of China, musicians and dancers from Sogd were constantly in service. E. Shefer provides information about their musical instruments, performance, clothes, dance types. He gives specific music and dance names such as "Sogdians are drinking wine", "Music in the ball game", "Dance of bathing with water in the snow".³¹ The music of the peoples of Central Asia also impressed the Arabs. Caliph Walid II (743-74) asked the viceroy of Khurasan to send Sogdian mashshaks from Khurasan for a feast. In most cases, the information in the written sources is also confirmed by archaeological data. During the excavations in the ruins of the Mugh fortress, a 27 cm long pipe was found. This stork bone flute has 6 holes at different distances. This flute was found during the excavations in the treasure section of the fort. It shows that the art of music and dance in Sogd had developed a lot;

As early as the Middle Ages, the art of painting flourished in Sogd. Art developed in this area based on ancient traditions. Monuments such as Panjikent, Afrosiyob, Varakhsha, Bolaliktepa were considered masterpieces of their time, and this type of art influenced the neighboring regions as well. From the objects of archaeological research, the similarity of Afrosiyab wall paintings with Panjikent wall paintings is noteworthy. While the object mainly features Sogdian and Turkic people, it also partially depicts people of the Far East, the similarity in the depiction of their clothes, and the proximity to each other in the gloss of colors indicate the harmony of cultures.³² Although many examples can be given in this matter, development of visual art knowledge in Sogd corresponds to the original historical processes;

Sogdian-Buddhist, Sogdian-Moni, Sogdian-Christian texts have been found in historical China and Eastern Turkestansuch as *Vessantara Jataka*, *Causes and Consequences of Our Deeds*, Sutra of Intoxicating Drinks related to the Buddha's life, moral works and epics, examples of literature in different languages like³³ *Mahabharata*, *Ramayana*, *Panchatantra*, *The Tale of the Goose that Lays Golden Eggs*, *Aesop's Epos*. There is information about 4 digital marriage documents and other legal documents in the Mugh archive, which show that knowledge such as philosophy, law, epics, literature, poetry, archival studies existed in in social life in Sogd in early Middle Ages;

The residents of Sogd worshipped celestial bodies (sun, moon, stars, planets), which became known through the pictures painted on the wall in the ruins of the building number VI / 26 of the historical city of Panjikent of Sogd. The Panjikent wall paintings, especially the wall paintings in the temples, reflect the symbolic representation of the planets of the solar system known at that time. According to the Sogdian calendar, each day of the seven-day week is dedicated to a different deity. The result of their analysis is as follows: *Midsummer* – Mithra's day (sun) – Sunday; *Maximum time* – lunar day – Monday; *Varakhan Zaman* – Mars Day – Tuesday; *Tir Zaman* – Day of Mercury – Wednesday; *Hormozd Zaman* – Jupiter Day – Thursday; *Anakhita time* – Venus day – Friday; *Kairvan time* – Saturn day – Saturday. Information such as thirty names for each day of the month and years divided into solar and lunar years in the astronomical calendar found on Mugh Mountain³⁴ are signs of the existence of astronomy in Sogd.

The study of the urban ruins of Afrosiyab, Panjikent, Varakhsha, Ishtikhan-tepa, Kafirkala and Southern Sogd in early medieval Sogd showed that urban planning was developed in the region, that every architectural structure was built based on a scientifically based construction method, that cities were divided typologically, that the city was clean and that construction was based on the science of urban planning in Sogd,³⁵ factors that indicate the existence of architectural science. The discovery of the site of an early medieval pharmacy by the Poykent expedition, the

analysis of documents such as contracts, receipts, and agreements related to economic relations in the Mugh archive, indicate the existence of economic and medical knowledge in Sogd during this period.

Thus, the empirical knowledge existing in early medieval Sogd left an important mark and laid the foundation stone for the early Renaissance period that arose in Central Asia in the 9th century.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE SUGGESTED SURNAME “KAN” IN CHINA

Studying the penetration of the Sogdians into the Chinese territories through East Turkestan through the analysis of different sources as well as individual terms will be of great benefit. Historical terms are also an important source of valuable information about the culture of a particular nation.

One of the popular terms in the Sogdian language in China is *Kan*. In the Mugh mountain Sogdian documents, this word also expressed the meaning of “city” name (Konibodom) in the form of *kn□(h)* – *Kan* (or “Kand”). Sogdian means *kn□h* – “city” or *kt* – “room (house)”. This component is also found in the forms *kan*, *kent*, *kant*, *kand*, *kam*.³⁶ In the Sogdian language, the expression *Kan* means “city” and is considered a unique “surname” used to express the concept of “Samarkandian”, “from Samarkand”, “citizen of Samarkand”.

According to Chinese chronicles, the surname *Kan* was added to the name of the rulers of Samarkand. It is recorded in the Chinese annals that the Western Turkish khagan Tardu khagan (567-600) married his daughter to the ruler of Samarkand named *Khan Shifubi*.³⁷ The spread of the *Kan* surname to the territory of China is mainly related to the migration of the Sogdians to China.

It is known from the chronicles that merchants from *Kan* (Samarkand), *Mi* (Maymurg), *Shi* (Kesh) and a number of other “Khu countries” went to China and settled in Gansu, Dunhuang (the most Sogdians) in this country. They established several trade colonies in the region and in the

cities of Turfan, Kucha, Koshghar, Khotan in Eastern Turkestan.³⁸ He tried to establish his own trading locations in China. Although the Samarkandis, Kesh and Maimurg people who came from Sogd lived in the same region, they preferred to be neighbors with the citizens of the rulership to which they belonged, and on this basis, they tried to create villages where the Sogd communities lived together.³⁹

The location of Sogdians throughout China and Eastern Turkestan was revived with the creation of the Great Silk Road.⁴⁰ As a result, Sogdian settlements emerged in Tarim oasis, Lobnor area and Gansu, Ordos and Mongolia. This led to an increase in the importance of Sogdian language and script along the Great Silk Road.⁴¹ Dozens of Sogdian villages appeared in these areas.⁴²

Around the 4th century AD, the first monist temples - monasteries appeared in China. *Kan Xuan* – Chan Min from Samarkand made significant contribution to the promotion of the doctrine among the Turks in the 6th century. Later, under the influence of the Sogdians, Moni teachings spread to China, and in 584 AD, the first temple of Moni communities was built in the east of China. In 694, this teaching reached the capital Changan.⁴³

According to K. Baykapova, in the 5th - 7th centuries, there were more than 300 cities and settlements (villages) whose population consisted entirely of Sogdians appeared in the Talos Valley, Chu, and Ili rivers. Only in the Chu Valley in the 6th-8th centuries there were 18 large cities and many small settlements, the main inhabitants of which were Sogdians.⁴⁴

Information about the spread of Sogdians in the Dunhuang area in mid-8th century became clearer as a result of the analysis of Chinese manuscripts by Professor Ikeda On of Hokkaido University (Japan). According to L. I. Chiguevsky, citing Ikeda On, 236 were men out of the total population in the village of Tsunhuasian alone, and they had 22 different surnames. More than half of these surnames (about 60%) belonged to 4 branches, including Samarkand (*Kan*, 48 people), Bukhara (*An*, 39 people), Tashkent (*Shi*, 31 people), Kabudon (*Tsao*, 30 people)

(total: 148). These surnames belonged to their rulers. Surnames belonging to Sogd and other regions of Central Asia are also recorded in the documents. The surnames of 23 people from Tokhariston (*Lo*), 20 people from Kushonia (*Xe*) and 20 people from Maimurg (*Mi*) are mentioned in the sources. According to the table compiled by Ikeda On, there are cases where the father had a Sogdian surname and the son had a Chinese surname, or vice versa. There are also cases where children of the same parents had both Sogdian and Chinese surnames.⁴⁵ In a word, there were people with Sogdian surnames in this region.

The oldest citizen mentioned in the *Book of Obligations*, a list of residents of the Tsunghuasian region of China, was 66-year-old *Kang Nu-tzu*. He was born in Samarkand around 635, and took this name only after he went to China.⁴⁶ The above information shows that in the 7th-8th centuries, the population settlements in Dunhuang and its neighboring regions were formed by those who came from Sogd, mainly from Samarkand.

A Sogdian document numbered R-3559 found in Dunhuang Province states that there were 13 villages in the province, one of which was called Sunghua. Many representatives of Central Asia were found in this area. For example, *Tsao Xiaoxiao*, *Tsao Tulicji* from *Tsao State*; *Kang Fu* from *Kan* (Samarkand) was famous person.⁴⁷

In the Chinese annals, the *Kang* hieroglyph is a shortened Chinese transcription of the Samarkand toponym. The second hieroglyph *guo* means "state" or "rule". The ancient Chinese called the people who came from Samarkand with the surname *Kan*, based on the name of the ruler.⁴⁸

According to sinologist A. Khojaev, in early Middle Ages, the Sogdians introduced themselves as Uyghurs using the trade privileges granted to the Uyghur Khaganate (745-840) for helping to repel the external enemy and protection of the Tang Empire, and thus the *Kan* surname was widespread in Eastern Turkestan. In many cases, Sogdians from Samarkand married Uyghur women. When the graves belonging to a person from Samarkand were studied in Loyang city, it was found that the name of the deceased was *Kang Mojya*, and the name of the person buried in another grave (647) was *Kang Danung*.⁴⁹ The addition of "Kang"

to the names served to indicate that it was from Samarkand.

In the 102nd chapter of the History of the Wei Dynasty (386-550), it is written that “*the merchants of the Sogdian state used to come to Loyang to trade more often*”. In Guzang they could be found a lot. The historical cities of Loyang and Guzang (now Uwei) were major trading centers along the ancient Hesi Corridor of the Great Silk Road.⁵⁰ Later, after the Turkic Khanate defeated the Sui dynasty of China, the Sogdians took control of the province of Hami near the city of Kumul and introduced Khanate rule there. The fact that *Kan Su-mi* from Samarkand was appointed to the position of the governor of Beyan district in Ordos during this period indicates that the Sogdians from Samarkand had a special place in the Turfan oasis in early Middle Ages. Sogdologist A. Otakho’jaev said that this process increased the arrival of immigrants from Sogd. In the second half of 7th century, a group of *Kan Yan-tian* from Samarkand (quoted in the source as “the great leader from the state of Khan”) settled in the abandoned city around Lake Lob Nor, east of the Tarim river, and built three villages there. One of them was called Putaochen – “Vineyard”. After the 7th century, the influence of Sogdians in this region increased. This is confirmed by documents found in Dunhuang. They mention that there were four Sogdian cities south of Lake Lob Nor in the 7th-10th centuries.⁵¹

In recent years, a large number of artefacts from the Sogdian culture of the Northern Wei Dynasty have been discovered in China’s Datang Province, including silver and gold dishes. As a result of the interpretation of these findings, it is known that in China, the Sogdians were involved not only in trade, but also in administrative and military work. It is mentioned that among the officials there were more than 20 people from Samarkand, such as *Khuchjifu Kangji*. During the Northern Wei Dynasty, Loyang was made the capital of the state. People from Central and South Asia, including the Sogdians, settled in this city and showed zeal in building Zoroastrian temples in Loyang.⁵²

It is possible to trace the spread of the *Kan* surname even before the Turkic Khanate. Central Asia was considered a transit area for the spread

of Buddhism to China. Many Central Asian missionaries participated in the propaganda work. In particular, the sources mention the names of propagandist-translators *Kan Mensian* from Sogd and *Kan Tzuhai* from Kang.⁵³

Thus, the phrase *Kan*, which originally represented a part of the toponym of Central Sogd – “Samarkand”, later became widespread in China. In this way, the term “Kan” was found in Chinese sources as both a place name and the name of the Samarkand dynasty. This is based on the fact that the *Kan* surname is found in Sogdian documents and tombstones found in China. Thus there is a high probability that the origin of people with the *Kan* surname in China is related to Samarkand.

CHINONCHKAT – SOGDIAN CITY IN CHINA

As mentioned above, there are a number of towns and villages where the Sogdians live crowded in many cities of China. One such city was the historic Chinese city of Chinonchkand (literally “Chinese City”), where the Sogdians were leaders in the city’s trade.

During the trip of the Japanese orientalist Yutaka Yoshida to Urumqi (China), the administrative center of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region, it became known that a Sogdian document, which is still unknown to science, is kept in the city museum. This document on the activities of the Sogdians in China was first read by Yutaka Yoshida and was first published in Japanese. In the late 1980s, the document was translated from Japanese to English under the co-authorship of Yu. Yoshida and T. Moriyasu.⁵⁴ This was considered an important innovation in forensic science and oriental studies, and it was considered an important source for illuminating the activities of the Sogdians in China. The document was translated into Russian by D. Dovutov with the assistance of the American orientalist Richard Fry. The Uzbek translation of the Chinonchkand document was made by M. Is’hakov.

The document was found in the sandy part of the surface of the grave called Astana, near the city of Chinonchkand (toponym meaning

“city of China”), an early medieval city ruin. Along with this Sogdian document, a Chinese document related to the sale of land dated 638 AD was also found in the tomb. The date of its creation is recorded in the document in the Sogdian, Chinese and Turkish calendars. It is indicated that the document was drawn up during the time of the ruler of the Tzuyu dynasty, Ventai. Ventai ruled in the years 624-640, and the Sogdian document may have been drawn up during these years (17 years).⁵⁵ Determining the date of the document on the basis of the twelve-year Turkish calendar gives an important result. By applying the twelve-year animal years to today’s calendar table, it is known that the Sogdian document was written in the year of the pig. Year of the Pig corresponds to one of the years 627 and 639 of the reign of Ventai. The Sogdian document was written in one of these two years. It is known that a Chinese document was found along with the Sogdian document. Its date is precisely dated to 638. In my opinion, both documents were buried in the tomb in 639, and it is highly probable that the Sogdian document was composed in 639, not 627. Because it is very unlikely that the documents were buried in the grave with an interval of 12 years.

It is no coincidence that this Sogdian document was found in the Turfan oasis. At the beginning of the last century (1904-1905), the discovery of samples of Sogdian writing in the Turfan oasis started the study of the Sogdian language. The discovery of these documents along Turfan indicates the active trading activity of the Sogdians here. In early Middle Ages, the Sogdian language reached the level of the language of international trade and communication. The Sogdians migrated to different regions of China. That they entered as early as the 4th century, one can find many neighborhoods where they lived in groups in China. A large part of the city of Chinonchkand, where the trade of slave women was established, was made up of representatives of the Sogdian ethnic group. The slave woman (*Upachah*), her master (son of *Vakhshubirt To’dak*), four witnesses (son of *Tishrat Chonak* from Maimurg; son of *Namdar Khushavoch* from Samarkand; son of *Pesak Kaj* from Nuchkand; son of *Nizat Nanaykavch* from Kushoniya) and the secretary who prepared the

document. It turns out that *Doypustak* (son of *Oxvan Patur*) was also a Sogdian.⁵⁶ So, from the text of the sale document, it is understood that there were many Sogdians in the city and that the Turks and Chinese in Chinonchkand also knew the Sogdian language in this period.

HISTORY OF CULTURAL RELATIONS OF SOGD AND INDIA

The Great Silk Road laid the foundation for the establishment of relations between Sogd and India. In antiquity and the Middle Ages, these two great regions were closely connected. As a result of archeological findings, a large part of the northern part of the Indian peninsula was under the rule of Kushans during 1st-2nd centuries AD. During the same period, the Sogdians entered the territories of India through Tokharistan. As a result of the entry of Alexander the Macedonian into Sogd through Bactria and his journey to India, many Sogd settlements were established, which later strengthened these relations. It is one of the factors that motivated the Sogdians to go to India along the Great Silk Road. The rock paintings found in Shatial are proof of the contacts between India and Sogd.⁵⁷ In the Karakorum Valley of the Silk Road, there is a mountain road that connects China with Gandhara and Bactria with Iran, through which traders and missionaries passed.

Historical information related to Buddhism in Sogd is depicted in palace wall paintings such as Afrosiyab, Panjikent, Varakhsha. The image of *Maitreyi* and the terracotta form of the seated Buddha in the Panjikent murals are different from purely Buddhist examples, and a synthesis of Sogdian and Buddhist traditions can be observed in them.⁵⁸ A study of the murals of Bunjikat, the center of Panjikent and Ustrushona, shows many scenes related to Hindu mythology.⁵⁹

Sogdian and Indian missionaries were the main transmitters of Buddhist traditions in the territories of the Turkish khanate. One of them is known to have been persecuted by the Zhou ruler Wu-di in 574 AD. It is also mentioned in the sources that *Chinogupta*, an Indian missionary-monk, was sheltered by the Khaganate. The Sogdian language and script

played an important role in the translation of Buddhist texts. Taspar translated some Buddhist sutras into Turkish for Khagan. Interpreting and secretarial work were mostly carried out by Sogdians.⁶⁰

Important information about Sogd-India relations can be obtained from the Panjikent wall paintings. The four-armed deity is depicted in the murals. The image shows a four-armed deity sitting on a dragon-shaped throne with a river flowing at his feet and various creatures in the background behind the throne. The four-armed deity is depicted holding the sun and the moon in his hands. N.V. Dyakonov and O.I. Smirnova conducted research on this mural and emphasized that it is the goddess *Nana*, which was already known in Sogd. Researchers believe that the deity *Nana* (goddess) is the patron of the city of Panjikent.⁶¹

The four-armed goddess depicted in the murals is also found in Hindu mythology and is known as *Makara*. Full head wall paintings are close to Indian iconography.⁶² The river image in it is a reference to the Ganges and Yamuna rivers. The reflection of this process in Panjikent is related to showing the importance of the Zarafshan river in the life of the people.

The Indian deities depicted in Panjikent painting represent the connection of this art form to other countries, both ideologically and practically. It is not difficult to understand that the deities of other countries are depicted by the image on the walls of buildings numbered VI/8 and VII/124. It features an image similar to that of the Hindu god *Shiva* dancing in blue. The image of the three-headed deity on the wall of building number XXII/1 is definitely associated with the *Shiva* deity, and these three-headed deities are called *Trimurti*. One of the deities depicted in it may be Lord *Brahma*, another may be *Shiva*, and the next may be *Vishnu*, which is related to the fact that by distinguishing *Shiva* in the middle, he is interpreted as the creator and destroyer of the whole world.⁶³

There was religious tolerance in Sogd, and there was a certain competition in the development of religions and art related to them, and local priests tried to adapt their religious views to Indian religious worldviews and art. As early as 4th century AD, the Sasanian rulers who ruled the former Kushan kingdoms in Bactria preserved the image of *Shiva*

on their coins. According to V.G. Lukonin, *Shiva* on Kushan Sasanian coins was understood as Ahura Mazda.⁶⁴ In the 4th century, the Sasanians in Bactria understood that there was a single image of *Shiva* in the palace of the viceroys. In contrast to them, in the 7th century Sogd, several images of the god *Shiva* were understood (“Shiva and Parvati”, “Bull sitting on the throne”, etc.).⁶⁵

V.A. Livshits read the phrase *wöprkr* (or *wyöprkr*) – *Vishvakarman*, written in ink on the clothes of the three-headed deity in the Panjikent wall paintings in Sogdian script, and translated it literally as “creator of existence”. This name is also found in Sogdian-Buddhist, Sogdian-Moni texts, V.A. Livshits says that *Vishvakarman* found in the Sogdian translation of Vessantara-jataka is the same as the image in the wall paintings. This leads to the conclusion that this happened as a result of the introduction of the image of this deity into local religious views through Buddhism and the emergence of new views related to the image of Shiva in religion.

Scenes from Indian epics, which are located in Panjikent murals, go back to the distant past. The Indian epic, which began to enter from the Kushan period, was passed from mouth to mouth. Examples of folk art in the mural paintings are more reminiscent of “jatakas”, which were stories about the rebirth of the Buddha.⁶⁶

On the walls of buildings numbered VI/1 and XX/1, there are pictures of animals standing in different situations. These animals are bull, lion, and jackal-like creatures, reminiscent of events in the *Panchatantra*, a collection of popular Indian fables called *Kalila and Dimna* in Arabic-Persian literature.⁶⁷ This proves that the artist, who wanted to connect the mural painted by him with the events of *Panchatantra*, knew this epic and that this Indian epic is known in Sogd. The fact that examples of Indian fairy tales are found in almost every household indicates that this saga was widely known among the people.

The depiction of the lion in these murals may also be related to the calendar. It is known from the Hindu calendar that the image of Leo is the symbol of the planet Venus, and the Panjikent wall paintings, especially the wall paintings in the temples, depict the symbolic expression of the

planets of the solar system known at that time in various forms. There was even a separate deity for each day. This is also mentioned in Mugh mountain Sogdian documents, where the days of the week were named after the planets.

When talking about the cultural relations between Sogd and India, it is necessary to pay special attention to Chess game.⁶⁸ Archaeological studies confirm that chess, widely played among the people of Central Asia, was a favorite game of the people of Sogd. This is evidenced by more than 100 pairs of chess pieces made of bronze and iron found during the research in Panjikent.⁶⁹ Along with these stones, a pair of amulets were also found. This amulet is worn to bring good luck in gambling. Such amulets were believed to bring good luck not only in Panjikent, but also in other regions⁷⁰. In Sogd, chess was played by young and old.

There are two different opinions about the homeland of chess. According to the first opinion, the basis of chess is prayer, worship, and it originated in China. Changing the position of chess pieces, winning, and losing were understood to be related to changes in human destiny.⁷¹ Supporters of the second opinion, looking at chess as related to real life – military work, put forward the opinion that it originated in India. It is known from history that in the middle of the 2nd millennium BC, the Indian peninsula was occupied by the Aryans, and in this battle, the cavalry decided the fate of the battle.⁷² This was later reflected in the games between the people. Bone games are known to have been played at Mohenjo-Daro since the Bronze Age. In addition, the epic *Mahabharata* also mentions that there was a game close to the game of chess among the Indian people.⁷³ It is known from the sources that this game was also in the peoples of Central Asia and that the essence of the game is the same as in India. The chess pieces found during the archaeological research in Afrosiyab⁷⁴ and the mural paintings of Panjikent pointy to ancient relations between Sogd and India.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the above-mentioned points, the following conclusions can be made:

- The trade activities of the Sogdians across Central Asia laid the groundwork for political, socio-economic and ethno-cultural relations in the early Middle Ages and activated the process of creating a single ethno-cultural space in the vast region. In addition, the network of the Great Silk Road up to Sogd and China brought the peoples living in this area closer politically and ethno-culturally on the basis of economic cooperation;
- The colonies of the Sogds acted as mediators in trade, economic, political and cultural relations between the peoples of Sogd and Eastern Turkestan and China on the one hand. These trading settlements became cities, where a synthesis of settled and nomadic cultures took place. The Sogdian language and writing had a leading position in this period, and the customs and traditions of the parties converged and left a certain mark;
- On the Great Silk Road, settled and nomadic cultures found common ground and enriched each other. Political stability, economic development and cultural progress in the region depended to a large extent on the stability of this road, and this basis stimulated the development of relations between China and Sogd;
- In early Middle Ages, cultural relations between Sogd and India developed. Especially religious and cultural relations reached the peak of their development. As a result of the achievement of art developed in Sogd in harmony with Indian culture, an important link between Iranian and Chinese art was formed. This art conveyed to us the aspirations of the people who lived at that time, political events in society, religious and worldly views. It deserves special recognition that the development of these cultural ties is the result of common ties along the Great Silk Road.

Thus, in early Middle Ages, trade, religious, and cultural relations between Sogd and China and India developed, and the contribution of the Sogds was significant. The cultural traces of the Sogdians found in these regions have conveyed to us the aspirations, political events of the society, religious and worldly views of the people who lived at that time, and most importantly, the Sogdians considered it their duty to pass on the cultural heritage they created and the examples of folklore to the generations. This is confirmed on the basis of written sources and archaeological data related to Sogd culture found in different regions of China and India.

REFERENCES

1. Starr, Frederick. *Utrachennoye Prosveshyeniye. Zolotoy vek Sentralnoy Azii ot arabskogo zavoyevaniya do vremen Tamerlana*. Moscow: 2017. pp. 12-15, 71-78, 91-98.
2. Goyibov, Bobir. *On the History of Early Medieval Sughd-Korean Relations*. UNESCO International Centre for Documentary Heritage. Sangdong-ro, Cheongwon-gu, Cheongju-si, Chungcheongbuk-do, Republic of Korea, 2022 December, Vol. 4. pp. 50-63.
3. Pigulevskaya, Nina. *Vizantiya vo putyax v Indiyu. Iz istorii torgovli Vizantii s Vostokom v IV-VI vv.* Moscow-Leningrad, 1951. p. 203.
4. VaissiÈre, Ètienne. *Sogdian traders: a history*. Translated by J. Ward. (Handbook of Oriental studies - Handbuch der Orientalistik. Section eight, Central Asia; vol. 10. Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2005.p. 120.
5. Pyankov, Igor'. *Srednyaya Aziya v antichnoy geograficheskoy traditsii. Istochnikovedcheskiy analiz*. Moscow: Oriental Literature Publishing, 1997. p. 342.
6. Raximov, Nabijon. *Sogdiyskaya kolonizatsiya: istoriya izucheniya i noviyè danniyè*. Uchenie zapiski. 2016. No. 2 (47). p. 32.
7. Henning, Walter. *The Date of Sogdian Ancient Letters. Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies, London, 1948. Vol. 12. pp. 601-615.*
8. Livshis, Vladimir. *Sogdiyskiye zStariye pisma (I, III). Pismenniyè pamyatniki vostoka*. Moscow, 2008. Vol. 1 (8). p. 173.
9. Grenet, Frantz & Sims-Williams, Nicholas. *The Historical Context of the Sogdian Ancient Letters. Transition Periods Iranian History. Actes du Symposium de Fribourg-en-Brisgeu, St Ir. (22-25 Ìai 1985). Cahier-Leuvan, 1987. Vol. 5. pp. 101-122.*
10. Harmatta, Jinos. *Sogdian Sources for the history of Preislamic Central Asia. Prolegomena to the History of Preislamic Central Asia*. Budapest, 1979. pp. 153-165.
11. Henning, Walter. *op cit.* pp. 601-613.

12. Vaissière, Étienne. *Sogdian traders: a history*. Translated by J. Ward. (Handbook of Oriental studies - Handbuch der Orientalistik. Section eight, Central Asia; Vol. 10. Brill. Leiden-Boston, 2005. pp. 43-45.
13. Chavannes, Eduard. *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*. Materiali Orxanskoy ekspeditsii. Sankt-Peterburg, 1903. Volume. 6. p. 229.
14. Xo'jayev, Ablat. *Xitoy manbalarida sug'dlarga oid ayrim ma'lumotlar*. *O'zbekiston tarixi* 2004. No.1. p. 55.
15. Dani, Ahmad. *History of civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. 1: The Dawn of civilization, earliest times to 700 B.C.* UNESCO, 1992. pp. 395-419. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000094466>
16. Humbach, Helmut. *Die Soghdischen inschriftenfunde vom oberen Indus (Pakistan)*. Allgemeine und vergleichende Archäologie – Beiträge. München, 1980. pp. 201-228.
17. Buryakov, Yuriy. *K voprosu o svyazyax Sogda i Indii v drevnosti i rannem srednevekovye. India i Centralnaya Asia (doislamskiy period)*. Tashkent, 2000. pp. 161-162.
18. Sims-Williams, Nicholas. *The Sogdian Inscriptions of the Upper Indus*. Antiquities of North Pakistan. Reports and Studies. Ed. K. Yettmar. Mainz, 1989. pp. 34-40.
19. Trembley, Xavier. *Pour une histoire de la Serinde (Le manichéisme parmi les peuples et régions d'Asie Centrale d'après les sources primaires)*. Wien, Der Österreichischen Akademie Der Wissenschaften, 2001. pp. 46-84, 97-110.
20. Hayashi, Toshio. *Sogdian Influence Seen on Turkic Stone Statues Focusing on the Fingers Representation*. *nrgrn und AnÁrgn. Studies Presented to B.I. Maröak on the occasion of His 70th Birthday*. Venezia, 2006. pp. 245-259.
21. Is'hakov, Mirsodiq. *Preyemstvoennost v istorii drevnix tyurkskix sistem pismennosti (sogdiysko-tyurkskiye kontakti)*. *O'zbekiston tarixi*. 2000. No. 4. p. 46.
22. Klyashorniy, Sergey & Livshis, Vladimir. *Sogdiyskaya nadpis iz Buguta. Strani I narodi Vostoka*. Moscow: Nauka, 1971. p. 133.
23. Bartol'd, Vasilii. *K voprosu o yazykax sogdiyskom i toxarskom*. Sochineniya, Volume II. Part 2. Moscow: 1964. p. 468.
24. Maxmud al-Kashgari. *Dögn Luggt at-Turk (Dögn Luggt at-Turk)*. Pervod, predisloviye i kommentarii Z. Auezovoy. Indeksi sostavleni R. Ermersom. Almaty: Dayk-Press, 2005. pp. 1210-1253.
25. *Epigrafika Kirgizii. Vip. I*. Sostavitel' Ch. Dzhumagulov. Frunze: Ilim, 1963. p. 40.
26. Livshis, Vladimir. *Sogdiysi daryat xum nestorianskomu uchitelyu Yarukteginu*. *Scrinium: T. 2. Universum Hagiographicum: Memorial R. P. Michel Van Esbroeck, S. J. (1934-2003)*. Hardcover. January 1, 2006. p. 365.
27. Filanovich, Margarita. *O nekotorex aspektax istorii obshini v drevnosti i proisxojudenii zmaxalla*. *O'zbekiston tarixi*, 2003. No. 2. p. 16.
28. Xo'jayev, Ablat. *Xitoy manbalari. O'zbekiston tarixi. Xrestomatiya. 2-jild 1-kitob. V-XI asrlar*. Ashkent: "Fan", 2014. pp. 31-35.
29. Kostrov, Pavel. *Texnika jivopisi i konservasiya rospisey drevnogo Pyandjikenta. Jivopis drevnogo Panjikenta*. Moscow: Isskustvo, 1954. pp. 162-163.
30. Al'baum, Lazar. *Jivopis Afrasiaba*. Tashkent: Nauka, 1975. p. 102.
31. Shefer, Edvard. *Zolotiye persiki Samarkanda. Kniga o chuzjemnix dikovinax v imperii Tan*. Moscow: "Nauka", 1981. pp. 80-82.
32. Al'baum, Lazar. *op cit.* pp. 73, 78, 97.

33. Qayumov, Aziz., Is'hoqov, Mirsodiq., Otaxo'jayev, Azimxuja., Sodiqov, Qosimjon. *Qadimgi yozma yodgorliklar. Sug'dlarning buddaviy falsafiy-axloqiy yozma merosidan*. Tashkent: Yozuvchi, 2000. pp. 33-116.
34. *Sogdiyskiye dokumenti s gori Mug. Vip. I*. A. Freiman. Opisanije publikasii i issledovaniye. Moskow: Izdatelstvo Vostochnoy literaturi, 1962. pp. 46-60.
35. Beleniskiy, Aleksandr, Marshak, Boris, Raspopova, Valentina. *Sogdiyskiy gorod v nachale srednix vekov (itogi metodi issledovaniya drevnogo Pendjikenta)*. Sovetskaya arxeologiya. Moscow: 1981. No 2. p. 105.
36. Lurje, Pavel. *Avtoreferat*. Sankt-Peterburg, 2004. p. 88.
37. Xodjayev, Ablat. *Svedeniya drevnekitayskix puteshestvennikov o Samarkande. Sivilizasiya i kultura Sentralnoy Azii v yedinstve i mnogoobraziye*. 2009 Sep. 7-8 Samarkand, 2009. pp. 142-143.
38. Xo'jayev, Ablat. *Xitoy manbalarida sug'dlarga oid ayrim ma'lumotlar. O'zbekiston tarixi* 2004. No 1. pp. 57-58.
39. Yoshida, Yutaka. *On the Origin of the Sogdian Surname Zhaowu and Related Problems*. Journal Asiatique, 2003. Tome 291. 1-2. pp. 35-67.
40. Aydinli, Osman. *Semerkant tarihi. Fethinden Samaniler'in Yikilishina Kadar (93 – 389 / 711 – 999)*. G'zden Ge'zirilmil. Ankara, T'rkuye Diyanet Vakfi, 2018. pp. 44-64.
41. Otaxo'jayev, Azimxuja. *Ilk o'rta asrlarda Markaziy Osiyo sivilizasiyasida turk-sug'd munosabatlari*. Tashkent: ART-FLEX, 2010. pp. 8-10.
42. Zuyev, Yuriy. *Kitayskiye izvestiya o Suyabe. Izvestiya Akademii nauk Kazaxskoy SSR*. Alma-ata, 1960. Volume 3 (14). p. 19.
43. Otaxo'jayev, Azimxuja. *Ilk o'rta asrlarda Markaziy Osiyo sivilizasiyasida turk-sug'd munosabatlari*. Tashkent: ART-FLEX, 2010. p. 56.
44. Baypakov, Karl. *Srednevekovaya gorodskaya kultura Yujnogo Kazaxstana i Semirechya*. Alma-ata, 1986. pp. 29-31.
45. G'oyibov, Bobir. *"Kan" familiyasi va uning tarqalishi xususida. Samarqand davlat universiteti ilmiy axborotnomasi*. 2021-yil, 2-son (126). p. 17.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
47. Xo'jayev, Ablat. *Xitoy manbalarida sug'dlarga oid ayrim ma'lumotlar. O'zbekiston tarixi* 2004. No. 1. p. 58.
48. Xodjayev, Ablat. *Svedeniya drevnekitayskix puteshestvennikov o Samarkande. Sivilizasiya i kultura Sentralnoy Azii v yedinstve i mnogoobraziye*. Samarkand. 7-8 September 2009. pp. 142-144.
49. Xo'jayev, Ablat. *Xitoy manbalarida sug'dlarga oid ayrim ma'lumotlar. O'zbekiston tarixi* 2004. No. 1. pp. 59-60.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
51. Otaxo'jayev, Azimxuja. *Ilk o'rta asrlarda Markaziy Osiyo sivilizasiyasida turk-sug'd munosabatlari*. Tashkent: ART-FLEX, 2010. p. 21.
52. Xo'jayev, Ablat. *Xitoy manbalarida sug'dlarga oid ayrim ma'lumotlar. O'zbekiston tarixi* 2004. No. 1. p. 58-59.
53. Otaxo'jayev, Azimxuja. *Ilk o'rta asrlarda Markaziy Osiyo sivilizasiyasida turk-sug'd munosabatlari*. T'eshkent: ART-FLEX, 2010. p. 51.
54. Yoshida, Yutaka & Moriyasu, Takao. *A Sogdian sale contract of a female slave from the period of the Gaochang kingdom under the rule of Qu clan" [in Japanese]. Studies on the Inner Asian Languages, IV*. 1988. p. 1-50.
55. Is'hoqov, Mirsodiq. *Nomi azal Turkiston. O'zbekiston adabiyoti va san'ati*. Tashkent,

- 1993, No. 45-46. pp. 1, 5.
56. Davutov, Davlatxoja. *Sogdiyskaya kupchaya VII v. iz Turfana*. Izvestiya Akademii nauk Respubliki Tadjikistan. Seriya: vostokovedeniye, istoriya, filologiya, Vol. 1 (25). 1992. pp. 25-29.
 57. Goyibov, Bobir. *From the history of relations between Sogd and India*. South and Central Asia: insights and commentaries. Edited by A. Sengupta and M. Rakhimov. New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2015. pp. 75-95.
 58. Marshak, Boris & Rasporova, Valentina. *Buddhist icon from Panjikent*. Silk Road art and Archeology. 5. Kamakara, 1997. p. 98.
 59. Beleniskiy, Aleksandr. *Voprosi ideologii i kultov Sogda po materialam Pyandjikenta*. Moskow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954. p. 25.
 60. Gabain, Annemarie. *Buddhistische Turken mission*. Asratica Festschrift Friedrich Weller. Leipzig, 1954. p. 196.
 61. Zarshenas, Zohreh & Asgari, Leyla. *The Lady of Arg's Letter. One Hundred & Nineteen Sogdian Fragments*. Tehran, Academy of Persian Language & Literature, 2010. pp. 72-98.
 62. Beleniskiy, Aleksandr. *Monumentalnoye iskusstvo Pendjikenta. Jivopis, skulptura*. Moskow: Isskustvo, 1973. p. 45.
 63. Niekum, Melinda. *Etnogenesis, iconographi and Sogdian shamanizm*. Culture of nomadic peoples of Central Asia. Materials of the international conference. Samarkand, November 22-24, 2007. Samarkand, IICAS, 2008. pp. 155-163.
 64. Lukonin, Vladimir. *Kushano-sasanidskiye moneti. Epigrafika vostoka*. Leningrad, 1967. Volume XVIII. pp. 20-26.
 65. Beleniskiy, Aleksandr & Marshak, Boris. *Cherti mirovozzreniya sogdiysev VII-VIII vv. v iskusstve Pendjikenta*. Istoriya i kultura narodov Sredney Azii. Moscow: Nauka, 1976. p. 79.
 66. Dani, Ahmad. History of civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. 1: *The Dawn of civilization, earliest times to 700 B.C.* UNESCO, 1992. pp. 283-318. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000094466>
 67. Beleniskiy, Aleksandr. *Monumental'noye iskusstvo Pendjikenta. Jivopis, skulptura*. Moskow: Isskustvo, 1973. p. 49.
 68. Goyibov, Bobir. *From the history of relations between Sogd and India*. South and Central Asia: insights and commentaries. Edited by A. Sengupta and M. Rakhimov. New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2015. pp. 76-83.
 69. Beleniskiy, Aleksandr, Bentovich, Ilona, Bolshakov, Oleg. *Srednevekoviy gorod Sredney Azii*. Leningrad: Nauka, 1973. p. 129.
 70. Tolstov, Sergey. *K voprosu o datirovke kulturi Kaunchi*. Vestnik drevnty istorii. Moskow, 1946. No. 1. p. 175.
 71. Orbeli, Iosif & Trever, Kamilla. *Shatrang: Kniga o shaxmatax*. Leningrad: Gosudarstvenniy Ermitag, 1936. p. 191.
 72. *Rigveda. Mandali I-IV (Mandalas I-IV)*. Izd. podg. T.Ya. Yelizarenkovoy. Moscow, 1989. p. 64.
 73. Il'in, Grigoriy. *Starinnoye indiyaskoye skazaniye o geroyax drevnosti Maxabxarata*. Moskow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1958. p. 33.
 74. Buryakov, Yuriy. *Shaxmatniye figuri VII veka s Afrasiaba. Obshestvennie nauki Uzbekistana*. Tashkent, 1977. No. 9. pp. 35-38.

MAP OF ZAHIRIDDIN BABUR STATE

OMONULLO BURIEV

ABSTRACT

In the study of the history of Babur and the Baburid state, researching the primary written sources of their time and creating maps based on the information contained in them is quite relevant. This article gives details of the map of the state of Zahiriddin Babur, which shows the state founded by Zahiriddin Babur and ruled by him from 1494 to 1530. The article gives information about the toponyms of the State of Babur – cities, regions, villages, rivers, mountains and other geographical objects, which are important for the study of the history, historical geography and toponymy of Asia and India in the Middle Ages.

Keywords: Timurids, Transoxiana, Bobur, “Boburnoma”, State Museum, climate, region, buluk, city, capital, kasaba (city), kasabacha, toponyms.

INTRODUCTION

This “Map of the State of Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur” was compiled by Omonullo Boriev and Azizjon Sharipov, Head of the Department of the State Museum of the History of Timurids, under the editorship of Zakirjon Mashrabov, chairman of the Bobur international public foundation. The Scientific Council of the State Museum of the History of the Timurids of the Republic of Uzbekistan in its decision No. 1 of 14-01-2022 approved a new map and recommended to be published for the general public. It is based on the methods of creating historical maps, historical and historical-geographical works written during the Timurid period, first of all Zahiriddin Babur’s *Baburnoma*¹, as well as Mirza Muhammad Haydar’s *History of Rashidi*², Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi’s *State*

of Amir Timur and the information from his works such as *Zafarnoma*³, dedicated to the history, was used.

A patent was also obtained for the map “State of Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur” by A.Buriev, A.Sharipov State of Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur (Official Bulletin of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan).(Information about industrial design protection documents included in this bulletin is considered to be published from May 31, 2022). Tashkent, 2022 No. 5 (253).pp.161-162.

MAP OF THE “STATE OF ZAHIRUDDIN MUHAMMAD BABUR”

The extent of the state ranges from northern Mowaroonnahr to central India, and administratively included Transoxiana, present-day Afghanistan, and northern India.



The state of Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur is depicted on this map in three different green colors - light green, green, and dark green, which represent the form of this state in different years: (1) light green - the state of Zahiriddin Babur in Transoxiana: 1497 - 1501 and 1511 - 1512; (2) green color - Zahiruddin Babur's state in Kabul: from 1503; (3) dark green color - the state of Zahiruddin Babur in India: 1526 - 1530 AD. These colors reflect the size of Zahiruddin Babur's state, but also represent its territorial changes over the years.

In addition to the colors, the political-administrative form of the state is expressed in Roman numerals on the map: I – Fergana region, which belonged to Zahiriddin Babur when he ascended the throne in Andijan in 1494; II – during his rule in Transoxiana in 1497–1501, the places subordinated to him; III – Tashkent region and Oratepa territories belonging to Sultan Mahmudkhan (1487–1503), the ruler of Mongolia, Babur's uncle in Transoxiana; IV – Zahiriddin Babur's recapture of Movarounnahr in 1511-1512; V - Zahiruddin Babur's state in Kabul, from 1503; VI – Zahiruddin Babur's state in India, 1526-1530.

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSOXIANA

The first ten years of Babur's reign in Transoxiana, and its administrative situation are recorded in *Boburnoma* using the terms *climate*, *region*, *buluk*, *city*, *capital*, *kasaba (city)*, *kasabacha (town)*, *kurgan*, *kent (village)*. During this period, the Timurid kingdom was administratively divided into several parts in Transoxiana. The center of Samarkand and nearby regions (Bukhara, Karshi) were ruled by Sultan Ahmed Mirza, the Ferghana Valley (capital Andijan) by Umarsheikh Mirza, and the southern regions - Hisar, Chaganiyan, Termiz, Khatlon, the lands on the left side up to the Hindu Kush range (the capital Hisar) - led by Sultan Mahmud Mirza. Since the truce concluded in Shahrukhiya, Tashkent region (1485 AD), it was given to Yunus Khan, Khan of Mongolia, and after his death (1487 AD), it passed to his son Sultan Mahmud Khan (1487-1503 AD). Tashkent received the status of the political-administrative capital of Mongolia for a short period

of time, more precisely between 1485 and 1503, as the residence of the Khan of Mongolia was located here.

The disunity in the ownership of Transoxiana increased after the death of Umarshaikh, the ruler of Fergana region (1494 AD). From Samarkand, Sultan Ahmed Mirza marched to Quba (Quva), from Tashkent, Sultan Mahmud Khan led an army and besieged Akhsi. Umarshaikh Mirza Bey under the leadership of Maulana Qazi showed fierce courage and Zahiruddin Babur preserved the property left by his father in Fergana province.

Babur initially regained Isfara and Khojand from Sultan Ahmed Mirza, which had been lost. However, Oratepa belonging to Umarshaikh, the father of Zahiriddin Babur, was taken over by Sultan Mahmud Khan (1495) and his administration was handed over to Muhammad Husain. He ruled this region until 1503. *This was the first administrative-territorial change in the political-administrative map of the Fergana region.*

Zahiriddin Babur saw the weakness of the central authority and marched when the Timurid princes were fighting for the throne in Samarkand (1496 AD). Sultan Ali Mirza and Zahiriddin Babur besieged the city of Samarkand, which was occupied by Boysunkur Mirza for more than four months. However, with the onset of winter (1496), they lifted the siege and returned to Samarkand in the summer of next year (1497). Baisunkur Mirza was besieged for seven months, he called Shaibani Khan from Turkestan for help, but he could not come and help and left the country. When Baysunkur Mirza was left with no choice, he went to Kunduz with 200-300 people to Khisravshah. The city of Samarkand was handed over to Zahiriddin Babur without a fight (1497). *The coming of Zahiriddin Babur to the throne of Samarkand was a new event in the administration of political power in Transoxiana.*

However, as soon as he took the throne of Samarkand, his father's property in the Ferghana region began to be robbed. In Tashkent, his uncle Sultan Mahmud Khan asked to give Andijan. Those who escaped from Babur's hand, including Sultan Ahmad Tanbal, the Mongol Cheri and Uzun Hasan Akhsi, whom Babur entrusted to guard the Akhsi fortress

when Babur left for Samarkand, demanded that Andijan be handed over to Jahangir Mirza. Andijan was besieged. After hearing this news, Babur reigned in Samarkand for only one hundred days (1497 - 1498) and returned to Andijan without any help. When he reached Khojand, he received news that Andijan had been captured and that Khoja Mavlanoy Qazi had been martyred at the gate of the arch. *This event was the second political-administrative change in the management of the Fergana region.*

Babur managed to recapture Andijan with the support of Ali Dost, who was leading Margion (1499). *This event was the third political-administrative change in the administration of the Fergana region.*

The next events related to the political-administrative situation of the Fergana region happened at the beginning of 1500 AD. Mirza Jahangir and Tanbal joined forces against Babur, and at the end, both sides decided to make peace. According to the terms of this truce (1500. II) concluded in Pishkhoran in Namangan, the Ferghana Valley was administratively and territorially divided into two; Its northern part belonged to Jahangir Mirza (center of Akhsi), and the southern part belonged to Babur (center of Andijan). *This situation is considered the second administrative-territorial change in the political-administrative map of the Fergana region after Zahiriddin Babur came to power.*

The reason for the urgent truce in Pishkhoran was related to the events in Samarkand. After the departure of Zahiriddin Babur, a conflict arose between Sultan Ali Mirza, who occupied the throne of Samarkand, and the Tarkhans led by Muhammad Mazid Tarkhan. Muhammad Mazid asked Babur to come. When Zahiriddin Babur reached Samarkand (1500), Shaibani Khan occupied Bukhara and headed towards Samarkand. Babur left Samarkand and went to Kesh, where he hears that Sultan Ali Mirza handed over Samarkand to Shaibani Khan without a fight. When they reached Chaganiyan's Chiltu village, it became known that the Begs in some fortresses in the Samarkand region had not yet submitted to Shaybani Khan, and he believed in the support of these Begs and aimed to return to Samarkand.

Zahir al-Din Babur with only two hundred and forty men, relying

on the support of the townspeople, made a sudden attack at night (1500 AD). At this time, Shaibani Khan appointed Mirza Jonwafa as a direct official in Samarkand, leaving him with more than five hundred sepoy, and with more than three thousand of his own sepoy and as many sepoy he had recruited from the local area, he settled in the vicinity of Khoja Diydar. Hamza Sultan and Mahdi Sultan settled with their men in the Bodana reserve near Samarkand.

Zahiruddin Babur entered the city through the Feruza gate at dawn. As anticipated, the townspeople sympathized with Babur, and attacked the servants left behind by Shaibani Khan, beating and stoning more than four hundred of them to death.

After the capture of the city of Samarkand, the inhabitants of the fortresses in the region rose up against Shaibani Khan and were freed one after another. Shaibani Khan retreated to Bukhara. Kesh, Karshi, Khuzar and Karakol also passed to Timurids. *The second administrative-territorial change in the political-administrative map of Transoxiana was Zahiriddin Babur's recapture of the throne of Samarkand.* But even when Zahiriddin Babur took the throne of Samarkand for the first and second time, only a part of Transoxiana came under his control.

Shaibani Khan also gathered strength in Bukhara and hesitated to recapture Samarkand with the onset of winter. He succeeded in capturing the fortress of Karakol and Dabusiya. Babur's army was defeated in a battle between the two, and he was besieged in the city for four months. When no help came from outside, he reluctantly agreed to Shaibani Khan's proposal to make peace, and left the city (1500), and stopped at Dahkat belonging to Oratepa (1501). According to the previous agreement, after Babur occupied the throne of Samarkand, Andijan was transferred to Mirza Jahangir, and he could not go there. But Tashkent and Oratepa regions were under the rule of Sultan Mahmud Khan.

When his younger uncle Sultan Ahmad Khan (Alacha Khan) arrived in Tashkent with about two thousand soldiers from Eastern Mongolia to help them, they marched to Andijan with an army of thirty thousand. Having appointed Babur to go through Uzgand to Andijan, they decided

to march with the main force to Akhsi on Tanbal. From Osh to Uzgand, the people of the region showed their goodwill for Babur and declared their submission without a fight.

His uncle informs that he wanted to give the lands to the left of the Khojand water towards Andijan to the younger Sultan Ahmed Khan, and gave the lands on the Akhsi side to Babur. He also emphasized that after taking Samarkand, Babur would remain on the throne of the kingdom there, and the Ferghana Valley would belong to the younger Khan Sultan Ahmad Khan. Babur reluctantly agreed. As a result of a joint effort, the Ferghana province was transferred to the rule of Sultan Mahmud Khan and was included in Mongolia. *This was the third administrative-territorial change in the political-administrative map of the Ferghana region.*

After Tanbal was defeated in Ferghana province, he turned to the path of treachery and sent his brother Bek Telba to Shaibani Khan and asked him to come, stating that he agreed to submit to him. Shaibani Khan sent a message that he was on his way. Zahiriddin Babur was forced to leave Andijan. *Shaibani Khan's conquest of Ferghana province brought about the fourth administrative-territorial change on the map of the province.*

After these events, Babur climbed the mountains and reached the Ilok pasture of the Hisar Valley (1503). From there, continuing his journey, he crossed the Amu Darya in the Ayvaj guzar and went and captured Kabul. When Zahiruddin Babur ruled Kabul, Muhammad Shaibani Khan (1451–1510) was informed that he was killed in a battle near Merv (1510) with the Shah of Iran, Ismail Safavi (1511). An ambassador came there from Shah Ismail with promises of friendship and assistance, the king also showed great respect to Babur's sister Khanzada Begum, who was captured in the harem of Shaibani Khan in the war in Merv. They met in Kunduz after a long ten-year separation. Zahiriddin Babur, on his part, sent Mirza Khan, the son of his uncle Sultan Mahmud Mirza, as an ambassador, taking into account his activity against the Shaibanites in these events. In 1511, Mirza Khan was the first ambassador sent from the Babur state to the Safavid state. The king agreed to help and a deal was struck between the two. The fact that Babur agreed to form an alliance

with Shah Ismail was due to the fact that the army under his command was much smaller than the army of Shaibani.

The Shaibani left the regions they occupied on the left side of the Amu Darya and moved to the right bank of the river (1510). 20,000 Mongols captured by Shaibani Khan at the time (1503) came to Kunduz after his death, intending to return to their homeland.

The troops sent by Shah Ismail under the leadership of Mirza Khan arrived in Kunduz and Babur started marching towards Hisar (1510). The Shaibani also attacked the main forces, and a fierce battle took place between the two sides at a place called Obdara near Puli Sangin in Khatlon Province. Part of the Mongols who came from Khurasan to Kunduz directly attached to Babur and another part to Mirza Haidar showed bravery and decided the fate of the battle. Among the Shaibani sultans, Sultan Hamza, Sultan Mahdi, and Sultan Mumaq were captured and killed⁴. Babur marched from there to Samarkand. The Shaibani, powerless to resist, fled to Turkestan.

Zahiriddin Babur assumed the throne of Samarkand (October 1511)⁵. Along with him, a part of the Turkmen qizilbash from Shah Ismail's soldiers also came to Samarkand. The inhabitants of the city hated this category of the Shia sect, and their arbitrariness, and they did not treat Babur, who temporarily dressed in the Shia style.

In general, Zahir al-Din Babur occupied Transoxiana for eight months and implemented certain administrative and territorial measures to manage the country. Before Samarkand was taken, Ferghana province was transferred to Babur through the activity of the historian Mirza Haydar's uncle Sayyid Muhammad Mirza, and Sultan Said Khan was the governor of Andijan. He entrusted the administration of the Tashkent region to Amir Ahmad Qasim Kuhbar and appointed his brother Kattabek to the headship of Sayram. The border between the state of Babur and the state of Kazakh Khan Qasim Khan is between Sayram and Taraz. But when Zahiriddin Babur left Transoxiana, the administration of Tashkent city and the region was again transferred to the Shaibanis.

In the north, Babur's state was separated from the Shaibani state by

Syr Darya, and its western border extended to Khorezm. Taking into account that the southern border of this state was up to the Sind (Indus) river, then it can be said that the extent of Babur's state during the last march to Transoxiana was the most extensive period in its history. In 1512, after Babur was defeated first in Koli Malik and then in Gijduwan with Ubaidullah Khan's army, he retreated to Hisar and from there he went to Kunduz and then returned to Kabul.

ZAHIRUDDIN BABUR'S STATES IN KABUL AND INDIA

A State in Kabul (present-day Afghanistan)

After coming under the rule of Shaibani Khan of Fergana province in Transoxiana, Babur climbed the mountains and reached the Ilok pasture of Hisar Valley (1503). From there, he passed through the Amu Darya in Ayvaj Guzari and continued his journey and settled in the city and province of Kabul (fourteen districts, including Ghazni). At that time, most of what is now Afghanistan belonged to Sultan Husain Mirza, and was ruled by his loyal Bahadur general Zunnun Arghun and his descendants. Muhammad Muqim, the youngest son of Zunnun Arghun, was in possession of the Kabul province, he made peace and handed over power (1503). He was assigned a residence at the Thebes near the city. Soon after, Muqim asked permission from Zahiruddin Babur and went to Kandahar, where his clan was located.

Zahiruddin Babur's visit to Kabul had a historical basis in terms of administrative and territorial management. At one time, Sultan Abusaid Mirza gave the Kabul province from his possessions to his youngest son Umarshaikh Mirza, and then he reversed this decision and assigned to him the province of Ferghana with Andijan as its center.

When Zahiriddin Babur settled in Kabul, many people from Samarkand, Hisar, and Kunduz escaped from Shaibani Khan and sought refuge in this direction. In order to collect taxes from the country, he had to go to far and near places. Part of the trips in Afghanistan were based

on this need, and another part was in the form of trips to the outskirts of Kabul. In this regard, Babur initially included the Kabul region, and then made several campaigns, and included other parts of present-day Afghanistan as part of his state. About the places belonging to his state in Kabul, in addition to Kabul and Ghazni, he also lists Kandahar to the southwest of Kabul and Badakhshan and Kunduz to the north.

One of Babur's long-term trips (1504) was to the southern regions, consisting of the mountains of Afghanistan and Mehtari Suleiman. It is known that Babur's grandfather, Sultan Abusaid, occupied these lands adjacent to the Kabul province from the south. In *Boburnoma* and other historical sources of the Timurid period, the inhabitants of these places were called "Afghans"; and the territory of the current state of Afghanistan is given names in different regions and districts. As a result of this trip, the border of Zahiruddin Babur's state extended to the south of the Sind (Indus) River (opposite Molton along the lower reaches of the river).

The city and province of Kandahar in the southern part of present-day Afghanistan was historically a part of Amir Timur and the Timurid state. After Shaybani Khan took Khurasan from the Timurids, Zahiruddin Babur, considering himself the main claimant to the possessions in the southwestern and western parts of Afghanistan, occupied Kandahar and entrusted its management to his brother Nasir Mirza. Shaibani Khan besieged Kandahar under the protection of Nasir Mirza and occupied the fortified part of the city, but he did not manage to take the city arch. The situation in Khurasan worsened and he hurriedly returned (1507).

Badakhshan province was located in the northern part of Babur's state, which was administratively part of Afghanistan and Transoxiana (currently it belongs to Tajikistan and Afghanistan). During Babur's time, the administrative center was the city of Kishm. This region was administratively part of the Timurid state in the 15th century, and at the end of the 15th century, it was considered the property of Sultan Mahmud Mirza bin Sultan Abusaid. Later, Badakhshan was part of Zahiruddin Babur's state. In 1520, Zahiruddin Babur entrusted the management of the Badakhshan region to his son Humayun. In the years 1530-1575,

Badakhshan was ruled by Suleimanshah from the Babur dynasty, and then by his descendants. In 1584 Shaibani king Abdullah Khan II occupied this region. It is believed that when Zahiruddin Babur ruled Kabul, the Kunduz region was under his control for a short time.

Babur's state in India

Zahiruddin Babur wrote in *Boburnoma* that he marched to India five times between seven and eight years (1519-1526). But the currently preserved text of *Boburnoma* contains information only about the first and fifth campaigns. In the first campaign (1519) he went as far as Bhira; on the way back he passed through the river Sindh (Indus) through the Nilob River. In the fifth campaign, he passed Nilob Guzari and won a complete victory in the Battle of Panipat (April 20, 1526), and took Delhi. Then he captured the city of Agra (December 5, 1526) and made it the capital of his state. From there, he made several campaigns to various parts of India, expanding the extent of his state as far south as Bengal⁶.

SOME TOPONYMS ON THE MAP

Another important aspect of this map is that it gives the names of the places that existed in Babur's time. Only a part of the toponyms is shown on the map (more than 1,500 place names are recorded in *Boburnoma* itself). In order to create a relatively complete picture of the toponyms on the map of the "State of Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur", it is appropriate to give a brief explanation of each of them⁷.

Amudarya - in the written sources of the Timurid era, Amudarya is more often called "Jayhun" and relatively less "Obi Omuya", the part near the city of Gurganj in the Khorezm region is called "Obi Gurlan" (Gurlan river) and "Joyi Gurlan" (Gurlan stream), in its upper reaches – "Punjab". comes with Its tributaries "Obi Vakhsh" (now Vakhsh River), "Surkhob", "Gund", "Hisar" and "Chagonrud" (now Surkhan River) are also mentioned. In *Boburnoma* the name of this river appears in the forms "Amu river" and "Amu suyi". In 1503 AD, Zahiriddin Babur passed through Ayvaj Guzari of Amu Darya on his way from Transoxiana to

Kabul: "When Amu suyini Uyoch (now called Ayvaj) passed Guzaridin".

Andijan is a city, the administrative center (capital) of the Ferghana region, it was a fortress and arch; It is also the center of the Andijan region. An important city on the Great Silk Road; trade caravans passed through Kashghar, Uzgand, Osh and stopped in Andijan; from there he passed to Akhsi and then went to Tashkent. Andijan is the birthplace of Zahiriddin Babur, and he wrote about it in the *Boburnoma* in the account of the events of 1506-1507: "I handed over all my servants to Sultan Saidkhan, added help, dedicated the province of Andijan, my birthplace, and sent him as a Khan". Geographical location of the cities in the Ferghana Valley is indicated, mainly in relation to the capital Andijan, and sometimes the distance is also given. "Margilon is in the west of Andijan, seven miles from Andijan". There is important geographical and historical information about Andijan⁸.

Afghanistan - in the Timurid period sources, including the *Boburnoma*, a small province adjacent to the Kabul province from the south, the southern part of present-day Afghanistan, was called this. In *Boburnoma* the inhabitants of this region are called Afghans. The mountains there are mentioned by the names of Afghanistan mountains and Mehtari Sulaiman mountains (now Sulaiman mountains): "Khoja Ismail and Dasht, Duki, and Afghanistan mountains are one mossy mountain; They are low-lying, grassy, scarce water, no wood, ugly, naughty mountains. The mountains are worthy of their country"⁹.

Balkh is a city and province in the northern part of present-day Afghanistan. Medieval Balkh now exists as an old city to the west of Mazori Sharif, and some ancient monuments have been preserved. *Boburnoma* mentions the names of the Balkhob river and Kohi Sof pasture near the city. The political history of Balkh city and region in the first quarter of the 16th century is covered in detail in *Boburnoma* and cannot be found in other sources.

Bamiyan mountain lies northwest of Kabul, the western part of the Hindu Kush range. There is the ancient city of Bamiyan (230 km from Kabul). This city was a major settlement on the caravan route and a

Buddhist religious center during the Kushan period. Buddha statues made of mountain rocks are still preserved and are considered valuable historical monuments. Some of the historical realities that happened during Babur's time also applied to Bamiyan. Waters started from Bamiyan mountain in different directions. *Boburnoma* states: "Bamiyan mountain is a closed mountain. Hirmand and Sindh and Dugobai Kunduz and Balkhob are the sources of this flood. They say that one can drink all four rivers in one day". From Kabul, he went to Bamiyan through the Shibartu pass in the Hindu Kush range. Zahir al-Din Babur left Herat on the 7th of Sha'ban 912 (December 23, 1506) to return to Kabul. After a long arduous journey through the Hindu Kush range in the winter, he reached Bamiyan on the Eid of Ramadan (February 14, 1507) and continued his journey to Kabul.

Bukhara is one of the major cities of Transoxiana in the 15th century, the center of the Bukhara region. *Boburnoma* notes that there are several districts of the Bukhara region, where various fruits and vegetables are good. "Transoxiana does not have as many good melons as Bukhara melons. All kinds of melons are abundant and good in Bukhara. There is no place like Bukhara melon."

Kashmir is mentioned in *Boburnoma* as a mountain, city and region. "After the river Sind, on this mountain (Himalaya range) are the tawabi regions of Kashmir... this mountain country is called Kas." I remembered that Hindustani people pronounce "shin" as "sin". Because Kashmir is the most important city on this mountain. "I will be a Jihattin, they will say Kashmir".

Kabul is a well-known and famous region during the Timurid period. The center is the city of Kabul. Zahiruddin Babur writes that he captured the city of Kabul in 1503 AD. Among the written sources of the Timurid era, Kabul region is described most perfectly in *Boburnoma*. According to the concept of seven climates, Kabul region is included in the fourth climate. Borders: in the east - Lamganot and Hind region; in the west - Ghor mountains; in the north - Kunduz and Andarab regions, separated by the Hindu Kush range; in the south - Farmul, Naghar, Bannu and Afghanistan. Kabul region consists of fourteen districts: in the east - Lamghonot; five

districts and two springs. The largest is Ningnahor, the center (the land of the drug) is Odinapur. Other districts: Kunar and Nurgil, Nijrov, Panjhir, Ghurband, Lahugar, Zurmat, Farmul, Bangash, etc. The citadel of the city of Kabul, called Shahi Kabul, is located on the side of a mountain. *Boburnoma* contains important information about the topography, climate, waters, grasses, fruits, crops, and landscaping of Kabul city and region. The description of the mountains is more detailed, giving their names, locations, height, passes, roads, waters, flora and fauna. Kabul region is surrounded by mountains. The Hindu Kush mountain separates it from Balkh, Kunduz and Badakhshan regions. The Kabul River is the main right tributary of the Indus River. Kohi Baba, a part of the Hindu Kush mountains, starts from the southern slope of the mountain range, first flows from the territory of Afghanistan, after the city of Kabul, it is joined by other tributaries, flows into the territory of Pakistan and flows into the Indus river. The total length of the river is 460 km. The main trade route from Kabul to India passed through the Kabul River Valley.

CONCLUSION

In general, the image on the map of the state of Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur embodies the stages of the establishment and development of this state and provides a visual understanding of its history. Students will have the opportunity to enrich their imaginations formed by reading books with the historicity reflected in this map, and their historical understanding of the state of Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur will be perfected. This map is important for the study of the historical geography and toponymy of the state of Babur. The location of many geographical objects – states, cities, regions, rivers, mountains, rural settlements, and various nationalities – it becomes possible to determine their role in the history of the peoples living in these territories and in the history of the Middle Ages as a whole.

REFERENCES

1. Bobur, Zahiriddin Muhammad. *Boburnama*. Based on the publications of Porso Shamsiev, Sadiq Mirzaev and Eiji Mano (Japan). Toshkent: Sharq, 2002. 336 p.
2. Ali Yazdiy, Sharafiddin. *Zafarnoma*. O'R FA Sharqshunoskik instituti qo'lyozmasi, No. 4472, fotofaksimal nashr. Nashrga tayorlovchi, so'zboshi, izoh va ko'rsatkichlar muallifi O'rinboyev Asomiddin. Toshkent: Fan, 1972. 1240 p.
3. Haidar, Mirza Muxammad. *Tarikh-i Rashidi*. Vvedeniye, perevod s persidskogo Urunbayeva Asomiddina, Djalilovoy Ra'no, Yepifanovoy Larisi. Tashkent: Fan, 1996. 728 p.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 320-322.
5. *Ibid.*, p.334.
6. *Zahiriddin Muhammad Bobur entsiklopediyasi* (qayta ishlangan ikkinchi nashr). Tahrir hay'ati: Qayumov Ahad, Bo'riyev Omonullo va b. Bosh muharrir: A'zamov Abdullo. Tashkent: Sharq, 2017. 688 p.
7. Bo'riyev, Omonullo. *Boburnomadagi toponimlar izohli lug'ati*. Toshkent: Navro'z, 2015. 140 p.
8. Bo'riyev, Omonullo. *Farg'ona vodiysining temuriylar manbalaridagi tavsifi*. Tashkent: Akademnashr, 2018. 28 p.
9. *Zahiriddin Muhammad Bobur entsiklopediyasi* (qayta ishlangan ikkinchi nashr). Tahrir hay'ati: Qayumov Ahad, Bo'riyev Omonullo va b. Bosh muharrir: A'zamov Abdullo. Tashkent: Sharq, 2017. 125 p.

INDIANS IN CENTRAL ASIA IN THE 19-20TH CENTURIES

OYBEK YARMATOV

Abstract

The trade, economic and cultural relations between Central Asia and India had been established from ancient times, which led to the mobility process between Central Asia and India. Since the 15th-16th centuries, some Indian citizens came for permanent residence in Turkestan. The first Indian settlements were built in Bukhara in the 16th century. First information about large settlements in Central Asia dates back to the 17th century and it was given in the work named Tarikhi Mukimkhoni of Mukhammad Yusuf Munshi. At first, Indians entered Central Asia through Afghanistan, later, they found the ways of entering Turkestan. After the opening of Transcaspian railway, they came through the Bombay-Batumi-Caucasus-Krasnovodsk sea-way which was the cheapest. This process impacted positively not only to the development of economic relations but also the development of cultural relations. This article deals with Central Asia-India relations and the history of Indian citizens in Turkestan, using the relevant sources and materials of National Archive of Uzbekistan.

Key words: Great Silk Road, India, Central Asia, Babur Dynasty, Bukhara, Akbarshah, Abdullakhan, trade, class, administrators.

INTRODUCTION

The trade, economic and cultural relations between Central Asia and India had been established from ancient times. In the 1st-3rd centuries AD, southern regions of Central Asia became part of Kushan Empire and Great Silk Road developed, which led to the process of interaction of Central Asian people with Indian citizens. The development of these relations began during 15th-16th centuries. For example, Shakhruh from Temurids

had great interest in India, and he tried to develop good relations with India. So the process of moving some Indian citizens for permanent residence in Turkestan took place. The baseline data about the earliest Indian community in Central Asia dates to 15th-16th centuries. The first Indian settlements were built in Bukhara in the 16th century. The first information about the large settlements in Central Asia dates to the 17th century and this information is given in the work named *Tarikhi Mukimkhoni* of Mukhammad Yusuf Munshi. At first, Indians entered Central Asia through Afghanistan. Later, they found other ways of entering Turkestan. After the opening of Transcaspian railway, they stopped entering through Afghanistan and began to come through the Bombay-Batumi-Caucasus-Krasnovodsk sea-way which was the cheapest. This process impacted positively not only the development of economic relations but also the development of cultural relations.

HISTORY OF INDIANS IN CENTRAL ASIA

The main research on the topic was conducted by the famous historian G. D. Dmitriev, using the materials of the National Archive of Uzbekistan to illuminate the activities of Indians in Turkestan¹. Information about Indian citizens who lived in Turkestan in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century is available in the "I-1" fund of the Turkestan Governor General's Court, the "I-2" fund of the diplomatic affairs officer of the Governor General, and the "I-3" fund of the political agency in Bukhara. U.A. Rustamov, N.A. Khalifin, M.M. Ermatov, and few other scientists also conducted scientific research on this topic. Although the main activities of Indians in Turkestan were studied more widely in the 19th-20th centuries, Indians had entered Central Asia earlier. According to historical written sources, the incorporation of the southern regions of Central Asia into the Kushan Empire and the development of the Great Silk Road led to the rapprochement of the relations of Indian citizens with the peoples of Central Asia in the 1st-3rd centuries AD. This article summarizes information from archival documents and published

sources about Indians in Central Asia, and their activities.

The development of Great Silk Road and the spread of Buddhism throughout Central Asia greatly contributed to the development of India-Central Asian relations. The existence of several Buddhist religious sites (Fayoztepa, Karatepa monastery, Zurmala tower) in the territory of Bactria (southern part of Uzbekistan) in the early centuries of our era shows that it began with the entry of Indians into Central Asia in order to spread Buddhism. In the 14th century, Amir Temur marched to India and brought a number of Indian craftsmen to Samarkand and used them in construction work. For example, Shahrukh, who was from the Timurids, had great interest in India². In 1433 AD he sent his ambassador to Bengal under the leadership of Abdulkakarim. In response, the governor of Bengal sent a letter to Shahrukh in 1437 through an ambassador. In the letter, the Governor of Bengal complained about the attacks of the Governor of Jaunpur and requested that appropriate action be taken against his rival. Shahrukh once again sent an ambassador to Bengal and called the two sides to come to an agreement, otherwise, the Timurids would be forced to send troops³. Shahrukh sought to establish political and diplomatic relations with the states of Delhi, Calicut, Vijayanagara and Jaunpur. Development of closer relations between India and Central Asia in the 16th century was because the rulers of Babur dynasty considered Central Asia as their ancestral land. However, the Babur dynasty in India was misinterpreted by European historians as “the Mughal Empire” (who considered them to be of Mughal descent). Academician B.B. Barthold was the first to point out the misinterpretation of European historians. Barthold explained that the dynasty was given the wrong term. “Europeans believed that Timur and his sons and grandsons were descended from the Mughals, and called Babur’s kingdom the Great Mughals.” In 1969, an Uzbek scholar H. Sulaimanov, pointed out that the history of the Baburi people was misinterpreted. “Temur and Timurids, including Z.M. Babur, were Uzbeks according to their ethnogenesis.” Indian historian Ramish Varma divides the history of political relations between Central Asia and India in the second half of the 16th century into two periods.

- 1) 1555-1589, the period of protection of diplomatic relations between the Bukhara Emirate and India.
- 2) Akbar Shah's violent policy towards Central Asia in 1588-1605. Bukhara Khan Abdullah Khan sent his ambassador named Altamish to India in 1572. Altamish handed Abdullah Khan's letter about strengthening diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries. According to historian Varmani, the ambassador also suggested to Akbar to conquer the Safavid lands, but Akbar kept it a secret.

These thoughts are far from the truth. Because at that time Abdullah Khan had not yet subjugated Movarounnahr and Balkh, and it was impossible to talk about Iran. Secondly, Iran was ruled by Shah Takhmasp from 1524 to 1576. During the Takhmasp kingdom, the political relation between Bukhara and Iran was not so great. In addition, in the letter sent by Altamish, it was said that Abdullah Khan wanted to win over his enemies in Turon with the help of Indians. Later, Akbar Shah also sent an ambassador to Abdullah Khan and emphasized that he was a true Muslim, that he did not try to violate the rules of Islam, but only tried to solve the problems that scholars could not solve. This letter did not express his reaction to the occupation of Badakhshan by Abdullah Khan. It can be seen that Akbar Shah did not want to break his relations with Bukhara. In the letter, Akbar Shah did not express a clear idea about conquering Iran, but he had the intention of conquering a part of Iran, so Akbar Shah tried to maintain good relations with Abdullah Khan⁴. Relations between the two continued with short interruptions in later periods. Indian citizens entered Central Asia to engage in a certain profession. First information about the first Indian communities in Central Asia dates back to the 15th and 16th centuries. The first Indian settlements were built in Bukhara in the 16th century. In his *The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550-1990*, Scott Levy noted that there were Indian communities and caravanserais in Samarkand, Tashkent and Bukhara in the 16th century. He mentions the existence of a Christian neighborhood named Tarsan, a Jewish neighborhood named Musaviyan and a small number of Indian

neighborhoods in Samarkand in the 15th-16th centuries⁵.

Information related to the history of Indian citizens in Turkestan is found in the works of Rawlinson, Kay Menon, Henri Lansdel, and Svetlana Garshina. In the studies of English orientalists Rawlinson and Menon, the information related to our topic is covered mainly under the influence of Anglo-Russian competition. According to Nirmala Joshi, there were 20 caravanserais in Bukhara belonging to Indian merchants. She cites Burnes' information that there were about 300 Indian citizens in Bukhara and that their number increased significantly in the following years. Indians in Turkestan were engaged in usury and barter in addition to trade. Nirmala says that in Andijan, Fergana, Namangan, almost all the cities of Central Asia, barter system prevailed in the activities of Indian citizens. There were 10 trading firms in Andijan in 1903, 2 of which belonged to Indians named Rambe Poshho and Ramsu Sufu, and they were engaged in the silk trade. The information from the National Archives of Uzbekistan also confirms her opinion. 10 Indian citizens were engaged in the bread and fruit trade in Khojand, and in 1901, 40 Indian citizens worked in Tashkent, 52 in Kokand, 28 in Namangan, and 4 in Osh⁶. Prof. K. Warikoo is another historian who has worked extensively on the trade between Central Asia and India and the relations between them. The historian noted the information of Meyendorff who came to Bukhara as part of the Negri expedition in 1820 that Kashmiri merchants in Bukhara exported about 2,000 Kashmiri shawls to Russia every year. The historian mentions that the trade of coral occupied an important place in the trade of Indian citizens in Turkestan and that due to the increase of the duty on Indian goods by the Russians, the Indians brought coral to Kokand through the Osh Mountains by way of smuggling (illegal trade). Warikoo studied the information of the Russian consulate in Kashgar and said that in 1901-1902, the Russian Empire collected 40,000 rupees from the customs coming to Turkestan through Kashgar, and in 1904-1905, this duty reached 216,000⁷.

INDIAN SETTLEMENTS IN TURKESTAN

The first information about large population settlements in Central Asia dates back to the 17th century, and this information is presented in Muhammad Yusuf Munshi's "History of Muqimkhani". Indians first entered Central Asia through Afghanistan, but over time they began to look for convenient ways to reach Turkestan. They stopped coming through Afghanistan and (after the opening of the Transcaspian railway) came through the cheapest sea route Bombay-Botumi-Caucasus-Krasnavodsk. In 1895 it was allowed to transport goods through this road⁸. Indian settlements in Turkestan also existed in Samarkand, Tashkent, Ko'kand, Bukhara, Namangan, Karshi, Andijan and other cities. There is little information about the presence of Indian settlements in the Khanate of Khiva. It seems that Indian merchants came to Khiva for a short period of 2-3 months for trade. Not all Indians lived in Central Asia for a lifetime. They lived in Turkestan for an average of 10-15 years and most of them returned to their homeland. Some of them lived in Turkestan for 10-15 years, even 40-50 years⁹. In early 20th century, Indians mainly lived in the capital and regions of Bukhara Khanate (Bukhara, Gijdivan, Varganza, Vobkent, Karshi, Guzor, Yakkabog, Chirakchi, Kerki, Boysun, Kitab, Bagauddin, Ziyauddin, Shahrisabz, Kerman, Tashkupir). Most Indians who came to Central Asia came from the mountainous regions of Sindh region, Shikarpur and its surroundings. They also came to Central Asia from Peshawar, Ludhiana, Lagora, Amritsar, Multan, Bombay, Banaras and other regions¹⁰.

The archival data stored in the National Archive funds has been analyzed, including "I-1" (documents of the Governor General's Court of Turkestan); "I-2" (documents of the diplomatic affairs officer of the governor general); "I-3" (Funds of Bukhara Political Agency); "I-5" (documents of the court of the head of Zarafshan district). "I-17" (documents of the head of the department of Sirdarya region); "I-18" (documents of the head of department of Samarkand region); "I-19" (documents of the head of the department of Fergana region); "I-20" (documents of the head of the Samarkand uezd administration); "I-22"

(documents of the head of Kattakurgan uezd, Samarkand region); "I-23" (documents of the head of Skobelov uezd, Fergana region); "I-36" (documents of the mayor of Tashkent); "I-46" (Name); "I-47" (Administrative documents of the Governor General's educational institutions); "I-469" (Tashkent city fair committee documents); "I-471" (business documents of the Department of Economic Relations of the Turkestan General Governorate); "I-473" (documents of the Tashkent City Department of Agriculture). According to the archival information, Indian citizens first came to Central Asia through Afghanistan, then Iran and Turkmenistan, but due to obstacles and difficulties on these roads, they entered by rail after their initiative was allowed to transport goods on the Caspian Railway. Also, in the middle of the 19th century, Central Asia became a field of political and economic competition between Russia and the British Empire, and the issue of Central Asia aroused great interest in Russian historiography. As a result, several works on this issue appeared, which served as a unique source for studying the history of peoples and tribes in Central Asia. Among them, Nebolsin's *Ocherki torgovli Rossii s Sredney Aziey*, Kostenko's *Puteshestvie v Bukhara Russian Mission* (1870), and Pashino's *Turkestansky Krai* (1866) can be mentioned.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

The social structure of Indian settlements in Turkestan at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century consisted of several layers - a merchant class engaged in wholesale trade, usurers, servants, and doctors. Most of the Indians living in Turkestan were economically developed immigrants, but among them, there were also poor Indian servants. In 1875, 36 Muslim Indians living in Tashkent were servants of their fellow tribesmen, while 5 more Indians lived in poverty¹¹. The main occupation of Ramdas Kishnu, who lived in Samarkand in the 1870s, was farming and engaged in gardening. Besides horticulture, Gupalsinh was also a master carpenter and tailor¹². Handicrafts, particularly jewellery were common among the Indians of Central Asia. Indian jewellers named

Dilbar Marvari and Kabli Shahvakh lived in Tashkent¹³. In the 1890s, Samanmal Chutmaliev, a silversmith in Tashkent, was also involved in the trade, some of them were great jewellery experts¹⁴. Bayarji, who lived in Bukhara in the 1890s, controlled the trade of all precious stones sold or bought in Bukhara¹⁵. Among the Indians who came to Turkestan, there were book editors, school teachers, and even doctors. In the 1880s, an Indian named Balm Mahal practiced medicine, at first he was forbidden to practice medicine, but after he treated a high-ranking Russian official, he was not prevented from doing so. In 1916, an Indian named Harir opened a shop in Chorjoi market, declared himself a doctor, and started selling various medicines¹⁶. Most of the Indians living in Turkestan knew Russian language. Nukra Buta Sinh, who worked in Tashkent in the 1870s, knew Russian language very well¹⁷. Neki Puran-Sinh, who lived in Samarkand, knew Russian language. In 1878, at the age of 32, Neki Puran Sinh attended Russian schools and read many Russian books¹⁸. In 1877-78, 16-year-old Mansak from India studied with the children of Russian officials at the primary school in Kattakurgan made it possible to go, seek help from Russian doctors and used other services¹⁹. The stay of Indian immigrants in Central Asia had a positive effect on the development of Russian language. In the 1890s, the Russian military authorities took the initiative to learn Urdu²⁰. In 1895, Lieutenant Vegornitsky was sent to the city of Bukhara, where Indians, who knew more Urdu, lived. Vegornitsky was sent by the Government to India for 10 months in 1896 to learn the Urdu language²¹. In the same year, Staff Captain Gilfarding came to Bukhara to learn Urdu language. Gilfarding hired a teacher from Peshawar to teach him oral and pronunciation skills as well as learn Urdu grammar from an English manual. In addition, Gilfardin's frequent visits to Indian caravansaries and conversations with local Indians helped him learn Urdu faster. Later, in 1897-1900, some Indians worked here as representatives of the practical course, after the opening of officer courses in oriental studies, which were trained by officer translators. In 1903, on the recommendation of the Russian consul in Bombay, Indian pilgrim Riyazuddin was invited as a teacher²².

Although there is not much information on the history of trade and economic relations between the two countries, most of the information is preserved in the state central archives in Uzbekistan. The documents of the "I-471" fund belonging to the caravanserai, market and economic offices are a valuable source of trade and economic relations between Central Asia and India in the 19th and 20th centuries. In addition, information about trade relations between the two countries has been preserved in the documents of the Central Asian State Economic Administration's Tashkent department. Some information about the trade of India and Central Asia is given in the 1865 city trade summary volume and the 1867 city trade data. According to customs documents and trade reports, tea, indigo, kisiie, porcelain, copper vessels, Kashmir scarves, leather shoes, rice, coral, pepper, ginger, nails and many other products were brought from India to Central Asia during this period. According to Petrovsky, 120 different products were imported from India during this period²³. Among the products brought from India to Central Asia, tea was considered the most popular. The quality of the blue and black tea varieties imported from India was very high and could even compete with Chinese teas. Therefore, in 1870, 2,800 poods of blue and black tea were brought to Samarkand from India. According to the Tashkent fair committee, 37,000 pounds of tea were brought from India to Turkestan in 1874. During this period, there were 10 tea factories in Samarkand, and 3 of them were owned by Indians²⁴. In 1887, there were 10 large trading settlements of Indians in Turkestan, and they were mainly engaged in grain trade. Indians engaged in trade in the cities of Turkestan mainly lived in caravansarais. They traded in 2 caravanserais in Bukhara called "Saray Karshi" and "Saray Hind". Besides, Indians lived in the caravanserai located in the central market in the old part of Tashkent. In places where there were no caravanserais, Indians lived in groups and formed Indian communities.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES OF INDIANS

The Indians who lived in Turkestan were not separated from each other. They remained in close contact with each other. In the Muslim cities of the East, a stable association of Indians, often engaged in trade or other activities and originating from the same city, region, or country, was formed. These associations were formed before the colonization of Central Asia by Russia and were organized in order to collectively protect their interests in the difficult and changing conditions of the Central Asian Khanates. Although there is no detailed information about whether Muslim Indians joined these associations or not, it can be assumed that the religious conflicts among the Indian immigrants in Turkestan were not so deep. According to P.I. Poshino, the Muslim members of the Kashmiri embassy who came to Tashkent in 1865-1866 lived in Indian caravanserais²⁵. Information about the ethnography of Indian citizens is also interesting. In 1972, G.D. Dmitriev writes in the journal *Strany narody Vostoka* about the social life of Indian citizens in the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century: "Indians are distinguished from the local population by their appearance. Along with their anthropological appearances, their clothes also differ. A square black headdress and low-heeled leather shoes distinguished them from the local population. In the cited written information, it is written that no large buildings were built by Indian citizens, and that Indian houses did not differ from the ideas of local residents of that time. There are many written sources about the religious ceremonies held by Indian citizens in Turkestan. It is possible to show some information about the holidays held by those who followed them. For example: in one of the caravanserais in the city of Tashkent, there is a temple, the interior of which is decorated with colorful paintings, and an idol picture (icon) of the goddess Kali is kept there. All the "molelnyas"-synagogues had their own priests, and they changed like their compatriots. For example Baba Nachaldasov is appointed to replace Ibyaumal Hirirama, who is returning to his homeland"²⁶. In 1872, the Russian historian A. Khoroskhin observed the life of Indians. According to him, "Each of the Indians used their own dishes and spoons and did

not even give them to their relatives. Even if a piece of coal was taken from the hearths of representatives of other religions, even if it touched their dishes, it was considered haram"²⁷. Such a situation may have been formed by the existence of the existing caste system in India. The following information about the ethnography of Indians in Turkestan is also interesting. Written sources report on the relations of Indian citizens with the local population, they can be divided into two parts. First: "Indians have established very good, trusting relations with the inhabitants of the area where they live, and participated in festive events. Their traditions - for example, washing with water poured over them every morning, "omovenia" according to Russian sources, were carried out regardless of the weather conditions. In the 1880s, Sufi-Ralesu from Andijan had another such purification room in the caravan palace called "kupalnya" in Russian sources. Second: In the ethnography of Indians in Turkestan, a peculiar and mysterious aspect was that they liked the dead person in their traditions. Due to different evaluations by the local population, the general governor's official conducts this ceremony in the evening under special police control, which is distinguished by the local population as a mysterious event". The famous Russian scientist E. Eversman reports that in the 1880s, sacred cows were kept in Bukhara, just like in India.

In the archival documents, the district judge of Kokand city gives information about the holiday held in honor of God Krishna on February 25 (March 9), 1879, as well as about the holidays held in Bukhara mirshabi Karshi, which experts say were held in honor of "Lakshmi". Russian researcher N.M. Lykoshin wrote about the celebration of "Diwali" in Tashkent²⁸.

LOCAL AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD INDIANS

The history of interaction between Indians in Turkestan and the administration of the Governor General of Turkestan is significant in that it sheds light on the relations of the Governor General with other nations. The Indian citizens who lived in Turkestan lived in caravanserais and as

communities for the purpose of class protection. Almost all Indian communities in Turkestan were ruled by elders. When necessary, the elder conducted legal relations with representatives of Bukhara and Russian colonialists on behalf of all the Indians of the region. Elders could make various suggestions to Indian communities and carry out the instructions of authority subject to existing laws and regulations. The main task of the Indian elders was official relations with the Russian authorities and the protection of the interests of the Indians. In carrying out these tasks, the elders had to consult their teammates and take their opinions into account. The elders were not appointed by the Bukhara or Russian authorities, they were elected by the Indian communities. This system of governance was fundamentally different from the governance of a local nation. The existence of Indian communities in Central Asia and the existence of elders indicates the existence of strong social ties among Indians. The existence of such contacts is confirmed by the Russian and Bukhara administrations' practice of contacts between immigrants from India. The elders who led the Indian communities in Central Asia also dealt with issues such as establishing legal relations with Turkestan and the colonial administration, managing the community's internal order, and distributing the inheritance of deceased Indians. Each Indian settlement had its elders, before whom Indian communities in the country were led by officials appointed by local authorities. The property of Indians who died in Turkestan was first handed over to the treasury of the Emir, and later such restrictions were removed and given to the heirs with the instructions of the members of the society. The testimony of community members played a key role in the distribution of inheritance. For example, Nanuyu and Senduru, brothers of Indian Jamenda who died in Tashkent in 1877 (they lived in Bukhara), were given legal aid only after the testimony of local Indian community members. In the distribution of the inheritance of Bai Tilla Marwari, a large businessman and merchant who died in Tashkent in 1876, his heir Rubchent Chibaldasov had a certified document from the colonial administration and the British administration in India, but the testimony of the local Indian communities was required²⁹. Although the local Indian communities

testified that the inheritance of a deceased Indian did not always go to the heir, there were also cases of opposition to this. The archive of the Koshbegi of the Bukhara Emirate contains information about the right of inheritance to land properties of Indian citizens who lived in the territory of the Emirate.

- 1) if the deceased Indian had no heir or was not identified, his assets and account book were confiscated in favor of the emirate.
- 2) if there was an heir of the deceased Indian, but there was no document about his claim to the inheritance, this inheritance was sold to the heir at its price.
- 3) if the Indians claimed an Indian citizen as the heir and he claimed the inheritance, the Indian communities testified in his favor, and the claimant substantiated the legality of his claim based on the Shari'ah to get the inheritance, the inheritance was subject to investigation and verification.
- 4) if there was no witness to confirm the heir of the deceased Indian, after mutual agreement, the original price of the relevant property and debt book was determined, and the right to purchase it was given to the person claiming the inheritance³⁰.

Indians in the region did not enjoy all rights enjoyed by the natives. The treatment of Indians and Jews was harsher than the natives and other nationalities living in the country. For example, the Russian government did not grant bail to Indians imprisoned for trivial crimes. Considering that Indians lived as a community, the imprisonment of a member of the community could lead to the destruction of the Indian caste system and the loss of local customs. Also, the prohibition of Indian citizens in the country to live in places other than those not designated before the occupation of Central Asia by Russia, was not only related to the places of residence of Indians (caravans), but also to the security and religious traditions of Indians.³¹ Indians later began to have more private homes and began to leave the caravansarai.

CONCLUSION

The activities of Indian citizens in Turkestan in the 19th-early 20th centuries, reflect upon the existence of economic relations between the two countries. Most of the Indian citizens who came to Turkestan during this period came for trade. The activities of Indian citizens in Turkestan were important not only in the development of trade relations between the two countries, but also in the development of cultural relations. Their activities had a positive effect not only on the culture of the Indian and Turkestan peoples but also on the cultural relations between the representatives of the Russian colonial administration in the country.

REFERENCES

1. Dmitriev, Heliy. *Indian immigrants in Central Asia at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries*. 1965. p. 82 ;"On Russian-Indian political relations at the beginning of the 20th century." *Proceedings of Tashkent State University*, no. 287, p. 4; *History of the Indian colonies in Central Asia (the second half of the 19th - the end of the 20th century)*. *Countries and peoples of Vastok*. XII. 52 p.
2. *Etnicheskiy atlas Uzbekistana*. Tashkent. 2002. pp 96-97.
3. Nizomiddinov, Najmiddin. *Buyuk Boburiylar (XVI-XIX asr)*. Tashkent. 2012. p.3.
4. Nizomiddinov, Ilyos "O'rta Osiyoning chet el sharqi bilan munosabatlari". O'zbekiston SSSR davlat nashriyoti. Tashkent: 1961. pp.12-13.
5. Levy, Scott. *The Indian diaspora in Central Asia and its trade, 1550-1990*. Brill. 2002.p.108.
6. Joshi, Nirmala. Responses to Non-Traditional Threats & Reconnecting India and Central Asia. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program- A joint Transatlantic Research and Police Center.2010. p.24.
7. Warikoo, Kulbhushan. *Central Asia and Kashmir. A Study in Political, Commerical and Cultural Contacts*. *Central Asian Survey*, oxford, Vol.7, No.1, 1988. pp. 63-83.; Warikoo, Kulbhushan. *The Transhimalayan trade of Ladakh*. 1995.; Warikoo, Kulbhushan. *Trade relations between Central Asia and Kashmir Himalayas during the dogra period, 1846-1947 Cahers d'Asie Centrale*, Tashkent. Paris. Nos.1-23,1996. pp. 113-124; Warikoo, Kulbhushan. *Eco-Cultural Heritage of Kashmir*. *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 1999, pp.39-49.
8. National Archive of Uzbekistan, Fund I 126, list 1, work 93, National Archive of Uzbekistan, Fund I 1, list 34, work 714, p 1-2.
9. CSARU, Fund I 36, list 1, work 3691, p 24.
10. CSARU, Fund I 45, list 1, work 530, p 1-2.
11. CSARU, Fund I 1, list 4, work 120, p 1.
12. CSARU, Fund I 5, list 1, work 1655, p 13.

13. CSARU, Fund I 1, list 34, work 1344, p 60.
14. CSARU, Fund I 1, list 34, work 3326, p 10.
15. Ayniy, Sadrididin. Buxoro. M.1957. Vol. 3. p.64.
16. CSARU, Fund I 5, list 1, work 1655, p 13.
17. CSARU, Fund I 1, list 16, work 1001, p 2.
18. CSARU, Fund I 5, list 1, work 2595, p 6-8.
19. *Obzor Ferganskoy oblasti za 1917 g*, Novyy Margelon. 1889.
20. CSARU, Fund I 19, list 1, work 4601, p 8.
21. CSARU, Fund I 3, list 2, work 35, p 29.
22. CSARU, Fund I 2, list 2, work 166, p 137.
23. CSARU, Fund I 2866, list 1, work 12, p 2.
24. CSARU, Fund I 2866, list 1, work 12, p 3.
25. Poshino, Peter. *Turkestansky kray v 1866 g*. SPb. 1866.
26. CSARU, Fund I 1, list 31, work 261, p 26.
27. Xoroshxin, Alexandr. Samarkand. *Turkestanskie vedomosti*. 1872. No. 44.
28. CSARU, Fund I 2866, list 1, work 10, p 49.
29. CSARU, Fund I 36, list 1, work 1477, p 18.
30. CSARU, Fund I 3, list 2, work 35, p 29.
31. Mikhailov, Mikhail. *Zametki o torgovykh poshlinax, Turkistanskie vedomosti*. 1880. No. 48.

EMPIRE AND MEDICINE IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1865-1917: A COMPARISON WITH BRITISH INDIA

SANOBAR SHADMANOVA and AKMAL BAZARBAEV

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how and to what extent the Russian Empire put into practice the European type of medicine in Turkestan in 1865-1917. Furthermore, we compare this process with British India. People of Central Asia had been using folk medicine for treatment since ancient times. In some cases, knowledge of folk medicine was passed from generation to generation through oral information and experiences, while some doctors left their knowledge and experiences in writing. This tradition continued in the region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In these years, European medicine entered Central Asia as a competitor to folk medicine. The Russian Empire initially tried to form a system of medicine for medical services to soldiers in Turkestan, and the spread of European medicine among the population was later carried out by the initiative of doctors.

Key words: Turkestan, medicine, the Russian Empire, India, the British Empire, doctor, hospital, gender, colonialism.

INTRODUCTION

People of Central Asia have been using folk medicine for treatment since ancient times. In some cases, knowledge of folk medicine was passed from generation to generation through oral information and experiences, while some doctors left their knowledge and experiences in writing. This tradition continued in the region till late 19th and early 20th centuries.¹ However, in these years, European medicine entered Central Asia as a competitor to folk medicine.

The late 19th-early 20th centuries imperial newspapers provide

information on how many women, children or men were treated during one year by the hospitals and clinics in Turkestan opened by the colonial administration.² Each hospital or outpatient clinic was presented as a separate case. Through this information, medicine established by the colonial administration spread rapidly in the region and achieved success. On the other hand, in the last years of the Russian Empire, the local *jadid* periodical press continued to emphasize that Turkistan needed a doctor.³ This indicates that the colonial administration and the local society evaluated the existing level of medicine differently. In order to assess whether the medicine brought to Turkestan by the empire was successful or not, it is necessary to analyze what kind of hospitals were opened in the country and by whom, as well as the activities of doctors.

In the second half of the 19th century and early 20th century, significant changes took place in the daily life of people of the region. These were associated with the introduction of new knowledge and technologies into the life of the population. One of them was related to the spread of early modern European medical knowledge and the formation of a system of institutions related to the field of medicine in Turkestan. European medicine was introduced to Turkestan by the orders of the colonial administration, but the administration itself did not always participate in this process. Some believe that the Russian Empire initially tried to form a system of medicine for making medical services for soldiers in Turkestan, and the spread of European medicine among the population was later carried out at the initiative of doctors.

This article, explores how and to what extent the Russian Empire integrated the European type of medicine in Turkestan in 1865-1917. This paper analyzes the opening of hospitals in Turkestan and the activities of doctors who served in them. Research in the history of medicine does not examine the development of medicine and the emergence of medical techniques, but the role of medicine in the life of society, related views, ideas and their implementation in practice. These issues have been studied more in the case of British India. We will do a comparative analysis of Central Asia and India in order to understand the similarities and

differences in how the empires introduced their existing medicine to Asian countries.

ESTABLISHING HOSPITALS IN TURKESTAN

The first European medical institution in Turkestan was opened in 1868. It was mainly intended to provide medical assistance to military personnel and was called the Tashkent military infirmary (*lazaret*).⁴ In 1869, a neurology department with 50 beds was opened under this military infirmary. In 1870, it was transformed into a second-level Tashkent military hospital with 415 beds.⁵ At its early step, the military-medical hospital also served the population. Later, with the opening of the city hospital and outpatient clinic, the attendance of general population stopped. In early 20th century, public servants were admitted here, as well as patients at the request of the police. In such cases, the Tashkent City Duma was bearing the costs of the patients. 15 rubles per month for lower-level officials and 18 rubles for officers were allocated for treatment in this hospital.

In 1860s-1870s, medical services for the population in Central Asia developed very slowly. In 1876, as in 1867, one doctor and two feldshers⁶ (paramedico) provided medical assistance to all residents in the “new” city of Tashkent.⁷ Since the 1880s, hospitals began to be opened in cities for the residents of Turkestan. Taking into account the conditions of that time and the mentality of the population, separate outpatient clinics for women and children and separate clinics for men were opened.⁸ But gradually, when necessary, women turned to the outpatient clinic opened for men and asked for medical help, and women not only used the services of female doctors but also the help of male doctors.

In the 1880s, the head of the city of Tashkent informed the military governor of Syrdarya province about the need for a female doctor.⁹ In 1883, on the initiative of female doctors, the first hospital for local women and children was established in Tashkent. From 1883 to 1893, that is, in 10 years, 24,747 patients visited it 48,185 times.¹⁰ In 1907, 30,700 patients addressed to this outpatient clinic¹¹, which is more than the number of

patients treated in 10 years. Only female doctors served in the hospital. Women and children who sought help were provided free care, including medicines, water treatments, simple surgery, and dressings free of charge. The colonial administration assigned female doctors not only to provide medical care to local women but also to penetrate into the hearts of Muslim women. In particular, it was the responsibility of female doctors to work among women and influence their minds in the Muslim society.

Later, hospitals were opened for the population in other parts of the country. After 1885 such hospitals appeared in Turkestan cities such as Khojand, Andijan, Margilan, Namangan and Kokand.¹² Some doctors in Turkestan received patients in their houses in order to provide medical service.¹³ People also called doctors to their houses for taking treatment for women patients.¹⁴ Also, during this period, local people who had medical knowledge opened hospitals to provide medical services to the population. For example, in 1886, in Qatortrak quarter of Tashkent, Muhammad Yusuf Mulla Zyoyev opened a hospital providing free healthcare for men.¹⁵ From 1886 to 1899, 99,887 people visited this hospital 250,372 times.¹⁶ In 1907, 19,980 patients received medical care from this clinic.¹⁷

On the other hand, the country still did not have a special inpatient hospital for the population. In 1886, the head of the city of Tashkent, A. Ilinsky, in his appeal to the Governor General of Turkestan, emphasized the need to establish a city hospital. But the hospital was not opened due to the lack of funds in the colonial administration. Only in 1891, a city hospital was opened for the treatment of diphtheria. In 1892, when cholera spread in Tashkent city, it was turned into a cholera department.¹⁸ Later it became a hospital for infectious diseases.

These hospitals operated in buildings that were not adapted for medicine. Only in 1898, for the first time, a special building for a hospital was built in Tashkent. In 1901, a city hospital that covered 95-bed place was opened in it. A therapist, surgery, women's and infectious diseases department worked there. The city Duma supported the city hospital financially.

By 1900, a second outpatient clinic was opened in the Beshyogoch part of Tashkent city to provide medical assistance to local women and children. It was headed by doctor A.N. Predtechenskaya in 1900-1908. In 1904, this hospital was moved to the Shaikhontohur quarter of the city. In the year of establishment, the outpatient clinic served 8,000 patients, and later their number increased to an average of 25,000 patients per year. Only 10 percent of the visitors to this hospital were men and the rest were women and children.¹⁹

In 1896, residents of the country could be treated at the Red Cross Turkestan Benevolent Hospital. In 1910, 1 doctor, 15 nurses, and 10 schoolgirls worked here. In this hospital, inpatient treatment and surgery could be performed for a certain amount of money. In addition, places for inpatient treatment began to be opened in the previously opened outpatient clinics. In 1901, a surgical department with 4 beds was opened for this purpose in the men's outpatient clinic in Shaikhontakhur, and by 1905, the number of beds increased to 8. In one year, 80 to 120 patients were treated there. Since 1905, 4 beds were reserved for inpatient treatment in women's and children's outpatient clinics in the old part of Tashkent city. By 1909, 44 people used inpatient treatment in outpatient clinic No. 1, and 19 of them were treated because of childbirth.²⁰ In 1909, the number of beds in outpatient clinic No. 2 increased to 15, and the number of inpatients in one year was 120.

In early 20th century, several private hospitals were established in Turkestan. These hospitals were opened mainly on the initiative of a certain doctor. In 1908, doctor A.N. Predtechenskoy opened the first private women's hospital in Tashkent. It was designed for five seats, and it was possible to increase it to 12 seats. During the first year, 220 women were treated in this hospital and most of them were in childbirth. The daily cost of inpatient medical care was 3 rubles. Patients paid 25 to 40 rubles for an eight-day treatment. Another doctor M. Gorenstein who worked in Turkestan, opened a gynecology hospital in Tashkent. This hospital had 4 places for different treatment and 6 places for childbirth. By the 1910s, private hospitals began to open in other cities of Turkestan. One of them

was opened in 1914 in the city of Kokand. This hospital was organized by doctors Ch. Norvilla and N. Kachhoev. The hospital provided medical services for pregnant women. In addition, it was designed to treat all diseases except infectious diseases.²¹ In early 20th century, the reputation of private hospitals surpassed that of public hospitals. We can understand this from the number of doctors working there. For example, in 1911, a total of 48 doctors worked in Turkestan. When 18 of them worked in state hospitals, other 30 doctors preferred to work in the private sector.²²

DOCTORS BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND SOCIETY

The colonial administration sent doctors who studied at the medical universities of the Russian Empire to serve in Turkestan. Doctors working in Turkestan can be conditionally divided into two groups. The first group included doctors who were sent to work in military hospitals, and the second group included doctors who were sent to provide medical services to the population. The mission of the doctors sent to Turkestan to provide medical services to the soldiers and the population distinguished from each other. The doctors of the first group were sent to provide medical services to the soldiers in the military units located in the region, while the doctors of second group were supposed to provide medical care to the women and children in Central Asia. These differences are especially evident when studying their activities as individual cases.

Almost all doctors who were sent by the Russian Empire to work in the military hospitals in Turkestan were educated at Saint-Petersburg medical universities or the medical faculty of Kazan University. There are many similarities in their activities. Most of them first served in the central parts of the Russian Empire and then were sent to Turkestan. It seems that the empire had a certain system of sending military doctors to border lands. One can consider this issue in the case of the military doctor Suvorov Ivan Petrovich who was sent to Turkestan.

Suvorov Ivan Petrovich was born in 1828 in the Tver province of the Russian Empire. After graduating from secondary school in Tver, he

entered the Imperial Medical and Surgical Academy in Saint-Petersburg in 1849 and graduated in 1854. After graduation, I. Suvorov was sent to the military unit located in the Pridunay province. He served as an assistant doctor in a military-medical hospital. On February 22, 1857, he was transferred to the Orenburg military hospital as an intership doctor. With the establishment of the Turkestan region, I. Suvorov started working as a senior doctor in the region. On October 1, 1867, he was appointed assistant military medical inspector of Turkestan military district. On February 10, 1874, he began to work as a district military-medical inspector, and for 24 years, until his resignation, he performed this task.²³

In the sources, more information is found about doctors sent to provide medical services to the population than about “military doctors”.²⁴ This was because the doctors of the first group worked mainly in military hospitals, and the doctors of the second group worked in hospitals open to the public. This is the first aspect of the matter. Secondly the doctors who provided medical services to the population had more interaction with the colonial administration. Because they often faced various shortcomings to carry out their activities. In order to solve these problems, doctors usually turned to the Governor-General of Turkestan, military governors of regions or city dumas for help. Most of these doctors served in the country in a certain field of medicine. In other words, they had a narrow specialization, they served the country in their direction and were interpreted in the sources as the initial initiators of those directions. Here, it is appropriate to consider the activities of some doctors who worked in medical institutions in Turkestan as a case study.

Muhammad-Khanafi Alyukovich Batirshin is interpreted as the first city doctor in Turkestan.²⁵ He was the first doctor working in Tashkent, the largest city in Central Asia. M. Batirshin was born on June 27, 1833 in Sterlitamak district of Ufa province. He studied at the medical faculty of Kazan University. In 1868, M.Kh. Batirshin was sent to the General Governorship of Turkestan as a district doctor.²⁶ In 1866, he was appointed a doctor of Tashkent city by the General Military-Medical Administration of Turkestan. According to the Regulation of 1867, the medical staff in

Tashkent consisted of a city doctor and a midwife.²⁷ In other words, during these years, he alone provided medical services to the entire population of the big city. He fought infectious diseases as a city doctor. M.Kh. Batirshin emphasized the need to prepare a brief guide to the population about the ways of the spread of cholera and measures to fight against it.²⁸ In the same way, he introduced the population to the prevention of diseases in the periodical press of Turkestan.²⁹

Every year, the colonial administration sent a certain number of medical workers from Turkestan to the Medical Academy in Saint-Petersburg for training.³⁰ At the same time, the colonial administration worked to prepare medical specialists from among the local population. Zeynab Abdrakhmanova was considered the first local female doctor in the region who studied and worked in the field of European medicine. She was born in Tashkent on November 20, 1881. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, one of the urgent problems was the training of local women as medical workers in Central Asia. In early 20th century, the Governor General of Turkestan awarded scholarships to 10 girls to study at the Saint-Petersburg Women's Medical Institute.³¹ One of the recipients of this scholarship was Zeynab Abdrakhmanova. In 1902-1908, she studied at the Saint-Petersburg Women's Medical Institute. After graduation, Abdrakhmanova was appointed as a doctor at the medical ward in Khanabad village of Tashkent district, Syrdarya province.³² For several years, she served as a district doctor, paramedic and paramedic-midwife in a rural medical district in Syrdarya province.³³ During this period, she managed the district hospital that was designed for six seats. She was also tasked with carrying out smallpox vaccination and training specialists from the local population. In the colonial period, each medical section provided medical services to approximately 84,000 residents.³⁴ In 1910-1911, Zeynab Abdrakhmanova worked as a district doctor in Kurgantepa, Andijan district, Fergana province.

Some doctors served in certain regions of Turkestan, and their activities were connected with the medical history of that region. Petr Fokich Borovsky worked only in Tashkent and Kazamir Mikhailovich

Aframovich in Samarkand.³⁵ Therefore, when talking about them, it is necessary to talk about their activities in that province or city. For example, P.F. Borovsky moved to Tashkent in 1892 and was appointed as the director of the city's military hospital. His career as a doctor began in Tashkent. He served as the head of the military hospital laboratory in Tashkent and took an active part in the fight against cholera. In case of suspected intestinal disease, he examined it in the laboratory, identified cholera and introduced it to doctors. At the suggestion of the City Duma, he headed the building opened for typhoid patients. In early 20th century, he worked as a consultant surgeon at the city hospital in Tashkent. In 1903-1904, he trained in hospitals in several European cities. In 1904-1909, he further expanded his surgical activities in Tashkent. In 1909, P.F. Borovsky was sent as a consultant to the Uyazdov Military Hospital in Warsaw, where he managed a 250-bed surgical department. However, a year later he resigned from the military court and returned to Tashkent. Another doctor M.I. Slonim who worked in Turkestan, writes about P.F. Borovsky's return to Turkestan: "Turkestan could not live without you, and he could not live without Turkestan, because in 4 years several doctors worked instead of P.F. Borovsky, but none of them could fill this gap".³⁶ P.F. Borovsky also served as the chairman of the sanitary commission of the Tashkent city duma. In 1915, at the meeting of the Tashkent City Duma, he emphasized the importance of providing the population with clean drinking water to prevent infectious diseases and suggested speeding up the construction of water pipelines and sewers.³⁷

EMPIRE AND MEDICINE IN BRITISH INDIA

In the first half of the 19th century, the medical system in India was male-oriented, with the army, prisons, and hospitals being run by men. Direct intervention in the health of Indian women began in 1868 with the passage of the Communicable Diseases Act by the state. This law was developed to protect the health of the military and was introduced to reduce the spread of communicable diseases.³⁸

In the 1860s and 1870s, American, British, and Canadian female doctors opened hospitals and dispensaries in India, trained midwives and nurses, and treated hundreds of female patients.³⁹ Systematic and regular medical care for Indian women began in 1885 with the founding of the Indian Women’s National Medical Association. Doctors Mary Charlib and Elizabeth Bilby met Queen Victoria and reported the lack of medical care for Indian women. The Queen asked Princess Dufferin to investigate the matter. In August 1885, a special fund was established at the initiative of the princess, to train female medical staff for hospitals and private medical homes and to provide medical assistance to women and children.⁴⁰ In 1886, a hospital run by female doctors for women and children was opened in Bombay.⁴¹ In 1888, there were 50 Western doctors working in India, and they made up 2/3 of the total female doctors in the region.⁴²

NUMBER OF PATIENTS ATTENDING THE CALCUTTA HOSPITAL AND DISPENSARY IN 1885⁴³

	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Children</i>	<i>Total</i>
1885	154 406	39,789	69 432	263 627
1884	—	36 398	64 338	—
1883	—	35,822	62 937	—
1872	—	36 274	43 719	—

The table above shows that among the patients visiting hospitals in India, women were more than men. There were several reasons why Indian women were the preferred choice in providing medical care. First, a large number of medical personnel could be trained by them. Second, it was very convenient for patients-clients to communicate with healers of their own nationality. Third, unlike Western female doctors, local health workers were willing to provide medical services in small towns, districts, and villages. Besides, the service was cheaper so that ordinary people could use the service.

Until almost the 20th century, men were stereotyped as doctors and women as nurses. Edith Pechy Phipson, who was one of the first to come

to India, suggested the establishment of a female medical staff. This section was originally intended to include only Europeans, and later Indians as well. He called for women's salaries to be equal to those of men, but the issue remained open.⁴⁴

In early 20th century the women's hospital in Bombay saw increase in the number of female medical staff, the number of female patients who made up 20% of the patients in the hospitals. Most of them graduated from Grant Medical College. The Association of Women Medical Officers of India, founded in Bombay in 1907, was one of the first to demand equal rights for women medical officers with men and demanded new posts. However, their demands were not fulfilled. This association aimed to improve professional communication and protect the interests of female medical workers. To do this, it was decided to work in three ways, including the holding of meetings, the provision and distribution of medical literature, and the publication of a quarterly journal. This association was the predecessor of similar associations established in the USA and the United Kingdom.⁴⁵ In general, medicine, which formed the basis of the civilizing mission, served as a means of control and domination.

CONCLUSION

Why did empires bring imperial medicine to colonial territories? In the case of Central Asia and India, it can be seen that the Russian Empire and the British Empire, brought the medicine to protect the health of their soldiers stationed in these countries and to provide them with medical services. This type of medicine was introduced to Central Asia by opening hospitals and sending doctors from the empire to the region. These hospitals were initially opened only for the treatment of the military. In turn, residents working in state institutions gradually began to come to these military hospitals. Later, in order to prevent or treat various infectious diseases in the country, the colonial administration began to pay attention to the protection of public health. The doctors who were sent to Turkestan had to make other inquiries about the health of the population.

We cannot say that the Russian Empire successfully introduced European medicine to Turkestan. Despite the fact that European medicine was brought to the country by order of the colonial administration, more medical specialists than colonial officials participated in the process. The archives have preserved the opinions of medical workers about the shortcomings of the field in the country and how they could be solved. It can be understood from these archives that the doctors did not have enough conditions to fully implement their activities. As a result, although there was medical knowledge, there was lack of material to use it in practice.

Secondly, if we compare the number of doctors working in Turkestan with the number of doctors in other regions of the Russian Empire, we can see a big difference. In the 1890s, 25 doctors and 60 paramedics worked in the three provinces of the Turkestan, namely Syrdarya, Samarkand and Ferghana. At that time, 243 doctors and 399 paramedics - a total of 642 medical workers - served in Tula, Vyatskaya and Kharkiv provinces of the Russian Empire. In other words, one doctor provided medical services to 135,500 people in Syrdarya region, 97,100 people in Samarkand, 100,000 people in Ferghana when one doctor served to 18,000 people in Tula province, 35,000 people in Vyatskaya province, and 21,000 people in Kharkiv province. The same picture is observed in the number of paramedics. One paramedic provided medical assistance to 31,300 people in Syrdarya region, 34,000 people in Samarkand, and 30,770 people in Ferghana, while as one paramedic offered medical service to 7,512 people in Tula province, 13,880 in Vyatskaya province, and 7,150 in Kharkiv province of the Russian Empire.⁴⁶

There are more similarities than differences in the medical policies of the Russian Empire in Central Asia and the British Empire in India. This was primarily because both empires introduced their own medicine to the colonial territories to provide medical care to their military. They did this by opening hospitals and sending medical personnel. Available sources show that the initiative and efforts to provide medical services to the population were mostly carried out by doctors.

REFERENCES

1. Shadmanova, Sanobar. 2017. "Health practices: 19 th century to early 20 th century", in: *Encyclopaedia of women and Islamic cultures*.
2. For example, see: "Otchet o deyatelnosti ambulatornoy lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnyx genshchin i detey v g. Tashkent". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 16, 28 (1885); "Otchet o deyatelnosti lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnyx genshchin i detey v g. Samarkand in 1885". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 16 (1886); Poslavskaya A. "Otchet o deyatelnosti lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnyx genshchin i detey za 1885 god". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 16 (1886).
3. "Tabibga muhtojlik". *Sadoi Farghona*, 55 (1914).
4. A military infirmary is a military medical institution that is part of military units and is designed to provide medical assistance to military personnel. In the Russian Empire, lazarets were formed in early 18th century when the regular army was created, and were used alongside the concept of "hospital" to provide medical services. By the 19th century, these concepts began to differ.
5. Dobrosmyslov, Aleksandr. 1912. *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoyashchem. Istoricheskiy ocherk*, Tashkent, pp. 326-327.
6. Feldsher is the name of a medical professional who provided many medical services in the Russian Empire.
7. O'zbekiston Milliy Arkhivi (National Archive of Uzbekistan, hereinafter O'zMA), f. I-17, op. 1, d. 28928, l. 196.
8. See more about this issue: Shadmanova, Sanobar. 2019. "Meditsinskiye praktiki Rossiyskoy imperii na okrainakh: Meditsinskaya pomoshch' musul'mankam v Turkestane (1870-1917)". *Obshchestvo, gender i sem'ya v Tsentralnoy Azii*, No. 1, pp. 10-22.
9. O'zMA, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 3149, l. 2.
10. Poslavskaya, Mandelshtamm. 1894. *Obzor desyatiletney (1883-1894) deyatelnosti ambulatornoy lechebnitsy dlya zhenshchin i detey v Tashkente*. Tashkent, p. 94.
11. "Uspekhi russkoy meditsiny sredi tuzemtsev". *Turkestanskiy kur'er*, 173 and 173 (1909).
12. "Otchet o deyatelnosti lechebnits dlya tuzemnykh zhenshchin i detey v g. Samarkand v 1885". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 16 (1886); "Otchet o vrachebnoy deyatelnosti Khodzhenstskoy ambulatornoy lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnykh zhenshchin i detey (za 29. IX. 86 po 1. I. 88)". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 44 (1888); "Izvlachenie iz otcheta ambulatornoy lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnyx zhenshchin i detey v g. Andijane za 1888". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 46-48 (1889); "Izvlachenie iz otcheta ambulatornoy lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnyx zhenshchin i detey v g. Kokande za 1888". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 50 and 51 (1890); "Izvlachenie iz otcheta Margelanskoy ambulatornoy lechebnitsy dlya tuzemnyx zhenshchin i detey za 1891". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 9, 82, 86, 90 (1893).
13. O'zMA, f. R-2405, op. 1, d. 140, l. 33.
14. O'zMA, f. I-718, op. 1, d. 17, l. 64-73.
15. *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 19 (1886).
16. *O narodnom vrachevanii sartov i kyrgyz Turkestana*. Meditsinskaya pomoshch' inorodtsam Turkestana i ikh otnoshenie k russkim vracham, Saint-Petersburg, 1903, pp. 96-97.
17. "Uspekhi russkoy meditsiny sredi tuzemtsev". *Turkestanskiy kur'er*, 172 and

- 173 (1909).
18. O'zMA, f. I-37, op. 1, d. 451, l. 15.
 19. Dobromyslov, Aleksandr. 1912. *Tashkent v proshlom i nastoyashchem. Istoricheskiy ocherk*, Tashkent, p.336.
 20. *Ibid.* pp. 332-333.
 21. Shadmanova, Sanobar. 2017. "Meditsina i naselenie Turkestana: traditsii i inovatsii (konets XIX - nachalo XX vv.)." *Istoricheskaya etnologiya*, Vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 129.
 22. O'zMA, f. I-17, op. 1, d. 38010, l. 1-3.
 23. "K pyatidesyatiletнему jubilee I.P. Suvorova". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 12 (1904).
 24. For example, see: Sultonova, Gulchehra and Shadmanova, Sanobar. 2017. "Sources and methods: Central Asia: 18 th century to early 20 th century", in: *Encyclopaedia of women and Islamic cultures*.
 25. Shadmanova, Sanobar. 2014. "Pervyi gorodskoy doctor Turkestana M. Kh. Batyrshin : shtrikhu k portretu." *Ekho vekov*, No. 1/2, pp. 232-235.
 26. O'zMA, f. I-17, op. 1, d. 38111, l. 22ob.
 27. O'zMA, f. I-1, op. 12, d. 1741, l. 45ob.
 28. O'zMA, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 875, l. 18.
 29. Batyrshin, Muhammad. "Kak predokhranit sebya ot zabolevaniya sobachim beshenstvom, nazyvaemym u cheloveka vodoboyaznyu". *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 33 (1888).
 30. O'zMA, f. R-2405, op. 1, d. 140, l. 57.
 31. Makhmudov, M. 2015. *Istoriya meditsina i zdravookhraneniya Turkestana, Bukhary i Khorezma (1865-1924 gg.)*, Taraz, pp. 169, 176.
 32. *Rossiyskiy meditsinskiy spisok na 1909 god*, Petrograd, 1909, p. 479.
 33. *Svod zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii*, Vol. XIII. Kn. 5. Saint-Petersburg, 2012, p. 233.
 34. *Obzor Syrdarinskoy oblast za 1910*, Tashkent, 1912, pp. 172-178.
 35. About the doctors who worked in the regions of Turkestan, see: Shadmanova, Sanobar. 2019. *Turkistonda tibbiyot khodimlari va ularning faoliyati (XIX asr oxhiri – XX asr boshlari)*, Tashkent, 296 p.
 36. Lunin, Boris. 1962. *Nauchnye obshchestva Turkestana i ikh progressivenaya deyatelnost. Konets XIX - nachalo XX v.*, Tashkent: Izdatelstvo AN UzSSR, p. 268.
 37. *Turkestanskije vedomosti*, 173 (1915).
 38. Mukherjee, Sujata. 2005-2006. "Women oath Medicine in Colonial India: A Case Study Of Three Women Doctors." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 66, pp. 1183-1193.
 39. Mute, Maneesha. 1994. "The politics of gender and medicine in Colonial India: The Countess of Dufferin's Fund, 1885-1888." *Bulletin of the history of medicine*, Vol. 68, No. 1, p. 32.
 40. Mukherjee, Sujata. *op cit.*
 41. Ramanna, Mridula. 2008. "Women Physicians as Vital Intermediaries in Colonial Bombay." *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 43, No. 12/13, pp. 71-78.
 42. Mute, Maneesha. *op cit.*
 43. *Ibid.* p. 40.
 44. Ramanna, Mridula *op cit.*
 45. *Ibid.*
 46. Vasiliev, N. "Nasha obshchaya beda i kak pomoch ey". *Okraina*, 61 and 62 (1895).

ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

VLADIMIR PARAMONOV and LOLA AKRAMOVA

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the economic ties of the Central Asian and European Union countries since their establishment in 1991, their main trends, the nature of the activity of European financial institutions, projects and programs, volume and dynamics of trade in recent years. At the same time, some indicators of trade and economic cooperation between the Central Asian countries and the European Union, Russia and China are given. Tables and graphs are provided for greater clarity. The examination of key factors contributing to, or hindering, the strengthening of economic relations has led to conclusions and proposals for enhancing bilateral and multilateral ties.

Keywords: Central Asia, European Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, relations, trade, economy, communication, strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Relations between post-Soviet Central Asia and a uniting Europe began to develop in 1991. Despite its geographical distance, the European Union has managed to become one of the main trading partners of the Central Asian States, along with such important and geographically close countries as Russia and China.¹ It is also known that, since the collapse of the USSR, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has allocated some 14 billion euros to the countries of the region. (mainly loans and grants) to Kazakhstan - a little over 9.1 billion Euro, to Uzbekistan -

2.8 billion Euro², to Kyrgyzstan - 805 million euro, to Tajikistan - 842 million euro, to Turkmenistan - 317 million euro³. Overall, the economic relations between Central Asia and the EU are ambiguous and vary from one Central Asian state to another. Consider this from a country perspective and from the perspective of the main factors leading to strengthened or weakened linkages.

The article considers the economic ties of the Central Asian and European Union countries since their creation in 1991, showing the chronology of the development of economic ties, their main trends, nature of activity of European financial institutions, projects and programmes, volumes and dynamics of trade in recent years. At the same time, comparatively, some indicators of trade and economic cooperation between the Central Asian countries and the European Union are given.

KAZAKHSTAN

After the collapse of the USSR, the Republic of Kazakhstan almost immediately became the object of increased attention of a number of European countries, and then the entire European Union. Initially, the interests of the leading European states in Kazakhstan were related to global security issues: nuclear weapons inherited by Kazakhstan from the USSR and the procedure of their voluntary renunciation. It was only later, around the end of the 1990s, that economic issues, and more precisely, energy issues came to the fore due to the existence in Kazakhstan of significant reserves of hydrocarbons and uranium and, consequently, the possibility of their large-scale supply to Europe.

Kazakhstan itself after independence was also interested in the development of economic relations with European countries. Moreover, this interest remains today, which is largely due to Kazakhstan's multi-vector policy, which implies diversification of economic ties. As a result, the mutual desire for cooperation determined not only the high dynamics of the development of Kazakhstan-European economic relations, but also the fact that the EU is quite firmly established in the Kazakh economy.

Although the economic relations between Kazakhstan and the European Union are still quite high, in the short term the ties may weaken significantly.

Factors leading to the strengthening of economic relations

Considering Kazakhstan as a rather important supplier of energy resources, as well as some other raw materials, the European Union and European companies have occupied certain niches in a number of strategic sectors of the Kazakh economy. According to Prime Minister A. Mamin, in early 2020, “the volume of EBRD investments in Kazakhstan exceeded 9 billion: \$271 in finance, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, IT technologies and utilities sectors, as well as support for small and medium-sized businesses”.⁴


Moreover, the EU has established itself as one of the main trading partners of Kazakhstan. Moreover, until 2018, there was a trend of steady increase in the volumes of Kazakh-European trade (at least in monetary terms). While in 2016 the turnover amounted to about 21 billion dollars. In 2018, it increased almost 1.5 times and reached more than 34 billion dollars. However, it decreased significantly during 2018-2020, returning to 2016 levels (Table 1, Figure 1).

TABLE 1
TRADE OF KAZAKHSTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2016-2020), MLN. USD.⁵

<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade turnover</i>	<i>Supplies to Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Supplies from Kazakhstan</i>
2016	21123	4368	16755
2017	26325	4656	21669
2018	34253	5565	28688
2019	28500	5479	23021
2020	21098 (22141)	4841 (5196)	16257 (16945)

Note: In the period 2016-2019, data on trade volumes are based on data on trade volumes with the UK, so it was part of the EU at that time. For 2020, these consolidated data are shown only in brackets.

FIGURE 1. TRADE OF KAZAKHSTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2016-2020), MLN. USD.



For comparison, the scale of Kazakhstan-Chinese and Kazakhstan-Russian trade in 2020 was comparable: about 21 and 19 billion dollars respectively.

Simultaneously with the development of trade relations, the European Union focused on the involvement of Kazakhstan in European infrastructure programs, which also influenced many strategic directions of Kazakhstan in the following years. Since 1996, Kazakhstan has participated in the INOGATE programme, which has already had a strong impact on Kazakhstan. In 1998, Kazakhstan became a participant in another EU program - TRACECA. This program not only influenced the development of the transport sector of Kazakhstan, but also played a rather important role in the orientation of Kazakhstan's transport routes to the European direction.

It seems that Kazakhstan's acceleration of the construction of transport infrastructure within the conceptual framework of the TRACECA programme is largely due to the high interest of Kazakhstan in the development of economic relations with the EU. This is due both to the Kazakhstan government's need for western financial resources and technology, and to its heavy dependence on European oil markets, as well as (to a lesser extent) uranium.

Factors leading to weakening of economic relations

Despite the rather strong position of the EU in Kazakhstan, prospects

for further development of relations are subject to significant risks. In addition to the factor of external competition, the economic position of the EU in the Republic of Kazakhstan is extremely vulnerable, because European attention is focused exclusively on the issues of oil production and transportation. If the largest hydrocarbon fields (Tengiz and Karachaganak) reach a stage of decreasing production and/or new problems around the North Caspian Project, many companies of EU member states are likely to leave Kazakhstan. Such a scenario would mean a radical weakening of European influence.

In turn, Kazakhstan itself in economic terms so far is oriented mainly on its large neighbors - Russia (market for many types of agricultural products, electricity, uranium, coal, etc.) and China (the market for oil and uranium, and eventually for gas). In addition, there is quite a close economic interdependence between Kazakhstan and Russia, which is especially evident in the border areas of both countries. All this and much more objectively makes Russia and China key economic partners of Kazakhstan.

As a result, although the EU still has quite strong positions in Kazakhstan, nevertheless, prospects for further development of Kazakhstan-European economic relations remain in question. This is determined primarily by the lack of close interdependence between Kazakhstan and the EU.

European business is largely aimed only at the export of oil and uranium from Kazakhstan, as evidenced by the country's almost complete raw material orientation in trade with the EU. Given that the economic interest of the European Union is actually limited only to oil and uranium, the prospects for Kazakhstan-European interaction will be determined mainly by Europe's need for these energy carriers. Meanwhile, it is not a fact that in the future (especially in the long term) the EU will need oil and uranium supplies from Kazakhstan. In addition, there is now a trend in Europe to switch to so-called green energy. This implies a significant reduction in the consumption of hydrocarbon fuels.

On the other hand, the EU's demand for Kazakhstan uranium is

likely to decline in the future. The fact is that the EU already has such large uranium suppliers as Canada and Australia. In addition, the European states themselves are likely to continue not to make ambitious plans for the development of nuclear power (mainly for safety reasons). Thus, it is likely that European interest in oil and uranium from Kazakhstan will decline, or at least significantly, in the future.

It should be assumed that sustainable development of economic relations between Kazakhstan and the EU is possible only if the format of Kazakhstan-European economic interaction changes dramatically. First of all, this requires the political will of Kazakhstan to overcome the commodity orientation in trade with the European Union (as in trade with China). In addition, the European business itself should begin to show an order of greater interest in the development of the processing industries of the Kazakh economy.

KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyz-European relations began to develop immediately after the collapse of the USSR. In April 1992, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the European Commission. Kyrgyzstan attracted special interest from a uniting Europe primarily because, unlike other Central Asian countries, from the first days of its independence, it opted for democratic and liberal reforms.

Kyrgyzstan itself has traditionally demonstrated an interest in cooperation with the European Union and other Western countries, while taking for granted their humanitarian, financial and other assistance. Moreover, despite regular rotations of ruling elites and frequent upheavals in the highest echelons of power, Kyrgyzstan, as a rule, has always confirmed its commitment to the liberal democratic vector and loyalty to the West. Some changes in the Kyrgyz Republic's policy have taken place only in recent years due to a combination of factors, the most important of which are the deepening of the crisis in Russian-Western relations and high dependence of Kyrgyzstan on Russia and China. As a result, the

general background of Kyrgyz-European relations, as well as the nature of their economic ties are rather complex and contradictory.

Currently, Kyrgyz-European economic relations are significant only in terms of political assistance to the process of liberalization of the Kyrgyz economy. At the same time, the economic position of the EU itself is extremely weak, as is the presence of European business in this Central Asian country (especially in comparison with the positions of Russia and China, as well as the presence of business structures from these states). This is mainly due to the fact that the European Union does not have any important economic interests in Kyrgyzstan and therefore no large projects.

Factors leading to the strengthening of economic relations

The European Union has managed to occupy certain niches in the economy of the Kyrgyz Republic mainly by providing assistance in carrying out liberal reforms, as well as by providing finance for certain projects and items of expenditure. In the first half of the 1990s, EU's economic interaction with Kyrgyzstan was limited mainly to expert, consulting and technical support (within the framework of the TACIS programme) to accelerate the liberalization of the national economy. This in many ways determined the nature, including the speed and scale of the reforms initiated by Bishkek.

Kyrgyz-European contacts intensified even more during the second half of the 1990s, when the EU launched the Food Aid Programme in Kyrgyzstan which became a participant in a number of infrastructure projects, mainly under the auspices of TACIS, and since 2007 - under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Since 1996, almost simultaneously with the Food Aid Programme, the EU has gradually extended the INOGATE programme to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan soon joined another European programme, TRACECA.

In addition to the INOGATE and TRACECA projects, the EU has also financed (mainly under the aegis of TACIS and then DCI) various projects on environmental protection, natural resource management, agriculture, rural infrastructure, small and medium-sized businesses.

EBRD activities are also visible in Kyrgyzstan. According to the Minister of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic A. Kasymaliev, at the end of 2018, as a realization of EU program assistance over the past 20 years, it allocated to Kyrgyzstan more than 200 million. euro. These funds are aimed at structural reforms of social protection, agriculture and education. According to the EBRD, the total amount of financial resources provided to Kyrgyzstan by the Bank has reached 805 mln. Euro⁶.

In turn, Kyrgyzstan has always shown a very high interest in cooperation with the European Union in the economic sphere. Unlike other Central Asian countries, the proposed structural adjustment algorithms and schemes have received great attention in Kyrgyzstan. Hoping that the West's recommendations would lead to economic prosperity and the next fiscal tranches, the Kyrgyz leadership strictly followed the Western economic liberalization policies.

In this regard, it is symbolic and revealing that one of the priorities during the Askar Akayev presidency (1991-2005) for Kyrgyzstan was to join the WTO. Related EU negotiations with Kyrgyzstan were relatively easy and successful unlike the long and complex negotiations for the same with Russia and Kazakhstan. As a result, the political and advisory support of the EU and the West as a whole, as well as Kyrgyzstan's immediate compliance with all requirements, ensured the rapid (already in 1998) accession of Kyrgyzstan to this organization.⁷

Factors leading to weakening of economic relations

Although the impact of the EU on Kyrgyzstan is still strong (especially in terms of political and advisory support for liberal reforms), the results of the transformation of Kyrgyzstan (including as a result of experiments in the economy) proved to be highly contradictory for the state and society. All this, was accompanied by the EU's virtual lack of economic interests in Kyrgyzstan, the decline in recent years in the West's attention to Central Asia, and the simultaneous increase in Russian and Chinese attention to the region, This resulted in a steady trend of further weakening of the EU's economic situation in Kyrgyzstan.

Given that the disintegration of the USSR and the liberalization of the Kyrgyz economy led to the near-total destruction of industry and significant degradation of the country's agriculture, the economic interaction of the European Union and Kyrgyzstan is mostly limited to trade. While the EU has been an important trading partner for Kyrgyzstan for some time, the situation has changed significantly in recent years and trade volumes have been low (except for the rapid increase in the export of gold produced at the "Kumtor" field from Kyrgyzstan to the UK). Thus, during 2016-2019, the volume of EU trade with Kyrgyzstan increased almost 6 times, from 180 to 1156 million dollars, respectively. However, this dynamic growth is associated with the supply of gold from Kyrgyzstan. After the United Kingdom left the EU in early 2020, trade between the EU and Kyrgyzstan (excluding the indicated gold shipments) fell immediately to 241 million dollars (Table 2, Figure 2).

TABLE 2
KYRGYZSTAN AND EUROPEAN UNION TRADE (2016-2020), MLN. USD.


<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade turnover</i>	<i>Supplies to Kyrgyzstan</i>	<i>Supplies from Kyrgyzstan</i>
2016	180	117	63
2017	462	216	246
2018	921	171	750
2019	1156	225	931
2020	241 (1241)	197 (207)	44 (1034)

Note: In the period 2016-2019, data on trade volumes are based on data on trade volumes with the UK, as it was part of the EU at that time. For 2020, these consolidated data are shown only in brackets and for information.

In comparison, the scale of Kyrgyz-Chinese and Kyrgyz-Russian trade in 2020 was incomparably higher: 2.9 and 1.7 billion dollars respectively.

Outside of trade relations, economic relations between the European Union and Kyrgyzstan are not developing. For example, the design and investment activities of European companies do not take place in the Kyrgyz

FIGURE 2. KYRGYZSTAN AND EUROPEAN UNION TRADE (2016-2020), MLN. USD.



Republic at all, and the EU financial assistance mainly contributes only to the preservation of macroeconomic stability without solving the fundamental problems of the real economy. It is obvious that all this clearly does not compensate for the enormous damage caused by the destruction of the country's industry and agriculture as a result of the disintegration of traditional economic ties in the post-Soviet area, as well as market experiments on the Kyrgyz economy and management system.

TAJIKISTAN

Almost immediately after the dissolution of the USSR and the attainment of independence, the Republic of Tajikistan failed to maintain stability, plunged into a civil war (1992-1997), and after its end went through a rather difficult and long period of return to peaceful life. Therefore, even though Tajikistan had established diplomatic relations with many European countries as early as 1992, there was little interaction between the EU and Tajikistan during the 1990s. Until the beginning of this century, the European Union confined itself mainly to providing humanitarian assistance to this Central Asian country.

A significant boost to the development of Tajik-European relations was given during the US/NATO military campaign in Afghanistan. At the end of 2001, the permanent mission of Tajikistan to the European Commission was opened in Brussels, and the European Commission office

in Tajikistan began work a few years later - in 2004 (in 2009 it was transformed into the EU representation). However, even during the build-up of the military and political presence of the Western coalition in Afghanistan, the European Union failed to establish itself economically in Tajikistan. After the withdrawal of the US/NATO military contingent from Afghanistan, the EU's ability to strengthen its economic presence in Tajikistan became even more illusory.

In turn, Tajikistan itself has always been quite open to interaction with the West, relying primarily on its economic assistance. At the same time, Tajikistan has had a real chance to intensify and deepen its economic cooperation with Western states only with the beginning of the military anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the dynamics and scale of Tajik-European economic relations are quite small and do not have special growth prospects. Currently, Tajikistan's economic ties with the European Union are weak (especially in comparison with Russia and China).

Factors leading to the strengthening of economic relations

The European Union has managed to occupy certain niches in the Tajik economy through the direct financing of certain budget items, the development of trade relations and the implementation of a rather large project in the oil and gas industry. At the same time, until the end of the civil war in Tajikistan, the EU confined itself mainly to humanitarian assistance. In the period 1998-1999, the European Union succeeded in involving Tajikistan in a number of European infrastructures programmes. In 1998, Tajikistan became a participant in the TRACECA programme. About a year later, the EU succeeded in involving the republic in another European programme, INOGATE. A few years later, when the TRACECA and INOGATE programmes were launched in Tajikistan, Tajik-European economic cooperation intensified somewhat. This was largely due to the launching of numerous international reconstruction projects, including trade with Afghanistan, since 2001, as well as the formation of trans-Afghan communications. Later, with the launch of the DCI program in

2007, European funding became increasingly focused on supporting the agrarian sector of the Tajik economy.

Soon after the launch of the DCI, in 2008, Tajik-European economic relations received a fairly strong boost due to the arrival of the British-European oil and gas industry Tethys Petroleum Ltd. In 2008, Tethys Petroleum Ltd. started a project in Tajikistan on exploration of oil and gas sector “Bokhtar” (Khatlon region). Later in 2013, the French company Total joined the project. It is assumed that the “Bokhtar” site may have quite large hydrocarbon reserves.

In addition, the EBRD is currently quite active in Tajikistan. According to the head of the Bank S. Chakrabarti, the EBRD in early 2019 allocated to Tajikistan about 755 million projects in various sectors of the national economy.⁸By the end of 2021, EBRD financial resources in the country reached 842 million euros.⁹

In turn, Tajikistan itself traditionally shows high interest in the development of economic cooperation with the European Union. This is largely because Tajikistan is in dire need of external financial assistance. Moreover, the Tajik leadership seems to have counted on Western, including European, support for the implementation of large hydropower projects (e.g., the Rogun hydropower plant) as well as projects for the construction of electric grid to South Asia. Tajikistan also continues to place special hopes on the participation of companies from the European Union in projects to extract raw materials and, above all, hydrocarbons. Overall, although the EU’s economic influence on Tajikistan has become much more pronounced since 2001, there are no specific prerequisites for further growth.

Factors leading to weakening of economic relations

Despite the fact that in the first decade of the century, the European Union acquired certain positions in Tajikistan, in recent years they have clearly weakened. This is due both to purely political reasons (for example, reduced interest of the West in Afghanistan and Central Asia) and to the very low level of European economic presence in Tajikistan. It is also due

in part to the failure of the Tajik side to gain Western support for the Rogun hydropower project. Besides, prospects for industrial production of oil and gas in Tajikistan are still in question.


An important indicator of the already small scale of Tajik-European economic interaction is the state of trade. Despite a certain increase in its volume during 2016-2020, at the end of 2020 it amounted to only 239 million dollars (Table 3, Figure 3).

TABLE 3
TRADE OF TAJIKISTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2016-2020), MLN. USD.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade turnover</i>	<i>Supplies to Tajikistan</i>	<i>Supplies from Tajikistan</i>
2016	133	96	37
2017	185	139	46
2018	221	160	61
2019	167	137	30
2020	239 (242)	175 (178)	64

Note: In the period 2016 - 2019, data on trade volumes are given taking into account data on trade volumes with the UK, as it was part of the EU at that time. For 2020, these consolidated data are shown only in brackets and for information

FIGURE 3. TRADE OF TAJIKISTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2016-2020), MLN. USD.



For comparison, in 2020, the volumes of Tajik-Chinese and Tajik-Russian trade amounted to 1 billion and 839 million dollars, respectively.

In the future (at least in the near future), Tajik-European economic relations are likely to remain at their present level or even weaken. This is largely due to the small interest in Tajikistan from the West, especially after the military operation in Afghanistan.

TURKMENISTAN

Despite the fact that in 1992 Turkmenistan established diplomatic relations with many European countries, the real economic interest of the leading EU member states in Turkmenistan manifested itself only around the mid-1990s of the last century. This interest was and remains primarily connected with the study of possibilities to organize the supply of natural gas to Europe in circumvention of the territory of Russia and the formation of appropriate pipeline infrastructure in the Caspian Sea.

Overall, economic interaction between Turkmenistan and the EU is extremely weak (not only compared to China and Russia, but even with countries like Iran and Turkey). In the event that regular deliveries of natural gas (and/or liquefied natural gas) from Turkmenistan to Europe do not begin yet.

Factors leading to the strengthening of economic relations

Considering Turkmenistan as a potentially important and alternative supplier of natural gas to the European market, the European Union has managed to occupy certain niches in this strategic branch of the Turkmen economy. Thus, in the mid-1990s, individual European companies entered into projects for the development and exploration of gas fields on the Turkmen part of the Caspian shelf.

In addition to the INOGATE program, Turkmenistan is a de facto participant in the TRACECA program. However, Turkmenistan has not yet officially joined the Programme and signed the basic multilateral agreement for the development of the transport corridor "Central Asia - Caucasus - Europe". Nevertheless, Turkmenistan pays great attention to the issues of increasing the volume of freight transport along the above-

mentioned route, guided by its own priorities.

Another important project, which is also being implemented on the basis of the conceptual guidelines of the TRACECA programme, is the project of the Turkmenbashi international seaport, which was launched in 2018. The port is expected to significantly increase traffic flows along the “Central Asia - Caucasus - Europe” route.

In addition, the EBRD is quite visible in Turkmenistan. The EBRD offers a number of products and services for Turkmen entrepreneurs, including long-term financing directly to local private sector companies, as well as guarantees that will help borrowers access finance through local banks, partners and business consulting services. The Turkmen side holds regular meetings with EBRD representatives. In January 2021 alone, three meetings were held to discuss lending, investment and advisory services for private financial institutions and small enterprises, as well as the prospects for EBRD participation in infrastructure projects in Turkmenistan. According to the EBRD spokesman, the bank’s total investment in Turkmenistan since its inception (2008) to date amounts to 350 mln USD. In 2019, the EBRD signed six contracts with private Turkmen companies for a total of 11 mln Euros. The current portfolio of the EBRD in Turkmenistan in early 2021 was 85 mln USD. The total amount of financial resources allocated at the end of 2021 was 317 mln Euros.¹⁰

However, the key mechanism and main direction of economic relations is the Energy Dialogue, which takes place within the framework of the joint cooperation committee. Although the Dialogue itself is essentially political and declarative in nature, however, it largely determines the scope, depth and intensity of economic interaction in general.

In turn, Turkmenistan itself is showing growing interest in developing economic ties with the European Union. Most likely, this is because Turkmenistan has an increasing need to maintain access to the European oil market, and in future, it may also need access to the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market.

Apart from the interest in LNG deliveries to Europe, Turkmenistan

certainly expects the participation of European companies in the development of offshore deposits in the Caspian Sea, as well as hopes for the export of natural gas to Europe in the future. Overall, economic relations between Turkmenistan and the EU, at first sight, have some growth prospects. However, their future remains uncertain.

Factors leading to weakening of economic relations

The Turkmen-European economic cooperation is complicated by the persistence of disagreements over the observance of human rights in Turkmenistan and, to some extent, the specific external course of this Central Asian country: formally neutral, it's basically isolationist. Although this course was especially typical for the period of S. Niyazov's rule (1991-2006), during the presidency of G. Berdymukhamedov (2007-2022) there were no radical changes in Turkmenistan's foreign policy. Moreover, transport and communication isolation, lack of a stable economic basis for convergence, the fundamental incompatibility of the European and Turkmen models of development - all this and much more predetermine the extremely weak relations between the EU and Turkmenistan in all spheres, including economic.

Despite the fact that the European Union has, in a sense, managed to establish itself in the Turkmen economy, the European presence in Turkmenistan is still limited. Nevertheless, in terms of trade relations with Turkmenistan, the EU has been growing in recent years, and Turkmen-European trade turnover amounted to 0.8 billion in 2020 dollars (Table 4, Figure 4).


TABLE 4
TRADE OF TURKMENISTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2016-2020), MLN. USD.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade turnover</i>	<i>Supplies to Turkmenistan</i>	<i>Supplies from Turkmenistan</i>
2016	1731	1092	639
2017	1186	911	275
2018	639	502	137

2019	927	587	340
2020	832 (852)	358 (374)	474 (478)

Note: In the period 2016 - 2019, data on trade volumes are given taking into account data on trade volumes with the UK, as it was part of the EU at that time. For 2020, these consolidated data are shown only in brackets and for information purposes.

FIGURE 4. TRADE OF TURKMENISTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2016-2020), MLN. USD.



For comparison, Turkmen-Russian and Turkmen-Chinese trade turnover in 2020 amounted to 0.9 and 6.5 billion dollars, respectively. Moreover, China remains the main export destination of Turkmen gas. In general, the weakness of Turkmen-European economic relations is also due to the fact that the presence of European businesses in Turkmenistan is still limited mainly to participation in projects on the Caspian shelf.

Another reason for the volatility of the European Union's position in Turkmenistan is the uncertainty of prospects for the supply of Turkmen natural gas to Europe. This is due not only to political obstacles to the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, the unresolved status of the reservoir, the latent opposition of Russia and Iran, but also to the possible shortage of gas for the European market. As a result, there is a high probability that Turkmen gas will not reach the EU even in the long term. At the same time, outside the oil and gas industry, the interests of European business in Turkmenistan are extremely insignificant. The main reasons being that there are no other (besides hydrocarbons) raw materials important for the EU, as well as a difficult business climate: the closed

economy, the non-convertibility of the national currency, excessive state control over foreign companies.

In turn, Turkmenistan itself, although expressing a desire to develop economic cooperation with the European Union, seems to be more focused on China (and a number of other Asian countries), as well as in some ways Russia. This applies both to economic cooperation in general and to the oil and gas industry in particular.

This is evidenced not only by the dynamics and geography of Turkmenistan's international economic relations, but also by Turkmenistan's official position on the key issue of Turkmen-European relations - the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, lobbied by the European Union. Despite the fact that Turkmenistan declares its interest in the project, but in fact - evades any practical measures to accelerate its implementation. In particular, Turkmenistan expresses its readiness to supply gas only if a gas pipeline is built by someone up to the Turkmen border. This position is most likely due to the fact that Turkmenistan does not want to complicate relations with Russia and Iran opposing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project and/or is more interested in resuscitating the gas pipeline project "Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India" (TAPI). If TAPI is launched (for which it is planned to pump up to 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually), the feasibility of constructing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline may be lost by itself because of the already accurate shortage of gas to fill it.

As a result, the European Union has no significant economic influence on Turkmenistan, as well as the weakness and fragility of the EU's impact in the Turkmen economy predetermine the actual unwillingness of leading European States to pursue and maintain any more or less clear economic course towards Turkmenistan.

The strengthening of economic relations seems to be possible mainly if the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project is implemented. The fact is that the price of gas in the EU market is significantly higher than in the markets of China, Iran, other Asian countries and Russia. Consequently, in the case of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan will be extremely

interested in increasing the volume of gas supplies to Europe. Dependence on the European gas market (if at all) will force Turkmenistan to reckon with EU policy more than it does today.

Another important condition for the dynamic development of economic relations may be the entry of Turkmenistan into the European liquefied natural gas market. However, much remains to be done. Long-distance transport of LNG by road is unprofitable, and rail transport is only possible (theoretically) through Russia and/or Iran. In turn, the water arteries that Turkmenistan had previously planned to supply LNG to Europe also pass through Russia. Given the deterioration of relations between Russia and the European Union/West, the Russian Federation may hinder the transit of Turkmen liquefied gas, citing, for example, environmental hazards, fire and explosion, etc. Iran may do the same.

UZBEKISTAN

The Republic of Uzbekistan attracted the attention of a number of European States immediately after the collapse of the USSR. Official contacts with a uniting Europe began in April 1992 as a result of the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Uzbekistan and the European Commission. At present, the interest of the EU is still largely determined by understanding the significant role of Uzbekistan in the region and around it: high economic, demographic and military potential, the central position in the system of regional transport communications, etc. Moreover, with the arrival of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to power in late 2016, as a result of a fundamental review and significant activation of the country's foreign policy, as well as the beginning of a complex set of liberal reforms, there has been a tendency to intensify Uzbek-European economic relations.

Factors leading to the strengthening of economic relations

The European Union has managed to occupy certain niches in the economy of Uzbekistan. This was reflected primarily in the country's

involvement in a number of major infrastructure programmes, the entry of EU producers (mainly from Germany) into the Uzbek market, and the participation of European companies and banks in the implementation of individual projects. The collapse of the USSR did not cause a surge of economic interest in Europe. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has made serious and successful attempts to draw Uzbekistan's attention to various European initiatives. In 1996, Uzbekistan became a participant in the INOGATE programme. At the same time, Tashkent was chosen as the headquarters of the Central Asian Regional Coordination Office of the Programme. Two years later, in 1998, Uzbekistan joined another major European programme, TRACECA.

In parallel with the development of cooperation between INOGATE and TRACECA programmes, the second half of the 1990s saw the first signs of intensification of economic relations.¹¹ First of all, it resulted in quite active participation of European business in the implementation of a number of projects in the oil and gas and electricity sectors of Uzbekistan. In addition, some companies from Germany have taken part in the creation of small assembly plants in Uzbekistan for passenger buses and trucks, as well as certain types of medical equipment.

After the arrival of a new leader of Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoyev. EBRD activities have increased in the country. As a result of the cooling of relations in 2005, contacts between Uzbekistan and the EBRD were effectively frozen until 2017. At that time, the Bank was engaged only in support of the accumulated portfolio of investments, which at the beginning of 2018 was approximately 545 mln USD. The Bank is engaged in support of investments. However, since 2017, the EBRD has resumed activities in Uzbekistan, and in 2018 adopted its own strategy for Uzbekistan. At the same time, since 2018, the volume of financial investments of EBRD in Uzbekistan began to grow rapidly and in the period 2018-2020 increased to 1.85 billion USD. As of the end of 2021, the EBRD's financial resources in the country amounted to more than 2.8 billion Euros.¹²In the spring of 2021, Uzbekistan became a beneficiary of the special (generalized) system of preferences of the European Union (GSP+). In turn, Uzbekistan itself

has traditionally shown high interest in interaction with the European Union in the economic sphere. While relying on the development of processing industries, Uzbekistan still hopes for the activity of European companies and banks in terms of promoting the industrialization of the country.

Factors leading to weakening of economic relations


The instability of European positions in the Uzbek economy is primarily due to the EU's lack of long-term economic interests in Uzbekistan. Thus, the main economic interests of the European Union in Central Asia are related to hydrocarbons. However, in Uzbekistan (unlike Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), the EU has no similar interests and is unlikely to do so. The EU's presence in the Uzbek economy is noticeable mainly in the trade segment. And even within this segment, the EU is far inferior to Russia and China. Thus, in 2020, the trade between Uzbekistan and the EU amounted to 2.3 billion dollars. However, during 2016-2019 Uzbek-European trade turnover had some tendency to increase. But between 2019 and 2020, there was still a significant decline in trade (Table 5, Figure 5).

TABLE 5
TRADE OF UZBEKISTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2016-2020). USD MILLION.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Trade turnover</i>	<i>Supplies to Uzbekistan</i>	<i>Supplies from Uzbekistan</i>
2016	1615	1307	308
2017	1663	1506	157
2018	2535	2200	335
2019	2702	2513	189
2020	2395 (2515)	2171 (2145)	344 (250)

Note: In the period 2016 - 2019, data on trade volumes are given taking into account data on trade volumes with the UK, as it was part of the EU at that time. For 2020, these consolidated data are shown only in brackets and for information purposes.

FIGURE 5. TRADE OF UZBEKISTAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE PERIOD 2016-2020, MLN. USD.



In comparison, the volumes of trade of Uzbekistan with Russia and China in the 2020 amounted to 5.8 and 6.6 billion dollars, respectively. Although Uzbekistan continues to maintain a fairly high interest in economic interaction with the European Union, it is inclined to focus also on its various partners.

CONCLUSION

Following the collapse of the USSR, the economic relations of the five Central Asian countries and the European Union have been quite dynamic. Moreover, the European Union's economic ties with Kazakhstan and, in recent years, with Uzbekistan, have developed most sustainably and on a large scale, with Kyrgyzstan and only in some respects with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. At the same time, there are fundamental differences in the nature of the European impact on Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. While in Kyrgyzstan the EU used primarily policy and advisory instruments (to accelerate the liberalization of the economy), in Turkmenistan there was quite active participation of a number of European companies in the development of gas fields on the Caspian shelf.

In this context, trade remains the only link between the economies of the Central Asian states and the EU (particularly in the case of Kazakhstan). During 2016-2018, trade between Central Asian countries


and the EU increased by about 60%. However, in the following two years, it declined. The main causes are the global economic crisis, the quarantine response to the coronavirus pandemic, and Britain’s exit from the European Union. As a result of 2020, trade turnover decreased to the level of 2016 (Table 6, Figure 6).

TABLE 6
TRADE OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES
(2016-2020), MLN USD.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Trade turnover</i>	<i>Supplies to Central Asia</i>	<i>Supplies from Central Asia</i>
2016	24782	6980	17802
2017	29821	7428	22393
2018	38569	8598	29971
2019	33452	8941	24511
2020	24805 (26991)	7716 (8126)	17089 (18865)

Note: In the period 2016 - 2019, data on trade volumes are given taking into account data on trade volumes with the UK, as it was part of the EU at that time. For 2020, these consolidated data are shown only in brackets and for information purposes.

FIGURE 6. TRADE OF CENTRAL ASIAN AND EU COUNTRIES
(2016-2020), MLN. USD.



In general, the factors leading to the weakening of economic relations between Central Asian countries and the EU are clearly more important than the factors that lead to their strengthening. In this context, it seems

that it is the rehabilitation of the overland trade transit between Europe and Asia - the restoration of the Great Silk Road - that could and should become the basis for the development of mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Central Asia.

REFERENCES

1. Knodt, Michele; Urdze Sigita; Nodia, Ghia; Paramonov, Vladimir. *EU's Policy of Democracy Promotion: Strategies and Impact in Central Asia and the South Caucasus*. Nomos (Germany), 2018. 319 p.; Paramonov, Vladimir; Stokov, Aleksej; Abduganieva Zebiniso; Alshin S. With foreword by Peirouse S. *European Union Impact on Central Asia: Political, Economic, Security and Social Spheres*. New York: Nova Sciences, 2018. 127 p. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kasachstan/13414-20170614.pdf>
2. According to other data, at the end of 2018 "EBRD invested 9.3 billion euros in 61 projects in the economy of Uzbekistan". The EBRD allocated EUR 333 million of loans to Uzbekistan, for infrastructure rehabilitation and development. Internet edition of "Spot", 16.10.2018: <https://www.spot.uz/ru/2018/10/16/ebrd/> (date of access: 20.09.2021).
3. *Annual Review 2021*. EBRD: <https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/ebrd-annual-review-2021-russian.pdf?blobnocache=true> (date of access: 04.02.2023).
4. Over 27 years, EBRD has invested in Kazakhstan more than \$9 billion. *IA News Front (Kazakhstan)*, 02.03.2020: <https://news-front.info/2020/03/02/ebrr-za-invest-valiroval-vkazahstan-9rd> (address: 21.09.2021).
5. Calculations are made based on the data of the International Trade Center.
6. *Annual Review 2021*. EBRD: <https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/ebrd-annual-review-2021-russian.pdf?blobnocache=true> (date of access: 04.02.2023).
7. Negotiations were held with Russia from 1993 to 2011, and with Kazakhstan from 1993 to 2015. Russia became a member of the WTO in 2012 and Kazakhstan in 2015.
8. *EBRR videlit na proekta v Tadjikistane 290 mln dollarov*. <https://finance.rambler.ru/markets/42428036-ebrr-vydelit-na-proekty-v-tadzhikistane-290-mln-dollarov/> (date of access 21.09.2021).
9. *Annual Review 2021*. EBRD: <https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/ebrd-annual-review-2021-russian.pdf?blobnocache=true> (date of access: 04.02.2023).
10. *Ibid.*
11. Mirzokhid Rakhimov. Contemporary Central Asia: balancing between Chinese and trans-Asian Silk Road Diplomacy. In *China's Global Rebalancing and the New Silk Road*. Springer. Berlin, Germany. 2018. pp.123-124.
12. *Annual Review 2021*. EBRD: <https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/ebrd-annual-review-2021-russian.pdf?blobnocache=true> (date of access: 04.02.2023).

CENTRAL ASIA AND UNITED NATIONS: DYNAMICS AND NEW TRENDS

OYBEK ABDIMUMINOV

ABSTRACT

Central Asia is an important region in world politics. Historical, political, natural-geographical, ethno-demographic, intellectual, economic and cultural factors of the region have made it one of the main participants in international relations. By the last quarter of the 20th century, the countries of Central Asia actively entered the world economy and international relations. The UN has played an important role in the international recognition of the countries of the region and promotion of various international initiatives. The Central Asian countries tried to show themselves in global politics as active members of the UN. The UN has become a forum for these countries to express their views, implement national, regional and international initiatives, protect their rights, and study world experience in national development. Central Asian countries and the UN are interested in mutual cooperation, and over time dynamic growth and new trends began to emerge in mutual relations. Main directions of cooperation of the Central Asian countries with the UN, the results of such cooperation and the analysis of existing problems are discussed in the paper.

The article outlines the historic significance of the accession of the Republics of Central Asian region to the UN, its partnership in political, economic and social issues, global and regional initiatives of Central Asian States in the framework of the Organization. This article focuses on cooperation in Central Asia with the UN in solving regional problems. It analyzes issues of sustainable development and peace in Central Asia, the historical and cultural heritage and restoration of national values.

Keywords: Central Asia, United Nations, UNESCO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, cooperation, peace, nuclear-weapon-free zone, sustainable development, ecological problems, culture, science, education.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) is a unique organization of independent countries that have united in the name of world peace and social progress¹. The decisive role of the UN in various aspects of the activities of the world community within the framework of disarmament, peacekeeping, international legal, political, socio-economic, cultural and humanitarian agenda makes an indispensable contribution to strengthening multilateral cooperation and interaction among the member states of the Organization.

The countries of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became members of the UN on March 2, 1992 at the 46th session of the UN General Assembly. Representative offices of the UN were opened in the capitals of each republic, and representative offices of Central Asian countries were opened at the UN headquarters in New York. Today, there are more UN programmers, funds and agencies operating in Central Asia. The UN in Central Asian countries works as a collaborating agency to support national reform efforts². The countries of Central Asia eagerly want the region to be nuclear-free and their neighbor Afghanistan to be a settled zone. As such, relations established between Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan and UN have a heavy task of making the region safe, secure and prosperous.

UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, UNDOC, UN Department of Information and Social Relations, UNIDO, UN Volunteers Program, UN World Bank, UN Food Organization (FAO) and other specialized organizations are operating in Central Asia. The countries of the region have ratified more than 70 international human rights treaties of the UN, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

In the 90s of the 20th century, significant work was done on the issues of declaring Central Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone, fight against the illegal circulation of narcotics, and solving the problem of Afghanistan by peaceful means³. Between the countries of Central Asia and the UN, large-

scale projects on international and regional security, problem of sustainable development, as well as socio-economic, political, ecological, cultural and scientific-educational issues have been implemented⁴. Today, the scope of cooperation is expanding.

The first forum in which the delegation of Kazakhstan participated as a full member of the UN was the 47th session of the UN General Assembly held in the fall of 1992. President N. Nazarbayev gave a speech at this and other sessions of the UN General Assembly. The main international initiatives of Kazakhstan promoted within the UN include: convening a council on cooperation and confidence measures in Asia; establishment of the Central Asian peacekeeping battalion (Centrazbat) under the auspices of the UN; formation of a fund under the formula "one plus one" for UN peacekeeping efforts: restoration of the Aral Sea and Semipalatinsk ecological disaster zones, etc. At the initiative of Tajikistan, a Resolution was adopted to declare 2003 as the International Year of Freshwater, after which the UN Secretary-General established an advisory council on water resources and sanitation. Tajikistan also took the initiative to announce the tenth anniversary of the international movement "Water for Life", which began on March 22, 2005, and this day is celebrated as International Water Day. In 2010, a new resolution of the UN General Assembly – "International Year of Water Cooperation – 2013"⁵ was adopted by consensus. At the initiative of Turkmenistan, in 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution "Reliable and stable transit of energy carriers and its role in ensuring sustainable development and international cooperation"⁶.

In his speech at the 48th (1993) and 50th (1995) meetings of the UN, the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov drew attention of the world community and UN member states to the problems of regional security, peace and sustainable development. During these meetings, the President of Uzbekistan paid attention to the ongoing problems of regional security of the Central Asian countries and environmental destruction. Tashkent emphasized that security and peace in the region were connected with military operations in Afghanistan, and if there was no peace in

Afghanistan, there would be no peace in Central Asia.

On October 24, 1995, at the special session of the General Assembly dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, Uzbekistan made some proposals to ensure regional security and cooperation of the Central Asian countries: organizing a UN seminar on security and cooperation in Central Asia; declaring Central Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone; establishment of the UN regional commission on cooperation in the fight against the illegal circulation of narcotics in Central Asia; and finally, the establishment of a special commission on the island problem. These issues are relevant not only for Central Asia, but are considered the most important in the world community. "Only by ensuring the mutual understanding and cooperation of states in certain regions, especially in the regions that are called "hot spots" today, it is possible to determine the ways to achieve peace and stability in the whole world".

In order to consider these issues on a global scale, a conference on security and cooperation issues in Central Asia was held in Tashkent on September 15-16, 1995 with the direct support of the UN Secretary General. Members of the UN Security Council (USA, France, England, Russia and China) and 20 international organizations participated in the Tashkent meeting. A number of regional and global issues were discussed at the Tashkent meeting. Implementation of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) idea required long and hard work by the Central Asian countries and the "nuclear five" countries, as well as the relevant structures of the UN. On February 28, 1997, the leaders of five Central Asian countries signed the Almaty Declaration unanimously supporting the initiative to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone at a meeting held in Kazakhstan. This document created an atmosphere of political confidence in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. Since then, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) has acquired the character of a comprehensive regional initiative that represents the collective will of all five countries of the region and the people living in them.

In 1997, the international conference "Central Asia - a nuclear-weapon-free zone" was held in Tashkent. This international conference

was attended by authorized representatives of the UN, OSCE, IAEA, OIC, as well as more than 50 countries. The circle of international partners for security in Central Asia is constantly expanding at the Tashkent Forum. The Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, sent a congratulatory letter to the participants of the conference and confirmed Central Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons.

Uzbekistan's proposals to achieve ecological and socio-economic stability as a basis for the safe development of the region are widely supported. Among the major international initiatives of Uzbekistan, which are widely recognized and supported, the idea of creating the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia holds a special place. President I.A. Karimov stated at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly on September 28, 1993: "The reality of the modern world is that one country's security cannot be ensured at the expense of another country, regional security cannot be separated from global security problems. Based on this, Uzbekistan is in favor of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, implementation of effective actions and extension of the period of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons....Uzbekistan is in favor of declaring the Central Asian region a nuclear-weapon-free zone"⁸.

UN Department for Disarmament and International Atomic Energy Agency experts actively assisted in the development of the draft agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. A number of working meetings of the Regional Expert Group of the Central Asian countries on the development of the Treaty on the CANWFZ were held in Geneva, Bishkek, Tashkent, Sapporo and Samarkand. On September 27, 2002, the first draft of the Treaty was agreed in Samarkand, which was submitted for consideration to the countries of the "nuclear five". At the seventh meeting of the Regional Expert Group, held on February 7-9, 2005 in Tashkent, the common position of the countries of the region on the text of the Treaty was agreed upon, taking into account the proposals and comments of the nuclear powers, the IAEA and the UN Department of Legal Affairs. The text of the Tashkent Statement was circulated as an

official document of the Security Council and the 59th session of the UN General Assembly⁹. Eventually the Treaty on the CANWFZ was signed by the states of the region on September 8, 2006 in Semipalatinsk. Uzbekistan was the first among the countries of the region to ratify the Treaty on the CANWFZ on May 10, 2007. The Treaty entered into force on March 21, 2009 after it was ratified by all other states of the region¹⁰.

Since the last quarter of the 20th century, one of the biggest security issues in Central Asia is the problem of Afghanistan. Particular attention of the world community was attracted by the initiatives of the Head of Uzbekistan, designed to put an end to the many years of bloody war in Afghanistan, which brought great disasters to the Afghan people and became a source of serious threats to the entire region. Back in 1993, at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, Uzbekistan called on the world community to actively contribute to solving the problem of Afghanistan. In 1995, at the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, Uzbekistan came up with the idea of imposing an international arms embargo on Afghanistan and proposed a model for creating a coalition government to achieve national reconciliation in this country.

On the constructive initiative of Uzbekistan and with the support of the UN, a group "6+2" was organized (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, China, plus Russia and the USA). The first meeting of the group took place in 1997 in New York and the second - on July 19-20, 1999 in Tashkent. At the Tashkent meeting, a declaration was adopted on the "Basic principles for resolving the Afghan conflicts by peaceful means." On October 22, 1999, in the UN General Assembly, the Chairman of the Security Council stated that the issues of Afghanistan can be resolved peacefully and he supported the basic principles of the Tashkent Declaration.

In 2001, the President of Uzbekistan addressed the UN Secretary General with a proposal to include the issue of the demilitarization of Afghanistan on the agenda of the Security Council. At the NATO/EAPC summit in Bucharest in 2008, Tashkent proposed to resume the activities of the Contact Group in the new 6+3 format with the aim of jointly seeking

a political settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan, reducing the level of conflict potential in this country and providing it with coordinated economic assistance. Peace and security will only be established in Afghanistan with international assistance in the development of the country's economy, coordinated by the UN¹¹.

On June 10, 2017, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres paid an official visit to the Central Asian republics. In different years, the leaders of Central Asian countries gave speeches at the sessions of the UN General Assembly and put forward various important initiatives. At the initiative of the new President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in November 2017, in cooperation with the UN, an international conference was held in Samarkand on the topic "Central Asia: One Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity". On the issues of peace and sustainable development in the region, the high-level Tashkent international conference on the topic of "Peace Process, Security Cooperation & Regional Connectivity" held on March 27, 2018 was of great importance in this regard.

Uzbekistan became a full member of the UN Human Rights Council for the first time in history. In particular, in 2017-2023, at the initiative of Uzbekistan, 6 international resolutions of the UN General Assembly were adopted.

RESOLUTIONS INITIATED BY UZBEKISTAN

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name of Resolutions</i>	<i>Adopted year</i>	<i>Comment</i>
1.	"Strengthening of regional and international cooperation to ensure peace, stability and consistent development in the Central Asian region" ¹²	2018	UN Resolution A/RES/72/283
2.	"Enlightenment and religious tolerance" ¹³	2018	UN Resolution A/RES/73/128
6.	"Sustainable tourism and sustainable development in Central Asia" ¹⁴	2019	UN Resolution A/RES/74/214

4. "The Aral Sea region a zone of ecological innovations and technologies" ¹⁵	2021	UN Resolution A/RES/75/278
5. "Strengthening interdependence in Central and South Asia" ¹⁶	2022	UN Resolution A/RES/76/295
6. "Strengthening the role of parliaments in accelerating the achievement of sustainable development goals" ¹⁷	2022	UN Resolution A/RES/77/159

COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

The problem of the Aral Sea is not only a regional problem of Central Asia, but is also one of the global problems. The Aral Sea problem is the biggest catastrophe of the 20th century. The problems of the Aral Sea arose and took on rampant proportions in the 60s of the 20th century as a result of the thoughtless regulation of the large transboundary rivers of the region - the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, due to the flow of which the Aral in the past annually received about 56 cubic meters km of water. The significant growth of population living here, the scale of urbanization and intensive land development, and the construction of large hydro technical and irrigation facilities on the watercourses of the Aral Sea basin, without taking into account environmental consequences, created the conditions for the drying up of one of the most beautiful reservoirs on the planet. In fact, during the lifetime of one generation, the whole sea perished, the process of environmental degradation continues, turning the Aral Sea region into a lifeless desert. Over the past 50 years, the total flow of rivers into the Aral Sea has decreased to an average of 12.7 cubic meters. km, or by almost 4.5 times. The area of the water surface of the sea has decreased by 8 times, and the volume of the water mass has decreased by more than 13 times. The water level, which was at an absolute mark of 53.4 m until 1960, decreased by 29 m. The salinity level increased by more than 13-25

times and exceeds the average level of mineralization of the World Ocean by 7-11 times.

Uzbekistan came up with an initiative at the UN: to create a special commission and organize an international conference on this issue led by the UN. The impetus for discussion of these problems was the meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in March 1993 in the city of Kyzyl-Orda. The second meeting of the Heads of State took place in January 1994 in the city of Nukus, and the third meeting took place in March 1994 in Dashoguz. On September 20, 1995, the Declaration of the States of Central Asia and international organizations on the problems of sustainable development of the Aral Sea basin was adopted in Nukus. After that, in February 1997, a meeting of the heads of five Central Asian states was organized in Almaty with the participation of UN representatives. At this meeting, it was decided to improve the organizational structures for solving the problem of the Aral Sea, the composition of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea and, on its basis, a mobile Executive Committee was formed.

At the UN Millennium Summit in New York on September 8, 2000, Uzbekistan proposed to create a Council on the problems of the Aral Sea under the auspices of the UN Environment Program in order to promote international cooperation in the field of environmental safety.

An important role in improving the environmental situation in the Aral Sea region was played by the international conference "Problems of the Aral Sea, their impact on the gene pool of the population, flora and fauna and international cooperation measures to mitigate their consequences", held in 2008 in Tashkent at the initiative of Uzbekistan with the support of the UN. The action plan developed at this conference formed the basis of the third Program for rendering assistance to the countries of the Aral Sea basin for 2011-2015. The countries and population of the Aral Sea region highly appreciate the serious attention given by the UN and personally by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to the search for solutions to global environmental problems, including the issues of overcoming the consequences of the Aral Sea catastrophe. One clear

evidence of this was the visit of the UN Secretary-General to the Aral Sea region on April 4–5, 2010, which confirmed the global nature of the Aral Sea crisis and the need to mobilize the efforts of world community to resolve it. Following his visit to the region, the UN Secretary-General called the death of the Aral Sea “one of the most serious environmental disasters in the world” and stated that the fight against its consequences is “the collective responsibility of the whole world and not just the countries of Central Asia”.

On October 28-29, 2014, the city of Urgench hosted an international conference “Development of cooperation in the Aral Sea basin region to mitigate the consequences of an environmental disaster”¹⁸. Its goal is to mobilize the efforts of the world community to implement programs and projects aimed at improving the environmental and socio-economic situation in the Aral Sea region, as well as further development of international cooperation to reduce the negative consequences of an environmental catastrophe. It was attended by representatives of 24 international and regional organizations, financial institutions, such as the UN, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), The UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy For Central Asia (UNRCCA), The International Center for Groundwater Resources Assessment (IGRAC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), The World Bank (WB), The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), scientists and experts in the field of ecology, climate change and water management from 26 countries. This international conference once again drew the attention of the international community to the problems of the Aral Sea zone and the entire Aral Sea basin, as well as to focus the efforts of all interested parties in solving existing environmental problems in the region.

The countries of Central Asia should approach the solution of environmental problems in the region based on the study of international experience and the development of broad cooperation within the framework of the UN. In this regard, it would be appropriate to open a

center for the analysis of water and environmental problems in Central Asia under the UN in Tashkent.

In 2021, on the initiative of Uzbekistan, a multi-partnership trust fund for human security was established for the Aral region. Thanks to the support of the UN Secretary-General, the multi-partnership Trust Fund¹⁹ for the Aral Sea began to operate under the auspices of the UN. Projects with a total value of more than 3 billion dollars have been developed and are being implemented on the island. The Multi-Partner Human Security Trust Fund for the Aral Sea region will serve as a unique single platform for uniting international donors communities' efforts and mobilization of their resources within the assistance framework to the Aral Sea region by implementing complex measures directed towards the improvement of the ecological and socio-economic situation in the Aral Sea region. The Fund's Program Strategy is built on the UN Human Security Concept, in turn, based on ensuring that people are protected from serious and widespread risks and situations by empowering their resilience. In this context, it is the most optimal and effective mechanism for mitigating risks and overcoming the negative consequences of the environmental crisis of the Aral Sea²⁰.

CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION

Central Asia, one of the oldest cradles of human civilization, is a remarkable region with a rich history, vibrant cultural heritage, magnificent landscape, vast natural resources and a highly educated population. The countries of Central Asia are actively cooperating with UNESCO, one of the 15 UN specialized agencies for science, culture, education and information, This organization enriches countries with an integrated experience of world intellectual development, attaches them to the richest cumulative experience of mankind²¹.

Between 1992 and 1993, all five states had joined UNESCO, which first opened an office in Uzbekistan in 1996 which was headed by Michael Barry Lane until 2007. UNESCO's interest in Central Asia became evident

after the implementation of the “East-West” project (1957-1966), when it tried to consider the influence of historical factors on complex inter-ethnic relations. Scientific research carried out as part of the (*Silk Road – Road of Dialogues*)²² project (1987-1997) was to have an even greater impact, during which the “Steppe Road” expedition crossed all the five countries. Its results are still effective today.

A number of such institutes were established within the comprehensive research program “Silk Road - Road of Communication”. For example, the China Maritime Silk Roads Study Center in Fuzhou, China, the Nara Research Center for Silk Road Studies in Nara²³, Japan, and the International Research Institute of Nomadic Civilizations in Ulaanbaatar Mongolia²⁴, The Buddhist Information and Research Center in Colombo, Sri Lanka²⁵, and the Institute of Comparative Civilization were established in Taxila, Pakistan.

Since the independence of five major countries of the region in 1991 and their subsequent accession to UNESCO in 1992 and 1993, the Organization has intensified its cooperation with Central Asia. In 1994, the UNESCO Office in Almaty was established, which became the cluster office for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1996, UNESCO opened the National Office in Tashkent, which focused its activities mainly on Uzbekistan. The UNESCO Office in Tehran, established in 1996, covered activities in Turkmenistan²⁶.

Central Asia where the ancient trade routes that connected East and West passed and received the general name of the “Silk Roads” was the cradle not only of nomadic states, but also (and for long periods in its history) of a settled civilization, knowledge and culture. Thus it deserved the interest that UNESCO showed in 1992 in the “Expedition along the Steppe Road in Central Asia”, held within the framework of the project “Integrated Study of the Silk Roads - Roads of Communication”.

As part of the project, the UNESCO International Institute for Central Asian Studies (IICAS)²⁷ was established in Samarkand in 1995. The main goal of IICAS is to develop and support international interdisciplinary scientific cooperation in the study of the history and culture of Central

Asia. Currently, the Institute's member countries are Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the Republic of Korea, China, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey. Scientists from Japan, Germany, France, India, Mongolia, Russia and Great Britain also take part in the scientific programs of the Institute. This institute aims to study the history, culture, archeology, language, religion, traditions, national mentality of the countries of the Great Silk Road, especially the Central Asian region. Several monographic studies were published by the institute, and international projects were implemented. Six volumes of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*²⁸ published after 1992, provide a modern picture of the history and cultures of Central Asia, and the articles included in this publication were written by well-known experts.,

Based on the proposals of the Republic of Uzbekistan, under the auspices and with the participation of UNESCO, anniversaries were celebrated: 1994 - the 600th anniversary of Mirzo Ulugbek, 1996 - the 660th anniversary of Amir Temur, 1997 - the 2500th anniversary of Bukhara and Khiva, 1998 - 1225- the anniversary of Imam Bukhori and the 1200th anniversary of Ahmad Fargoni, 1999 - the 1000th anniversary of the epic "Alpamysh", 2000 - the 545th anniversary of Kamoliddin Behzod, 2001 - the 2700th anniversary of the creation of "Avesta", 2002 - the 2500th anniversary of Termez and 2700 Anniversary of Shakhrisabz, 2003 - 900th anniversary of Abduholik Gijduvoni, 2005 - 2700th anniversary of Karshi and 1000th anniversary of the Khorezm Mamun Academy, 2007 - 2750th anniversary of Samarkand and 2000th anniversary of Margilan, 2009 - 2200th anniversary of Tashkent²⁹.

The five states of Central Asia have acceded to the World Heritage Convention in the following sequence: Tajikistan in 1992, Uzbekistan in 1993, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in 1994, Kyrgyzstan in 1995. In the field of culture, cooperation with UNESCO is based on the preservation and development of the cultural (material and spiritual) heritage of Uzbekistan. The historical and cultural sites are included in the UNESCO World Heritage List.

UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE LIST IN CENTRAL ASIA

<i>No.</i>	<i>Name of Object</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Country</i>
1.	Itchan Kala in Khiva	1990	Uzbekistan
2.	Historical Center of Bukhara	1993	Uzbekistan
3.	Historical Center of Shakhrisabz	2000	Uzbekistan
4.	Samarkand - Crossroads of Cultures	2001	Uzbekistan
5.	Mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi	2003	Kazakhstan
6.	Petroglyphs of the archaeological landscape of Tamgaly	2004	Kazakhstan
7.	Sary-Arka - the steppe and lakes of northern Kazakhstan	2008	Kazakhstan
8.	Sulaiman-Too Sacred Mountain	2009	Kyrgyzstan
9.	Proto-urban site Sarazm	2010	Tajikistan
10.	Tajik National Park – Pamir Mountains	2013	Tajikistan
11.	Ancient Kunya-Urgench	1999	Turkmenistan
12.	State Historical and Cultural Park - Ancient Merv	1999	Turkmenistan
13.	Parthian fortresses of Nisa	2007	Turkmenistan
14.	Silk Road: the routes network of Changan-Tien Shan corridors	2014	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China
15.	Western Tien Shan	2016	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan

Ichon Kala in Khiva was the first UNESCO monument in Central Asia. UNESCO's interests here concern the safeguarding of historical architecture.³⁰ The cultural space of Boysun, as well as Shashmaqom, Katta ashula, Navruz and Askiya are included in the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. The Koran of Osman

(1997), The collection of manuscripts of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan (1997) and Archives of the Chancellery of Khiva Khans (2017) are included in the international list of the “Memory of the World”,³¹ program of UNESCO.

Also, the General Conference approved the inclusion of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the director and actor Sh. Aimanov (2014) and the 100th anniversary of the birth of the writer I. Yesenberlin (2015) in the UNESCO Calendar of Commemorative Dates and Events for 2014-2015. From Kazakhstan, the UNESCO calendar of memorable and anniversary dates includes: the 150th anniversary of the birth of Abai Kunanbaev, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Mukhtar Auevov, the 1500th anniversary of the founding of the city of Turkestan, the 500th anniversary of Muhammad Khaidar Dulaty, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Sabit Mukanov and Kanysh Satpaev. With the participation of the UN and UNESCO, the 2000th anniversary of Taraz, the 100th anniversary of Gabit Musrepov, the 200th anniversary of Makhambet Otemisuly, the 100th anniversary of Abylkhan Kasteev, the 100th anniversary of Alkey Margulan, the 100th anniversary of Akhmet Zhubanov were celebrated. In the UNESCO Calendar of Memorable Dates and Events for 2008-2009, the UNESCO General Conference included the 500th anniversary of the creation of the Kyz-Zhibek epic. In 2001, UNESCO approved the “Tentative List of Cultural and Natural Heritage Sites”³² submitted by Kazakhstan.

At the initiative of Kyrgyzstan, the 1000th anniversary of the epic “Manas”, the 3000th anniversary of the city of Osh, the 2200th anniversary of the Kyrgyz statehood were observed.³³ In 2008, Tajikistan celebrated the 1150th anniversary of the birth of the poet Abu Abdallah Rudaki, who is considered the founder of Persian classical literature and who was born in today’s city of Penjikent³⁴. Since the late 1990s, UNESCO and its offices in Tashkent and Tehran have been supporting the Ministry of Culture of Turkmenistan in the implementation of the World Heritage Convention, particularly in the areas of capacity building, conservation, cataloging and preparing for the successful inscription of sites in the World

Heritage List.

The large number of World Heritage Sites contributes to the attractive image and tourism potential of the country. They create conditions for tourism. However, there is serious threat to the monuments. For example, the tourist-human factor, urbanization, natural disasters, etc. World heritage sites in Central Asia are no longer immune from this scourge. The “historic center of the city of Shakhrisabz” from Uzbekistan is already at risk and is included in the List of World Heritage in danger³⁵. In the opinion of experts, the states on whose territory the monuments are located are formally accountable to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee for their preservation, but it seems not always effective. Representatives of the non-state sector could help in this: private individuals, NGOs, civil society. Such initiatives are practiced in many states, but are not widespread enough in the Central Asian countries³⁶.

CONCLUSION

The cooperation of Central Asian republics with the UN and its specialized agencies is of great importance for the successful implementation of socio-political reforms and sustainable development of countries. Within the framework of the UN, the countries of Central Asia actively participate in the discussion and solution of many security problems in the region, including security issues, nuclear non-proliferation, drug trafficking, and terrorism. Thanks to the efforts of the countries of Central Asia, the UN adopted a number of resolutions aimed at a peaceful solution to Afghanistan’s security issues. The republics are also transit countries for the delivery of humanitarian cargo to Afghanistan. The Central Asian Republics and the UN, within the framework of various institutions, including, first of all, UNESCO, have a broad partnership in the field of culture, education and the preservation of the rich cultural heritage of Central Asia. Humanitarian cooperation is an important aspect of national, regional and global sustainable development in the face of complex globalization processes. The countries of Central Asia can study and apply

world experience to develop digital economy, digital diplomacy, tourism and other areas within the framework of the UN. This will further increase the international image of Central Asian countries.

REFERENCES

1. Weiss, Thomas, Forsythe, David, Coate, Roger, Pease, Kelly-Kate. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics Revised and Updated with a New Introduction*. Eighth edition. UK. Routledge. 2019. 452 p.
2. *Central Asia: Issues, Problems, and Perspectives*. Jonboboiev, Sunatullo., Rakhimov, Mirzokhid., Seidelman, Reimund. (eds). Germany. Cuviller Verlag Gottingen. 2015. p. 138.
3. Mirzohid Rahimov. From Soviet Republics to independent states: Challenges of transitions in Central Asia. Perspective on Global Development and Technology. Brill. Leiden-Boston. Volume 6, no.1-3 2007. pp.291-312.
4. *The United Nations Development Programme in Central Asia*. United Nations Development Programme. New York. 2010. 34 p.
5. Wadlow, Rene. 2013: The International Year of Water Cooperation. *World Affairs*. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter (October-December) 2013), pp. 160-162.
6. *Turkmenistan and the United Nations: Partners for change*. UN in Turkmenistan. 2007. P. 33.
7. Karimov, Islam. *Ot regionalnoy bezopasnosti k globalnoy bezopasnosti. Po puti sozidaniya. Tom 4*. Tashkent. Uzbekistan, 1996, p 57.
8. Karimov, Islam. *Nasha tsel: svobodnaya i protsovetayushaya Rodina. Tom 2*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan. pp. 52-53.
9. Buranelli, Costa Filippo. *May we have a say? Central Asian states in the UN General Assembly*. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*. No. 5, 2014, p.137.
10. Abdimuminov, Oybek. Uzbekistan and the United Nations. *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*. Uzbekistan special. Vol.19, Nos.3-4, July-December 2015. p.191.
11. Olga Porshneva, Mirzokhid Rakhimov, Sergey Razinkov. *Historical and Legal Aspects of the SCO Formation and Institutional Development*. In *Shanghai Cooperation Organization: From Interaction to Integration? Exploring New Horizons*. Edited by Sergey Marochkin and Yury Bezborodov. Routledge 2022. p. 20. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003170617-3/formation-institutional-development-sco-olga-porshneva-mirzokhid-rakhimov-sergey-razinkov?context=ubx&refId=8e80147d-69db-44a7-bdea-ff89c6e5bddd>
12. UN Resolution A/RES/72/283. Strengthening regional and international cooperation to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Central Asian region. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 22 June 2018. New York. UN. 2018.
13. UN Resolution A/RES/73/128. Enlightenment and religious tolerance. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 2018. New York. UN. 2018.

14. UN Resolution A/RES/74/214. Sustainable tourism and sustainable development in Central Asia. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2019. New York. UN. 2019.
15. UN Resolution A/RES/75/278. Declaring the Aral Sea region a zone of ecological innovations and technologies. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 May 2021. New York. UN. 2021.
16. UN Resolution A/RES/76/295. Strengthening connectivity between Central and South Asia. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 11 July 2022. New York. UN. 2022.
17. UN Resolution A /RES/77/159. Enhancing the role of parliaments in accelerating the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 2022. New York. UN. 2022.
18. Official site of the Executive Committee of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea - <https://ecifas-tj.org/>
19. Mirziyoyev, Shavkat. *Yangi O'zbekiston strategiyasi*. Tashkent: 2021. p. 347.
20. Official site The Multi-Partner Human Security Trust Fund for the Aral Sea region. <https://www.aral.mptf.uz/site/strategy2.html> (20.06.2023).
21. Rakhimov, Mirzokhid. *Sovremenaya istoriya vzaimootnosheniy Uzbekistana i stran Sentralnoy Azii s vedushimi gosudarstvami mira*. Tashkent: 2016. p. 140.
22. *The Silk Roads Project: Integral study of the Silk Roads: Roads of Dialogue, 1988-1997* // <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000159189> (12.05.2023).
23. Nara International Center for Silk Road Studies, (Nara, Japan.) <http://www.nifs.or.jp/> (14.11.2018)
24. International Institute for the Study of Nomadic Civilisations <https://nomadic.mn/en/structure-of-iisnc/> (22.08.2020).
25. The Silk Roads Project "Integral study of the Silk Roads: Roads of Dialogue" 1988-1997. Paris. 2002. p. 12.
26. *UNESCO in Central Asia at the dawn of the third millennium*. Sector for External Relations and Cooperation UNESCO, Paris, 2008. p.14.
27. Official web site International Institute for Central Asian studies. <https://unesco-iicas.org/ru> (06.08.2023).
28. *History of Civilizations of Central Asia. The dawn of civilization: earliest times to 700 B.C.* Volume I. Editors: Dani, Ahmad Hasan, Masson, Vadim. UNESCO 1992. 514 p.; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia. The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations: 700 BC to A.D. 250.* Volume II. Editor: Harmatta, Janos. Co-editors: Puri, Baij Nath. and Etemadi, Gul. UNESCO 1994. 550 p.; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia. The crossroads of civilizations: AD 250 to 750.* Volume III. Editor: Litvinsky, Boris. Co-editors: Guang-da, Zhang and Samghabad, Shabani. UNESCO 1996. 558 p.; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia. The age of achievement AD 750 to the end of the fifteenth century (Part I & Part II).* Volume IV. Editors: Asimov, Mohammad and Bosworth, Clifford Edmund. UNESCO, 1998. 474 p.; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Development in contrast: from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century.* Volume V. Editors: Adle, Chahryar and Habib, Irfan. Co-editor: Baipakov, Karl. UNESCO 2003. 910 p.; *History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Towards contemporary civilization: from the mid-nineteenth century to the present time.* Volume VI. President: Adle, Chahryar. Co-Editors: Palat, Madhavan and Tabyshalieva, Anara. UNESCO 2005. 992 p.
29. Rakhimov, Mirzokhid., Abdimuminov, Oybek. *Uzbekiston va BMT: munosabalar*

- tarihi va bahkaror rivojlanish omillari*. Tashkent. 2021. p. 229.
30. Mentges, Gabriele. *The Role of UNESCO and the Uzbek Nation Building Process in Heritage Regimes and the State* [online]. Göttingen: Göttingen University Press, 2013 (generated 10 septembre 2020). p. 216.
 31. Memory of the World UNESCO. Uzbekistan <https://webarchive.unesco.org/web/20220331151420/http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/access-by-region-and-country/uz> (26.06.2023).
 32. Kassymzhanova, Nazim., Dutta, Mondira. *Kazakhstan and UNESCO: some aspects of cooperation*. Bulletin of Karaganda University. Series "History. Philosophy". No. 4. 2016. p. 76.
 33. *UNESCO in Central Asia*. UNESCO Paris, 1997, p. 18.
 34. *UNESCO in Central Asia at the dawn of the third millennium*. Sector of external relations and cooperation. UNESCO, Paris, 2008. p. 38.
 35. List of World Heritage in Danger // <https://whc.unesco.org/en/danger/> (24.06.2023).
 36. Atanova, Snejana. *Sentralnaya Aziya vo vsemirnom nasledii UNESKO*. <https://www.caa-network.org/archives/9903> (12.05.2023).

THE EU'S SOFT AND SMART APPROACHES IN CENTRAL ASIA

MIRZOKHID RAKHIMOV and FIRDAVS KOBILOV

ABSTRACT

The European Union employs soft power instruments to defend European values and norms and promote national interests. The European Union (EU), based on its diverse but at the same time united cultural, historical and educational soft power resources, attracts an international audience. Relations between the countries of Central Asia (CA) and the European Union have gone through several stages. Since 2007 the EU has implemented a strategy in Central Asia, and in June 2019, the EU adopted a new strategy, highlighting several priority points.

Based on an interdisciplinary approach of system and comparative study, this paper analyses the status and perspectives of the EU's soft and smart approaches in Central Asia, and the dynamics and shortcomings of EU-CA relations, The European Union's soft and smart power policy, resources, and anticipated results are defined in its Strategy. The EU achieved some positive results in developing its soft and smart power approach to Central Asia, but there are also some limitations. There are general challenges for EU-CA relations, including external factors. Deepening political, economic, cultural, educational and humanitarian the EU-CA partnership will contribute the sustainable development of Central Asia and strengthen stability in Eurasia. This paper was prepared in the framework of EU's grant Tashkent Jean Monnet Center of Excellence for European Studies / TashCoEUWED.

Key words: European Union, Central Asia, relations, soft power, smart power, strategy, politics, economy, education, security.

INTRODUCTION

Both soft and smart power are important tools in the diplomatic kit of any international actor. The EU, based on its diverse but at the same time united cultural, historical, and educational soft power resources, attracts an international audience. Relations between the countries of Central Asia and the European Union have gone through several stages. In academic circles, there are number of studies on EU's global and regional foreign policy, including EU-Central Asia relations¹. But there is need for more elaboration of EU soft and smart power approach toward Centra Asia.

THE SOFT AND SMART APPROACH TO EU'S FOREIGN POLICY

Power was always among the most contested topics and perennial mainstream in international relations. There is often a demand for defining the inherited feature and changing the character of power in academic literature. Significant transitions have occurred with the change in the essence of international structure and systems and the nature of power. For instance, traditionally, states often used military capabilities (hard power) to influence and control the other states' behaviour; in the current world order, several manners affect other states. States could coerce other states with threats, charm them with payments, or might use the attraction and co-opt them to get the desired outcome². Even though states had used soft power long before Joseph Nye, he was the trailblazer to introduce it to the academic society in describing power relations among states and other actors of the global community³. As an indispensable foreign policy instrument, soft power promotes values, norms, objectives, and actions through attraction and persuasion⁴.

Soft power comes up with a peculiar currency (not force, not money) to lure the states to cooperate with shared values and the justness and responsibility of contributing to accomplishing those values. Hayden defines that attraction⁵, while Nye draws parallels between soft power and Adam Smith's invisible hand theory⁶ that leads people when making

decisions in a free market and decisions in the marketplace for ideas are often shaped by the soft power—a supernatural attraction that influences us to go along with others’ purposes without any direct threat or exchange taking place. Nye’s statement talked about three resources of soft power that involved state and non-state actors of international relations: culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (domestic political values and ordinary human norms), and its foreign policies (legitimate and holding moral authority)⁷.

Soft power implements unique resources (culture, political ideas, and foreign policy legitimacy) and allocates them to amend behaviours (agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction) to get the desired outcome. Despite its advantages, soft power has several limitations and inept foreign policy instruments for short-term goals. Nye states that soft power “is often hard to use, easy to lose, and costly to re-establish”⁸. But, Niall Ferguson argues that soft power’s problem is that it is soft⁹.

Another type of power defined by Nye is innovative power, considered a new form of power relations. Smart power combines the soft and hard power instruments¹⁰ and their practical implementation to get accepted outcomes. Thus, innovative power is the instrument of foreign policy that is now used widely by numerous regional powers to promote their national interests by implementing challenging and soft power tools. According to Irace, the EU has the potential, the preferred position in the international order and the political DNA to combine its soft and hard power resources into effective strategies: innovative power¹¹. Thus, smart power is the strategic and simultaneous use of coercion and co-option. The practical implementation of European values and norms, economic and political power, financial support, and the legitimacy of external policy provide the EU with innovative power tools. However, the current pandemic and war in Ukraine have challenged the appropriate external policy of the European Union, especially in Central Asia, due to the EU’s focus and concern for its European security issues.

Irrespective of the rapid development of new technologies and the spread of innovations worldwide, today, explicit bargaining and face-to-

face negotiations among leaders and politicians are still at stake on the global agenda. The latest digital communication technologies have profoundly changed how people, states and enterprises function and interact with the other actors in international relations. Social media has been significantly adopted as instrument to govern internal and external relations through new communication technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram. As a result of these developments, International Organization bureaucracies, which have recently been perceived as relatively obscure and impenetrable, have become more visible and “sociable” on the global digital¹². Furthermore, to prop up diplomacy implementing digital technologies is highly crucial, and it also facilitates the practice of soft power through communication.

The possibility of the prominent spillover effect of digital technologies on the management of global issues has attracted the attention of International Relations thinkers, focusing on the dynamics that describe the recent “global information age”¹³. Studies of Khatib, Dutton and Thelwall on digital diplomacy have investigated the role of digital technologies in political leaders and foreign policy officials’ function to trigger attracting foreign audiences via implementing broadly social media platforms that are considered an influential foreign policy tool¹⁴.

Despite all limitations, the European Union plays a significant role in world politics. Several approaches, such as neo-realistic, neo-functional, and intergovernmental institutionalists, attempted to analyse the EU’s inherent nature as a power actor and its external policy. Some scholars considered the EU as a normative power in international relations due to its many individual features, such as the idea of “uniting sovereignty”¹⁵, resistance concept in the EU foreign policy¹⁶, as a ‘civilian power’¹⁷, or as a ‘soft power’¹⁸. However, there is no single opinion about the nature of the power of the EU and which is the intense and best way to act. Thus, a comprehensive approach to the study of EU foreign policy, based on an analysis of the values, images and principles that shape the discourse and practice of EU relations with the rest of the world¹⁹, international conditions that influence, and European and domestic level should be considered for

a broad picture. Thus, considering the mentioned opinions, one can conclude that the EU's modus operandi in its external relations is based on soft power tools rather than hard power.

The European Union effectively employs its soft power instruments in vending European values and norms and promoting national interests as an experienced grandmaster that acts confidently on the chessboard. The EU can implement many figures to enrich resources of soft power such as education, culture, language, and economic prosperity that could be used in external policy. The EU is a unique integration union that reached the fifth level of the integration process: political. This level of integration has boosted the European global image with several factors that eagerly augmented the desire of the regions and countries to build enhanced cooperation with the EU. According to some scholars, the EU soft power consists of and can be expressed in three primary forms: economic policies, cultural initiatives, and its role as a mediator²⁰. Firstly, the EU is among the most significant single markets in the world, with more than 447 million consumers²¹, making it the most coveted destination for exporting national products to Central Asian countries.

These tremendous economic indicators of the EU have provided it a focus on international economic policies as one of the backbones of its soft power policy. Nye assessed the economic potential as a resource of hard power. However, it cannot be assumed as hard power because the EU does not cooperate economically with others to force them to carry out specific measures but to persuade them. The EU starts from the basis of solidarity and neighbourhood; its goal is to help societies to grow and not blackmail them in order to adapt their measures and values.²² Thus, we can see that the European Union's economic and financial aids to neighbouring and other regions aim to increase its political significance as an international actor and to strengthen its economic presence, but not to dictate its one-sided beneficial interests.

Culture as a soft power resource possesses different forms that could be employed to affect other actors' behaviour, choice, and desire to gain aimed outcome. UNESCO defines culture as "a soft power that strives to

foster the exchange of views and ideas, promote knowledge of other cultures, and build bridges between communities”²³. Furthermore, based on its diverse but united cultural, historical, and educational soft power resources, the EU attracts the international audience, their hearts, and minds. The EU High Representative emphasized that culture is the infallible engine that will drive the EU when dealing with everyday challenges and thus build an alliance of civilizations against those trying to separate the European society²⁴. Moreover, European culture, lifestyle, music, films, and languages magnetize many people worldwide.

TRANSFORMATION OF EU-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS

Relations between the European Union and Central Asia have undergone several stages in their development. The first stage covered the beginning of the 1990s when the countries of Europe and Central Asia were establishing their bilateral and multilateral relations. In July 1999, the second stage began when the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” (PCA) signed with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (1996) and PCA with Tajikistan in 2010 came into force. The increased EU interest in Central Asia is partly due to the growing European role in international processes. The third stage in relations between the EU and Central Asia came in 2007, when, within the framework of the EU Presidency program, Germany initiated a new program to expand political cooperation with the countries of Central Asia.

During the EU presidency in 2007, Germany initiated increasing multilateral partnerships with Central Asian states due to the EU strategy toward Central Asia from 2007-2013²⁵. In 2014, the EU decided to extend the Strategy for 2014-2018. In June 2019, the EU extended its Strategy for the next five years. Along with Russia and China, the EU is the leading trading partner of the Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan. In addition, the EU has expressed an interest in the energy supplies of Central Asia. In the coming decades, the EU will extend its dependence on external energy supplies²⁶.

From the very beginning, the countries of the region supported the “EU Strategy for a New Partnership for Central Asia”. They welcomed the implementation of the EU initiatives - on the rule of law, education, environmental issues, and water management. Within the framework of the Strategy in 2007–2013, assistance was provided to the countries of Central Asia to liberalise the judicial and legal system further, ensure the rule of law, form a civil society, ensure border security, and counter drug trafficking. As a result of joint activities and efforts in this direction, for example, the death penalty was abolished in Uzbekistan, the principle of habeas corpus was introduced, the system of a bicameral parliament was improved, etc.

The trade between the two regions has grown significantly during the last three years despite the COVID-19 pandemic, and the EU is the third leading trade partner for Central Asia. Nevertheless, the total trade turnover could be considered low compared to other regions and trade partners. Central Asian countries’ export to the EU mainly consists of natural resources such as crude oil, gas, metals, and cotton fibre. In contrast, EU exports include machinery, transport equipment, and other manufactured goods.


FIGURE 1: TOTAL TRADE TURNOVER BETWEEN THE EU AND CENTRAL ASIA (2019 – 2021)



Source: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/central-asia_en

During 2014–2019, EU financial support in the region in the rule of law, environmental protection, water resources, trade and border management did not change considerably and exceeded 1 billion Euros. In 2010, the EU launched the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), which provides financial and technical assistance. In the framework of IFCA, the European Union provided EURO 145 million in financial aid to five Central Asian countries.

FIGURE -2



Source: prepared by the authors using data site: https://www.eib.org/en/projects/regions/central-asia/technical_assistance_and_grants/index.htm

An institutional framework has been created between Central Asia and the EU through joint bilateral and multilateral interaction bodies within the framework of the interregional dialogue “European Union and Central Asia” at the level of foreign ministers.

In June 2019, the EU adopted a new strategy for Central Asia, highlighting three priorities. The first is strengthening stability in the region, including hybrid threats and cyberattacks, and the fight against corruption and reforms that develop democracy and establish the rule of law. The second is economic development. The third is the intensification of political dialogue, in which Brussels emphasises the involvement of civil society

and parliament²⁷. New Strategy supporting the development of cooperation between Afghanistan and the region's republics." According to EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini Central Asia has always played a key role: because of its history, culture, and its role in communication between East and West. Today, this region is of increasing strategic importance"²⁸.

The EU believes Central Asia needs new economic development and diversification models. In particular, the development of the private sector, improving the investment climate, reducing inequality, and accelerating the transition to a "green", circular economy. Therefore, Brussels supports the entry of all Central Asian countries into the World Trade Organization; Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan already member, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are discussing the issue of joining the WTO.

The EU occupies an important place in the external economic relations of the countries of Central Asia (this mainly concerns Kazakhstan, and in recent years - Uzbekistan), but trade between the EU and CA is relatively low compared to China and Russia. (Table 1; Diagram 1).

TABLE 1
VOLUME OF TRADE OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, RUSSIA, AND CHINA AT THE END OF 2020 (MILLION US DOLLARS)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Level of trade with mU</i>	<i>Level of trade with China</i>	<i>Level of trade with Russia</i>
Kazakhstan	21098	21447	18996
Kyrgyzstan	241	2901	1692
Tajikistan	239	1064	839
Turkmenistan	832	6516	970
Uzbekistan	2395	6629	5881
Central Asia	24805	38557	28378

Source: Paramonov, Vladimir; Stokov, Aleksey; Abduganieva Zebo, Alshin Sergei. 2018. European Union Impact on Central Asia: Political, Economic, Security and Social Spheres. New York: Nova Science, p. 127. Last data was included by the authors based on Central Asia and the EU statistics.

The global pandemic 2019-2021 also substantially impacted Central Asia and the EU; the region's countries increased the volume of external loans and borrowings, including from European structures. As a result, Uzbekistan and the EU are jointly preparing a new document for a comprehensive multi-level and multi-faceted partnership.

Within the framework of INOGATE and TRACECA, the EU promotes the development and expansion of regional infrastructure in the field of transport, energy, and trade in order to optimally use the economic potential of Central Asia and improve regional cooperation. Furthermore, Central Asia can benefit from increased trade volumes as an essential trade corridor between different regions of Asia and Europe.

Summing up, relations between Central Asia and the European Union have undergone several stages. The main goals of the EU strategy in Central Asia are to continue democratic and economic reforms and to increase the scale of trade, including the energy sector. However, the escalation of US and general Western relations with Russia and the Russian military conflict with Ukraine also negatively affects the expansion of EU-Central Asia relations. In particular, it is evident on economic activity and export, transport and logistics, inflation, rise of cost of food and medicine, fuel-lubricants, and various basic needs. The main route from Central Asia passes through the territory of the Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and further to Europe. In the conditions of Central Asia and Caucasus countries, there is interest in the development of international transport corridors such as "East-West", "South-South" and other projects, with frequent routes passing through the territory and region. Central Asia nations main emphasis is principle of multilateralism.

EU APPROACH TOWARD CENTRAL ASIAN HIGHER EDUCATION

After twelve years after the first Strategy was adopted, the European Union launched the New Strategy for Central Asia. The existence of mutual interests between the EU and Central Asian region serves as a *raison d'être* for adopting the New Strategy. The Council emphasises that for

implementing the Strategy, establishing a financial and technical cooperation programme, developing bilateral and regional cooperation with the Member States and strengthening links between two regions are the main goals of the New Strategy²⁹.

The European Union's soft and smart power policy, resources, and anticipated results are clearly defined in this Strategy. The EU emphasises several priority issues for further strengthening and increased dialogue. Cooperation in cultural and educational spheres is one of the main areas of the New Strategy, and the Council will support reforms to improve the education systems in Central Asian countries. The priorities are reforms in higher education, vocational education and training, exchange programmes of staff and students, and digital education³⁰. The cultural and educational partnership will promote citizens' mobility and strengthen the EU and CA links. This type of partnership will be mutually beneficial in economic and social terms. It will enrich the teachers, professors, and students' academic backgrounds with an international experience they can use in their daily routines. The EU can use the Erasmus+ programme to help Central Asian universities to modernise and meet the targets of the Bologna process on higher education and Torino principles on vocational education and training.

Representatives of universities and research institutes of the republic participated in such EU programs and projects as Tempus, Erasmus Mundus, and others. The EU countries are active in Central Asia. For example, German and French humanitarian foundations - the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, DVV-International, DAAD, the Ebert Foundation, the Goethe Institute, the FMSH, the French Alliance, and universities - are active in cooperation with educational and research centres of the Central Asian countries.


However, the European Union's soft power in Central Asia in the education sphere has different outcomes for the region's five countries. For instance, in Kazakhstan, the educational power of the EU has achieved some good results. The European process of Bologna marked a sea change in Kazakhstan's education system with the completion of meaningful steps

to improve and develop. Kazakhstan's experience, which has been a full member of the Bologna process since 2011, demonstrated positive effects in reforming and developing tertiary education in Kazakhstan. Ten universities are in the top 1,000 universities according to QS World University Rankings-2020³¹, three are in the top 500, and even Al-Farabi Kazakh National University is in the top 300. Hence, the overall Bologna process's impact is positive. But universities from other Central Asian republics also need to work closely with EU institutions and try to be on the list of World University Rankings.

The European Union is one of the most coveted destinations among youth to study in tertiary education. There are several reasons and factors for the EU's soft power potential in cultural and educational spheres. The indispensable component of the soft power instrument in education is the ERASMUS MUNDUS scholarship for local and international students worldwide. For instance, Erasmus Mundus Joint Master's Degrees (EMJMDs) award EU-funded scholarships to Master students worldwide that cover tuition, travel, and a living allowance. The programmes last one to two years, during which students' study in at least two European countries and obtain joint, double, or multiple degrees³². The diagram below demonstrates how the number of EMJMD scholarship winners from Central Asia going to study for a master's degree in the EU changed during the last seven years. We can see that each number experienced gradual growth with a few fluctuations. In 2020, the number of students showed a slight decrease; we could consider it a spillover effect and consequence of COVID-19.

The number of Central Asian universities participating so far has been 26 from Kazakhstan, 14 from Uzbekistan, six from Kyrgyz Republic, and 4 from Tajikistan, and (reflecting its much closer political order) only one from Turkmenistan.³³ Another soft power instrument of the EU in the tertiary education sector is the Tempus programme funded by the European Union. This programme encourages the modernisation of tertiary education in the Partner Countries in Eastern Europe, including Central Asia, the Western Balkans, and the Mediterranean, mainly

FIGURE -3: THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO WON EMJMD SCHOLARSHIPS FROM CENTRAL ASIA



Source: Prepared by the authors using data of Erasmus+ for higher education data using data <https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/worldwide/asean/2756-students-141-different-countries-awarded-erasmus-mundus-scholarships>

boosting and strengthening university cooperation projects. The driving force of the EU for being one of the desired destinations for undergraduate and graduate studies, European languages are among the most learned foreign languages. Language is an instrument for spreading culture, traditions and values and plays a vital role in promoting soft power and assertion of the cultural power of the states. There are special language centres in Uzbekistan where the Uzbek youth learn European languages such as German, French, and Spanish. Striking examples are Goethe-Institut and French Alliance in Tashkent, where people learn the German and French languages. At some public universities and institutions specialising in foreign languages, also at National University of Uzbekistan and the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, students learn, among other languages, the European ones as a first and second foreign language.

Our social poll, where we asked only one question and four options among 100 students at the University of World Economy and diplomacy

and Webster University in Tashkent about studying in the European Union, demonstrated that students tend to choose to study in Europe more due to the education system and its quality. (Table 2). Today, many European universities are in the top 1,000 universities of the world according to several rankings such as QS ranking and Times. Secondly, the students want to win the ERASMUS Scholarship for their master's degree studies. Financial support for students for their graduate studies is one of the driving and attractive forces of the European Union education system. Besides, some students learn German, France, and Spanish languages at the university as second foreign languages after English, and their interest in studying in this country, learning their culture and traditions, and improving their second foreign language. Further, the EU provides a unique opportunity for students to travel in the Schengen zone. This is one of the features of the EU that makes it attractive to foreigners.

TABLE 2
SOCIAL POLL AMONG 100 STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WORLD ECONOMY
AND DIPLOMACY AND WEBSTER UNIVERSITY IN TASHKENT

Why do you choose to study in European Union?	
1	Education system and its quality 48%
2	ERASMUS Scholarship 26%
3	Travelling by Schengen visa 15%
4	Interest to particular European culture and language 6%
5	Other 5%

Europe's wealthy historical and cultural architectural heritage attracts many tourists worldwide. Travelling and family trips to Europe are popular among Central Asian countries as well. The EU's advantage in the tourist sector, among other destinations, is its Schengen visa system, which allows travelling to member countries, making Europe a favorite target for leisure vacations. The Schengen zone system is a striking example of European values, and many people like these values and norms. Furthermore, it is

not only for providing freedom of movement among people but also for feeling that makes every place a home for people. Initially, 'borderless Europe' was a phenomenal idea, but it has suffered a lot due to the migration crisis in 2015, and now COVID-19 makes Europe close frontiers even among the Schengen zone. Thus, this attractiveness of the EU now magnetises many migrants from around the world, and during the COVID-19 pandemic, the 'Borderless Europe' has been challenged.

It should be noted that among most attractive universities for Central Asian students are Russian, Chinese, Turkish, Japanese, Indian, Korean, and other countries³⁴.

DIGITAL DIPLOMACY AS TOOL FOR SOFT AND SMART POWER

European Union effectively implements digital diplomacy in spreading its values and norms, promoting its digital diplomacy. EU Council mentions that the evolution of digital technologies delivers outstanding opportunities for social and economic development and the protection of the planet. However, it also poses new challenges and risks, especially in the areas of human rights, security, environment, privacy, fair competition, and employment. COVID-19 pandemic has further underlined the need to accelerate the digital transition in Europe and across the globe. According to the Council, linking technology voids, including the gender digital range, is more paramount than ever during and after the pandemic. Digital is already a fundamental component of the transformative schedule for an inclusive, sustainable recuperation at the global level and will become an even more major driver³⁵.

The European Union's digital diplomacy in Central Asian countries' Strategy can be found in the EU Council conclusion on digital diplomacy and New Strategy for Central Asia. The New Strategy consists of three interconnected and mutually reinforced or "cross-cutting" prioritised spheres, such as partnering for resilience, partnering for prosperity and working better together, divided into ten critical areas. Many of the

priorities remained in force, but some of them became more significant, and some are more salient. Moreover, new areas for cooperation were supplemented with the consequences of dropping a few from the first Strategy.

This preference area consists of financing investments in digitisation, digital connectivity and digital technologies that build smooth international cooperation and partnership with other regions and countries. The spillover effect of the development of digital technologies and innovations put forward establishing such a strategic plan from all countries in the global space. Significantly, the significance of such measures in international and inter-state relations promotes digital diplomacy to the top global issues during the COVID-19 pandemic. Closing national borders and local lockdowns have negatively affected the transportation of services, finance, and mobility of people from one country to another, even within one state. Thus, considering the importance of the EU for Central Asian countries as one of the biggest trade partners, the digitisation of economic and trade relations is a sensitive issue for other relations. Besides, trade relations between the EU and Uzbekistan increased with the approval of the former to the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP +), the last one, which provides preferential tariffs on goods imported from Uzbekistan under this agreement from April 2021. Accordingly, Uzbekistan will be benefited by exporting its goods to the EU and joining the global market more smoothly within this program. It will expand the economic and trade relations between the two actors and maintain the EU presence in Uzbekistan and the region. Among the Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan primarily benefitted from the GSP+ scheme in 2016, which is expected to stimulate economic growth with the opportunity of exporting to Europe.

The digitisation of trade relations will further increase the significance of the GSP+ scheme for both sides by strengthening inter and intra-regional economic relations and soft and smart power. The Council's conclusion on digital diplomacy reflects the EU's first and new strategic goals and interests in Central Asia. For instance, The European Union will remain a

strong supporter of digital cooperation in several spheres such as notably on human rights, capacity building, new technologies, trade facilitation, sustainable development, and affordable connectivity, in cooperation with all relevant actors, including the private sector, civil society and academia, through a multi-stakeholder process.


International organizations specify communication channels, share pertinent data, and engage in dialogue with appropriate stakeholders to persuade and charm them to cooperate towards the accomplishment and performance goals or initiatives³⁶

The instruments of digital diplomacy are social media (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) and other website platforms (LinkedIn) that can also be used as one of the leading soft power tools. Today people, especially youth, can only imagine their life with the internet and social media platforms where they spend much time with their life and much new knowledge and information they get from there. Besides, these digital diplomacy and soft power instruments reach target groups faster and financially; it is cheaper than other costly tools for states. Additionally, social media possess such an advantage as direct communication with the audience without representatives. The EU effectively implements social media to promote “brand-making” by building a favorable image among targeted audiences. Social media can increase the actors’ accountability, as they “facilitate the articulation of complaints and grievances”³⁷.

Many entrepreneurs, officials, experts, scholars, and youngsters from Central Asia follow the EU’s social media to be aware of the EU’s external policy in this region, new opportunities for business, academic positions in Europe, and scholarships for study. Every social group persuades their interests, while the EU promotes its image and values through these means. The EU uses social media to spread its external policy actions in the spheres mentioned above, distributing European norms and values directed not only to decision-makers but also by covering broader audiences. By straight contacting their targeted audience, social media even expand the capability of the EU “to effectively raise public awareness for global problems, publicly shame governments for not complying with international commitments

to teach norms and knowledge to citizens³⁸. Some scholars note that the process of image management, so-called “corporate branding”³⁹, seeks to intercommunicate with external entertainers (target groups) to shape their beliefs and behaviours about the actor. The EU digital policy uses this philosophy to get expected output in its priority areas.

FIGURE 4
THE EU'S DIGITAL DIPLOMACY'S GOALS, TOOLS AND TARGET GROUPS IN CA



Source: Prepared by the authors

This figure demonstrates how the EU promotes soft and smart power based on digital diplomacy and its objectives, tools, and primary target groups. To sum up, digital diplomacy that developed with technological innovations and communication instruments can be defined as the EU's soft and smart power nature.

CONCLUSION

From the first years of cooperation between the two regions, there is a significant growth in collaboration in various areas. The changing structure of the world order, shifting foreign policy of Central Asian countries from

one direction toward “multi-vector” policy, and the changes that occurred in the systemic and institutional framework of the EU, promoted reconsidering previous Strategy and external policy of the Union. Furthermore, mutual interests in bilateral relations and building partnerships without obligating claims are fundamental to the close and long-standing partnership. As an emerging global player, the EU uses different foreign policy instruments in its external policy based on European interests. Besides, the EU’s power nature differs from region to region, as was mentioned above. In Central Asian countries, the EU has mainly been a normative power that uses soft and intelligent power.

European Union’s economic and financial aids to Central Asia and other regions aim to increase its political significance as an international actor and to strengthen its economic presence. Economic partnership is also important part of smart power, it is also case in EU-Central Asia relation. The EU, based on its diverse but at the same time united cultural, historical and educational soft power resources, attracts an international audience. In its development, relations between the countries of Central Asia and the European Union have gone through several stages. Since 2007 the EU has been implementing Strategy in Central Asia, and in June 2019, the EU adopted a new strategy, highlighting several priority points. The European Union’s soft and smart power policy, resources, and anticipated results are clearly defined in this Strategy. However, the escalation of EU and US relations with Russia and the Russian military conflict with Ukraine also negatively affects the expansion of EU-Central Asia relations.

Deepening political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian development and expanding international cooperation between the EU-Central Asia will be important in ensuring the sustainable development of Central Asia and strengthening stability in Eurasia.

The existing problems and challenges in Central Asia and Europe, require expanding and deepening the entire spectrum of relations and in the context of the future development of EU-Central Asia relations, it seems appropriate:

- + Firstly, the expansion of the use of interdisciplinary approaches in the study of the EU and Central Asia relations, which also includes cross-regional studies;
- + Secondly, Central Asian nations need to improve effectiveness of the state and social system as well as increase regional partnership and cooperation, which, of course, will require a broad mobilisation of resources, knowledge and the active application of advanced international experience, including the EU;
- + Thirdly, to achieve sustainability in bilateral and multilateral EU-Central Asia relations, it is advisable to intensify efforts in the implementation of joint integration projects, in the creation of new mechanisms for multilateral partnership, including within the framework of the EU strategy in Central Asia, etc.

Further deepening of soft and smart approaches and expansion of international cooperation between the EU and Central Asia will be of great importance in ensuring the sustainable development of entire Central Asia and strengthening stability in Eurasia.

REFERENCES

1. See: Peyrouse, Sebastien; Boonstra Jos; Laruelle Marlene. 2012. "Security and development approaches to Central Asia. The EU compared to China and Russia," *EUCAM Working Paper 11*, 16 48; Peyrouse, Sebastien. 2017. *A Donor without Influence: The European Union in Central Asia*. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 478; Boonstra, Jos; Panella, Riccardo. 2018. *Three Reasons Why the EU Matters to Central Asia*. March 13, DOI: <https://voicesoncentralasia.org/three-reasons-why-the-eu-matters-to-central-asia/>; Paramonov, Vladimir; Stokov, Aleksey; Abduganieva Zebo, Alshin Sergei. 2018. *European Union Impact on Central Asia: Political, Economic, Security and Social Spheres*. New York: Nova Sciences, 127 p.; Pantucci, Raffaello. 2018. Europe's pivot to Central Asia. *RUSI Commentary*. Accessed October 18, DOI: <https://rusi.org/commentary/europe%E2%80%99s-pivot-central-asia>; Bossuyt, Fabienne. 2020. *What role for the EU in a post-COVID-19 Central Asia: On the way out or right back in?* UNU-CRIS Policy Paper. Accessed April 21, 2021. <https://cris.unu.edu/what-role-eu-post-covid-19-central-asia>; Anghelescu, Ana-Maria. 2018. *European Union and Central Asia – past directions and future perspectives*, CES Working Papers, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Vol. 10, Iss. 3, pp. 271-290 <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198545/1/ceswp-v10-i3-p271-290.pdf>; Dzhuraev, Emilbek; Muratalieva, Nargiza. 2020.

- The EU Strategy on Central Asia. To the successful implementation of the new Strategy.* March, DOI: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bischkek/16168.pdf>; Jalolov, Sarvar. 2020. *Normative power of the EU in Central Asia.* April 4, <https://cabar.asia/ru/normativnaya-sila-evrosoyuza-v-tsentralnoj-azii>; Spaiser, Olga A. 2008. *The European Union's influence in Central Asia: Geopolitical challenges and responses.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; Tocci Nathalie. 2017. *Framing the EU Global Strategy. A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World.* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 168; 55; Chebotaryov, Andrey; Gubaydullina, Mara. 2021. *Evropeyskiy Soyuz I strani Tsentralnoy Azii: vozmozhnosti I perspektivi sotrudnichestvo v svete novoy strategii.* Almati, pp177-202; Winn, Neil; Ganzle, Stefan. 2022. *Recalibrating EU Foreign Policy Vis-à-vis Central Asia: Towards Principled Pragmatism and Resilience, Geopolitics.* <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2022.2042260>
2. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* New York: *Public Affairs*, pp.31-32.
 3. *Global Ranking of Soft Power.* 2019. The Soft Power 30.
 4. Nye, Joseph S. 2011. *The Future of Power.* New York: Public Affairs Print. Turabian (6th ed.), 4 p.
 5. Hayden, Craig. 2011. *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts,* Lexington Books.
 6. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* New York: Public Affairs, p.31–32.
 7. Sharp, Paul. *Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy.* The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 106–123.
 8. Nye, J.S. (2012). *The Future of Power.* p.102
 9. Ferguson, Niall. 2003, *Power. Foreign Policy,* January/February, p. 21
 10. Nye, J.S. (2012). *The Future of Power*
 11. Irace Giuliano. (2020). *Forwarding Europe's 'smart power' through the current Covid-19 Crisis.* Institute of European Democrats, 7 p
 12. Corneliu, Bjola and Ruben, Zaiotti. *Digital Diplomacy and International Organisations: Autonomy, Legitimacy and Contestation.* Routledge New Diplomacy Studies. 2021, pp. 2-18.
 13. Beth Simmons. 2019. *International studies in the global information age. International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 55(3), pp. 589-599.
 14. Khatib, Lina; Dutton, William; Thelwall, Michael. 2012. *Public Diplomacy 2.0: A Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team,* *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 66, pp. 453–72.
 15. Nathalie, Tocci. 2007. *Profiling normative foreign policy: the European Union and its global partners,* Centre for European Policy Studies, pp. 1–19.
 16. Korosteleva, Elena A. 2019. *Reclaiming resilience back: A local turn in EU external governance.* <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2019.1685316>; Petrova, Irina. 2019. *From principle to practice? The resilience–local ownership nexus in the EU Eastern Partnership policy.* 21 October, DOI: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678280>; Wagner, Wolfgang; Anholt Rosanne. 2016. *Resilience as the EU Global Strategy's new leitmotif: pragmatic, problematic or promising? Contemporary Security Policy.* Vol. 37. No. 3. pp. 414–430.

17. Duch ne, Fran ois. *Europe's Role in World Peace*. Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, R. Mayne (ed.). London: Collins, 1972, pp. 32-47.
18. Michalski, Anna. 2005. *The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion, The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations*. [ed] Jan Melissen, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 124-144.
19. Costello, Patrick. (2020). *Values and interests in post-Lisbon European Union foreign policy*. European Union in International Affairs, pp. 45-57
20. Moreno, Naomi, Puigrefagut, Alejandro, Y rnoz, Ignacio. 2018, *The European Union's soft power: Image branding or neo-colonialism?* Centre for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies, p. 13.
21. Eurostat, 2021 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_statistics
22. Moreno, Naomi, Puigrefagut, Alejandro, Y rnoz, Ignacio. 2018. *op.cit.*
23. UNESCO. *The Soft Power of Culture*. Culture Sector Knowledge Management. 2016.
24. Commission, European. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council "*The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership.*" 2019.
25. European Commission. 2019. *New EU Strategy on Central Asia*, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/62412_en
26. Petroleum, British. 2014.
27. ACADEMIE, DW. 2019.
28. EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini said in May 2019 (<https://www.dw.com/ru/a-49233006>)
29. Into Eurasia Monitoring the EU's Central Asia Strategy: Executive Summary and Recommendations. Emerson, Michael; Boonstra, Jos. 2010, EUCAM, p. 76.
30. European Commission. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council "*The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership*", 2019. pp.1-17. DOI: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-eu-and-central-asia-new-opportunities-stronger-partnership_en
31. University Rankings 2020 <https://www.universityrankings.ch/results/QS/2020?ranking=QS&year=2020®ion=&q=Kazakhstan>
32. Erasmus+ for higher education in Turkmenistan https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/turkmenistan_erasmusplus_2020.pdf.
33. Emerson, Michael; Boonstra, Jos. 2010. "*Into Eurasia Monitoring the EU's Central Asia Strategy: Executive Summary and Recommendations*". *EUCAM Policy Brief*. No.13. p.76. DOI:http://aei.pitt.edu/58488/1/EUCAM_PB_13.pdf
34. Dadabayev, Timur. *Decolonising Central Asian International Relations*. Routledge, 2021. p.1; Mirzokhid, Rakhimov and Farhod, Yakubov. 1, 2022, Uzbekistan external migration: key trends and directions. *Eurasian Research Journal*, Vol. 4, pp. 27-47.
35. EU Council, 2020.
36. Bjola, Corneliu; Zaiotti, Ruben. 2021. *Digital Diplomacy and International Organisations: Autonomy, Legitimacy and Contestation*. Bjola Corneliu, Zaiotti Ruben. Routledge New Diplomacy Studies, p. 7.
- Kowalczyk, Stanley. J. Pawlish, Michael. J. 2002, Corporate branding through

- the external perception of organisational culture. *Corporate Reputation Review*, Vols. 5(2-3), pp. 159–174
37. Buchanan, Allen, Keohane, Robert. 2006, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. *Ethics & International Affairs*. Vol. 20(4), pp. 405-437.
- Peyrouse Sebastien; Boonstra Jos; Laruelle Marlene. Security and development approaches to Central Asia. The EU compared to China and Russia. *EUCAM Working Paper*, 2012, Vol. 11. p.16.
38. Pamment, James. 2016, Digital diplomacy as transmedia engagement: Aligning theories of participatory culture with international advocacy campaigns. *New Media & Society*, Vol. 18(9), pp. 2046-2062.
39. Kowalczyk, Stanley. J. Pawlish, Michael. J. 2002, Corporate branding through the external perception of organisational culture. *Corporate Reputation Review*, Vol. 5(2-3), pp. 159–174.

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN, 2021

AKRAM UMAROV

ABSTRACT

Central Asia (CA) faces an important stage of its development. Over 30 years have passed since the independence of the Central Asian states. The election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as the President of Uzbekistan in 2016 became a focal point in the contemporary situation in the region and contributed to the intensification of Uzbekistan's foreign policy. The latter has demonstrated increasing cooperation with neighbouring countries, strengthening trade and economic relations, as well as seeking compromise solutions on the most pressing issues in Central Asia, including borders and water usage. Such position of Uzbekistan which keeps a special role in the region due to its strategic location, economic and demographic potential, rich history and culture has marked a trend towards the growth of regional cooperation in CA.

Resorting to systematic and comparative methods of analysis, and to the regional security complex (RSC) theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, we put forward the argument of the formation of a new independent RSC in Central Asia, for the last 30 years after the acquisition of sovereignty by the five regional countries. At the same time, by looking at Afghanistan through the lens of an 'insulator', we identify a country that has a significant impact on the security processes in the region and participates in the RSC of CA. The paper investigates how the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan could impact regional rapprochement in CA and its plans to enhance connectivity with South Asia.

Keywords: Central Asia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, stabilization, challenges, security, regional cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary Political Science, the term “Central Asian region” is used not only to denote the territorial community of the five independent Central Asian republics that emerged after the collapse of the USSR, but also the historical, economic, political and cultural past of these states. Five countries have formed along the borders of the former union republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. They occupy the centre of Eurasia and border on the great world civilizational centres. The notion of the “Central Asian region” is beginning to include Afghanistan, as it has geographic community with the countries of the region, the historical and cultural past and also influences the strategic balance of the entire region. Traditionally, the events in Afghanistan and impact of the intra-Afghan conflict on the regional security of Central Asia (CA) are explored using the concepts of the balance of forces inherent in realist and neo-realist IR theories, as well as military power, the state of the armed forces, rational choice. However, in my opinion, this narrows the subject of study, reducing it to certain aspects of the Afghan conflict and its impact on the Central Asian countries. Such a reductionist approach cannot provide a full picture of what is happening without considering the root causes of the high concern of the countries of the region with the processes in Afghanistan.

Drawing upon the regional security complex (RSC) theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and testing its evaluation of Central Asia as a weak subcomplex of the post-Soviet RSC, the present contribution puts forward the argument of the formation of a new independent RSC in Central Asia, for the last more than 30 years after the acquisition of sovereignty by five regional countries. At the same time, by looking at Afghanistan, we identify a country that has a significant impact on the security processes in the region and participates in the RSC of CA.

The present contribution is structured as follows. The first section examines Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s evaluation of the Central Asian regional security processes and their inclusion of the region in post-Soviet RSC. The second section, presents the existing perspectives on the security

relationship between Central Asia and Afghanistan. The third section explores arguments of the evolution of Central Asia to form an independent RSC and the fourth section analyses the level of Afghanistan's participation in the Central Asian RSC.

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

Few works conceptually explain regional security processes in CA. For example, Dr. Bobokulov, investigating the problems of international legal aspects of ensuring regional security in Central Asia, mentions the theory of regional security complex¹. He argues that the relations of the states of the region determine the content of regional security, but these relations can be both friendly and hostile. He defines regional security as "the regional states' recognition of the unity of their destinies - the community of existing threats, problems and interests", which is close to the Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT) postulates.

In our opinion, the influence of the situation in Afghanistan on regional security in Central Asia can be explained with the help of the theory of a regional security complex². The concept of a regional security complex (RSC) was subsequently finalised with the participation of O.Waever and acquired modern outlines³. Initially, the definition given to regional security complex by B.Buzan was as follows - a group of states whose main security concerns connect them so closely that their national security cannot be considered in isolation from each other⁴. However, in 1998, B. Buzan and O. Waever made corrections in the definition of the theory of the RSC, in order to avoid the state centred and military-political orientation of the previous version and allowing for the possibility of taking into account various actors and security sectors – a set of units whose main securitisation, desecuritisation visions, or they are both so interconnected that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved separately from each other⁵.

An integral part of the theory of the RSC was the "theory of securitisation", which was presented in the joint work of O. Waever, B.

Buzan and J. Wilde in 1998⁶. In their view, security should be seen as a speech act, where the main issue is not whether the threat is real or not, but in ways how a particular problem can be socially constructed as a threat. Hence, the problem is declared a threat, because it is perceived and publicly declared by the state as such.

B. Buzan and O. Waever believe that there is a post-Soviet RSC, centring on Russia; The core of this complex is the Russian Federation, which links the subcomplexes of the Baltic region (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), the Western group of states (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia)⁷. The authors classify CA as a weak subcomplex, in which internal dynamics are only being formed, and Russia's involvement is strong. For most countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus, internal security is a top priority. The state system in some countries is so weak that security threats can cause a general crisis of political order and in some cases a civil war⁸.

According to B. Buzan and O. Waever, security problems in Central Asia, as a rule, are more transnational in character than interstate, if we exclude traditional suspicions and competition for regional leadership between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, no model of friendliness or enmity among regional states was formed⁹. Part of the explanation for the lack of regional security dynamics can be the weak armed forces that the countries of the region have (with the exception of Uzbekistan). Thus, the countries of Central Asia contain elements of unstructured type: the states have not yet fully taken place, and the region is relatively open for the penetration of external forces.

B. Buzan and O. Waever are convinced that most often the borders between regions are geographically defined by weak interaction zones or insulators (Turkey, Burma, Afghanistan), which are turned in both directions, but not strong enough to unite the two regions into one whole¹⁰. The concept of 'an insulator' is important for the theory of the RSC, it should not be confused with the traditional buffer state, whose function is at the centre of a strong securitisation system, and not at its edge.

In the course of regional security processes in South Asia and the Middle East, Afghanistan has always remained an insulator that attracted its neighbours on all grounds, but at the same time kept them away from each other, rather than uniting them. According to scientists, despite even the West's sustained involvement in Afghanistan as a result of the outbreak of the war in 2001, this basic characteristic is unlikely to change¹¹.

AFGHAN INFLUENCE ON THE REGIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

A number of scholars conducted research on the current state of the post-Soviet RSC and analysed the influence of Afghanistan on security processes in this region. Dr. Lukin expressed the opinion that Central Asia continues to be a part of the post-Soviet space since Russia still remains the dominant player here. However, the presence of China has increased significantly, and this is due not only to the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia, but also to the transnational threats of Uyghur separatism and Islamic extremism. In addition, Beijing is trying to prevent a scenario in which Central Asia can be used by its rivals (primarily the US) to create threats in the rear of the PRC. Increased interest in the countries of Central Asia is also shown by India and Japan. All this allows A. Lukin to assert that the Central Asian countries can already be regarded to some extent as part of the Asian supercomplex of security, although for them membership in this supercomplex is still secondary, less significant in comparison with the post-Soviet, Russian-centric region security¹².

Some researchers even talk about the formation of a unified RSC in Asia. A. Voskresensky calls it "Great East Asia", including Central, South, North-East and South-East Asia in its composition¹³. About strengthening of tendencies to formation of the uniform Asian complex including East, South and Central Asia, the contribution of E. Feigenbaum is of special importance¹⁴.

A. Priego considers that Afghanistan, which had been previously performing the functions of the isolator, separating the opposing forces,

suddenly became the centre of the new RSC that can be called “South and Central Asia”¹⁵. Sh. Tadjbakhsh also views Central Asia as a separate RSC¹⁶. At the same time, according to K. Nurzhanov, for many centuries Central Asia has evolved as a deeply integrated geopolitical space¹⁷. The troubled decade of the 1990s undoubtedly showed that modern Central Asia is an independent RSC.

CENTRAL ASIA – INDEPENDENT REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

In our opinion, such a separate RSC appeared over the past 30 years after the independence of the Central Asian states as a result of internal transformation of the subcomplex. General historical, ethno-religious, economic and cultural ties and geographical proximity predetermined the emergence of this complex. The countries of the region have significantly strengthened their political and economic independence in comparison with the period after the collapse of the USSR when, under the influence of the Soviet economic complex and close contacts, Central Asia could be viewed as a subcomplex of a wider RSC under Russia.

It is difficult to imagine common important security threats for the countries of Central Asia and the Baltic States, which is certainly important for them within the framework of one RSC, therefore, security ties between the Western group of states and CA also decreased significantly. For example, it is difficult to talk about some serious threats to the security of Central Asia as a result of domestic political upheaval in Moldova in recent years. At the same time, any internal problems of the regional state cause great interest and attract the attention of its neighbours in Central Asia. Even the connection with the Caucasian subcomplex is not so pronounced. The main link between the security of the Caucasus and Central Asia remains the Caspian Sea and the interaction of the Caspian countries, but this issue directly affects only two countries from the five countries in the region (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan with access to this reservoir).

Russia’s continued significant participation in regional security

processes can be explained by its status as a great power in accordance with the theory of the RSC, which does not obey the factor of geography and neighbourhood in security matters. If earlier Russia was the main external player in the region, in our time this role is levelled by China, which attaches increasing importance to Central Asia in its foreign policy, as well as the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the EU, Iran, Turkey and others.

The Central Asian region has all the qualities that shape security:

- the common border of the region, which is determined by the state borders of the countries of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan;
- an anarchic structure that includes two or more autonomous units (states) - the RSC includes five CA states.
- polarity; due to economic potential, demographic and territorial factors, the possession of significant reserves of natural resources in the region stand out two states - Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; Turkmenistan, although it has significant energy resources, does not have a great demographic potential; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, taking into account the smaller number of people, the limited nature of natural resources and the complex mountainous landscape, are just entering the path of sustainable development.
- a social construction that encompasses amity and enmity between countries; in the region it is not easy to clearly distinguish between the models of friendliness or enmity; among the states of Central Asia there are more often models of distrust, rivalry and limited pragmatic cooperation. There are no institutionalised region-wide mechanisms (apart from IFAS and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination), which include regulation of important issues for all countries. It can be explained by the lack of the necessary level of interaction between states and their leaders; a model of contention is traced in the attempts of some countries to promote their energy projects without due regard for the interests of their neighbours. This situation is improving under the influence of new

Uzbek President Sh.Mirziyoyev, but it will take some time to solve very sensitive issues of regional politics.

ROLE OF THE AFGHAN CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIAN RSC

Leaders of regional countries often argue that the conflict over the last 40 years in Afghanistan has a negative impact on virtually all political and economic processes in Central Asia and is potentially one of the main destabilising factors in the region. Afghanistan is seen as a threat to regional security not only by leaders, the political establishment and the expert community for each country, but also by the entire region of Central Asia. After the Taliban takeover in 2021, the perception of Afghanistan did not change much. The leaders of most regional countries established links with the movement with the hope that it will be able to bring long-awaited peace and stability to the country. However, the current realities are not demonstrating many positive results of Taliban governance. The shortcomings in governance, the increasing presence of resistance movements led by some leaders of the former government and the terrorist activity of *Daesh* are undermining the positions of the Taliban. Therefore, the situation in the country is still fragile and is changing quickly.

For a long time, people lived on both sides of the Amu Darya, who had similar customs, traditions and culture. The modern territory of northern Afghanistan and the adjacent regions of southern Uzbekistan was, for a certain period of history, a common cultural, civilizational and economic space. Afghanistan and Central Asia were parts of Greco-Bactrian Kingdom, Kushan Empire, Ghaznavid Empire. Later during the Timurids and the Baburids, contemporary Afghan territory was part of a regional security complex stretching from the northern regions of modern Kazakhstan (the Golden Horde) to the coastal regions of modern India. Afghanistan carried out the function of the isolator after the agreements of the Russian Empire with the Great Britain on the delimitation of spheres of influence and the establishment of a "buffer zone" on the Afghan territory.

However, the destruction of the colonial system after the Second World War, the emergence of Pakistan and India, as well as the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 led to the cancellation of the Russian-British agreement on this region. The security relationship between Central Asia and South Asia has increased through Afghanistan. During the Civil War, armed formations of the armed opposition appeared in Tajikistan. Radical extremist movements from Central Asian countries were based in Afghanistan in 1990s. Their attempts to infiltrate into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s were stopped. However, Afghanistan has become a source of security threats, which actualises the return to the historical structure of the regional security complex.

The urgency of the creation of the RSC is due to the involvement in the zone of the terrorist groups activity of the northern and north-western provinces of Afghanistan, bordering with the Central Asian countries and which previously served as a buffer zone between the unstable southern and central Afghan provinces and Central Asian states. Afghanistan's internal problems also affect its external contacts. The provinces of Afghanistan are increasingly establishing closer relations in the economic and security spheres with the bordering states than with other Afghan regions. The regional security complex of Central Asia is subject to the strong influence of the northern provinces of Afghanistan in comparison with the western and southern regions of the country. At the same time, the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan have close ties in almost all spheres with Pakistan and with the South Asian RSC.

Despite the fact that the theory of the RSC does not imply a line of delineation between the two RSCs within the territory of one country, as well as the simultaneous participation of one country in the two RSCs, in the case of Afghanistan, its specificity should be highlighted. In our opinion, the peculiar border between the RSC of Central Asia and South Asia passes through the central provinces of Afghanistan, while the northern and north-western provinces of the country are closer to the RSC of CA, and the southern and eastern provinces to the RSC of South Asia. Taliban is underlying its interest to become a connecting bridge between Central

and South Asia. However, the implementation of this ideology requires more commitment, hard work and mutual understanding from all the involved countries.

The situation in the Afghan provinces of Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan, which share borders with the Central Asian states, is the determining factor in the perception of threats from Afghanistan by regional countries. All these provinces have established close economic cooperation with the Central Asian countries and actively cooperated with them. Short disruption in trade exchange caused by the Taliban takeover in August 2021 was quickly recovered based on bilateral interest. A significant proportion of the participation of regional states in the construction of socio-economic infrastructure and the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover falls on these Afghan provinces and these regions are predominantly inhabited by ethnic groups with close ties to countries of Central Asia. The natural geographic separator of northern Afghanistan from the rest of the country is the mountain system of Hindukush, which stretches practically through the whole of the central part of the Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Central Asia formed an independent RSC during its evolution in the post-Soviet period. Existing regional issues, external challenges and threats facilitated the shaping of regional cooperation and even confrontation on such sensitive issues as the use of water resources, delimitation of borders, transit transport corridors. Conflict in Afghanistan and its perception as the major regional security threat by Central Asian states was one of the main stimulating sources of the RSC's formation in CA. However, it is not yet possible to assert the complete loss of the function of the insulator by Afghanistan and the completion of its entry into the RSCs of Central and South Asia. Given the ongoing internal conflict in the country and the significant influence of many external forces in intra-Afghan processes, it

is difficult to view Afghanistan as a fully independent consolidated force capable of defining consensual internal and external priorities.

There arises to a certain extent an unclear picture of the prospects for the development of the Central Asian region. Along with the visible increase in the activity of several countries in Central Asia, in the general context there is a slight decrease in interest to the region after the full withdrawal of the Western forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and its transfer to the periphery of the priority areas of international political, trade and economic relations. The current failure of the Taliban governance can have a tangible impact on the prospects of attracting new investments and technologies vital for sustainable development of the region.

After the completion of the stage of strengthening statehood in the region, the countries of Central Asia desperately need external developed partners ready to assist in achieving the regional states' ambitious goals of comprehensive development. Afghanistan should not be left behind after the end of the Western military presence. The external participants in the processes in Central Asia should unite their efforts without getting involved in the zero-sum game in the region in order to establish their spheres of influence. Stability and sustainable development of Central Asia will benefit all neighbouring regions and the international community as a whole.

REFERENCES

1. Bobokulov, Inomjon. (2010) *Mezhdunarodno-pravovyye aspektyi obespecheniya regionalnoy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii: voprosyi teorii i praktiki*. Diss. dokt. yur. nauk. Tashkent, UWED. pp. 25-26
2. Buzan, Barry. (1983) *People, States, and Fear*. Brighton, Wheatsheaf. p. 72
3. Buzan, Barry & Waever, Ole. (2003) *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 93
4. Buzan, Barry. (1983) *op cit.* p. 106
5. Buzan, Barry. & Waever, Ole. (1998) *Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan*. Copenhagen, COPRI Working Paper 23, p. 201.
6. Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, De Wilde, Jaap. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner. p. 107
7. Buzan, Barry & Waever, Ole. (2003) *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 397-436
8. *Ibid.* p. 423
9. *Ibid.* p. 426.

10. *Ibid.* p. 41.
11. *Ibid.* pp. 110-111.
12. Lukin, Artem. (2011) 'Teoriya kompleksov regionalnoy bezopasnosti i Vostochnaya Aziya', *Oykumena*, 2. pp.17-18
13. Voskresenskiy, Alexey. (2006) "Bolshaya Vostochnaya Aziya": mirovaya politika i energeticheskaya bezopasnost .Moscow, Lenand. p.26
14. Feigenbaum, Evan. (2011) 'Why America No Longer Gets Asia'. *The Washington Quarterly*. Spring Issue. pp. 25-43.
15. Priego, Alberto. (2008) 'Pakistan mezhdur regionalnyimi kompleksami bezopasnosti Tsentralnoy i Yuzhnoy Azii', *Central Asia and Caucasus*, Vol. 60, No. 6. pp. 63-83.
16. Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. (2012) 'Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia', *PRIOPaper*, Oslo. pp.3-4
17. Nourzhanov, Kirill. (2009) 'Changing security threat perceptions in Central Asia', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.63, No. 1. p.86

UZBEKISTAN: ENHANCING COOPERATION IN THE REGION AND BEYOND

KAMALA KUMARI

ABSTRACT

Uzbekistan is one of the five countries of Central Asia which became independent in 1991 from erstwhile USSR. Uzbekistan being the most strategically located right in the heart of Central Asia, is the only country to share its border with all the other four countries: Kazakhstan to the northwest and north, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the east and southeast and Turkmenistan to the southwest. Uzbekistan borders Afghanistan in the south. Amongst the five Central Asian countries Uzbekistan is doubly landlocked, yet, by virtue of significant military capabilities and resources, its location at the heart of regional trade and transport networks, largest population, sizeable Uzbek communities in the region and charismatic leadership, is potential regional power in Central Asia.

Today, Uzbekistan under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has entered a new and dynamic phase of development. Uzbekistan appears more open to enhancing the country's relationships within and outside the region. This paper highlights the cooperation and collaboration of Uzbekistan with countries in the region particularly with India and delineates the potential that will help towards the sustainable development of the region.

Key Words: Uzbekistan, Central Asia, India, Regional Cooperation Potential

Uzbekistan and other countries of Central Asia have always been at the crossroads of civilisations. Besides, this region has rich cultural heritage having cultural and religious centres in earlier times, as this region was transit point for various trade routes, where exchange of knowledge, ideas and culture took place apart from trade and commerce.

In contemporary times also, this region holds great importance as the region is quite diverse with abundance of natural resources. Each country has some similarities yet they are different. And despite sharing 70 years of history and politics, Central Asian countries have held on to their own unique identity and considering they became independent in the same year, they have different level of developmental story, as each of them followed their own path and pace of reforms.

The significance of this region is ever growing owing to its geostrategic location and the changing dynamics of geopolitics. Several multilateral arrangements are in place to engage and cooperate with countries in this region and major countries like Russia, US, EU, Korea and Japan, have multilateral cooperation formats in place. In January 2021 first such summit - the 'India- Central Asia' Summit was hosted by India also.

The linkages and the sense of interdependence between these countries and their neighbours have been part of their history and culture which got intricate in recent times due to the security dynamics in the region. The intra-regional cooperation is also changing both in terms of its nature and outlook and Uzbekistan is taking the lead with support of all other countries in the region.

Uzbekistan is moving steadily on the path of development and prosperity. Ever since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, several reforms have been adopted that have led to improvements in several sectors including economy. Apart from doing well on domestic front due to changes brought about with reforms, transparency and openness, Uzbekistan has been very active with regard to improving its relation with its neighbours and working very hard on the issue of regional cooperation and integration. As Uzbekistan shares borders with all other Central Asian countries, any changes in political, economic, or cultural spheres in one country, affect the others directly. Therefore, creating an atmosphere of peace, stability and security around its territory has been the key factor of Uzbekistan's foreign policy apart from the "development and strengthening of friendly and good-neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations"¹ with countries in the region particularly of Central

Asia. Even during the pandemic, Uzbekistan paid special attention in maintaining cooperation with the countries of the region and the world community.

It would not be wrong to say that Uzbekistan has been steady in focussing on regional cooperation and contributing to the sustainable development of Central Asia. And with the initiatives of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev actively supported by the leaders of neighbouring countries, “political dialogue and personal trust between the Presidents have been strengthened and consultative meetings of Central Asian leaders have been set up”.² As a result, the whole region is being viewed as a space with enormous opportunities.

Uzbekistan has been cooperating with neighbouring countries on bilateral and international platforms to address issues such as water sharing and territorial disputes. Uzbekistan’s border disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have almost been resolved. And issues of water sharing and energy security, are being discussed to develop concrete solutions particularly in foreign ministers meetings of all the countries in the region including Russia and China.³

Since 2016 President Mirziyoyev has taken steps “to boost commerce, including suspending foreign exchange controls and opening the economy. He has also sought to augment private-sector growth by targeting privatisation and increased opportunity for small business development particularly stimulating entrepreneurship among young people and women. He has emphasized the need to boost the overall workforce participation rate of women with help of grant from the World Bank. At the same time he has also paved the way for integration with neighbouring countries by striving to settle disputed borders, liberalize trade and tackle transnational issues. Most importantly, the effort it has put along with its neighbours on a sustainable framework to manage Central Asian water resources”.⁴

In the process, the cooperation amongst the Central Asian countries has helped in regional trade and commerce. As a result “the share of Central Asian states in the total foreign trade turnover of Uzbekistan

increased from 12.4% in 2019 to 13.6% in 2020, in which the share of Kazakhstan accounts for 61%, Kyrgyzstan - 18.2%, Turkmenistan - 10.6%, and Tajikistan - 10.2%”.⁵ Uzbekistan’s total trade turnover in 2017-2019, with Central Asian countries increased, by “an average of more than 50% annually and amounted to 5.2 billion dollars, in 2020 it was 5 billion dollars”.⁶

This further helps attracting investments in the region and “during 2017 and 2020, more than 300 agreements, and about \$ 75 billion worth of contracts were signed between Uzbekistan and the countries of the region”.⁷ Besides, there have been several joint measures taken by the leaders of central Asian countries during the Covid 19 pandemic in order to help each other through humanitarian assistance, active partnership and constant communication; the exchange of information and experience in the field of medicine to fight against coronavirus and uninterrupted movement of goods across state borders. Uzbekistan sent humanitarian aid to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. And “in December 2020, with the support of Uzbekistan, an infectious diseases hospital with 200 beds and fully equipped with the necessary medical equipment and furniture was commissioned in Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan’s neighbours particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in response have provided humanitarian assistance to restore the Sardoba Reservoir”.⁸

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, together with the United States, “launched the ‘Central Asia Investment Partnership’ in January 2021, to attract at least \$ 1 billion over five years to support projects that advance private-sector-led growth and increase economic connectivity within Central Asia and the broader region. Working through the C5+1 platform, the initiative will seek to take advantage of opportunities for increasing trade, development, and connectivity to make each country in Central Asia stronger and more prosperous”.⁹

President Mirziyoyev in his address to the Parliament regarding the State Program for 2021, paid special attention to strengthening good neighbourly relations with Central Asia countries creating “favourable conditions for the development of trade and economic relations and the

growth of trade turnover, strengthening cooperation; and ensuring the effective use of transit and logistics potential of the region and the development of transport infrastructure; intensification of cooperation between the regions (including border areas) of Central Asia. Uzbekistan is also keen to strengthen its relations with Central Asian states through multilateral cooperation mechanisms, including the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Turkic Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other structures by improving not only political and diplomatic relations but also economic, inter-parliamentary and public diplomacy".¹⁰

However, this region faces some serious challenges and issues like water, border dispute, refugee issues, and drug trafficking. Other local factors facing the Central Asian region range from creating a national identity to coping with the ongoing political, economic, and military reforms. Besides, issues like efficiency or inefficiency of security services etc. become a factor in defending against Islamist insurgencies, religious extremism, jihadi activities, drug-trafficking and drug crime etc.

The Central Asian countries apart from the broader regional issues have their own specificities in terms of existing challenges and capability to deal with such challenges. Uzbekistan so far under President Mirziyoyev has taken the lead and has been able to solve the border issue with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. As reported, the "Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was usually crossed by 200-300 people a day, on the eve of the global pandemic, this figure reached 30 thousand a day, and the Uzbek-Tajik border was crossed by 20 thousand citizens a day". There is some understanding with regard to water sharing as well.¹¹

However, the most pressing issue is the Afghan problem, as the implications of the possible spill-over could be manifold and can pose a serious security challenge not only to the three bordering countries but to the entire region of Central Asia. As, a transition economy, unemployment, drug trade, illicit weapons are some factors that further add to the challenge and contribute to instability. And since, no proper security

arrangement is in place other than CSTO, which is only a mechanism for security, the situation becomes more complex. Therefore, the implications of the ongoing developments in Afghanistan, need immediate attention.

THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE

Peace and stability in Afghanistan is an issue which affects not only its neighbours, but also influences the regional and global security as a whole. Central Asian governments are seriously concerned about the developments in neighbouring Afghanistan. This is mainly because “they perceive political Islam as a threat to their national secular institutions. Uzbekistan has always pursued a good neighbourly and friendly policy towards Afghanistan. Given its rich historical ties and experience, Uzbekistan builds its relations with Afghanistan on bilateral basis taking into consideration the national interests of both countries and respecting Afghanistan’s choice for its people and the future of their country”.¹²

Uzbekistan, as a close neighbour, has supported the Afghan initiatives by participating in the implementation of concrete projects on peace-building, reconstruction of the economy of the country destroyed by years of war. Uzbekistan has also helped in building the motorway bridges and automobile roads on the territory of Afghanistan. Besides, Uzbekistan has been providing electricity from the electricity power line ‘Khairaton-Puli-Humri-Kabul’ to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has also joined Uzbekistan’s fiber-optical communication line. The “railroad route ‘Khairation-Mazari-Shareef’ built by the Uzbek specialists, has been functioning since 2011. The further construction of the rail link section from ‘Mazari-Shareef-Shibergan’ shall pave the way for implementing the Trans-Afghan transport corridor project which will ensure the shortest route for the transit of goods from Central Asia to seaport”.¹³ For the future of this region, all these are of great significance.

It may be emphasized that Uzbekistan is aware that peace and stability in Afghanistan are crucial to regional and global security. Out of

the three neighbouring countries in the north, Uzbekistan has been the most active and has vibrant relations with Afghanistan, although it shares only a short 137 km border with that country and there are just few million Uzbeks on the Afghan side of the border. Hence, the role of Uzbekistan has become significant.

Even in the post-August 2021 scenario, Uzbekistan has been very forthcoming in its approach towards Afghanistan. Apart from giving humanitarian aid, Uzbekistan has also been vocal about engaging with Taliban at different levels instead of marginalisation of Taliban. Abdusamat Khaydarov sums it up when he says, “it is necessary to interact with the Taliban without recognising the regime. Development activity is necessary, therefore, engagement with the Taliban should be undertaken for developmental purposes so as to not let an isolated Afghanistan become a rogue state”.¹⁴

And as noted by Aziz Vasikovich Rasulov, a stable and peaceful Afghanistan has the prospect to open huge opportunities for solving critical problems of sustainable social and economic development of all nations and peoples living in Central Asia,¹⁵ and the region as a whole. Uzbekistan’s effort in this regard has the potential to position it as a regional leader in Central Asia, contributing to the overall stability and development of the region.

In this endeavour, India’s partnership with Uzbekistan could go a long way. As of now Uzbekistan’s relations with India have been going steady. Before moving further it is important to look at India-Uzbekistan relations in order to understand the synergy between the two.

INDIA-UZBEKISTAN RELATIONS

India and Uzbekistan share long and traditionally strong economic, social, political, cultural and spiritual ties, which have further intensified in recent times giving a new momentum to this relations. Besides, the historical as well as cultural relevance, there has been cooperation in several spheres. The strategic, political, security and

economic significance of India-Uzbekistan relation is immense; especially, security concerns related to political instability in Afghanistan and its impact on both India and Uzbekistan. India and Uzbekistan have been working very hard to engage and expand their relations in the region, so as to play a more robust role in the peaceful and sustainable development of the region.

The background to this goes back to 2005-2006, when Uzbek President Islam Karimov visited India in April 2005 and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Tashkent, Uzbekistan on April 25-26, 2006 on a two-day state visit and this marked a new chapter in India-Uzbek relations. This was the second visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Uzbekistan since Uzbekistan's independence in August 1991. Later on in 2011 during Uzbek President Islam Karimov's visit to India, a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed, expanding "the opportunities for boosting the cooperation across a broad spectrum of dimensions, including all aspects of political, economic, cultural-humanitarian spheres, which the two sides consider mutually advantageous".¹⁶

Later on PM Modi visited Tashkent in July 2015 and June 2016 and President Mirziyoyev's visit to India in October 2018 and in January 2019 further deepened the relations.

The bilateral relation now "encompasses a wider canvas, including political and strategic issues, defence and security, trade and investment, energy, agriculture, Science and Technology, education and people-to-people ties".¹⁷ Today India-Uzbekistan relation has developed into a strategic partnership.

INDIA-UZBEKISTAN COOPERATIVE STRATEGY

Both countries are working hard towards a cooperative strategy, as issues and challenges facing the region are common and the core concern of both countries are more or less similar, be it the Afghan issue or terrorism, extremism, environmental, security issues or geopolitical matters. Both countries share the same view. Both are a power in their region and would

like to play more important role for the peace and sustainable development of the region.

Uzbekistan's vision for peaceful settlement of Afghan issue is worth a mention. However, Uzbekistan understands that, "Uzbekistan's efforts alone would not be enough to meet this challenge. The Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, made a tour to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, soliciting the support of Uzbekistan's neighbours".¹⁸ India also is of the opinion that Afghanistan issue should be resolved peacefully at the earliest and all like-minded countries should cooperate. India and Uzbekistan also work together being part of SCO.

Several agreements of cooperation between India and Uzbekistan were signed during Uzbek President's visit in 2018. Several agreements signed included State/Region Agreements like Agreements on establishment of cooperation between Andijan region and the State of Gujarat and between the cities of Samarkand and Agra. Other agreements signed were in health, scientific-technical and innovation fields, agriculture, tourism; cooperation in combating illicit trafficking narcotic drugs and exploration and uses of space for peaceful purposes; and a MoU on cooperation in military education, in law and justice and pharmaceuticals sector; and a programme of cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign affairs and others.¹⁹

Besides, there are several bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in place as well to engage with each other. For example, India and Uzbekistan have set up National Coordination Committees to oversee the implementation of mutually agreed projects and initiatives. "The Committee is led by MOS(VM) on the Indian side and comprises senior MEA officials and a representative from Government of Gujarat. On the Uzbek side, it is led by Sardor Umurzakov, Deputy Prime Minister for Investments and Foreign Economic Affairs-Minister of Investments and Foreign Trade (MIFT) and includes First Deputy Foreign Minister, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI), and senior officials from MIFT and Andijan. Several meetings have taken place since the first meeting of the Committee took place on 24 August 2020. Both

sides reviewed projects through grant assistance, LOC and private investment proposals along with other aspects of bilateral cooperation in trade, investment and education fields".²⁰

Then there is the Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC) and the Foreign Office Consultations. Besides, the Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism has been conducting meetings. Several areas for training and capacity building in the field of law enforcement and counter terrorism operations were sought by the Uzbek side.²¹

There is the India-Central Asia Business Council, in which business council of all five Central Asian countries take part to take the trade and investment partnership forward with special focus on energy, pharmaceuticals, automotive, agro-processing, education, urban infrastructure and transport, civil aviation, IT and tourism. The India-Central Asia Dialogue is another platform where all Central Asian countries participate with India on one platform.²²

In the defence sector also, the cooperation has acquired a new level of intensity and regular defence cooperation is carried out, for example the first-ever Defence-Industry Workshop was organised in Tashkent in September 2019 and the second was organised in November 2020 respectively during which representatives from public and private sector defence companies participated²³; as part of defence industrial cooperation, India has "offered a concessional line of credit of USD 40 million for procurement of goods and services by Uzbekistan from India"²⁴; there are also joint training of special forces, India conducts training capsules in military engineering for Uzbeks. There are exchanges between air forces for assistance. India has assisted in setting up an India Room at the Armed Forces Academy of Uzbekistan in Tashkent apart from the development of Qarshi Aviation School in Uzbekistan. There is an MoU for cooperation in training and capacity building²⁵; MoU on Military Medicine was signed during Raksha Mantri's visit, to Uzbekistan in November 2019. During this visit Raksha Mantri also inaugurated the first-ever joint military exercise between India and Uzbekistan which was conducted from 4-14 November 2019.²⁶ The latest edition of the joint

military exercise 'Dustlik' was conducted from 20 February to 5 March 2023 in Pithoragarh, Uttarakhand, India.

India and Uzbekistan share common perspectives on a number of non traditional security issues, including on terrorism, trans-national organized crime, illegal trafficking and smuggling, etc. and cooperate both at bilateral and multilateral level. As India has expertise and experience on most of these issues, it provides assistance to Uzbek security agencies through training and capacity building.

Keeping these cooperative bilateral engagements in mind "Uzbekistan's opinion has been that role of India in the region has been constructive and a respectful cooperation. Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan Mr. Abdulaziz Kamilov during the Raisina Dialogue 2020 had noted that, Countries of Central Asia share warm relation with India and it is very cordial with positive dynamics and without political contradiction and discord".²⁷

Both India and Uzbekistan discuss these issues quite frequently and at highest level. During the Virtual Summit "between PM Narendra Modi and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev which was held on 11 December 2020, both sides discussed bilateral issues including in the fields of politics, development cooperation, security, space, education, development projects and regional issues including Afghanistan".²⁸ And both leaders discuss these issues on regular basis on the sidelines of different summits and meetings. Uzbekistan and India also cooperate in connectivity projects.

The potential for cooperation and collaboration that will help in working towards the sustainable development of the region is huge. To mention a few: i) Agriculture- Ambassador Manish Prabhat & Uzbek Minister of Agriculture Jamshid Hodjaev discussed ways to strengthen cooperation in agriculture especially in precision farming, use of satellite and modern technology, exchange of experience. Earlier in 2019, India and Uzbekistan agreed to create an agro-cluster. The goal of this partnership was to introduce innovative technologies, advanced agro-technical methods in agriculture of the country; ii) Pharma Sector- Ambassador Shri Manish Prabhat and Uzbek Director of Agency on Dvt

of Pharma Industry Sardor Kariev discussed ways for strengthening cooperation in pharma sector between India and Uzbekistan, December 16, 2020; iii) Health-Ambassador Manish Prabhat & Uzbek Minister of Health Abdukhakim Khadjibaev discussed areas of cooperation including cooperation during COVID pandemic, investment in healthcare, pharma exports from India, traditional medicines etc. 660,000 doses of 'Made in India' COVID-19 vaccines arrived in Uzbekistan, by 17 March 2021; iv) IT communications-Ambassador Manish Prabhat met Shuhrat Sadikov, Minister for Development of IT and Communications of Uzbekistan, 29 April 2021;v) Transport and Connectivity-Ambassador of India Manish Prabhat met with Minister of Transport of Uzbekistan Ilkhom Makhkamov, January 18, 2021.²⁹

Apart from this, Uzbekistan invited India for a major International high-level conference, 'Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity - Challenges and Opportunities' which was held on 15-16 July 2021 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. India's Foreign Minister S Jaishankar attended the conference where he made a speech and also had several meetings on the side lines. In his address at the conference, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed "an initiative to strengthen regional connectivity in the context of the dynamic foreign policy strategy of Tashkent and India will play a key role in that strategy".³⁰

This sets in motion the cooperative strategy for the region. In this regard several meetings have taken place at diplomatic level and with the dynamic and dedicated leadership of both countries there is potential for building stronger partnership and closer relations in the peaceful and sustainable development of the region.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Connectivity projects will play very constructive role in the region in dealing with unemployment, economic, social and other related developmental issues. Several proposed transport corridors have been promoted, including the International North South Transport Corridor

(INSTC) in which India, Russia, and Iran are founding members. This corridor is adjacent to the Central Asian transport infrastructure and is suitable for the development of cooperation with India. The other connectivity project like the Ashgabat Agreement in which now India is a member, aims to implement a transport corridor project that also has the potential to link Central and South Asia. Uzbekistan has shown interest in joining the INSTC and discussions are on about India joining the Trans-Afghan corridor project.

The development of the Chabahar port by India, which opens the way to the Indian sub-continent, will be another game changer for Afghanistan and the region. The Lapis Lazuli corridor, is another potential project for prosperity of Afghanistan and as a result help in the sustainable development of the region. In fact, the initiative to strengthen regional interconnectivity was proposed by President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, as part of "Tashkent's new foreign policy strategy aimed at turning Central Asia into a region of security, stability and sustainable development, one that is integrated into the world economy".³¹

Ambassador Dilshod Akhatov, Uzbekistan's Ambassador to India, "highlighted the importance of expanding the economic agenda and deepening cooperation between Central and South Asia countries and how India one of the key actor in the region. He also talked about the joint effort required for ensuring food security in the region and consolidation of efforts in the fight against common challenges and threats to stability and security".³²

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion it can said, that the dynamic leadership of Uzbekistan has been working very hard to make the country a regional power. Several initiatives have been taken in this regard. These initiatives are indicative of the fact that Uzbekistan has given regional cooperation and integration a priority in its foreign policy.

In this regard India-Uzbekistan relations could go a long way. India and Uzbekistan have been linked since centuries and the historical as well as cultural relevance of this relation is huge. Further intensification of bilateral ties, in recent times have given a new momentum to this relation.

Uzbekistan and India's partnership is based on mutual interest and both countries are dedicated in pursuing a cooperative strategy for the region and this partnership has already started to show positive result as many collaborative projects are been carried out in this regard. The immense potential will further pave way for more cooperation and collaboration and peace and development of the region. The economic integration through connectivity and developmental projects is just beginning.

REFERENCES

*(All internet sources accessed between September - October 2023 or otherwise mentioned)

1. https://www.gov.uz/en/activity_page/foreign_policy/
2. Central Asia- priority of foreign policy of Uzbekistan, 15/07/2020, <https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/58469>
3. Pravesh Kumar Gupta, "Deconstructing regional cooperation in Central Asia and the role of Uzbekistan", June 2, 2023, <https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/deconstructing-regional-cooperation-in-central-asia-and-the-role-of-uzbekistan/3111617/>
4. Nathan Hutson, Marsha McGraw Olive, China will play a decisive role in anointing Central Asia's leader, Feb 8, 2021, <https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-uzbekistan-rising-as-central-asian-integration-catalyst>
5. Kutbitdinov, Yu. (2021, January 26). Central Asia is the priority of the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. <https://review.uz/post/centralnaya-aziya-v-prioritete-vneshney-politiki-uzbekistana>
6. State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on statistics, (2020, January 22), Foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://stat.uz/images/uploads/docs/tashqi_savdo_uz_22012021.pdf
7. Qodirov, A. (2020, July 29). Key foreign policy priorities of a renewed Uzbekistan, Institute of strategic and regional studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. <http://www.isrs.uz/en/maqolalar/klucevye-prioritety-vnesnej-politiki-obnovlennogo-uzbekistana>
8. <https://mift.uz/en/news/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-of-america-the-republic-of-uzbekistan-and-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-on-the-announcement->

- of-the-central-asia-investment-partnership
9. Joint Statement of the United States of America, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Announcement of the Central Asia Investment Partnership. <https://mift.uz/en/news/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-of-america-the-republic-of-uzbekistan-and-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-on-the-announcement-of-the-central-asia-investment-partnership>
 10. Central Asia- priority of foreign policy of Uzbekistan, 15/07/2020, <https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/58469>
 11. CentralAsia-Priority of Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan, 15/07/2020, <https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/58469>
 12. <http://www.uzbekistan.org.sg/press.php?pid=428>
 13. <http://www.uzbekistan.be/press-releases/29-2012.html>
 14. Abdusamat Khaydarov is former Ambassador and presently a professor at the Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Tashkent. Abdusamat Khaydarov, Uzbekistan, at the ICAF International seminar on, "Understanding Central Asian Perspectives on Eurasia", on 13 April 2023
 15. Aziz Vasikovich Rasulov, "Uzbek Perspectives on the Afghan Connundrum", in Nirmala Joshi, *Enhancing India Central Asia Engagement: Prospects and Issues*, Vij Books India Pvt. Lmt., New Delhi, 2014, p76-77
 16. <https://www.uzbekembassy.in/uzbek-indian-relations/>.
 17. https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan_September_2022.pdf.
 18. Yuri M Yarmolinsky, "Changing dynamics in Central and South Asia: The role of Uzbekistan", July 1 2021, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/changing-dynamics-in-central-and-south-asia-the-role-of-uzbekistan/> Accessed on August 11 2021
 19. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30452/List_of_Documents_signed_between_India_and_the_Republic_of_Uzbekistan_during_the_State_Visit_of_President_of_Uzbekistan_to_India
 20. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-zbekistan_September_2022.pdf
 21. MEA document 2023, <https://www.mea.gov.in/>; https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan_September_2022.pdf
 22. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan_September_2022.pdf
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1590146>
 25. https://meacms.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan_22-7-2021.pdf
 26. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan_September_2022.pdf.
 27. Raisina Dialogue 2020, January 14-16, 2020. Delhi.
 28. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan_September_2022.pdf
 29. Uzbek Embassy India, Doc., <http://www.uzbekembassy.in/india-and-Uzbekistan-are-expanding-innovative-cooperation-in-agricultural-and-pharmaceutical-sectors/>. Accessed on August 11 2021
 30. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "Proposed Uzbekistan- India Regional Connectivity:

- Opportunities Galore”, Jul 15, 2021, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/proposed-uzbekistan-india-regional-connectivity-opportunities-galore/articleshow/84430224.cms?from=mdr>. Accessed on August 11 2021
31. Japan Times, June 24, 2021, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/2021/06/24/special-supplements/interconnectivity-central-south-asia/>. Accessed on August 11 2021
32. Ashoke Raj, New Delhi, August 1 (ANI): <https://in.news.yahoo.com/expand-economic-agenda-deepen-cooperation-152237627.html>. Accessed on August 11 2021

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES is a quarterly Journal published by the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, which is a non-governmental, non-profit research, cultural and development facilitative organisation. The Journal is devoted to the study of various issues pertaining to the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, connected with its environment, resources, history, art and culture, language and literature, demography, social structures, communication, tourism, regional development, governance, human rights, geopolitics etc.

While the principal concern of the Journal is on its focal area, i.e., from Afghanistan to Myanmar including the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, China, Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan and the Indian Himalayan States of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand and North East states; papers with a broad sweep addressing environmental, social, cultural, economic, geopolitical and human rights issues are also welcomed.

The objective is to make a scientific appraisal of the issues confronting the Himalayan and adjoining region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof, and to make specific policy oriented studies and need based recommendations as the means to promote the human, educational and economic advancement of the peoples of the region besides preserving and enriching their ethno-cultural, literary and historical heritage. Promotion of human rights, social justice, peace, harmony and national integration are the other key areas in which the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation has been active.

**CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PUBLICATION AND ANY ENQUIRIES
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO:**

Prof. K. WARIKOO

Editor and Secretary General

Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation

B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave

New Delhi - 110029 (India)

Tel. : 0091-11-26742763, 0091-11-41651969

Fax : 0091-11-26742843

E-mail: kwarikoo@gmail.com

Website: www.himalayanresearch.org

Books for review should be sent to the same address.

HRCF PUBLICATIONS

- Afghanistan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1994, 73pp.)
- Society and Culture in the Himalayas**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995, 316pp.)
- Central Asia : Emerging New Order**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995, 352pp.)
- Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh : Linguistic Predicament**
Edited by P. N. Pushp and K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1996, 224pp.)
- Artisan of the Paradise : A Study of Art and Artisans of Kashmir**
By D.N. Dhar (New Delhi, 1999, 230pp.)
- Gujjars of Jammu and Kashmir**
Edited by K. Warikoo (Bhopal, 2001, 317pp.)
- Bamiyan: Challenge to World Heritage**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002, xviii, 313 pp., 61 plates.)
- The Afghanistan Crisis : Issues and Perspectives**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002, xxvi, 523pp.)
- Mongolia-India Relations**
By O. Nyamdasavaa (New Delhi, 2003, 278pp.)
- Child Labour Rehabilitation in India**
Edited by B. Zutshi and M. Dutta (New Delhi, 2003, 257pp.)
- Mongolia-China Relations**
By Sharad K. Sori (New Delhi, 2006, xix, 378pp.)
- Afghanistan: The Challenge**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2007, 377pp.)
- Drugs Production and Trafficking in Afghanistan**
By Deepali Gaur Singh (New Delhi, 2007, 360pp.)
- Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities (Set of 3 vols.)**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2007)
- L. Berzeneczy, Adventures in Central Asia: A Hungarian in the Great Game**
Edited by P. J. Marzall (New Delhi, 2007)
- Cultural Heritage of Jammu and Kashmir**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2009, 338pp.)
- Cultural Heritage of Kashmiri Pandits**
Edited by S.S. Toshkhara and K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2009, xxviii, 365pp.)
- Mongolia in the 21st Century**
Edited by K. Warikoo and S.K. Sori (New Delhi, 2010, ix, 374pp.)
- Central Asia and South Asia: Energy Cooperation and Transport Linkages**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2011, 293pp.)
- Tajikistan in the 21st Century**
Edited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2015, 300pp.)
- Democratisation Process in Afghanistan**
by Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan (New Delhi, 2019, 259pp.)



HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION

B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029 (India)

Tele: 0091-11-41651969

E-mail: kwarikoo@gmail.com Website: www.himalayanresearch.org